Concept
Unenforceable Modifications
Statute of Frauds and oral modification
Unenforceable Modifications
When the Statute of Frauds defeats an oral modification, the dispute is only half resolved. The parties made a first contract, tried to change it, and failed, so a court must still say what binds them. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 149(2) answers in two parts: where the second contract is unenforceable by virtue of the Statute of Frauds and there has been no material change of position in reliance on it, the prior contract is not modified.1 The first part is a default: the original terms continue. The second is a qualifier: the default holds only if no one has materially changed position because of the oral change.
Original Terms Survive
A court asked to enforce a failed modification declines, and it then enforces the first contract, so the terms of the signed writing control performance. This is the first condition of § 149(2): the modification fails under the statute.2 The reliance condition is taken up in the next subsection.
The rule is short because of how a modification works. It replaces some terms of an existing contract with new ones, and a replacement that a court will not enforce has no effect on the terms it was meant to replace. The court is not choosing between two rival contracts. It is declining to honor one attempted swap of terms, and everything the parties had before the swap stays where it was.
The failed modification also does not rescind the original contract. Rescission is an agreement to discharge the duties on both sides, whereas the parties to a modification agree to keep the contract alive and adjust it. They meant to alter their deal, so when the alteration cannot be enforced, the thing they meant to alter is what remains. Treating the original as intact keeps the signed writing as the baseline that both sides and the court can rely on. Two errors tempt readers here: concluding that the whole bargain collapses because the change failed, and concluding that the oral price controls because both parties agreed to it. Section 149(2) supports neither.
The conversation was identical in the two scenes, and the seller's signature was the only fact that moved the answer. Sufficiency of the writing is tested against the party to be charged, which for a price cut that the buyer wants to hold the seller to means the seller's signature.
Sales of goods follow the same pattern, because UCC § 2-209(3) applies the as-modified test to the contract for goods. In the standard illustration, A agrees in writing to sell goods to B for $1,500, with delivery in ten days, and the parties orally agree to extend delivery by twenty days. That is an ineffective oral modification, so the written ten-day term is the one that governs unless someone relies on the extension.3 A later section of this chapter takes up the Code in detail.
The Reliance Qualifier
The default has a limit built into the same sentence of § 149(2): the prior contract is left unmodified only where there has been no material change of position in reliance on the unenforceable second contract.5 The default protects a party who has only talked. Once a party has materially changed position because of the oral change, the section no longer directs that the prior contract stays unmodified, so a court is not bound to hold the parties to the original terms as though nothing had been said. The text goes no further than that. It does not say the oral change becomes fully enforceable, and it does not say the original terms disappear.
The reason for the qualifier follows from what the default would otherwise do. A party who gives up something real because the other side agreed to new terms would bear a concrete loss if the other side could then invoke the statute and snap the contract back to its written terms. The loss would trace to the other side's own promise, and the statute would reward the party who made it. The word material keeps the qualifier narrow. If any claim of reliance sufficed, every party to a modified contract could say it had relied, and the writing requirement would mean little for modifications.
Reliance does comparable work elsewhere in contract law. Section 89(c) of the Restatement (Second) treats reliance on a promised modification as another basis for enforcing the modifying agreement without fresh consideration.6 That provision removes a different obstacle, the want of consideration, but it rests on the same intuition. The pattern also appears with offers: mere preparation to perform does not make an offer irrevocable under Section 45, yet under promissory estoppel preparation may.7 In each setting a formal limit gives way when a party has acted on a promise in a way that makes reversal unfair.
The two buyers heard the same promise, and what separated them was what each did next. Readiness to perform on the new terms is not a change of position, since a party who has merely planned around the change can undo the plan at no cost. The qualifier asks whether the party has done something that cannot be undone without loss.
The goods illustration shows the same split. If A and B orally extend delivery by twenty days, and A relies on the extension by actually holding the goods for those twenty days, B has waived the original delivery date.8 Reliance on an oral waiver or excusal is governed by § 150, which provides that where the parties to an enforceable contract subsequently agree that all or part of a duty need not be performed or that a condition need not occur, the Statute of Frauds does not prevent enforcement of the subsequent agreement if reinstating the original terms would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on it.9 The next section develops that rule.