Concept
Infancy
Incapacity to contract
Infancy
A minor's contract exists, binds the adult, and can be undone by the minor. That is the working meaning of infancy, a status category the Restatement lists among the exceptions to full capacity.1 Under § 14, a person below the age line incurs only voidable contractual duties,2 so the minor holds an election to avoid, while the adult cannot avoid on the ground of the minor's age.3
The rule rests on a presumption that minors are too immature or inexperienced to bargain effectively with adults.4 It lets them undo improvident contracts with adults who would take advantage of them in the marketplace.5 The protection has a price: a minor cannot give legal assurance that a contract will stand, so adults frequently refuse to deal with minors at all.6 The sections below follow a minor's contract from signing to resolution. They ask where the age line falls, how the minor avoids or ratifies, what each side returns, what a lie about age changes, which obligations survive avoidance, and how statutes and emancipation alter the default.
Age of Majority
Section 14 draws the line: unless a statute provides otherwise, a natural person incurs only voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the day before the eighteenth birthday.7 Lawyers call anyone below that line an infant, an old term of art that survives in the digests and texts, so a seventeen-year-old buyer is an infant for purposes of capacity.8 The earlier discussion of voidable contracts carries over without change: the infant's agreement exists, and only the infant may elect to avoid it.
Eighteen is a default, not a constant. At common law a person remained an infant until twenty-one, and legislation enacted mostly in the 1970s lowered the age of majority to eighteen in most jurisdictions.9 As of 2022, forty-six states had set eighteen by statute, three had set nineteen, and Mississippi kept twenty-one.10 Because § 14 yields to statute, a problem that names no statute calls for eighteen, and a problem that supplies a statutory age calls for that age. Twenty-one is the trap: it is the old rule, and it no longer governs in nearly every state.
The age rule looks at age and nothing else. A minor may disaffirm even if the minor fully understood the transaction or planned to use the goods in a business venture, and it makes no difference that the other party was barely an adult, dealt on fair terms, or exploited no one.11 A fixed line spares courts and parties a contest over each young person's maturity, argued after the fact, and lets both sides check a birth date before they sign. The price is that the line misfits some people at its edges: a worldly seventeen-year-old may avoid a bargain that a sensible adult would keep, and a naive eighteen-year-old is bound. The mental illness tests that follow take the opposite approach and ask what this person understood about this transaction.
The age rule reaches every kind of contract, including agreements formed over the Internet, unless a state statute gives minors over a stated age capacity for specific transactions.12 A seventeen-year-old who accepts a click-through agreement can avoid it as readily as one who signs on paper. Some states also enforce particular infants' contracts, such as those of children employed in the entertainment industry, usually after court approval, and public policy supports enforcing others, such as an infant parent's promise to support the infant's own child.13
The second feature of § 14 is the way it counts. Infancy ends at the very first moment of the day before the eighteenth birthday, following the maxim that the law often disregards fractions of a day.14 Treating the day as a single unit keeps the question on the calendar and away from the hour of birth, which the parties rarely know. A person born on September 14, 2013 stops being an infant after midnight on the morning of September 13, 2031.15 A contract signed on September 12, 2031 is voidable at that person's election, and the same contract signed on September 13 binds in full, though the eighteenth birthday is still a day away. A problem that gives a birth date and a signing date one day apart is testing this count.
Two cautions follow from step 4. Passing the line ends only the infancy ground, so a signer past it can still fall within the guardianship, mental illness, or intoxication categories taught later. And a contract made during infancy does not become binding merely because majority arrives, since the former infant keeps a reasonable time after majority in which to disaffirm.16
Disaffirmance and Ratification
A voidable contract is one in which a party may, by manifesting an election, avoid the legal relations the contract created, or may extinguish that power by ratifying the contract.18 For a minor, exercising the power is called disaffirmance and surrendering it is called ratification.19 This section follows the election to each ending: when the minor may still disaffirm, what disaffirmance requires, how much of the contract it reaches, and what ratifies.
A minor may disaffirm at any time before ratification,20 which means during minority or within a reasonable time after reaching majority.21 The window runs past the eighteenth birthday because of what ratification requires. A minor lacks capacity to be bound and so lacks capacity to ratify, and a purported ratification before majority carries the same voidability as the contract itself.22 If the election could end only by ratification, and ratification cannot validly occur until adulthood, the election must stay open until the former minor can decide with full capacity. For the same reason, nothing the minor does before majority, including full performance of the contract, waives the right to disaffirm.23
Conveyances of real property are the exception to the clear rule that a disaffirmance may be made during infancy.24 Once made, a disaffirmance is irrevocable.25 Irrevocability follows from what avoidance does: it undoes the legal relations the contract created, so a minor who has undone them cannot revive them by changing course, and the adult may treat the matter as closed.
No particular form is required. Any manifestation of unwillingness to be bound by the transaction suffices, and it may be oral.26 Other formulations ask for an act or declaration disclosing an unequivocal intent to repudiate.27 Often the first manifestation is a plea of infancy raised as a defense when the adult sues, or an action the minor brings to set the transaction aside.28 A minor cannot be expected to know legal procedure, and a formal-notice requirement would let the adult defeat the protection by pointing to a missing step.
The election reaches the whole contract. A minor who disaffirms must disaffirm the entire agreement and cannot keep the favorable provisions while rejecting the burdensome ones.29 Avoidance unwinds the legal relations the contract created, so the law offers a choice between the contract as made and no contract at all. A partial disaffirmance would give the minor a better deal than either side agreed to, with the adult bound on one side and free on the other. In E.K.D. v. Facebook, Inc., a minor who kept using the social network while trying to avoid its forum-selection clause lost for that reason: he could not disaffirm only the part that did not suit him while continuing to receive performance.30
The bar is narrow. It applies only to continuing benefits the minor seeks to retain while disaffirming other parts of the contract, and as a general rule a minor need not restore the value of services used before disaffirmance.31 Disputes over online services, such as T.K. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., test the same distinction between benefits a minor keeps taking and benefits already used.
Ratification is the opposite ending. It extinguishes the power to avoid and leaves an ordinary binding contract. It occurs in three ways: failure to make a timely disaffirmance, express ratification, and conduct manifesting an intent to ratify, and no consideration is required to make it effective.33 Each route must operate after majority, because a purported ratification during minority suffers from the same infirmity as the contract.34 The contract already rests on its original exchange, so ratification adds no new promise; it only removes the option to undo what was made.
Express ratification is the plain case: after reaching majority, the former minor says or signs something confirming the contract. Ratification by conduct turns on whether what the former minor does as an adult manifests an intent to be bound, as when the person keeps performing or accepting benefits after the eighteenth birthday. Only adult behavior counts.
The third route requires no word or act. Failure to disaffirm within a reasonable time after reaching majority is a ratification by default.35 What counts as a reasonable time is often a question of fact that depends on whether either or both parties have performed, the nature of the transaction, and the extent to which delay has prejudiced the other party.36 The limit exists because the adult cannot plan around a bargain the other side may undo whenever it likes. Once majority arrives the former minor can decide with full capacity, so the law allows a fair period to decide and then lets silence settle the question.
Some decisions draw a firm line between executed and executory contracts. An executed contract is automatically ratified if not disaffirmed within a reasonable time after majority, while an executory contract does not bind unless the former minor ratifies it by words or conduct.37 The line carries over the older view that an infant's executory contract is void and not voidable, and courts do not apply it when the former minor's failure to disaffirm would work injustice on the other party.38 Mention it as a tendency, and keep the reasonable-time factors as the working test.
The adult plays no part in any of this. The power of avoidance resides in the infant or in the infant's heirs, administrators, or executors, and the adult stays bound until the minor disaffirms or ratifies.39 The adult's protection comes from the limits on the minor's power: the reasonable-time rule, the whole-contract requirement, and the effect of ratification.
Restoring Benefits After Disaffirmance
Avoiding a contract undoes the legal relations it created,41 and that raises a practical question: what does each side hand back? Title supplies the first answer. On disaffirmance, title to property the minor received revests in the party from whom it was obtained, and title to property the minor transferred revests in the minor, unless the property has been resold to a good-faith purchaser for value.42 Each side takes back what it gave, and the contract's promises drop out.
Property the minor has consumed or destroyed is the harder case, because nothing remains to revest. Under the general rule the minor may still disaffirm and owes no contractual obligation, even though the property received has been consumed or destroyed.43 The rule takes this shape because of what the protection is for. Courts justify the doctrine as a safeguard against improvident contracts with adults who would take advantage of minors in the marketplace,44 and a minor who has struck an improvident bargain is often the one who has spent the money or used up the goods. If disaffirmance required the minor to make the adult whole for whatever was squandered, the minor would pay out of pocket for the very improvidence the rule forgives. So the minor returns what remains, and the adult who chose to deal with a minor bears the loss on the rest. Services follow the same logic: as a general rule a minor need not restore the value of services used before disaffirmance.45
That result is the baseline, and a minority of jurisdictions alter it when the minor keeps and uses an article before disaffirming. In Olshen v. Kaufman, a case about a spendthrift's contract that drew on infancy law by analogy, the court stated the compensation rule this way: a minor who buys a motorcycle or an automobile, disaffirms on reaching majority, returns the property, and sues to recover the price may not recover the amount paid without allowing the seller reasonable compensation for the use and depreciation of the article.46 Other minority rules take two forms. One holds the minor to the extent of the benefit actually derived from what the minor received, and the other deducts from the minor's recovery of the full price for the minor's use of the article or for its depreciation or deterioration.47 Some jurisdictions go further and hold the minor liable in restitution, meaning payment measured by value received, and not on the contract, for the fair value of property that cannot be returned and for services or other benefits received.48
The compensation formulation carries its own limits. The seller may deduct reasonable compensation for use, depreciation, and willful or negligent damage, but the rule does not apply if the seller defrauded or imposed on the minor, if the contract is unfair, or if any unfair advantage was taken to induce the purchase.49 A rule that refunded the full price after a season of use would leave a fair-dealing seller with a worn article and the minor with free enjoyment, and the compensation rule prevents that. The conditions keep a seller who overreached from invoking the rule against the person the doctrine protects. For a minor who kept and used a car or motorcycle before disaffirming, say that jurisdictions divide, with some requiring an accounting for use and depreciation before the price comes back, and apply the general rule when the facts show only consumed or destroyed property.
The rule for mental illness departs from the minor's rule at this point. A minor may disaffirm even though the property received has been consumed or destroyed.50 Where a contract with a person with a mental illness or defect is made on fair terms and the other party lacks knowledge of the condition, the power of avoidance ends to the extent that the contract has been performed in whole or in part, or the circumstances have so changed that avoidance would be unjust, and a court may grant relief as justice requires.51 The difference tracks what each counterparty can know. A seller can learn a buyer's age from a document, so an adult who deals with a seventeen-year-old takes the risk of avoidance with the facts in view. Nothing on the surface warns an adult who deals with a person whose illness shows only in judgment, so a fair-dealing counterparty has done nothing to deserve the loss.
Strangers who acquired the property from the other party complicate the unwinding, and the answer depends on what was transferred. For goods, a good-faith purchaser for value who bought from the adult takes good title that disaffirmance cannot defeat. This is one of the few situations in which a transferor with voidable title has the power to pass better title than the transferor held, and UCC § 2-403 leads to the same result.53 Land and negotiable instruments come out the other way. After the minor exercises the power to avoid, the transaction is treated for many purposes as if it had been void from the beginning, so the minor may reclaim real property from a later purchaser who bought in good faith and without notice that an infant was in the chain of title, and may disaffirm liability on a negotiable instrument even against a holder in due course.54 The rule for goods does not extend to those transactions.
Misrepresentation of Age
Section 14 fixes capacity by age alone, so a minor's lie about age raises a question the section does not answer: does the lie cost the minor the power to avoid? Under the majority view it does not, and a minor who willfully misrepresents his age may still disaffirm.56 In Olshen v. Kaufman, the court observed that a minor who induces a contract by misrepresenting his age is held by all but a few courts not to be estopped, when sued at law, from avoiding the contract.57 Estoppel bars a party from asserting a right because the other side relied on that party's words or conduct, so the majority rule says the seller's reliance on the lie does not cancel the minor's protection. The New York Court of Appeals reached the same result in Sternlieb v. Normandie National Securities Corp., rejecting a misrepresentation-of-age defense to a suit to rescind a stock purchase and describing the rule as the holding of the courts in the majority of states.58
The reason lies in what the protection is for. The law gives a minor the power to undo a contract because a minor's judgment is not yet trusted in dealings with adults, and the same immaturity that leads to an improvident purchase can lead a minor to claim to be older than he is. If a false claim of age defeated avoidance, the protection would last only until the seller asked whether the buyer was eighteen and heard yes. The adult can guard against the problem cheaply by reading a birth date from a document, while a minor cannot be expected to foresee that a casual answer will cost him the protection. Leaving the risk with the adult puts the loss on the party better placed to prevent it.
The majority rule carries a qualification. Courts sitting in equity, which shape remedies by fairness when ordinary legal relief falls short, often hold that a minor who disaffirms after misrepresenting his age must restore the other party to the status quo ante, meaning the position that party held before the contract.59 That demand exceeds the general rule from the preceding section, under which a disaffirming minor returns what remains and owes nothing on the contract for consideration that was squandered or destroyed. A misrepresentation of age may therefore affect how much restitution a court requires.60
A minority of courts go further and estop the minor outright. Some decisions hold that a minor with every appearance of adulthood who induces a contract by misrepresenting his age may be estopped to repudiate it, and some apply estoppel where the minor made no false statement about age but carried on business as an adult and the other party reasonably believed he could contract.61 Even the Olshen court noted that, so far as it was aware, no decision had held a minor estopped unless he was old enough at signing to understand his rights and the nature of the business.62 Estoppel therefore bears most heavily on an older minor who understood what he was doing.
Courts divide a second time over tort liability for the lie. A tort action will not lie against an infant if in essence it involves the enforcement of a contract,64 and the question is whether deceit about age falls within that bar. Some courts hold that the fraud action is ultimately based on the contract, so a seller suing for the loss the lie caused is asking for the benefit of a bargain the minor had the power to avoid. Others hold that the tort is sufficiently independent of the contract, because the seller seeks compensation for the deception itself and no promise is being enforced. A case can be made for either view.65 Misrepresentation of age can therefore be treated as a tort committed by the minor in some jurisdictions and not in others.66
Separately from tort and estoppel, a minor's misrepresentation of age or of another material fact lets the other party avoid the contract on grounds of fraud.67 That rule can look inconsistent with the principle that an adult cannot avoid a contract because the other party is an infant,68 but the two rest on different grounds. The fraud remedy depends on a material misrepresentation, and the minor's age as such plays no part. An adult who simply learns afterward that the buyer was seventeen still has no power to avoid, while an adult deceived about age has the ordinary remedy for deception. Because a problem often will not identify the jurisdiction, state the majority outcome first and then name the contrary view and what it produces.
Contracts for Necessaries
Infancy belongs to the long-accepted defenses that undermine the enforceability of an otherwise valid contract,70 and the necessaries exception marks a place where the defense gives the minor less than full relief. Contracts for food, shelter, clothing, or other basic items needed to maintain life are typically found to be necessaries. A minor who has contracted for a necessary is liable only for its reasonable value, and that liability is deemed to arise in restitution and not on the contract.71 The exception stands out against the general rule from the preceding section, under which a disaffirming minor owes nothing on the contract for consideration that was consumed or destroyed. Food and shelter are consumed by use, so without the exception a minor could occupy an apartment, disaffirm, and pay nothing for the months of occupancy.
The phrase “in restitution and not on the contract” follows from what avoidance does. Avoidance undoes the legal relations the contract created, and the price term, the payment schedule, and the remedies for breach are among them.72 A provider who cannot sue on the contract needs another ground for payment, and the law supplies one: an obligation imposed to prevent unjust enrichment, which means one person keeping a benefit that fairness requires to be paid for even though no promise to pay was made. That kind of obligation is called quasi-contractual, and courts such as the one in Webster Street Partnership, Ltd. v. Sheridan treat a minor's liability for necessaries in that way. Because the duty is to pay for a benefit received, the provider recovers the reasonable value of what the minor actually got, which may be less than the contract price, and the unperformed remainder falls away with the contract.
The rule has two parts, an exception and a measure, and each has its own reason. The exception exists because the power to disaffirm discourages adults from dealing with minors, since a minor cannot give legal assurance that a deal will stand.73 That discouragement is a small cost when a minor wants a game console. It becomes harmful when a minor living apart from his parents needs food or a place to sleep, because a landlord or grocer who expects to go unpaid after avoidance will decline to serve, and the minor is left without the very things the doctrine meant to keep secure. The measure does separate work. The power of avoidance protects against improvident contracts with adults who would take advantage of minors in the marketplace.74 If a minor owed the contract price for necessaries, a provider could inflate the rent or the bill and collect it in full. Tying recovery to reasonable value pays the provider for what it gave and strips out any premium that the minor's dependence let it charge. The same benefit-based reasoning appears in the decisions from the preceding section that make a disaffirming minor account for use of purchased goods, which one line of cases describes as an extension of the traditional necessaries rule to the extent of the benefit actually derived.75
The core categories are food, shelter, clothing, and other basic items needed to maintain life.76 Legal services show how the label can reach beyond them. In Zelnick v. Adams, the court held that contracts for legal services by infants should be regarded as contracts for necessaries in some instances, because, as Statler v. Dodson had reasoned, minors who need not pay for legal representation cannot protect their various interests.77 The logic matches the logic for shelter: a lawyer will not take a minor's case if the fee agreement can be avoided at will, so the minor's own claims would go unprotected. The phrase “in some instances” matters, because the label depends on genuine need and not on the kind of service.
The luxury vacation sits at the other pole. A college student who is a minor books a vacation online, accepts a nonrefundable booking term with a click, and later disaffirms. A luxury trip is not a basic item needed to maintain life,78 so the exception does not reach it and the seller has no restitution claim for the trip as a necessary. It makes no difference that the student is brilliant or advanced for his age, because the protection rests on the objective fact of age.79 What separates this trip from Jolene's apartment is the nature of the item: shelter answers a basic need, a luxury trip answers a want, and only the first produces liability for reasonable value.
The second step does the real work, and borderline items generate the disputes. An answer that labels an item a necessary should say why this minor needed it, and an answer that rejects the label should say why the item was a want. Either way, the fourth step keeps the measure in view: even a clear necessary produces liability for value received and never for the price the minor promised.
Emancipation and Statutes
Section 14 opens by yielding to legislation: “Unless a statute provides otherwise,” a person incurs only voidable duties until the beginning of the day before the eighteenth birthday.81 The voidable default developed in the preceding sections is therefore the rule for contracts no statute has touched, and an answer about a minor's contract starts by asking whether a statute reaches the transaction. A statute can validate particular minors' contracts so that infancy is no ground for avoidance. Some states enforce contracts of children employed in the entertainment industry and usually require court approval,82 and some statutes give minors over a stated age capacity for specific transactions.83 Decisions such as Sharon v. City of Newton survey the statutory exceptions a state has created.
Legislatures validate contracts because the voidable default has a cost that falls on minors who most need a service. An adult asked to deal with a minor knows the minor cannot give legal assurance against disaffirmance, so adults often refuse to deal at all.84 That reluctance is a small inconvenience when the contract is for a video game and a real barrier when it is for something the minor cannot do without. The necessaries doctrine attacks the same refusal with a narrow tool that leaves a disaffirming minor liable in restitution for reasonable value. A statute can go further and make the contract itself binding for a defined category.
A statute that adds a protection does not necessarily remove the common-law power. One opinion in Shields v. Gross reasoned about a statute requiring written consent, signed by a parent if the person is a minor. The opinion found no indication that the legislature meant the consent requirement to abrogate the minor's right to disaffirm, because the parental-consent requirement, like the broad right to disaffirm, was granted to afford the minor as much protection against exploitation as possible.85 When the facts name a statute, read its terms for what it displaces, and apply the Restatement's voidable rule to the rest.
Emancipation raises a different question, and it tempts students to find a statute where none exists. Emancipation frees a minor from parental control; it does not by itself make the minor an adult for contract purposes. A sixteen- or seventeen-year-old can obtain legal capacity by petitioning a court to become an emancipated adult and having the court grant the petition.87 Short of that, the common-law default is that emancipation does not enlarge capacity to contract.88 The two statements fit together once you see where adult status comes from. A court order granting adult status confers capacity, while emancipation by parental release or by marriage changes only who controls the minor.
The default is applied in Mitchell v. Mitchell, which involved a married minor who had signed a settlement and release. The court reversed and remanded for an order voiding the release.89 It began from the presumption that infants are insufficiently mature or experienced to bargain effectively with adults, so any transaction that may deplete their estates is scrutinized with care. Marriage emancipates the minor without making the minor sui juris, meaning fully independent in law, and the court followed the general rule that parental emancipation may free the infant from parental control but does not remove all the disabilities of infancy and “does not, for example, enlarge or affect the minor's capacity or incapacity to contract.”90 The court also noted that repudiating the agreement requires the minor to return the consideration paid, which ties the case back to the restoration rules.91
The reasoning separates two questions that emancipation can blur. Emancipation answers whose authority the minor lives under, while the incapacity rule asks whether the minor has the experience to bargain with adults, and escaping a parent's control supplies none of that experience. Emancipation does change one thing: decisions allowing a parent to disaffirm for the minor are regarded as sound only when the minor is not emancipated.92 The minor's own power to avoid stays where it was.
The third and fourth steps separate the two routes to emancipation, and a problem that says only that the minor is married supplies a fact and no rule. If it names no statute giving married minors adult capacity, apply the common-law default.