Concept
Intoxication
Incapacity to contract
Intoxication
Intoxication is the last entry on the Restatement's list of exceptions to full capacity, which also names guardianship, infancy, and mental illness or defect.1 The list marks exceptions to a presumption: adults are generally assumed to have the legal power to form contracts, and it takes evidence to refute that assumption.2
Section 16 supplies the rule. A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a transaction if the other party has reason to know that, by reason of intoxication, the person is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction, or is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to it.3 The word voidable matters. The contract exists, and the intoxicated person holds the election to avoid it or to stand on it. A void contract is a different thing: any manifestation of assent is a nullity, as when a person whose property is under adjudicated guardianship purports to contract.4 Intoxication gives the person a power to avoid and no more.
Intoxication differs from the other capacity categories in one respect that the cases have noticed. The condition is usually self-induced, and the treatise observes that this gives the cases a different emphasis.5 Older decisions voiced moral indignation at the intoxicated person or at whoever supplied the liquor, and cases permitting avoidance for intoxication alone are rare.6 Against that background the structure of § 16 makes sense: the person who drank controlled the risk, so the law shifts the loss to the other side only when that side had reason to see the impairment and dealt on regardless.
The rule has three parts, a gate and two prongs. The prongs track § 15(1) for mental illness, and the Restatement treats the intoxication test as basically the same as the mental-illness test.7 One prong asks whether the person could understand the deal, and the other asks whether the person could act reasonably in relation to it. The difference is the gate. In the mental-illness section the other party's knowledge matters in two places: it is an element of the volitional prong, and it conditions the limit that protects a counterparty who dealt fairly and without knowledge once the contract has been performed or circumstances have changed.8 The cognitive prong asks nothing about the counterparty.9 Section 16 moves the knowledge requirement to the front, so a person who was thoroughly impaired but gave the other side no sign of it cannot avoid under that section.
Reason to Know of Intoxication
The gate asks what the other party had reason to know, and it comes first because neither prong helps a claimant who cannot pass it. Its object is the incapacitating condition itself. Section 16 speaks of reason to know that, by reason of intoxication, the person is unable to understand or unable to act reasonably, so learning that the person had been drinking falls short.10 The counterparty must have had reason to know that the impairment had reached the point of defeating understanding or reasonable conduct. The question is fixed at the time of dealing, and in practice it turns on what the counterparty could perceive: slurred or incoherent speech, an unsteady gait, a failure to follow the terms under discussion.
Two showings therefore stack. The claimant must establish an impairment severe enough to defeat understanding or reasonable conduct, and must also establish that the other side had reason to know of it. That structure fits the observation that cases permitting avoidance for intoxication alone are rare, since a competent party seldom contracts unknowingly with someone too intoxicated to understand the transaction. The treatise adds that where the other party is aware of the intoxication, other rules may also come into play.11
Students most often go wrong here by carrying the cognitive prong of the mental-illness rule over to intoxication. Under § 15(1)(a), a person who is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction incurs only voidable duties, and the clause says nothing about what the other party knew.12 Clause (a) of § 16 uses the same words about understanding, yet it sits beneath the reason-to-know clause, and that placement changes the result.13
The two owners were equally unable to understand, and the dealer perceived the same thing in each, so the cause of the impairment accounts for the different results. Section 15 recognizes that unfairness might arise when the other party did not know of the mental illness, and it answers that problem after the fact, by ending the power of avoidance to the extent the contract has been performed or circumstances have changed.14 Because intoxication is usually self-induced, § 16 answers the problem earlier, by requiring reason to know from the outset.15 On the volitional prong the two sections already agree, since § 15(1)(b) likewise requires reason to know of the condition.16 They part company at the cognitive prong alone.
Inability to Understand
Clause (a) asks what intoxication did to the person's grasp of the deal. The duties are voidable when the person is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction.20 Those words repeat § 15(1)(a), so the cognitive test learned for mental illness carries over,21 and the Restatement treats the two tests as basically the same.22 The treatise draws the same parallel: intoxication by alcohol or narcotics can render a party legally incompetent, and if the person does not understand the nature and consequences of the transaction, the legal effect is much the same as for any other mental infirmity with that result.23
Put plainly, the nature of a transaction is what the deal is, meaning what is being bought or sold and what each side must do, and its consequences are what the deal will do to the person who made it. The text asks about understanding 'in a reasonable manner,' so a buyer who follows the price, the subject matter, and his own obligations is not unable to understand, even if he has been drinking.
The difference from mental illness lies in the opening clause of § 16, which conditions both prongs on the counterparty's reason to know.24 A claimant under clause (a) therefore makes two showings where § 15(1)(a) required one: the person was in fact unable to understand, and the other party had reason to know it. The first showing protects the idea of assent, since a person who cannot grasp what is being promised has not meaningfully agreed to it. The second ties relief to a situation in which the counterparty saw the problem and could have declined to deal.
The two showings tend to travel together in the cases that succeed. A competent party would be unlikely to contract unknowingly with someone so intoxicated as not to understand the transaction, and that helps explain why decisions permitting avoidance for intoxication alone are rare.25 The usual exam error is to treat evidence of drinking as evidence of incapacity. The prong measures what the person could grasp; the amount drunk and the unsteadiness observed matter only as evidence of that.
Tomas's seller noticed the drinking, yet that awareness changes nothing. Reason to know opens the gate; it cannot supply a failure of understanding that never occurred. Clause (b) offers Tomas little more, because a man who negotiates a price and plans his payments has shown that he can act reasonably in relation to the deal, a point the next part takes up.
Inability to Act Reasonably
Clause (b) supplies the second route to avoidance. A person incurs only voidable duties if, by reason of intoxication, he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know this condition.27 Clause (a) asks whether the intoxicated person could grasp the deal; clause (b) asks whether a person who grasped it could still govern his own conduct. It is the intoxication counterpart of the volitional prong of § 15(1)(b), which uses nearly the same words and likewise requires that the other party have reason to know of the condition.28
A second clause is needed because impairment can disable judgment while leaving comprehension intact. The mental-illness cases make the point. In Gore v. Gadd, 268 Ore. 527, 522 P.2d 212 (1974), the court recognized that a person such as a manic-depressive psychotic, although aware of the nature and consequences of his conduct, may still be incompetent because the illness impels him to act irrationally and leaves him incapable of making a rational judgment in executing the transaction.29 The Restatement treats its intoxication test as basically the same as its mental-illness test,30 so the same reasoning supports clause (b). A person who can recite the terms of a deal accurately but whose intoxication leaves him unable to hold back from it passes the test of understanding and may still fail the test of acting reasonably.
The first element turns on the word unable. A few drinks loosen caution, and a regrettable bargain struck under loosened caution shows poor judgment, which is not the same as inability. Tomas, the beer-drinking motorcycle buyer from the preceding part, therefore gets no more from clause (b) than from clause (a): a man who inspects the bike, negotiates the price, and works out a payment plan has shown that he could act reasonably, whatever the beer did to his inhibitions. A mind cannot be observed directly, so proof will usually come from conduct, and a pattern of self-defeating behavior that a sober person would not engage in says more than one extravagant purchase.
The second element ties relief to what the counterparty could perceive. The words this condition point back to the inability to act reasonably, so a counterparty who merely noticed that the person had been drinking has not thereby been shown to have reason to know of an incapacitating loss of control. The requirement matches the opening of § 16, which makes the other party's reason to know a condition of both clauses.31 Older decisions voiced moral indignation at the intoxicated person and at whoever supplied the liquor.32 A counterparty who keeps refilling the glass of a visibly unsteady person will have trouble denying that it saw the condition.
Gideon and Leila match on the first element and differ on the second, and the difference decides the outcome. The broker had every reason to know Gideon's condition, because it was on display and the broker was supplying the drinks. The dealership saw a customer who looked sober. Leila's later proof of how much she drank cannot supply the missing element, because the clause tests what the counterparty had reason to know when the deal was made. A claimant under clause (b) has two things to prove, and a record that establishes only the first leaves the contract enforceable.
Because § 15(1)(b) and clause (b) both demand reason to know, the two sections part ways only at the cognitive prong, where § 16(a) adds a knowledge requirement that § 15(1)(a) does not carry.33 An answer on an intoxication problem can therefore reuse everything learned about the volitional test, and the intoxication-specific work lies in what the counterparty saw.