Concept
Physical Compulsion
Duress
Duress as a Contract Defense
Physical Compulsion
Duress takes two forms, and the form decides what the victim may do afterward. In physical compulsion, force strips away the victim's act of assent, and no contract exists. In duress by improper threat, which occupies the rest of this chapter, the victim still acts, and the contract is voidable. This section covers the first form.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 174 states the rule: if conduct that appears to be a manifestation of assent by a party who does not intend to engage in that conduct is physically compelled by duress, the conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent.1 Without a manifestation of assent there is no contract to avoid. The result is a void contract, not a voidable one, and the victim needs no election.
In Everbank v. Marini, the Vermont Supreme Court described the essence of this duress: a party is compelled by physical force to do an act the party has no intention of doing, so the party is "a mere mechanical instrument," and "there is no contract at all, or a 'void contract' as distinguished from a voidable one."2
The court's illustration shows the rule at its cleanest. A, who is physically stronger than B, presents B with a written contract and demands that B sign it. B refuses. A grasps B's hand and compels B by physical force to write his name. B's signature is not effective as a manifestation of his assent, and there is no contract.3 The phrase "mechanical instrument" explains why. A hand moved by someone else's strength performs no act of the signer's own, so the signature manifests nothing.
Okafor's deed is voidable because his consent, though coerced, is real. Parents who pay a kidnapper to save their daughter's life may express "the most genuine, heartfelt consent." The flaw is not that consent is missing but that it was coerced in a manner society brands as wrongful, so it is not presumed the product of free will.4 Section 175(1) turns that flaw into a power to avoid: a contract is voidable by the victim when assent is induced by an improper threat that leaves no reasonable alternative.5 Whether a reasonable alternative existed is a question of fact that depends on the circumstances, and an available legal remedy, such as an action for breach of contract, may supply one.6 Section 174 contains no such inquiry, because the victim there chose nothing.
An exam answer that sees a gun and writes "void" has skipped the question § 174 asks: did force operate on the victim's body so that the victim did nothing at all? A threat, however terrifying, belongs to § 175 and the rules that define improper threats.
A few courts have stretched the void category beyond the Restatement's line. In Everbank, a husband called his wife to the kitchen table and waved a large pair of scissors while berating her about her refusal to sign a mortgage application. The Vermont Supreme Court held that physical compulsion includes a threat of imminent physical violence, even though § 174 would treat such a contract as only voidable. That holding is a jurisdictional variation, so an answer should apply § 174 as written unless the jurisdiction has adopted the broader approach. Courts also deny relief where no force or threat is shown. In Shultz v. Shultz, a claimant signed a child support reduction agreement because she feared her violent ex-husband and wanted to avoid an argument. With no evidence of force or threats, duress was not established.