Concept
The Voidability Rule
Mutual mistake
The Voidability Rule
A shared mistake does not by itself undo a contract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152(1) states when it does: where a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made, as to a basic assumption on which the contract was made, has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless that party bears the risk of the mistake under § 154.1 The rule asks for three things and carves out one exception. The mistake must be shared, it must concern a basic assumption, and it must materially affect the exchange. A party who bears the risk of the mistake cannot avoid, and many formulations count that exception as a fourth element.2
Sherwood v. Walker shows how the pieces fit. A banker looking for stock asked about animals on the sellers’ Greenfield farm and was told they were probably barren and would not breed.3 He bought a cow, Rose.4 A breeding cow was worth at least $750; a barren one, not over $80.5 After Rose proved able to breed, the sellers sought to escape the sale. The majority held that the parties’ mistake went to the whole substance of the agreement and granted a new trial.6 The dissent denied that the parties were mistaken in a legal sense: they were merely ignorant or uncertain, each took his chances, and the banker should have his cow.7 The majority and the dissent disagree about what the parties believed, about whether the mistake was basic, and about who should carry the uncertainty, so the case returns in each subsection below.
The word voidable is chosen with care. Parties who assent to different things, as in the two ships named Peerless, never made a contract, and the apparent arrangement is void.8 In a mistake case the parties agreed on the same exchange and were wrong about a fact behind it. A contract exists, so the question is whether to undo it, and the choice belongs to the party the mistake hurt. Only that party may raise the defense, and she may prefer to enforce a bargain that has turned out well.9 In Sherwood the sellers lost the value of a breeding cow and were the adversely affected party; the buyer, who would gain from the error, had nothing to avoid. Once a contract is avoided, each side has a restitution claim for any benefit it already conferred on the other.10
The remedy follows from what a bargain presupposes, which is that both parties expect to gain from it. Mistake cases do not always fit that rationale, but where relief is granted, the usually shared assumption of mutual gain has been thwarted.11 The subsections below take the three conditions in order: a mistake both parties share, a basic assumption, and a material effect. A last subsection turns to § 152(2), which brings available relief into the measure of materiality.12 The risk exception and the mistaken party’s own fault are left for later parts of the chapter.
A Mistake Both Parties Share
The first condition is that the mistake belong to both parties at the time they contracted.13 Both must have understood the deal to rest on the same fact, later shown to be untrue, and it does not matter that one of them would profit from the error.14 The error must also be one of fact. A bad judgment, a rash decision, or a venture that flopped is a mistake in the lay sense but not in the legal one.15
Mutuality matters because a party who alone is mistaken faces a higher bar. The defense of unilateral mistake carries the same first elements and adds another: the mistaken party must show that enforcement would be unconscionable or that the other side had reason to know of the mistake or caused it.16 Courts are substantially more skeptical of that defense than of mutual mistake.17 Where both parties built the exchange on the same false premise, neither can say that avoidance defeats an expectation the other was entitled to rely on.
Sherwood turned on mutuality. The majority treated the sale as made on both parties’ belief that Rose could not breed.18 The dissent read the record differently. The sellers thought the cow would never breed; the banker thought she might; and neither was sure.19 Because Sherwood had seen Rose with a bull, the dissent reasoned, he believed she might not be barren, so he did not share the Walkers’ mistake and the mistake was not mutual.20 In the dissent’s words, the cow was “supposed to be barren by one party, and believed not to be by the other.”21 Two parties who hold opposing views of an unknown fact do not share one false belief. The majority and the dissent therefore disagree about what the buyer believed, and a court deciding mutuality must find that fact.
Indifference to the other side’s goals does not defeat mutuality. In Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., Essex argued that the mistake was ALCOA’s alone, because its chairman testified that he had no particular concern for ALCOA’s well-being and sought only Essex’s best interests in the negotiations.22 The court disagreed. The chairman did not share the motive to protect ALCOA, but he understood the functional purposes of the agreement, so he shared the mistake, and his mistake was Essex’s.23 The court drew support from an earlier case in which the buyer was indifferent to the unknown fact and would have been pleased to keep the unexpected profit, yet understood that the bargain rested on a presumed state of facts.24 What a party hopes to gain from an error is motive, and motive leaves mutuality intact. What a party believes about the fact is what mutuality tests.
Shared ignorance, by contrast, is not enough.
A mistake that only one party holds is a unilateral mistake, and the excavator would have to meet the added requirements described above.25 Bert Allen Toyota, Inc. v. Grasz fits the same pattern. A dealer’s computer priced a pickup truck $2,000 too low, and the dealer argued that both sides had relied on the figure. The court held that the buyer cared only about what the truck would cost him, so the miscalculation was the dealer’s unilateral mistake.26 The price formula in Alcoa differs because both sides chose it together and understood the job it was to do.27 Where neither party knows the truth, the question is whether the false fact entered both parties’ decisions or only one party’s.
Shared mistakes also arise outside commercial pricing. A person may sign a personal-injury release without being aware of her injuries at all, learn the truth later, and seek compensation. Courts may grant relief under the theory of mutual, material mistake.28
A Basic Assumption
The second condition is that the shared mistake concern a basic assumption on which the contract was made.30 A fact is a basic assumption when it is so fundamental to the shared intent and purpose of both parties that it is reasonable to conclude they would not have made the contract at all, or not on its present terms, had they known the truth.31 A lakefront lot sold for $500,000 supplies an example. The price is high because the lot sits in a prime waterfront setting in a popular vacation area; the seller knows the buyer plans to build a luxury home, and both believe the lot will support one. When the ground proves porous and unstable and cannot carry a building, the false belief turns out to have been the basis of the bargain.32
The element screens out the ordinary beliefs that every contract carries. Most of what parties take for granted is peripheral, and only a belief on which the exchange itself was built justifies undoing it.
Courts once drew the line with labels. In Sherwood the majority reasoned that Rose, though the same animal the parties thought they were dealing in, differed in her very nature from the animal bargained for: the mistake was not of mere quality but went to the very nature of the thing, and a barren cow is substantially a different creature from a breeding one.33 It contrasted a horse bought as sound, where both parties honestly believe it sound: the buyer must stand by the bargain unless there was a warranty.34 The majority also stated a general rule that a party may avoid a contract founded on a mistake of a material fact, such as the subject-matter, the price, or some collateral fact materially inducing the agreement, when the mistake is mutual. It conceded that the dividing line between the decided cases was not easily discerned.35
The labels did not settle the case, because the same fact looks different through each. To the dissent, Rose’s capacity to breed was a matter of quality: “as to the quality of the animal, subsequently developed, both parties were equally ignorant, and as to this each party took his chances.”36 The majority saw the same capacity as going to the nature of the thing. A test that two judges can apply to identical facts and reach opposite results gives little guidance to someone planning a contract.
Michigan later changed course. In Lenawee County Board of Health v. Messerly, a prior owner had installed a septic tank on the property without a permit and in violation of the health code, and later owners used the building as an income investment.37 The court chose “a case-by-case analysis whereby rescission is indicated when the mistaken belief relates to a basic assumption of the parties upon which the contract is made, and which materially affects the agreed performances of the parties.”38 That is the inquiry § 152(1) states. Yet the court denied the rescission that Mr. and Mrs. Pickles sought. Despite the significance of the mistake, it concluded that equity did not justify that remedy.39 The inquiry is bifurcated, because proof of a mutual mistake does not mandate legal or equitable relief in every case.40
A basic assumption can likewise be proved and still earn no relief once the risk is allocated. A seller of farm land who later learns, along with the buyer, that the land holds valuable minerals generally cannot avoid, even though the price rested on the assumption that the land suited only farming and the effect on the exchange is material. A court will ordinarily allocate the risk of that mistake to the seller, who must perform regardless.41 The basic-assumption element is therefore necessary but not sufficient, and the risk analysis later in this chapter finishes the inquiry.
Price assumptions cause particular confusion, because courts often say that a mistake about price or future market conditions will not justify relief. In Alcoa the court held that the assumed capacity of a price formula in a long-term service contract to protect against vast windfall profits to one party and vast windfall losses to the other was so clearly basic as to repel dispute. Relief is denied in the usual price cases not because price assumptions are never basic but because the parties allocated the risk of present price uncertainties or uncertain future market values by their contract. Where a price error derives from a mistake about the nature or quantity of what was sold, courts have allowed a remedy, finding no contractual allocation of that risk.42
An intended use can also be a basic assumption. In Renner v. Kehl the parties believed that adequate water supplies lay beneath the property. That belief was “a basic assumption on which both parties made the contract,” and the mutual mistake had such a material effect on the exchange as to upset the very bases of the contract, so the contract was voidable and the respondents were entitled to rescission.43 A Restatement illustration reaches the same result for a tract valued mainly for its timber: both parties believe the timber still stands, but fire has destroyed it, and the contract is voidable by the buyer.44
A purpose reaches the level of a basic assumption only when both parties took it for granted. The lakefront seller knew of the luxury-home plan, and the Renner parties shared a premise about water. A reason that one side keeps to itself never entered the shared purpose.
A Material Effect
The third condition is that the mistake have a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances.46 This can look like a repeat of the last condition, since a false belief on which the contract was built seems certain to disturb the exchange. The two elements ask different questions. Basic assumption examines how the false fact relates to the purpose both parties shared. Materiality asks what the mistake did to the balance of the exchange, meaning whether it substantially deprived the adversely affected party of the value expected.47 The Restatement’s comment frames the test as whether the error creates an overall imbalance by making the exchange less desirable to the adversely affected party and more advantageous to the other.48 A court must therefore look at both sides, at what the mistake took from one party and what it gave the other. The inquiry carries an element of equitable balancing, in which the court weighs the effect on both parties to decide whether enforcement is fair.49
The test also has a severity threshold. Mistakes about facts that have a relatively minor impact on the transaction cannot serve as a defense to enforcement or as a basis for rescission or reformation.50 A party’s own regret does not cross the threshold. Merely showing that this party would not have entered the contract had it known the truth most likely does not establish materiality. The party must show that the contract as made is severely imbalanced and that enforcement would therefore be unfair.51
Sherwood supplies a severe imbalance. By the majority’s account Rose was worth at least $750 if she could breed and not over $80 if she was barren, and the parties would not have made the sale except on the understanding that she could not breed.52 The second fact goes to basic assumption and the first to materiality. A gap of nearly ten to one means that enforcing a sale made on the belief that she was barren would give one side a windfall and the other a matching loss.
Alcoa measures a similar imbalance across a long contract. ALCOA had suffered increasingly large out-of-pocket losses over the last three years, and its net profit to date was $9 million. The court said that profit would raise doubts about materiality if the contract expired at once, but that even then the mistake would be material because the profit left ALCOA dramatically short of the minimum return of one cent per pound that the parties had contemplated.53 Looking to the entire life of the contract, on a commonly accepted prediction of future conditions, ALCOA would lose more than $60 million out of pocket, and that loss would be matched by an equal windfall profit to Essex. The court held that this proof clearly established a material effect, and it said it would not hesitate to call enforcement unconscionable if that were the question.54
Two lessons follow from the case. A profit to date does not defeat materiality when the exchange as a whole is lopsided, because the comparison covers the life of the contract. And the matching windfall is the second ledger, since the loss to one side was exactly the gain to the other.
Because the elements differ, a mistake can satisfy one and strain the other. On the lakefront facts, if the unstable ground leaves the lot worth far less than the $500,000 price, both elements are met together. Now vary them.
The buyer in that variation has lost the use the parties contemplated, so the answer is not beyond question. The point is that the considerations governing materiality differ from those governing basic assumption and can lead to a different conclusion.55
At the other end of the range are discrepancies too small to unbalance anything. Parties negotiate a commercial lot at $6 per square foot and sign for $600,000, both believing it holds 100,000 square feet. It holds 97,000, so the buyer is short by $18,000, three percent of the price. That shortfall is the kind of minor impact that does not justify rescinding the sale.56 What separates this lot from Rose is the size of the swing, and in each case the question is how far the mistake unbalanced the bargain. The next subsection asks what, if anything, should repair a shortfall that small.
Relief and Materiality
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152(2) ties materiality to remedy: in deciding whether a mistake has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the court takes account of any relief by way of reformation, restitution, or otherwise.58 The last subsection measured the imbalance a mistake creates. Section 152(2) adds that the imbalance is measured with the available relief in view, because an error that a modest adjustment would cure is a different problem from one that no adjustment can reach.
The tie to remedy matters because avoidance is a blunt tool. Avoidance and mutual restitution is the standard and common remedy for mistake, and it ends the contract.59 Reformation does not. It rectifies a term and leaves the transaction in force.60 Because mistake doctrine has equitable roots, courts have some flexibility to give relief other than avoidance when the equities require it.61
The commercial lot shows the choice. The parties signed for $600,000 at $6 per square foot, both believing the lot held 100,000 square feet, and it holds 97,000. The shortfall is $18,000, too slight to justify rescission. A court may nonetheless reform the contract by reducing the price by that amount, an abatement.62 The parties’ own rate supplies the figure, 3,000 missing square feet at $6 each, so the court applies a measure the parties chose and invents none. A mistake too minor to avoid a contract may therefore support reforming it where a fair and equitable method exists.63
Alcoa applies the same logic to a price term. Where avoidance would be disruptive and the error relates to an aspect of the contract that can be adjusted, such as a price calculation, an alteration of terms may be a fair remedy, and the court in Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group did reform the contract’s price term.64
These two outcomes should not suggest that reformation is a routine answer to mistake. Reformation for mutual mistake remains an extraordinary remedy, and courts use it sparingly.65 Courts generally require the parties to have been mistaken about a fact, the mistaken belief to have been a basic assumption underlying the contract, the mistake to have had a material effect on the bargain, and the contract not to have put the risk of the mistake on the party seeking reformation.66 The materiality required may be less than the severe imbalance rescission demands, as the lot shows, but a party who bears the risk of the mistake obtains neither remedy. Reformation is more common where the error is a scrivener’s or transcriber’s slip.67
The reason for that caution lies in what reformation is for. Contracts are not reformed for mistake; records are. With rare exceptions, courts have been tenacious in refusing to remake a bargain entered into because of mistake, but they will rewrite a record that does not express the bargain.68 A mutual mistake about the description or quantity of the subject matter is a prime illustration of the need for reformation. The court may correct errors in the integration of the agreement to conform to the parties’ reasonable expectations, and the parol evidence rule does not bar extrinsic evidence offered solely to explain and correct the terms.69 The line between a mistake that induced the bargain and a mistake in articulating it can be hard to draw, and courts have reached contradictory results on facts near it.70
Reformation also has an outer edge. It is not appropriate when the mistake is so fundamental that it would alter the entire character of the transaction or defeat the contract’s basic purpose, and it is seldom the best solution when the contract is entirely executory and neither party performed or relied on it before the mistake was discovered.71
The two ends of the range therefore sit side by side. A defect in an adjustable term, such as a quantity or a price calculation, can be cured by adjustment. A defect that reaches the core of the transaction calls for avoidance, with each side restoring what it received.72