Concept
Who Bears the Risk
Unilateral mistake
Who Bears the Risk
Section 154 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts supplies the last gate a mistaken party must pass. A party bears the risk of a mistake in three situations: the parties' agreement allocates the risk to it; it knew when the contract was made that its knowledge of the relevant facts was limited but treated that knowledge as sufficient; or a court allocates the risk to it because doing so is reasonable in the circumstances.1 Section 153 makes a contract voidable for unilateral mistake only if the mistaken party does not bear the risk under § 154.2 A party can therefore prove a mistaken belief about a basic assumption and a material adverse effect on the exchange, and still lose because the loss belongs to that party.
There is no neutral way to decide the question, since a finding that one party did not bear the risk means the other did. The answer is often dispositive: if the adversely affected party bore the risk, the contract cannot be avoided, no matter how serious the error.3
The Restatement's standard illustration is the seller of farm land. The price was negotiated on the assumption that the land was suitable only for farming. Both parties later discover valuable mineral deposits, and the effect on the exchange is material. The seller generally still cannot avoid the sale, because a court will ordinarily allocate the risk of that mistake to the seller, who must perform regardless.4
The risk rule is the same for mutual and unilateral mistakes. Hart v. Arnold, a case involving a mutual mistake, quoted § 154 for the point that it determines whether a party bears the risk for purposes of both § 152 and § 153.5 In the unilateral setting the gate does much of the work. Unilateral relief is most often sought for erroneous bids, as in Elsinore School District v. Kastorff, where a bidder for building work obtained relief, but bids are not the only setting.6 The three routes to bearing the risk run from the most deliberate act of the parties to the most discretionary judgment of the court, and the parties' own agreement comes first.
Risk Allocated by Agreement
Section 154(a) provides that a party bears the risk of a mistake when the parties' agreement allocates the risk to that party.7 A party may agree, by appropriate language or other manifestations, to perform in spite of a mistake that would otherwise justify avoidance, just as it may agree to perform despite circumstances that would otherwise excuse it. An insurer, for example, may expressly undertake the risk of loss of property covered as of a date already past.8
Whether an agreement places the risk on the mistaken party is a question of interpretation, answered under the rules that govern the scope of contractual obligations, including interpretation, usage, and unconscionability.9 The rule calls for no particular words. Express language assigning the risk works, and so does any term that a court, reading it in light of usage and the surrounding circumstances, construes as having that effect.
The clearest everyday device is the as-is clause. Because implied warranties protect against latent defects, an as-is clause puts the risk of latent defects, such as an inadequate sanitation system, on the purchaser.10 If a defect then surfaces that neither side knew about, the buyer cannot treat it as a mistake the seller must bear, since the clause has already assigned that risk to the buyer. The clause answers the question for honest error about latent conditions. A separate ground applies when the seller materially misrepresented a fact on which the buyer was justified in relying, because rescission for material misrepresentation requires neither fraud nor negligence, and an innocent misrepresentation can suffice.11
Silence marks the opposite pole. A buyer plans a home office in a townhome and learns after signing that a zoning rule forbids business use. The contract has no as-is clause and says nothing about zoning. No agreement allocates the risk, so § 154(a) does not decide the case, but the buyer is not released on that account. The court moves to the remaining routes, conscious ignorance and allocation by the court, which stay available when the agreement is silent.12 A buyer who could have checked the zoning rule before signing is a likely candidate to bear the loss under the third route, by the reasoning the gravel illustration below applies to a builder who could have looked over the property.
Conscious Ignorance
Section 154(b) names the second route: a party bears the risk when it is aware, at the time the contract is made, that it has only limited knowledge of the facts to which the mistake relates but treats that limited knowledge as sufficient.14 Such a party knew of a particular risk when it formed the contract and did nothing to protect itself.15 One who undertook to perform in the face of that awareness bears the risk of the mistake.16
The test looks at what the party recognized at signing, not at what hindsight shows it should have learned. A party who never considered the question simply took the fact for granted, which makes it mistaken in the ordinary sense, and § 154(b) does not reach it, though court allocation may. Students often treat every failure to investigate as conscious ignorance, but the subsection requires awareness that one's knowledge was limited.
The second step is where claims usually turn. In Estate of Nelson v. Rice, an estate sold two paintings at a trivial price after consulting an appraiser who told it she was not qualified to appraise fine art, and the buyer later resold them for more than a million dollars. The estate was held to bear the risk because it knew its knowledge of the paintings' worth was limited and sold anyway. The one person it had asked had told it she could not vouch for their value.
The same reasoning governs unilateral mistakes, because § 154 determines who bears the risk under both § 152 and § 153.17 The unilateral analogue is the bidder who knows its information is incomplete. Handle Construction Co. v. Norcon, Inc. denied relief to a subcontractor whose bid rested on information it knew was incomplete. The subcontractor did more than assume its costs were right; it knew the foundation of its estimate was thin and bid anyway.
Set beside Nelson, Roger's case differs in one fact that matters. Each seller consulted someone before selling. The jeweler gave Roger an opinion on the stone, and he relied on it, whereas the appraiser told the estate she could not value fine art, and the estate sold on its own guess. What decides the risk is whether the party recognized and accepted the limits of what it knew. Consulting an expert protects a party only when the expert's opinion actually fills the gap that the party's own knowledge left open.
Risk Allocated by the Court
Section 154(c) names the third route: the court allocates the risk to a party on the ground that doing so is reasonable in the circumstances.19 It reaches cases where neither agreement nor conscious ignorance settles the matter. The court considers the purposes of the parties and draws on its general knowledge of human behavior in bargain transactions, as it does when supplying a term under § 204, and the result is subject to contrary agreement and to usage.20 Two considerations recur: whether the party is an expert on the subject matter of the risk, and whether it was otherwise in the best position to investigate that risk.21
The farm-land seller shows the reasoning. No one can fairly accuse the seller of neglecting a legal duty by failing to discover the minerals, so the allocation rests on something else. Drawing on general knowledge of bargains, a court could reasonably place the risk on the seller because the seller was in a better position than the buyer to know the composition of the property.22 A second reason looks to the buyer. A purchaser who conducts a geological survey performs a socially valuable service and must be rewarded for the effort. Requiring the purchaser to share the discovery with the seller would discourage that investment, and the economy would produce more farm crops and fewer minerals than we seem to want.23
The gravel illustration reaches a similar result for a builder. A landowner and a builder agree to remove gravel at a stated price per cubic yard, and, unknown to both, part of the gravel lies under water and is more expensive to remove. The court allocates the risk to the builder, not because the builder neglected a legal duty, but because it is reasonable to expect a builder to look over the property before entering into the contract.24 The farm-land seller bears the risk that the thing sold is worth more than the price, and the builder bears the risk that the work costs more than the price. What the two share is that each could have checked the fact before committing.
The purposes a court weighs are often shown by what the parties said before signing. In a sale of unimproved Arizona land, the purchasers made clear to the sellers that they were interested in the property only for the cultivation of jojoba and required adequate water supplies, which is the kind of shared purpose a court considers under § 154(c).25
Court allocation matters most in unilateral cases, where the mistaken party usually made its own error. In BMW Financial Services NA, LLC v. Deloach, BMW Financial failed to tag Deloach's account as being in litigation, and Firstsource and David Deloach then negotiated a settlement. The trial court found it reasonable under the circumstances to allocate the risk to BMW Financial, and substantial evidence supported that finding. The error was attributable solely to BMW Financial's failure to tag the account, and BMW Financial presented no evidence that Firstsource or either Deloach knew about the default judgment when the negotiations began.26 The court's discussion of neglect of a legal duty followed Donovan, which concentrates on what that is not: ordinary carelessness or negligence, although extreme negligence could qualify.27
The court distinguished Donovan v. RRL Corp. on the identity of the person who made the mistake. In Donovan, an unrelated third party, a newspaper, caused the car dealer's mistake by printing the wrong sale price of a car. BMW Financial's mistake was its own and no one else's.28 The court treated that as a crucial difference, because a party's own error is a stronger candidate for bearing the loss than an outsider's.
Negligence is relevant but not automatically decisive. Ordinary carelessness is not neglect of a legal duty, although extreme negligence could be.29 The mistaken party's fault also feeds the balance of the equities: even where there has not been enough sloppiness or serious negligence to dispose of the case on risk allocation, the fault could tip the balance in favor of the other party.30 The more serious the lapse, the more likely it is to place the risk on the party who could have prevented the error.
Pricing errors fall readily on the seller. Even in the absence of negligence, it is usually reasonable to allocate the risk of underpricing to a seller and the risk of overpricing to a buyer. The allocation is stronger where the seller held the correct facts and negligently overlooked them. The seller's remaining route is then to show that, despite its negligent error, the equities favor relief.31
A party who does not bear the risk is not safe in every case. Even then, it may be barred from avoidance if the mistake resulted from its failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.32 That bar is taken up below.
Step three does most of the work, and it is the step a student skips by asking only whether the mistaken party did something wrong. The farm-land seller and the gravel builder breached no duty, yet each bears the loss because each was positioned to learn the fact before signing. Since this route is residual, a silent contract with no conscious ignorance often ends here, which is why many unilateral claims that satisfy the earlier elements still fail at this gate.