Concept
The Added Unilateral Showing
Unilateral mistake
The Added Unilateral Showing
A party who has shown a basic assumption, a material adverse effect, and no assumption of the risk has still not earned avoidance for a unilateral mistake. Section 153 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts requires one thing more: either that the effect of the mistake makes enforcement unconscionable, or that the other party had reason to know of the mistake or caused it by its own fault.1 The first alternative is § 153(a).2 The second, § 153(b), has two limbs, reason to know and fault.3 The statute joins the alternatives with 'or,' so the mistaken party needs only one of the three, and failing one leaves the others open.
The extra requirement exists because only one side made the error. The other side holds what looks like a valid agreement, and the older rule protected that agreement: avoidance was unavailable for a unilateral mistake unless the mistake was palpable, meaning one the other party knows or has reason to know of, and relief in that case came readily. Modern decisions permit avoidance in more cases where only one party erred, but they have not abandoned the generalization, because a liberal rule of relief for impalpable mistakes would erode, if not totally deluge, the objective theory of contracts.4 Section 153 reflects both halves of that history. Subsection (b) keeps the palpable-mistake route, and subsection (a) adds a route for mistakes whose effects are too harsh to enforce.
The showing is the same whether the mistake concerns fact or law. Early cases assumed that everyone knows the law and denied relief even when one or both parties misunderstood a law relevant to the deal, such as the permitted uses of a parcel of land. Modern cases treat a mistaken understanding of the law as analogous to a mistake of fact, so it can support relief if the other requirements are met.5
Bids are the most common setting for these claims, as in Elsinore School District v. Kastorff, where a bidder for building work got relief for his mistaken offer.6 Suppose a contractor's mistaken bid is 25 percent lower than the competing bids and the owner accepts it. The contractor must prove one of the alternatives, and the three are not equally promising. Unconscionable enforcement may be difficult to prove. Reason to know may follow from the gap itself. The owner's fault is very unlikely.7 The subsections below take the routes in that order.
Unconscionable Enforcement
The first alternative asks whether, because of the effect of the mistake, enforcing the contract would be unconscionable.8 The mistake is already proved when this question arrives, so the court looks at the result: would holding the mistaken party to a bargain it never meant to make be harsh enough that a court should refuse? This is not the general unconscionability defense, which tests a contract's terms or formation with no mistake in the picture. Here the mistake supplies the reason for relief and its effect supplies the harshness. The other party's conduct, if it matters at all, falls under the second alternative.
Courts frame the test in two parts that must concur. Enforcement against the mistaken party must be oppressive, or at least must produce an unconscionably unequal exchange of values, and avoidance must impose no substantial hardship on the other party beyond the loss of the bargain.9 The second part checks the first. When avoidance takes from the other side only the advantage the error created, the other side loses nothing it earned.
Step two is not the materiality inquiry over again. Materiality asks whether the mistake has a material adverse effect on the agreed exchange; this element asks whether that effect is harsh enough to make enforcement unconscionable. The decisions that follow count actual loss.
BMW Financial shows what the requirement excludes. A lender settled a debtor's account for much less than the default judgment against him, because the lender had failed to tag the account as being in litigation, and it later sought to avoid the settlement for mistake. The court contrasted Donovan v. RRL Corp., where a newspaper's proofreading error printed the wrong price for a car: the losses in the cases Donovan cited were actual losses, and the amount the lender gave up here did not reflect one.10 To the extent the lost money reflected penalties and punitive damages, those awards exist to punish and not to make a plaintiff whole, and the court observed that losing the extra cash might make the lender more vigilant in its bookkeeping. The cash might never have been collectable anyway from a debtor who could not make his car lease payments.11 Judgments, the court added, are routinely satisfied by a payment of less than the face amount, the circumstances made such a deal very likely, and California law gives settlements a favored position.12 Unconscionability was not the lender's only obstacle. The court upheld the trial court's finding that it was reasonable to allocate the risk to the lender, whose own failure to tag the account caused the error, and the lender offered no evidence that the other side knew of the judgment.13
Sumerel v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. falls on the other side of the line. The plaintiffs there sought to enforce a settlement figure built on a calculation error by Goodyear's side, which they admitted they knew or had reason to know of. Enforcement would have given them a windfall of more than $550,000 above what the jury had awarded. The court called the agreement oppressive and unconscionable and noted that avoiding it worked no hardship on the plaintiffs, who would receive exactly what they were due. Both conditions courts apply are visible: the burden on the mistaken party was severe, and avoidance cost the other side only the advantage the error had created.14
The two cases differ in the gain at stake. In BMW Financial the 'loss' was money the lender never held and might never have collected. In Sumerel the windfall was money the plaintiffs should never have received. Counting only real loss keeps the doctrine from rescuing parties whose bargains simply earned less than they planned.
Reason to Know
The first limb of § 153(b) is that the other party had reason to know of the mistake.16 The idea is old. Under the generalization that allowed avoidance only for palpable mistakes, the mistake was one the other party knew of or had reason to know of, and relief in those cases was readily available.17 A party who sees, or should see, that an offer rests on an error cannot hold the offeror to it, so the limb turns on what the other party already knew when it accepted. Reason to know is one of two doors under § 153: a party who proves it needs nothing more on the added showing, and a party who cannot may still argue that enforcement would be unconscionable.18
Reason to know takes in more than actual knowledge. The palpable-mistake formulation lists the two together, a mistake the other party 'knows or has reason to know' of, so a party that denies ever suspecting the error can still be charged with the information it held. The inquiry asks what that information would have shown, and not what the party admits to thinking. Other legal systems face the same question about the other party's state of mind. In B2C2 Ltd v. Quoine Pte Ltd, Quoine had reversed seven trades, and it argued in the alternative that, if the reversal breached the contracts, unilateral mistake at common law or in equity made them void or voidable.19 The Restatement asks only whether the other party had reason to know. It does not require proof that the other party actually knew.
In bidding, the information that matters most is the spread of competing bids. A gap of 25 percent, as in the contractor example above, may be enough to supply reason to know. The same gap means little in a field where bids range widely. In Drennan v. Star Paving, a subcontractor's bid was built into a prime contractor's bid and later proved erroneous, and the subcontractor got no relief for unilateral mistake because the bids for the work varied considerably, so the prime contractor had no reason to suspect that the low bid was a mistake. A tight cluster with one outlier exposes the error, and a wide spread hides it.
Construction bids are not the only site of application for unilateral mistake,20 and the same inquiry works elsewhere. Sumerel shows it in a settlement. The plaintiffs admitted they knew or had reason to know that the figure rested on Goodyear's miscalculation, which contradicted the jury's allocation of fault and other calculations in the same documents, and the court held in the alternative that any agreement was voidable for unilateral mistake. The inconsistency was visible in papers the plaintiffs already held.
What the mistaken party has said can also supply information. Before contracting in Renner v. Kehl, the purchasers made it clear to the sellers that they were interested in the unimproved land leases only for cultivating jojoba and required adequate water supplies.21 Sellers told that much know the premise behind the price. Knowing a premise is not the same as having reason to know that it is false, and § 153(b) asks the second question.
Reason to know does not replace the shared elements. The mistaken party must still show that it does not bear the risk under § 154, and courts decide risk by what is reasonable in the circumstances. In one illustration, a builder who agreed to remove gravel at a stated rate bore the risk that part of it lay under water, not because the builder neglected a legal duty but because a builder can reasonably be expected to look over the property first.22 In another, a court could reasonably allocate the risk to a seller on the ground that he was in a better position than the buyer to know what the land contained.23
Fault Causing the Mistake
The second limb of § 153(b) is that the other party's fault caused the mistake.25 Reason to know asks what the other party saw after the error existed. This limb asks how the error came to exist. A party whose own conduct produced the other side's false belief is poorly placed to hold the other side to the bargain. The limb adds to the showing without replacing the rest: the mistake must still concern a basic assumption, hurt the exchange materially, and fall on a party who does not bear the risk.26
Fault does not require intent to deceive. In Alibri v. Detroit Wayne County Stadium Authority, a public authority negotiating to buy land for stadium parking told the owner the property was needed and threatened eminent domain if she refused to sell. The project later changed, and the parking was not needed. The court allowed rescission for innocent misrepresentation even though nothing showed the authority knew its statement was inaccurate. The decision rests on misrepresentation law, but it shows what fault can look like in a mistake case: the owner's false belief came from the authority's own statement, and no one had to prove that the authority knew better.
Mistake and misrepresentation overlap in this way, so the order of analysis matters. The first question in a unilateral-mistake problem is whether the other party induced the mistake. If it did, misrepresentation is a separate defense to examine first, and only a party who cannot establish it is left to prove unilateral mistake.27 Other law may also reach a seller's description. New York, for one, provides that an art merchant who sells to a nonmerchant buyer creates an express warranty if, in describing the work, the merchant identifies it with an author or authorship.28
Errors that did not begin with the other party fall outside the limb, whoever made them. In BMW Financial, the error was attributable solely to the lender's failure to tag the debtor's account,29 and the court said the mistake was the lender's and no one else's.30 A party that generated its own error cannot point to anything the other side did to cause it. The same holds for an error by a third party. In Donovan, a newspaper, an unrelated third party, made the mistake by printing the wrong sale price of a car.31 A party who profits from a mistake it did not produce has not caused it, however large the windfall, and a party who merely noticed the error belongs under the reason-to-know limb. Whether silence can count as producing the other side's error is a question for the duty-to-disclose rules in the next section.
The other party's fault differs from the mistaken party's own carelessness. A mistaken party's negligence bears on who carries the risk and on the balance of the equities. A dealer who did not check its computer's calculations, though it knew the computer had erred before, failed to exercise reasonable care, and the more serious the negligence, the likelier a court is to leave the risk with the party who could have avoided the error by taking greater care.32 Those questions belong to the later treatment of the mistaken party's own fault.