Concept
The Mistaken Party's Own Fault
Unilateral mistake
The Mistaken Party's Own Fault
Mistakes usually trace back to some lapse in care: a figure trusted without checking, a line misread, an item left off a list. Section 157 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts decides what that lapse costs the party who made it. A mistaken party's fault in failing to know or discover the facts before making the contract does not bar avoidance or reformation, unless the fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.1 Fault is no bar, in short, unless it amounts to a failure of good faith.
That rule does not make fault irrelevant. Section 157 answers one question only: whether fault by itself defeats relief. Elsewhere in the analysis, the presence and degree of the mistaken party's negligence bear on whether that party carries the risk of the mistake, and carelessness too slight to shift the risk can still tip the balance of the equities against avoidance.2 The good-faith exception sits inside § 157 itself. The common error is to treat negligence as a single switch that either defeats relief or does not. The steps below keep its separate roles apart.
Carelessness Alone Is Not a Bar
Carelessness accompanies nearly every mistake, and a rule that disqualified careless claimants would leave the doctrine almost nothing to do. Section 157 therefore does not ask whether the mistaken party was free of negligence. It asks only whether the party's fault amounted to a failure of good faith and fair dealing.3
The case law agrees, though its vocabulary is messier. Many opinions say the error must not have been negligent, but the holdings turn on negligence of a particular sort, and courts have floundered over distinctions between 'culpable' and ordinary negligence and between 'bad faith' and 'good faith' negligence. The better question, as in tort law, is whether the carelessness injured the other party.4 Where the test is whether the mistaken party neglected a legal duty, the Donovan decision explains mainly what that is not: it is not ordinary carelessness or negligence, and it is not necessarily the violation of a statute.5 Extreme negligence is the exception those cases leave open.6
Contract law also has little interest in punishing a party for a harmless error, however foolish it looks. A party who proves a clerical error may treat its own negligence in making it as irrelevant, unless that negligence was extreme.7 'Harmless' is the key word. Ben and Margaret Altruist meant to send a zoo $130 and sent $93,447 instead, because their computer put their ZIP code where the dollar amount belonged. They recovered part of the money, but the zoo had spent some of it, and that spending is a good defense to their claim if the zoo reasonably was unaware that the amount was a mistake.8 The harm to the zoo, not the donors' carelessness, kept part of the money out of their hands.
In DePrince v. Starboard Cruise Services, Inc., salespeople at a jewelry store aboard a cruise ship sold a diamond far below its intended price after misreading the price, an error careless on any view. The trial judge told the jury to consider the store's negligence along with whether the buyers could be returned to their earlier position and whether enforcement would be inequitable, and the jury found for the store. Negligence entered as one consideration in a weighing, not as a bar, which matches the general approach of balancing a mistaken party's carelessness against the other side's justifiable reliance.9
Fault and Risk Allocation
Fault does its most direct work in the element that asks whether the mistaken party bears the risk of the mistake. In a unilateral case, allocating that risk raises the same questions of interpretation and construction as in mutual mistake, but the mistaken party's negligence in causing the error plays an even stronger role, because that party is most likely the one who had to ascertain the correct facts. Negligence does not invariably preclude relief, but its presence and degree are highly relevant.11 A court may also place the risk on the mistaken party when it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.12
Bert Allen Toyota, Inc. v. Grasz is the standard illustration. A dealer's computer miscalculated a price, and the court refused avoidance because the dealer failed to exercise reasonable care when it did not check the computer's calculations, especially since it knew the computer had made errors before.13 The refusal belongs to the risk element. A dealer that ignored a known weakness in its own process was the party who could have avoided the error by taking greater care, so the loss fell on it. The case does not show that negligence alone bars avoidance, a proposition § 157 rejects, and a student who writes that the dealer lost 'because it was negligent' has named the wrong doctrine. The more serious the negligence, whether gross negligence, recklessness, or dereliction of a duty owed to the other party, the likelier a court is to place the risk on the party who could have avoided the error.14
Allocation by the court does not require a breach of duty. In the Restatement's gravel illustration, a landowner and a builder contract to remove gravel at a stated rate per cubic yard, and neither knows that part of the gravel lies under water and costs more to remove. The court allocates the risk to the builder, not because the builder neglected a legal duty, but because it is reasonable to expect a builder to look over the property before contracting.15 BMW Financial Services NA, LLC v. Deloach reasons the same way. The court upheld the finding that allocating the risk to BMW Financial was reasonable, because the error was attributable solely to BMW Financial's failure to tag Deloach's account as being in litigation, and BMW Financial offered no evidence that Firstsource or either Deloach knew of the default judgment when settlement negotiations began.16
Fault and the Equities
Carelessness too slight to move the risk can still matter in the balance of the equities. Even when the sloppiness falls short of deciding the case on risk allocation, the mistaken party's fault can tip the balance toward the other party.18 The balance has its own section below, so the question here is how much weight fault carries on the scale. Relative economic impact is relevant but may not be weighty enough to decide the matter, and relative blame and innocence count as well.19
Bill's bid was too low because he miscalculated it, and Reliabuild, a prime contractor, accepted it. His carelessness must be weighed against Reliabuild's justifiable reliance on his commitment. If Reliabuild, as an experienced prime contractor, should have realized the bid was too low, it has no legitimate reliance interest and may even be guilty of fraudulent nondisclosure for keeping silent and seizing on the error. The facts leave open whether Reliabuild acted in bad faith in accepting a bid it knew or should have known was incorrectly calculated.20 The mistaken party's fault is thus weighed against the other party's reliance, and that reliance shrinks when the other party knew or should have known of the error.
Manny, who ordered a painting from the wrong artist, shows the same weighing from the losing side. Even if the other elements are satisfied, he is likely to lose on risk allocation and the equities, because he had ready access to information and advice and should have proceeded more carefully before committing himself. Nothing suggests that Leonardo had reason to suspect an error and exploited it, and Leonardo has a legitimate reliance interest worth protecting.21 Courts also deny relief when the mistaken party had easy access to the information about which it was mistaken.22
The Good-Faith Bar
The last route is the exception written into § 157 itself: fault bars relief when it amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.24 The text points at the mistaken party's conduct in failing to know or discover the facts before the contract was made, and it asks what kind of conduct that was. The inquiry differs from the one on risk allocation, where the seriousness of the negligence counts. Here the question is whether the fault amounts to a failure of good faith and fair dealing.
Courts have not always kept the distinction clear. Efforts to sort negligence into 'culpable' and ordinary kinds, or into 'bad faith' and 'good faith' kinds, have left the cases confused, and the Restatement's own wording is the safer guide.25
What separates the two bidders is not the size of the error but what each did toward the owner.