Concept
Typical Mistake Settings
Unilateral mistake
Typical Mistake Settings
Claims of unilateral mistake cluster in three settings, and the setting goes a long way toward predicting the result. The first is the mechanical slip: a wrong total, a transposed digit, a figure typed into the wrong field. The second is a bid or quoted price built on such a slip or on a misreading of the specifications, the fact pattern in which relief is most often sought.1 The third is a wrong estimate of what something is worth or what work will cost. Courts generally grant relief for the first, grant it on conditions for the second, and refuse it for the third.
All three claims run the same test. The mistake must concern a basic assumption and have a material adverse effect on the exchange; the mistaken party must not bear the risk under § 154; and that party must show either that enforcement would be unconscionable or that the other side had reason to know of the mistake or caused it.2 The settings part company at two points: whether the claimant can prove an inadvertent error, and whether it bears the risk of that error. A slip can be proved and seldom reflects a risk its maker chose to take. A misjudgment fails on both counts, because the party that misjudged usually either went ahead knowing its information was limited or is the party a court finds it reasonable to hold responsible.3
One question comes before the test. If the other party induced the mistake, misrepresentation may supply a defense, and the claimant is confined to unilateral mistake only when it does not.4
Clerical and Computational Errors
A clerical or computational error is the claim that fits § 153 most easily, because it matches the definition of a mistake exactly: a belief that is not in accord with the facts.5 A seller who adds three prices on an adding machine and quotes $37 believes the total is $37, and the correct total is $127. No one needs an expert to see the gap, since adding the column again proves it.
Rescission is the usual remedy. Contract law generally grants it for unilateral clerical errors, provided the error is readily provable.6 If the buyer, Alice, reasonably did not realize the figure was wrong and has not acted on it, the seller can cancel the sale and return both sides to where they began. Reformation answers a different sequence. Suppose the seller and Alice had agreed on $127 before the arithmetic error reached the written price, and Alice now insists on the $37. The seller can ask the court to rewrite the contract to state the price actually agreed, because contract law enforces the contract the parties intended to make, not the one that results from a failure to record its terms correctly.7
Errors that are clerical without being numerical get the same treatment. A buyer agrees to purchase the contents of boxcar #306 at a price that assumes it holds soybeans, but the car holds gold bars. The seller meant boxcar #206, the soybean car, and the buyer understood that. No sensible rule would deny the seller rescission or reformation, for a contrary rule would turn administrative and quasi-clerical errors into forfeitures and would make sense only if law were a mindless ritual.8
Three features explain the courts’ sympathy, and a claim that the price was misjudged has none of them. The first is proof: the correct figure can be recomputed, and the clerical error must be readily provable.9 The second is fault. If the claimant proves a clerical error, its negligence in making the error is irrelevant unless extreme, because contract law does not punish parties for harmless errors, even stupid ones.10 Section 157 states the general rule: a mistaken party’s fault in failing to know or discover the facts does not bar avoidance unless it amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.11 The third is consequence. Refusing relief for a slip would convert it into a forfeiture, as the boxcar example shows.12 Electronic tools have not retired the problem, because the age of computers may bring more clerical errors, not fewer.13
The decisions follow the pattern. In First Baptist Church of Moultrie v. Barber Contracting Co. a contractor made a $118,776 error in adding the cost of materials on its work sheets, and the Georgia Court of Appeals granted rescission.14 A contractor who inadvertently omits a major cost item from the total of a winning bid fares the same way. Courts almost always let it rescind or reform on the ground that enforcement would be unconscionable, provided it acts before the other side has relied on the contract in some substantial way.15
The first limit on relief is proof. When the real reason a party seeks relief is that it now sees the price was too high or too low, it has made an error of judgment, and contract law should not grant relief for that; people would hesitate to make and rely on contracts if the other side could leave them too easily.16
Reliance supplies the second limit. A couple meant to send a zoo a $130 donation, but their computer placed their ZIP code where the dollar amount belonged, and the check went out for $93,447. They recovered some of the money, but the zoo had spent part of it, and that is a good defense to their unilateral mistake claim if the zoo reasonably was unaware that the amount was a mistake. The zoo apparently received many large donations, even ones with odd amounts.17 A bank that credited a real estate agent’s account with $50 billion in what it called a technical glitch stands differently. The deposit was too good to be true, so the agent would have to return it even if he had spent it, because spending it would not be reasonable.18 Reasonable ignorance of the error is what protects a recipient. That is the inquiry § 153 makes when it treats the other party’s reason to know of the mistake as an alternative route to relief,19 and it explains why the same slip produces opposite results depending on what the recipient could see.
Run through § 153, a slip supplies the basic assumption, and the material adverse effect follows when the error is large against the contract. The risk rules seldom reach the slip’s maker, because each route to bearing a risk (agreement, conscious ignorance, or a court’s judgment that it is reasonable) depends on a choice, a recognized gap in knowledge, or a reason to put the loss on that party,20 and a plain slip usually involves none of them. The added showing then comes from the unconscionable effect of enforcement21 or from the other party’s reason to know of the error.22
Mistaken Construction Bids
Construction bidding gives unilateral mistake its heaviest use. A mistaken bid by a construction contractor, usually caused by computational error or misconstruction of the invitation to bid, is the most frequent fact pattern in which relief is sought.24 The law has moved in this setting. Decades ago relief generally required that the error be palpable, meaning known or obvious to the party receiving the bid. Modern cases permit relief even for an impalpable mistake, and relief has gone even to a mortgagee whose agent mistakenly underbid at a foreclosure auction. Liberally applied, such a rule would erode, if not swamp, the prevailing objective theory of contracts, and the limits courts have attached to relief are what hold that risk in check.25
Three limits recur. First, relief is unavailable unless the agreement is entirely executory or the other party can be returned to the status quo ante. Second, the mistake must be vital: one large enough to be obvious is classified as palpable and relief comes easily, one that is not substantial gets none, and an impalpable mistake must be substantial but not astronomical. In the bidding cases the test of substantiality is probably met when the mistake swallows up the profit built into the bid. Third, the mistake must be a clerical or computational error or a misconstruction of the specifications or something of that sort, since avoidance is not allowed for a mistake of judgment. Many cases add that the error should not have been negligent.26 The Restatement treats carelessness less strictly: fault does not bar avoidance unless it amounts to bad faith, although serious negligence bears on risk and on the equities.27
Each limit lines up with a part of §§ 153 and 154, so a bid problem is best run as a sequence of questions.
The first two steps establish a mistake worth hearing, and the last three allocate the loss. Size also works differently at the top of the range than students expect. An error large enough to be obvious is palpable and earns relief easily, so the ceiling applies only to the impalpable error the owner could not see.33
In Wil-Fred’s, Inc. v. Metropolitan Sanitary District the Sanitary District solicited bids for rehabilitation work at a water reclamation plant, and Wil-Fred’s bid $882,600 with a $100,000 deposit. Its price rested in material part on an excavating subcontractor’s bid that was $150,000 too low because the subcontractor had misunderstood the specifications. The bidding documents said the bid could not be cancelled or withdrawn and that the District would keep the deposit as liquidated damages if the winning bidder failed to perform, and Wil-Fred’s had certified that it had examined the contract documents and made the investigation needed to bid. The court granted relief anyway.34 The mistake concerned a material part of the contract, Wil-Fred’s had used reasonable care, having dealt with the subcontractor for years without problem, and forfeiting the deposit would have cut its bonding capacity. The District had not changed its position and could be restored to the status quo, and the $235,775 gap between Wil-Fred’s bid and the next lowest should have put it on notice of a material mistake.35
Each of those facts answers a different part of the test. The error’s size against the bid and the cost of forfeiture speak to material effect and unconscionable enforcement. The years of trouble-free dealing speak to the bidder’s care and, through it, to the risk. The $235,775 gap speaks to reason to know, and the District’s unchanged position speaks to the equities. The firm-bid language and the certification were the District’s best argument that Wil-Fred’s had taken the risk by agreement under § 154(a), and the court granted relief despite them.36
Handle Construction Co. v. Norcon, Inc. came out the other way. A subcontractor there underbid by about $140,000 after submitting its bid with knowledge that its information was incomplete, and the Alaska Supreme Court denied relief, finding that a 35 percent differential from the next lowest bid was too small to put the contractor on notice of a mistake.37 The two decisions differ on nearly every factor, and the differences sort cleanly. In Wil-Fred’s the error was a misreading of the specifications by a subcontractor with a clean record, the kind of slip a careful bidder cannot easily prevent. In Handle the subcontractor had made a choice, because it bid while aware that its estimate rested on incomplete information, and a party that treats limited knowledge as sufficient takes the risk of being wrong.38 The bid gaps point the same way: one owner was on notice, and the other had no signal that anything was wrong. The Wil-Fred’s bidder offered a slip, a gap that put the owner on notice, and an owner who could be restored; the Handle bidder offered a known gamble and a counterparty with no reason to suspect an error.
Reliance separates a harmless withdrawal from a harmful one. Avoidance returns both sides to where they stood before the contract. That is simple while the owner has done nothing but accept the bid and impossible once it has acted on the bid in ways that cannot be undone, which is why relief requires that the other party be capable of restoration to the status quo ante39 and why the bidder who acts before the other side has relied in some substantial way has the better claim.40
Carelessness works through risk and the equities, not as a separate bar. The more serious the negligence, whether gross negligence, recklessness, or dereliction of a duty owed to the other party, the likelier a court is to leave the risk with the party who could have avoided the error by taking greater care, and carelessness can also tip the balance of the equities apart from risk allocation. In one case a dealer failed to exercise reasonable care when it did not check its computer’s calculations, especially because it knew the computer had made errors before.41
A bidder whose careless error leads an innocent party with no reason to suspect it to commit to others has the weakest claim of all, and the weakness grows with the other side’s reliance.42 The same reasoning protects an owner from a general contractor that built its bid on a subcontractor’s mistaken figure. In one worked example, enforcing the bid would severely diminish the general contractor’s profits, but nonenforcement would deprive the owner of its bargain to the same extent, and the owner had a strong reliance interest. The risk belonged with the general contractor, who selected and dealt with the subcontractor; the owner had no direct contact with him, no means of evaluating his bid, and no role in releasing him.43
Errors of Judgment
A claimant who proves it was wrong about something has not yet proved a mistake the law will relieve. The traditional statement is that avoidance is not allowed for a mistake of judgment.45 Courts have often drawn the line between clerical errors and other mistakes of fact, which can support relief, and mistakes of judgment, which cannot. The Restatement does not use that distinction, although it can bear on the allocation of risk, and recent decisions look instead to the strength of the proof that the claimant made a genuine, identifiable mistake about a basic assumption of the contract.46 The label therefore forecasts the result without supplying the reasoning, and a claim of this kind fails by one of two routes.
The first route is the definition. A mistake is a belief that is not in accord with the facts,47 and a misjudgment about future cost involves no such belief. Take a mover who agrees to haul a pile of dirt for a set price. If the mover thought the pile held 800 yards and it holds 1,000, that is a mistake of fact, although whether it excuses performance is a further question. If the pile holds the 800 yards the mover expected but hauling it costs more than the price, the mover has no mistaken belief about the facts, only a misjudgment.48
The second route applies when the claimant can name an existing fact it got wrong, such as the true value of what it sold. The claim then reaches § 154, and the party that acted on its own appraisal usually bears the risk, either because it knew its knowledge was limited and treated it as sufficient49 or because a court finds it reasonable to leave the loss with it.50 A landowner and a builder agree to remove gravel at a stated price per cubic yard, and, unknown to both, part of the gravel lies under water and costs more to remove. The court allocates the risk to the builder, not because the builder neglected a legal duty but because it is reasonable to expect a builder to look over the property before contracting.51
The reasoning is economic. A dealer deciding whether to hire extra staff to check appraisals weighs the cost against the errors the staff would catch, and sensibly declines if the cost exceeds the expected benefit. Having made that choice, the dealer cannot also call a rare bad appraisal a mistake and rescind, because rescission would give it the proceeds of “misappraisal insurance” for which it never paid a premium.52 Where the goods are particularized but appraising their value is the seller’s professional task, the better view puts the loss on the seller.53
The label ‘bore the risk’ sometimes covers a different rationale. A shrewd purchaser who has run geological tests on neighboring tracts buys a farmer’s 100 acres at a price that reflects the farmer’s assumption that the land is good for farming only, and the land in fact holds valuable minerals. The farmer cannot rescind, and courts commonly say he bore the risk, although he could hardly have run the same tests himself.54 The sounder reason is incentive. The purchaser performs a socially valuable service when he surveys and must be rewarded for his time and effort, and a rule that made him share his discovery would discourage the investment, leaving us with more lettuce and tomatoes but less copper and sulfur than we want.55
Judgments about quality and suitability follow the same logic. In one sale of leases on unimproved land near Yuma, Arizona, the purchasers made it clear to the sellers that they wanted the property only for growing jojoba and required adequate water supplies.56 Stating the purpose aloud makes the buyers’ premise easy to establish as a basic assumption. It does not settle who bears the risk if the premise fails, and a buyer that goes ahead knowing its information about the water is limited is the party § 154(b) describes.57
Bidding shows the line most clearly, because the same shortfall can come from two places. A contractor whose total omits a major cost item can ordinarily rescind or reform if it acts before the other side relies in some substantial way. A contractor whose total includes every item but underestimated the cost of material and labor is bound, because its ‘mistake’ is a business misjudgment.58 The shortfalls can match in dollars, so size cannot separate them; what separates them is what the contractor did with the cost. In the first case it never decided to carry the omitted item, and the price misrecords its own estimate. In the second it decided how much the work would cost and priced accordingly, and a court asking who was better placed to know what the work would cost is likely to put the loss on the party that plans the crews and orders the materials.
Proof points the same way. A slip leaves a trail, such as a worksheet whose lines add up to more than the bid. A misjudgment leaves only the claimant’s word that it would have judged differently, and when the real reason a party seeks relief is the realization that the price was too high or too low, contract law should not grant it.59
The seller has an argument, because the buyer’s reason to know of her mistake is one route to the added unilateral showing.60 That argument supplies one element of § 153 and leaves the rest open. She must still show that she does not bear the risk under § 154, and a court is likely to place the loss on an owner who chose the price of her own car without checking its value.61 The buyer’s greater knowledge does not reverse that result by itself, for the reason that lets a purchaser keep a mineral discovery: he earned what he knows.62
The duty to disclose can still arise in a unilateral mistake situation, and the extreme case shows how. A buyer pays $35 at a yard sale for a bowl he knows is a rare antique worth more than $700,000 and says nothing. The seller reasonably did not know the bowl’s value, because she probably thought the items at her sale were junk, and she should be able to rescind and recover the bowl.63 The coupe seller is differently placed, since she could have learned what her car was worth before she named a price.