Concept
Balancing the Equities
Unilateral mistake
Balancing the Equities
Section 153 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts lists what a mistaken party must show, and weighing the equities is not on the list. The mistaken party must establish an error about a basic assumption, a material adverse effect on the exchange, no allocation of the risk to that party under § 154, and either an unconscionable result or the other party's reason to know of the mistake or fault in causing it.1 Yet the law of mistake grew up in courts of equity and is still applied as a matter of equity, so fault, good faith, unconscionability, and general fairness shape the outcome although no element names them.2 Some treatments add the balance as a fifth element: the equities must favor relief, and the degree to which the first four elements are satisfied is a vital component of the balance.3 Whether it is called an element or a judgment, the balance is where close cases get decided.
The balance weighs heavily in a unilateral case because the error touched only one party's assent. The other party's assent was sound, so the law emphasizes protection of its reliance more strongly, and relief follows only if the equities favoring release of the mistaken party outweigh the need to uphold the other party's reasonable expectations.4 The contrast with mutual mistake is smaller than it first appears, since the elements of mutual mistake also take account of the reliance of the party against whom avoidance is sought.5 In either setting the question is who should absorb a loss between two parties, and avoidance is the act that moves it. Courts generally allow avoidance when enforcement would be oppressive to the mistaken party, or would at least produce an unconscionably unequal exchange, and avoidance would impose no substantial hardship on the other party beyond the loss of its bargain.6 Where the other party stands to lose more than a bargain, avoidance shifts the loss from the party who erred to one who did not, and the case for release weakens.
The first question measures what the other party stands to lose, and the limit is firmest when the mistake is one the other party could not have spotted. Such an impalpable mistake supports relief only if the agreement is entirely executory or the other party can be placed in the status quo ante, and the mistake must also be vital. A mistake large enough that it should be obvious counts as palpable, and relief then comes easily; a mistake that is not substantial earns none, so an impalpable mistake must be substantial but not astronomical.7
The second question asks whether reliance is reasonable, because reliance earns protection only while it is. In the treatise's hypothetical, Bill carelessly underbid and the prime contractor, Reliabuild, accepted his figure. Bill's carelessness must be weighed against Reliabuild's justifiable reliance, and the weighing turns on a fact the hypothetical leaves open: whether Reliabuild, as an experienced prime contractor, should have realized that the bid was too low. If it should have, Reliabuild has no legitimate reliance interest, and by keeping silent and seizing on the erroneous bid it may even have been guilty of fraudulent nondisclosure.8 The facts given do not show whether Reliabuild accepted a bid it knew or should have known was miscalculated, so the question stays open.9
The same inquiry decides the case of Ben and Margaret Altruist, who meant to give a zoo $130 but sent a check for $93,447 because their computer printed their ZIP code where the amount belonged. They recovered part of the money, but the zoo had spent some of it, and that is a good defense to their claim as to the spent portion if the zoo reasonably was unaware that the amount was a mistake. The zoo had little reason to suspect an error, since it apparently received many large donations, even ones with odd amounts.10 What the other party saw, or should have seen, when it accepted therefore decides whether its reliance counts, and the reason-to-know limb of § 153 makes the same inquiry an element.11
Two equally careless claimants make the contrast concrete. A jewelry store's clerk prices a diamond at a twentieth of its value, and the buyers see the error and say nothing. A subcontractor underbids a job, and a prime contractor with no reason to suspect the figure builds it into its own bid and commits to the owner. Because the carelessness is the same, it cannot explain a difference in outcome. The buyers knew of the mistake, which satisfies the reason-to-know limb outright, and a refund returns them to where they stood, so they lose only an unexpectedly generous bargain.12 The prime contractor is innocent and has acted on the bid, so avoidance would shift the loss to someone who did nothing wrong.13 The store stands on far firmer ground, although gross carelessness on its part could still matter.
Fault does double duty. The more serious the negligence, whether gross negligence, recklessness, or dereliction of a duty owed to the other party, the likelier the court is to place the risk on the party who could have avoided the error by taking greater care. A dealer that did not check its computer's calculations, knowing the computer had erred before, failed to exercise reasonable care.14 The risk can also fall on a party who breached no duty. In the gravel illustration, part of the gravel lay under water, which made it costlier to remove, and the court allocates that cost to the builder. It does so not because the builder neglected a legal duty but because it is reasonable to expect a builder to have looked over the property before contracting.15 BMW Financial's mistake was likewise its own: the trial court found it reasonable to allocate the risk to the lender when the error came solely from its failure to tag the debtor's account as being in litigation and nothing showed that the other side knew of the default judgment when settlement negotiations began.16
Fault too mild to settle the risk question still counts in the balance, because carelessness short of serious negligence can tip the equities toward the other party.17 It does not, however, bar avoidance automatically. A mistaken party's failure to know or discover the facts before contracting is no bar unless the fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.18
Relative hardship rounds out the scale. The court sets the hardship of enforcement on the mistaken party against the hardship of avoidance on the other party, and it counts economic consequences along with relative innocence and fault.19 A heavy loss to the mistaken party does not settle the matter alone, because the relative economic impact may not be weighty enough to be the overriding factor. In Bill's case the loss must still be set against Reliabuild's justifiable reliance.20 The balance works the same way whether the error concerns fact or law. Early cases assumed that everyone knows the law and refused relief for mistakes about it, but modern cases treat a mistaken understanding of the law as analogous to a mistake of fact, so it can support relief if the other requirements are met.21
Because the Restatement lists no separate balancing element, an answer built on it should assign each fact to the element it serves and use the balance to reconcile a close result. The mistaken party's fault, the other party's reliance, and the fairness of leaving the loss where it fell all bear on the risk question, where a court may place the risk on a party when it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so.22 The size of the loss and the burden of avoidance on the other side bear on unconscionability, which courts commonly pair with the hardship test.23 Counting one fact under several labels overstates it. A court also has room to soften an all-or-nothing choice: it may order avoidance on condition that the mistaken party pay the reliance expenses needed to restore the other party to its earlier position.24 The next section turns to what avoidance and restitution then involve.