Concept
Related Doctrines Compared
Misunderstanding
Related Doctrines Compared
Section 20 asks a formation question: did these parties assent to the same exchange? When they attach materially different meanings to their manifestations, the answer turns on notice. If neither party knows or has reason to know the other's meaning, or if each does, there is no mutual assent.1 If only one party is on notice, the manifestations operate according to the meaning of the party who was not.2
Two neighboring doctrines resemble this one from the outside. Mistake also arises when a bargain goes wrong over something a party failed to anticipate, and interpretation also asks what a term means. But mistake asks whether a party may avoid a bargain, while interpretation asks whose meaning the bargain carries, and a problem sent to the wrong doctrine meets the wrong question. Mistake comes first below.
Misunderstanding Versus Mistake
The two doctrines locate the error in different places. In a misunderstanding, the error lies in the words: they reasonably point to two things, and each party assents to a different one. In a mistake, the parties attach the same meaning to the words, but one or both hold what the Restatement calls “a belief that is not in accord with the facts.”3 The first problem can prevent a contract from forming, as § 20(1) provides.4 The second leaves a contract that, in the right circumstances, the adversely affected party may avoid.5
Raffles v. Wichelhaus is the model of a misunderstanding. The buyers pleaded that they meant the Peerless that sailed from Bombay in October, and that the seller offered only 125 bales of Surat cotton that arrived on another, different ship, which was also called the Peerless.6 Both ships existed, and the dispute concerned which one the name referred to. Each party was reasonable in believing that the agreement referred to its own ship, and neither had reason to know of the other's contrary understanding, so no objective criterion could decide which ship was intended and no contract on reasonable terms could be established.7 That is the result § 20 prescribes when the double meaning cannot be settled by the most reasonable reading and the parties are equally blameless.8
Mistake looks different. Suppose a buyer agrees to buy the contents of boxcar #306 at a price that reflects the assumption that it carries soybeans, when it in fact carries gold bars. If the seller can show that both he and the buyer meant boxcar #206, the one that holds the soybeans, no sensible legal rule would deny him the right to rescind or reform the contract.9 The parties' meanings did not diverge. What failed was a belief about the world, and the law needs a doctrine of mistake for that failure. Even a commentator who finds the decision in Sherwood v. Walker hard to accept, taking the facts as the court presented them, insists: “Certainly we must have a doctrine of ‘mistake.’”10
A mistake is not an easy exit, however. Everyone who breaches a contract in some sense erred by entering it, so letting any mistake justify avoidance would effectively eliminate contractual enforcement; a mistake counts only when coupled with other circumstances.11 For mutual mistake, Restatement § 152, read with §§ 151 and 154, makes the contract avoidable by the adversely affected party only if its prerequisites are satisfied. Allocation of risk is often dispositive: no matter how serious the error, a party who bore the risk of the mistake cannot avoid the contract.12 Section 20 has no such inquiry. It asks only what each party meant and what each knew or had reason to know.
Courts resist both exits. A court that confronts a true misunderstanding usually chooses one of the intended meanings and enforces the contract, and a holding that no contract exists is the occasional result.13 The law is equally slow to release a party who later regrets a deal and views it, in effect, as a mistake.14
The sorting question, then, is whether the parties attached the same meaning to the disputed words.
The second step does most of the sorting. A shared false belief about an identified thing sends the analysis to mistake, and words that reasonably name two things send it to § 20.
Misunderstanding Versus Interpretation
Section 201 poses the same problem to a court that is interpreting a term. When the parties have attached different meanings, the term takes the meaning of one party if, at the time of the agreement, that party did not know of the other's different meaning and the other knew the first party's, or if the first party had no reason to know of the other's meaning and the other had reason to know the first party's.17 Those two clauses track § 20(2)(a) and (b) nearly word for word, with “interpreted” standing in for “operative.”18
Section 201(3) supplies the residue. Except as the section states, neither party is bound by the meaning the other attached, “even though the result may be a failure of mutual assent.”19 The residue covers the symmetrical cases that § 20(1) names, in which neither party or each party was on notice.20 The two sections therefore apply one test. A material misunderstanding precludes formation when the parties were equally innocent in not realizing it, or equally guilty in realizing it and saying nothing. If one party is more accountable than the other for knowing of the misunderstanding, a contract exists on the terms the more innocent party understood.21
In practice, courts usually pick one of the intended meanings and enforce the contract.22 They also need not choose between the parties' accounts. In a complex deal each side may offer a detailed, self-serving account of its subjective intention on many points, and a court may find that the manifested intention each party should reasonably have understood differs somewhat from the subjective intent of either.23
A shared meaning ends the inquiry before notice becomes relevant. Under § 201(1), if both parties in fact attach the same meaning to a provision, that meaning governs, even when it differs from the interpretation a reasonable person would give.24 A court that had held a lease amendment's rent-escalation clause ambiguous, and so open to more than one reasonable meaning, still invoked this rule.25 Ambiguity is not misunderstanding: the § 20 problem arises only when the parties actually attach different meanings.
Raffles v. Wichelhaus had no equivalent of the tour. Neither party had reason to know of the other's understanding, so nothing tipped the balance, and the principle of Raffles, as § 20 embodies it, yields no contract.26 A modern court reached the same result in Stitch Ranch v. Double B.J. Farms.
Notice is the variable both sections measure, and it decides whether a case ends in a failure of assent or an enforced contract. On an exam, the posture of the problem selects the label. A party who argues that no contract formed invokes § 20, and a party who concedes a contract but disputes what a term means invokes § 201. The findings are the same in either setting.