Concept
Concealment and Misleading Conduct
Fraud, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure
Concealment and Misleading Conduct
A seller can mislead a buyer without telling a lie. A representation usually consists of oral or written words, but conduct intended as an assertion of fact may amount to the same thing.1 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the principle for conduct that hides a fact: action intended or known to be likely to prevent another from learning a fact is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist.2 The second way to mislead without lying is the half-truth, a statement that is accurate in itself but leaves a false impression. Each is a misrepresentation, and each can support a misrepresentation defense, subject to the further requirements that later sections of this chapter take up. Neither is silence, which the next section addresses, because in each the party has done something to shape what the other believes.
Concealment by Conduct
A seller who paints over water stains to hide a leaking roof has concealed the leak, and the fresh paint says as plainly as words that the roof is sound.3 The rule gives two routes to that result. The act may be intended to prevent discovery, or it may only be known to be likely to prevent discovery. A seller who understands that a coat of paint will hide the stain cannot escape by claiming that the real purpose was to freshen the room.
The rule matters most where the law otherwise leaves buyers to look out for themselves. In a minority of jurisdictions, caveat emptor still reigns, and a seller who stays silent owes no duty to disclose even a latent defect, so the buyer must inspect all the more carefully. Even there, a seller cannot mislead the buyer by affirmatively misrepresenting facts or actively concealing them, and a buyer of defective premises may still sue for fraudulent misrepresentation.4 Concealment therefore stands apart from silence. The seller who hides the defect has acted to produce a false belief, and the law treats that act as it would treat a statement.
The cases cover a wide range of goods and property. A dealer in Osborn v. Gene Teague Chevrolet Co. set a used car's odometer back from 100,000 to 62,000 miles without saying a word, and the buyer's fraud verdict was sustained. In Croyle v. Moses the seller hitched his horse short to conceal that the animal was a cribber and a windsucker, and that too was fraud.5 Turning back an odometer, exhibiting a document without authority, and packaging, arranging, or camouflaging goods to conceal a known defect are no less misrepresentations than words to the same effect.6 Real-property disputes follow the same pattern, as in Jablonski v. Rapalje and Weintraub v. Krobatsch, where the sellers allegedly masked an infestation while the house was shown.
Students often analyze concealment as a failure to disclose and then ask whether the seller owed a duty to speak. That question fits the first seller and misses the second. Mere nondisclosure is traditionally not a representation, which keeps every failure to warn from becoming a misrepresentation automatically.7 Painting over the defect is different because it is an act, and the buyer need not find a separate duty to speak before the act counts. Silence becomes actionable only where such a duty exists, and numerous cases hold that a seller of goods, lands, or securities must disclose latent defects.8 The next section takes up those duties.
Proving concealment does not finish the case. The buyer must still show that the concealment induced the agreement, and what inducement requires depends on the theory. In a threat case, for example, the victim must show that under all the circumstances it had no reasonable alternative but to acquiesce.9 Later sections of this chapter state the inducement and reliance requirements that govern a misrepresentation.
Half-Truths
A half-truth is a statement that is literally true as to the fact stated but produces a false implication about other facts, and it supports a misrepresentation defense. A dog seller who says the dog ate well last night has made a half-truth, and it is a misrepresentation if the dog later became so sick that the veterinarian pumped its stomach.11 A listener takes a statement in context, as the answer to a question or as part of a pitch, and draws from it everything it fairly conveys. When that message is false, the statement misleads in the only way that matters to the person who relies on it.
A half-truth can mislead more than an outright falsehood. A buyer looking at a used vehicle asks how the brakes are. The seller, whose technician told him last week that the brakes were very dangerous and needed urgent repair, answers, "I just had them checked last week." The statement is factually correct, yet it is more misleading and potentially more dangerous than the flat answer "I don't know," because ignorance might at least send the buyer off to investigate.12 The half-truth therefore does the same work as the paint over the stain, since it shuts down the buyer's own inquiry. The same words from a seller whose technician had found the brakes sound would imply nothing false, so the words alone do not decide the case. The gap between the picture the words create and the facts the speaker knows does.
A party who chooses to speak about a subject must disclose enough to keep the statement from becoming incomplete and misleading. The statement "This car was driven only by a sweet little old grandmother" is a misrepresentation unless the seller also discloses that she drove it in stock car races.13 Kannavos v. Annino applies the principle to a land sale. The vendors' advertising, statements, and conduct conveyed that the property was multi-family housing suitable for investment that could continue to be used for that purpose. Because the vendors did as much as they did, they were bound to do more, and having failed to do so they were responsible for misrepresentation.14 The vendors had done more than stay silent, which separates the case from bare nondisclosure of the kind in Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank.
Two boundaries mark the edges of the doctrine. A statement that was accurate when made but is later overtaken by events raises a different question, the duty to speak, because a party who knows the other is relying on a statement must disclose the truth.15 The half-truth also concerns existing facts. Fraud is not usually predicated on a promise of future action, though such a promise can qualify as fraudulent if, when made, the promisor had no intention of keeping it, a point the chapter returns to under statements of intention.16