Concept
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Fraud, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
Section 164(1) makes a contract voidable when the other party's fraudulent or material misrepresentation induced the recipient's assent and the recipient was justified in relying on it.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162(1) defines the fraudulent kind. A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends the assertion to induce the recipient to manifest assent and the maker also has one of three culpable states of mind.2 Under clause (a), the maker knows or believes that the assertion is not in accord with the facts.3 Under clause (b), the maker lacks the confidence in its truth that he states or implies.4 Under clause (c), the maker knows that he lacks the basis he states or implies for the assertion.5
The two parts of the definition do different work. The intent requirement ties the statement to the bargain: the maker must have meant the assertion to move the other party toward agreement, so a false remark in idle conversation does not qualify. The state-of-mind requirement separates deliberate deception from honest error. Section 159 reaches any assertion that is not in accord with the facts,6 but fraud requires a maker who knows, or pretends to know, what he does not. The three clauses echo the classic tort test of scienter from Derry v. Peek, an action against the chairman and directors of a tramways company for fraudulent misrepresentations that induced the plaintiff to take shares.7 That test asks whether the representation was made knowingly, without belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.8 The clauses run from the plain lie to subtler cases, in which the maker never lies about a fact but misstates how much he knows or how sure he is.
The clauses also explain results reached earlier in the chapter. A promise supports a fraud claim when the promisor, at the moment of promising, had no intention of keeping it, because the promise carries an implied assertion of present intent that the promisor knows is untrue. A fact-based opinion supports one when the speaker knows the facts do not support it.9
Fraud brings a consequence that the nonfraudulent route lacks: the victim need not show that the misstated fact was important. If the maker's state of mind satisfies § 162(1), a defense to enforcement arises irrespective of the importance of the misrepresented fact.10 The law's disapproval of deliberate falsehood explains the difference. A court may find the remaining prerequisites comparatively easy to satisfy, may judge inducement on a more subjective standard, and may weigh the deceiver's accountability for purposeful deceit more heavily than the victim's gullibility or carelessness. An innocent or negligent misrepresentation is not as morally reprehensible and may not entirely defeat the maker's reliance interest.11
The rule has limits. Dispensing with materiality does not dispense with inducement and justified reliance, which the recipient must still prove under § 164(1). Some courts nonetheless recite materiality as an element of fraud, as the tort elements do, so an exam answer should state the Restatement rule and note that a court may add the requirement.12 The consequences of fraud also reach past avoidance, to tort liability, including punitive damages, and to criminal liability.13 Tort recovery for misrepresentation was at first limited to the person or class of persons for whose guidance the information was furnished, and to the same or a substantially identical transaction.14 The first clause, the knowing falsehood, comes first.
Knowing Falsehood
Clause (a) describes the plainest culpable state of mind: the maker knows or believes that the assertion is not in accord with the facts.15 It measures two things against two standards. Falsity is measured against the world, and § 159 already supplies it.16 Awareness is measured against the maker's own mind when he speaks, so the question is what this maker actually knew or believed. A failure to check that a more careful person would have made does not satisfy the clause, because a maker who honestly believed the statement, however unreasonably, was at most negligent.17 The word believes carries the clause past certainty: a maker convinced that the statement is untrue, though unable to prove it, has made the same choice to speak as one who knows. The lead-in to § 162(1) adds a second requirement, that the maker intend the assertion to induce assent, which separates the lie told to close a deal from a falsehood tossed off in idle talk.18
Knowing falsehood is the paradigm of fraud. The recipient's assent under § 164(1) rested on a belief the other side supplied. The honest maker supplied it without knowing it was wrong; the liar chose to corrupt the recipient's judgment. The law marks the difference by giving the two makers different routes. Because § 164(1) is written in the alternative, the deliberate liar's statement supports avoidance without proof that the misstated fact was important, while the honest maker's statement must clear the materiality bar.19 Motive earns the liar no credit. A maker who has the requisite scienter is liable even though he did not intend to harm the recipient and thought he was benefiting him.20
Courts find knowledge in ordinary facts. Rodi sued a school over its accreditation prospects. The district court dismissed his claim, but the court of appeals reversed and allowed a trial on fraudulent misrepresentation. The school knew it had substantial problems in obtaining accreditation, and Rodi had made a credible preliminary showing that the opinions its officials expressed were not honest, given their knowledge of the ABA's criteria and the school's prospects of satisfying them.21 The case shows that knowledge of falsity reaches statements phrased as opinion. In another dispute, the findings were that Scannell knew the document he presented for the Karteses' signatures was a guaranty and therefore knowingly made false misrepresentations. The Karteses, using ordinary care, believed they were signing a lease, and the court concluded that the trial evidence supported those findings, noting that a guaranty of the lease was never discussed during the lease negotiations.22 Willen v. Hewson applies the clause to a seller's answer to a direct question. The seller, who had advertised her estate as peaceful and serene, told the buyers that trespass incidents had happened only once or twice and that her niece was prone to exaggeration. The buyers later faced a serious and constant problem with trespass and vandalism, and the court upheld the finding that the seller knew about it.
Direct proof of what a maker privately knew is rare, so the ordinary rules of circumstantial evidence apply. If the recipient shows that it would have been unlikely or unreasonable for the maker to believe the statement true, the trier of fact may infer that the maker knew it was false.23 The maker can rebut the inference. If he persuades the trier that he actually believed the statement, however unreasonably, he was at most negligent and scienter is not established.24 Whether such a statement is fraudulent on another ground is a question for clauses (b) and (c), which address the maker who is unsure or who claims more knowledge than he has. A fact pattern that reports only that a painting's celebrity provenance was false cannot be sorted into fraud or innocent misrepresentation until it says what the seller knew.
Proving the maker's knowledge settles only one side of § 164(1). The recipient must still show that the lie induced the assent and that reliance on it was justified. A buyer who hears the seller say that the plumbing is lead-free, when the seller knows the pipes are lead, has been told a deliberate lie. If the buyer then signs a contract that omits the assurance and contains a merger clause, a court may hold that reliance on an oral statement left out of the writing was not justified.25 The knowing falsehood answers the question about the maker. The later sections on inducement and justified reliance answer the questions about the recipient.
Feigned Confidence
Clause (b) supplies the second culpable state of mind: the maker does not have the confidence that he states or implies in the truth of the assertion.27 The maker must still intend the assertion to induce assent.28 This clause reaches a different speaker from the knowing liar. The liar believes the statement false. The maker here holds no such belief and is simply unsure, so clause (a) does not fit. The clause compares how sure the maker actually was with how sure he sounded. A flat statement with no hedge implies full confidence, and a speaker who harbors real doubt and hides it misstates his own state of mind much as a liar misstates the facts.
The law reads confidence into a plain assertion because of how listeners calibrate what they hear. A remark offered as a guess prompts a check, while a flat assertion invites reliance and ends the inquiry. Only the speaker knows how much doubt lies behind his words, and the form of the statement is the listener's only gauge. A speaker who strips out the hedges that honesty would have supplied withholds what the listener needs to decide whether to verify. Where the line between a statement of fact and mere opinion or puffing is disputed, the question is ordinarily for the jury and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.29 Clause (b) applies to any assertion, whether phrased as fact or as opinion, because each carries the confidence it conveys.
Recklessness is where the clause does most of its work. The classic scienter formulation reaches a false representation made knowingly, without belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.30 In Edgington, the court explained that it is immaterial whether the maker knew the statement was untrue or made it recklessly, without caring whether it was true, because to make a statement recklessly for the purpose of influencing another person is dishonest. It added that it is wholly immaterial with what object the lie is told.31 Many courts likewise treat a statement made as of the speaker's own knowledge, without knowing whether it is true, as adequate scienter, whether they label that state of mind intent or recklessness.32 The doubt need not amount to disbelief. The maker's real confidence need only fall short of the confidence conveyed.
Jordan v. Knafel applies the clause to a categorical assertion of paternity. Karla Knafel told Michael Jordan flatly that he was the father of her child, and the court read that flat assertion as impliedly representing that he was her only sexual partner during the period of conception. She did not know he was not the father, but she did know he might not be, so she spoke without the confidence she conveyed. Clause (a) could not have reached her, because nothing showed that she believed the assertion false. The categorical wording did the work: it told Jordan she had no doubt, when she had a doubt she kept to herself.
The clause does not reach a speaker who is confident and mistaken. A maker who actually believed the statement to the degree conveyed, however unreasonably, was at most negligent, and scienter is not established.33 Such a statement may still support avoidance, but only by the other route, as a material misrepresentation. When clause (b) is satisfied, the victim need not show that the misstated fact was important, because the maker's culpability replaces the materiality requirement.34 The victim must still prove inducement and justified reliance.
Clause (b) measures the maker's certainty, and clause (c) measures his grounds. The two can come apart: a speaker may feel sure with nothing behind the feeling, and a speaker may have solid reasons and still doubt the result. Judge Cardozo's remark that fraud includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none describes the second case most directly.35
Pretended Basis
Clause (c) names the third culpable state of mind: the maker knows that he does not have the basis that he states or implies for the assertion.38 The maker must again intend the assertion to induce assent.39 The three clauses ask three different questions about the maker. Clause (a) asks whether he believed the statement false, clause (b) whether he was as sure as he sounded, and clause (c) whether he had the grounds he claimed. The phrase states or implies carries the weight, because few speakers announce where their information comes from, and the clause reaches the common case in which the form of the assertion itself supplies the claimed basis.
A flat assertion of fact implies a basis because listeners cannot see what the speaker examined and so infer it. Someone who speaks without qualification is taken to speak from knowledge, whether firsthand or from reliable records, and the listener skips the checking that a hedge would have prompted. A speaker who makes a statement as of his own knowledge, without knowing whether it is true, falsely implies that he has reason to believe it.40 The implied basis is the reason the listener stops looking. A speaker who knows the basis is missing has taken that benefit knowing it was undeserved, so the law treats him like a liar even though he may never have said anything he knew to be untrue. The assertion must still be false in the first place, since § 159 defines the misrepresentation.41
Cardozo compressed the clause into one sentence in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.: fraud includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none.42 The pretense does not depend on disbelief. A maker who knows he lacks the basis his statement implies is covered even if he hopes the statement is true. The line against the merely careless maker runs through what the maker knew about his own grounds. One maker thinks he has some reason and is careless about it; the other knows he has none. A maker who persuades the trier that he actually believed the statement, however unreasonably, was at most negligent, and scienter is not established. If the recipient instead shows that it would have been unlikely or unreasonable for the maker to believe the statement true, the trier may infer that he knew he lacked the knowledge his statement asserted or implied.43
The same logic governs opinions that imply facts. A seller who calls a sofa's green and orange plaid a “fun color” offers pure opinion. A seller who says “this sofa is fashionable” suggests some familiarity with facts about current market trends. The fact-based opinion is a misrepresentation if the speaker knows it is not supported by the facts on which it rests, or makes it with reckless disregard of whether it is true.44 A seller who describes the condition of his own property stands in a similar position. In Waste Management of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Carver, the seller misrepresented the extent of contamination on the land without obtaining current information from the consultants hired to test it, and the court granted rescission, refusing to let him avoid liability by ignoring information available to him. A statement about how contaminated land is presents itself as the product of what the seller knows or has learned, and a seller who has not obtained the consultants' findings knows he lacks that basis. If the clause let a speaker make confident statements and then escape by declining to read what lay within reach, it would reward deliberate ignorance.
A seller who says, “I have not had the land tested, but I know of no contamination,” stands on the other side of the line. He neither states nor implies a basis he lacks, because he has told the listener exactly how little stands behind the sentence, and the listener can decide whether to commission a test. If he truly knows of no contamination, the statement is accurate as to his own knowledge and pretends to nothing more.
When clause (c) is satisfied, the misrepresentation is fraudulent. Because § 164(1) makes a contract voidable for either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation, the recipient need not separately prove that the misstated fact was important to a reasonable person.45 The recipient must still show that the assertion induced the assent and that reliance on it was justified, and a merger clause in a final writing that omits the statement can undercut the second showing.46 A maker who honestly believed he had adequate grounds, however poor, falls outside clause (c). His statement supports avoidance only if it meets the materiality test of § 162(2), taken up next.47 The three clauses together mark the ways a maker can be culpable. What remains is the innocent misrepresentation that still matters enough to undo a bargain.