Concept
Justified Reliance
Fraud, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure
Justified Reliance
Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164(1), a contract is voidable when a fraudulent or material misrepresentation induces the recipient’s assent and the recipient is “justified in relying” on it.1 The inducement requirement asked whether the false statement moved the recipient. This requirement asks whether the recipient was entitled to be moved. The two can part company: a recipient may be thoroughly deceived and still lose, because the law gave the recipient no right to credit the statement. For that reason a court keeps the question of diligence distinct from the question whether any credence was placed in the representation at all.2
Reliance also presupposes something to rely on. Only a misrepresentation of fact ordinarily constitutes fraud; an opinion, a prediction, and a promise of future action generally do not.3 In one dispute over a painting’s sale, the court held that the defendant’s assurance that the painting would disappear into a private collection and not be resold was a nonactionable prediction. It rested on no present fact and anticipated the conduct of a buyer over whom the speaker had no control, although a contrary result is conceivable if the speaker had no factual basis for the prediction. In another, a court held that a driver kept waiting almost two years for a delivery route had made out a cause of action for fraud, noting that a promise of future action can be fraudulent if, when it was made, the promisor had no intention of keeping it.4 A broken promise alone is not enough. The victim must prove that the promisor intended not to perform when the contract was made, and circumstantial evidence can prove it if the evidence is compelling.5
How much the recipient must show depends partly on how culpable the speaker was. The elements of fraud reflect the law’s disapproval of deliberate falsehood. Once a fraudulent assertion is proved, a court may be comparatively lenient in finding the remaining prerequisites satisfied, may judge inducement on a more subjective standard, and is much more likely to find that the speaker’s purposeful deceit outweighs the victim’s gullibility or carelessness.6 A negligent or innocent misrepresentation is less reprehensible and may not wholly defeat the speaker’s own reliance interest.7 Materiality follows the same sliding scale. Avoidance for an unintentional misrepresentation usually requires materiality, judged objectively. Where the misrepresentation is intentional, avoidance is available even if the fact is immaterial, and the standard is subjective.8
Both routes to avoidance run through justified reliance, because § 164(1) conditions each of them on it.9 Equity permits avoidance for an innocent material misrepresentation, subject to timeliness rules and other equities,10 so a recipient who cannot prove a knowing lie can still reach the remedy. That recipient must still show that reliance was justified.
Two questions carry most of the practical weight. The first is diligence: what must a recipient do to check a statement before acting on it? The second is the signed writing. A party who executes a writing that omits a material representation may be held not justified in relying on it, especially if the writing contains a merger clause stating that no other representations were made.11
Reasonableness and Due Diligence
A recipient may ordinarily rely on an assertion of fact without investigating it, even when its falsity could have been discovered easily and quickly, unless something known to the recipient or apparent in the situation should have warned that the statement ought not to be accepted without further inquiry.12 That rule displaced an older one. Under the influence of caveat emptor, persons dealing at arm’s length were required to be highly skeptical of each other’s statements and could not justifiably believe them if a reasonable independent investigation would have revealed the truth.13 The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopts the modern position in §§ 540 and 541.14
The modern rule has a limit. Where “red flags” would put a reasonable person on notice that a statement is false, a court may reject a claim of justifiable reliance as unreasonable, on the ground that the recipient proceeded in the face of warning signs without investigating.15 Those decisions invite the question whether they conflict with § 540. They are best read as applying the exception built into the rule itself, which withholds justification when something known or apparent should have warned the recipient off.16
The measure is the particular recipient. An unusually gullible, ignorant, or stupid recipient may honestly and justifiably believe a misrepresentation that a normal person would not. A recipient with special expertise, competence, knowledge, or experience must use it and may be unjustified in accepting at face value what an ordinary person could.17 The diligence expected therefore depends partly on the recipient’s capacities, partly on the nature of the transaction, and partly on how plausible the statement was.18
Halpert v. Rosenthal shows how a court answers a speaker who blames the victim for not checking. The seller there argued that the buyer had neglected either to put a clause in the contract protecting him if termites were found or to have the house inspected, and that this negligence barred recovery of his deposit. The court treated the argument as a challenge to justified reliance and found nothing patently absurd or ridiculous in the statements attributed to the seller and her agent that would warrant holding the buyer unjustified.19 In National Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Building Corp., by contrast, a former industrial tenant sued its landlords for damages in fraud and for breach of warranty, and the landlords counterclaimed for rent.20 Together the two cases show that the question whether the recipient was entitled to rely arises whether the defrauded party attacks the contract or defends against a suit on it.
Reliance may also be justified without investigation where the maker prevents or deters further inquiry.21 A maker who has talked the recipient out of checking cannot then fault the recipient for not checking. In Adan v. Steinbrecher, a seller warned a young, gullible buyer against asking others about the property for sale, and the buyer who made no inquiry was allowed to recover.
A recipient who holds the means of detection in hand stands on the other side of the line. In Williams v. Rank & Son Buick, Inc., a buyer relied on a salesman’s representation about a used car’s air conditioning, a feature he himself called a primary reason for the purchase. The court concluded that he lacked objective reliance, because it was unreasonable not to “flip the [air] knob” during the ninety minutes he test drove the car.22 The court also remarked that it was doubtful he would not have tried the air conditioner if it mattered so much, a remark that could support a finding that he never actually relied. The overlap between diligence and credence is real, even though the two questions are distinct. Nigro v. Lee falls on the same side: a buyer who bid on a car at an online auction without seeing it could not rely on the advertisement’s description once the defects proved easy to discover through ordinary checks.
Reliance on silence carries an extra step, because the recipient must first show that the nondisclosure was equivalent to an assertion. That is so only where disclosure is needed to keep a previous assertion from being a misrepresentation or from being fraudulent or material; where disclosure would correct the other party’s mistake about a basic assumption of the contract and withholding it fails good faith and reasonable standards of fair dealing; where it would correct a mistake about the contents or effect of a writing; and where a relation of trust and confidence entitles the other party to know.23 A half-truth can also be a misrepresentation, and sellers of goods, land, and securities are commonly held to a duty to disclose latent defects.24 Property sales supply many of the cases. Stambovsky v. Ackley is the familiar example of a buyer who obtained relief for a condition the seller never mentioned, and Bowman v. Presley concerned a statement about a home’s square footage.
The maker’s culpability also bears on how much the recipient’s carelessness counts. The victim of an ordinary accident must use the care of an average person, but the victim of a deliberate fraud is barred only by notice of the fraud and need only avoid deliberate and reckless risk-taking.25 That is why a careless but unsuspecting recipient can still avoid the contract, and why a recipient who proceeds in the face of a warning cannot.
Diligence takes a sharper form when the recipient signed a writing without reading it. A party who employs misrepresentation to induce another’s obligation under a contract cannot bind that party to the agreement’s terms.26 A person relying on another’s representations must use ordinary care and diligence, but the requirement of reasonable prudence in business is not carried so far that the law will ignore an intentional fraud practiced on the unwary.27 That relaxation has limits. A signer who never read the writing is in a weaker position, because the failure to read can undercut justifiable reliance even when evidence of the oral statement is admitted.28 At the opposite extreme, where a misrepresentation about the character or essential terms of a proposed contract induces apparent assent from someone who neither knows nor has reasonable opportunity to know them, § 163 treats the signer’s conduct as not effective as a manifestation of assent at all.29 That consequence is stronger than voidability, and the later treatment of fraud in the factum develops it.
The second and third steps are where the cases divide: a warning the recipient ignored points toward the recipient’s loss, and a check the maker defeated points toward the recipient’s recovery.
Merger Clauses and Disclaimers
A merger clause or disclaimer in the signed writing forces a court to answer two questions that are easy to run together. The first is evidentiary: does the parol evidence rule keep the oral statement away from the fact-finder? The second goes to the merits: if the statement comes in, was the recipient justified in relying on it? A fraud claimant can win the first and still lose the second, so an answer that merges them will misstate the result.
Proof of fraud in the inducement may be offered to avoid a written agreement even in the face of a merger clause, and even where the evidence specifically contradicts the writing or the merger clause.31 The oral statement serves a different purpose than extrinsic evidence in the supplementation cases, where a party offers evidence to show that the parties agreed to a term the final writing does not express, as when the defendant in Thompson claimed that the seller’s agent had orally warranted the quality of logs.32 The fraud claimant offers the statement not as a term of the contract but as the reason the contract should be avoided.
A merger clause does not change this. In Hill v. Jones, the claimed misrepresentation came after the parties signed, and the court held that, even assuming the integration clause reached post-signing statements, the clause could not shield the sellers from liability if the buyers proved fraud.33 The exception has a guard against abuse. Fraud is easy to claim and hard to prove, and a party should not be able to introduce an extrinsic term merely by alleging fraud, so the judge may hold a preliminary hearing outside the jury’s presence to decide whether the party really seeks to show fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Without that screen the exception would swallow the parol evidence rule.34 In America’s Directories, Inc. v. Stellhorn One Hour Photo, Inc., a seller’s president orally assured a reluctant buyer of directory advertising that the contracts could be cancelled after a year, although the written contracts said they could not be cancelled and contained a merger clause, and the court admitted the oral statement as evidence of fraud.
Admission of the evidence settles only the first question. The victim of the alleged fraud must still prove every element of fraud, including justified reliance, and the writing supplies the other side’s best evidence against that element.35 A seller who knows the pipes are lead and assures the buyer that the plumbing is lead-free has told a deliberate lie. Yet if the buyer never made sure the assurance reached the written contract, a court may hold that the buyer cannot show justifiable reliance on a representation that should have been, but was not, in the writing.36 In Riverisland, borrowers behind on their payments signed an agreement under which the lender extended the loan for three months in exchange for additional collateral, after the lender’s representative told them it extended the loan for two years. The court held the evidence of the misstatement admissible under the fraud exception but pointed out that the borrowers would still have to establish fraud and might have trouble proving justifiable reliance, given their failure to read the agreement.37 Some courts go further and treat a merger clause in an integrated contract as itself a disclaimer that makes reliance on an omitted oral representation unjustifiable, as in Pinnock v. Kings Carlyle Club Apartments, LLC. Reliancee is justified only if the recipient was entitled to credit the statement. A writing that is complete, or that says the opposite, tells the signer that the oral statement is not part of the deal, and a signer who goes ahead has chosen to trust the speaker over the paper.
A specific disclaimer does more damage than a general merger clause. Some cases hold that where the writing contains a “specific disclaimer of the very representation later alleged to be foundation for rescission,” the parol evidence rule excludes the allegation of fraud.38 In Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, the New York court stated that a person who has read and understood a disclaimer-of-representation clause is bound by it.39 It reasoned that the presence of such a clause “is inconsistent with the contention that plaintiff relied upon the misrepresentation, and was led thereby to make the contract.”40 The court contrasted Sabo v. Delman, which refused to let a general merger clause bar a fraud claim. Psenicska v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. applied the disclaimer logic against film participants who had signed a consent waiving reliance on statements about the film’s nature.
No-reliance clauses will usually control in sophisticated business relationships but may be set aside in consumer transactions.41 The line fits the reason a disclaimer works at all: a sophisticated party that disclaims reliance has said it was not relying, while a consumer who signs a form has said little of the kind.
Innocent misrepresentations draw less sympathy and a less settled answer. Equity’s “constructive fraud” label covers innocent misrepresentations that warrant rescission or reformation.42 The tort claim for damages traditionally requires a knowing falsehood, and the rules for damages differ from the rules for avoidance.43 In states that require scienter for fraud, the judge should not invoke the fraud exception to admit extrinsic evidence of a wholly innocent misrepresentation, although the evidence may still come in to show that the parties attached a special meaning to contract words.44 Other courts allow relief. In Halpert, the court reasoned that if a merger clause will not stop rescission for fraud, nothing justifies letting it stop rescission for an innocent misrepresentation, because rescission exists to keep the speaker from retaining the fruits of a bargain the misstatement induced, and the “boiler plate” of a merger clause is no bar.45