Concept
Fraud in the Factum
Fraud, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure
Fraud in the Factum
A signature ordinarily binds the signer, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 163 marks the narrow exception. When a misrepresentation about the character or essential terms of a proposed contract induces conduct that appears to be assent, and the person who acts neither knows nor has reasonable opportunity to know those terms, the conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent.1 Courts call this fraud in the factum, or fraud in the execution. It contrasts with the more common fraud in the inducement, in which the victim knows what is being signed but is moved to sign by false statements of fact.2
The two labels lead to different results. Fraud in the inducement generally makes a contract voidable; fraud in the factum voids it completely.3 The victim of inducement made a real choice on a false premise, and the law leaves that choice standing until the victim disowns it. The victim of fraud in the factum never chose the transaction the signature will be said to represent, and the deceiver cannot treat as assent an appearance the deceiver created. Three questions organize what follows: what counts as the character or essential terms of a transaction, when a signer’s failure to read is excused, and what the difference between void and voidable accomplishes.
The Section 163 Test
Section 163 poses three questions. Did the misrepresentation concern the character or essential terms of the proposed contract? Did it induce conduct, usually a signature, that looks like assent? Did the person who acted neither know nor have a reasonable opportunity to know the truth about those terms? The first question sets the scope: the comment to § 163 says the section applies when the misrepresentation relates to the very nature of the contract itself and not to one of its nonessential terms.4 The stock examples show what that means. A signer persuaded that an order for goods is only a request for a catalog, or that a contract is only a receipt, has been deceived about what the paper is.5
Fraud in the execution also differs from supplementation of the writing. In a case of supplementation, one party offers extrinsic evidence to show that the parties made an agreement the final writing does not express; in Thompson, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff’s agent had given an oral warranty about the quality of logs.6 The fraud-in-the-execution claimant offers evidence for a different purpose: to show that the signed instrument is not what it appears to be, even though it appears to be an integration.7
Park 100 Development Co. v. Kartes shows the deception at full strength. During the lease negotiations no one mentioned a guaranty, and the lease agreement itself referred to none. Scannell nonetheless presented the Karteses a document titled “Lease Agreement” for their signatures. It was a personal guaranty of the lease, and he never told them so, even after he overheard Mr. Kartes ask Kaplan by telephone whether a lawyer had approved the lease agreement.8 The trial court concluded that Park 100 had obtained the signatures through fraudulent means, and the appellate court held that the findings supported the judgment.9 Those findings track the elements of actual fraud, reasonable reliance included, but the deception is the kind § 163 describes: the Karteses believed they were signing a lease, and the paper made them personally liable as guarantors.
The label does not follow every lie that touches a writing. A lie about the quality of goods in a contract the signer understood is fraud in the inducement, and § 163 stays out of the case: the signer grasped what the transaction was and was moved to enter it by a false statement of fact. The question to put to a fact pattern is what the signer believed the paper to be. Section 163 applies only when that belief differs in kind from the truth, and even then the knowledge-and-opportunity requirement must be met, as the next section shows.
The Duty to Read and Reasonable Opportunity
The general rule cuts against the victim: parties are obligated to know the terms of the agreement they sign, and they cannot avoid their obligations by pleading that they did not read it.11 The Park 100 court stated the limit that makes § 163 possible. Where one employs misrepresentation to induce a party’s obligation under a contract, one cannot bind the party to the terms of the agreement.12 The court also quoted the principle that a person relying on another’s representations must use ordinary care and diligence to guard against fraud, but that the requirement of reasonable prudence in business transactions “is not carried to the extent that the law will ignore an intentional fraud practiced on the unwary.”13
Courts have taken two positions on whether a signer’s failure to read bars proof of fraud in the execution. One view holds that the failure to read precludes the evidence; the modern view reaches the opposite conclusion, on the theory that fraud is a greater evil than the failure to read.14 Section 163 builds the modern view into a test. It asks whether the signer knew, or had a reasonable opportunity to know, the character and essential terms, and it does not ask only whether the signer read. The duty to read survives inside that test. A signer who held the paper, could read it, and had time to do so usually had the opportunity, and the failure to use it counts against the signer. A signer who was denied the paper, or shown terms that were secretly changed, lacks it.
The circumstances of the signing decide the question. TufAmerica, Inc. v. Codigo Music LLC, applying New York law, required a showing of excusable ignorance of the written terms, which may be proved with evidence that someone secretly changed an important term before the ignorant party signed and that the party lacked a reasonable opportunity to learn of the change.15 The court found a triable issue where four earlier drafts of music-rights contracts had material terms that were drastically and inexplicably changed, to the drafter’s benefit, in the final writing. A signer who has already seen the terms in earlier drafts has little reason to hunt for a switch in the last one, and that is why a secret change can defeat the opportunity to know.
The borrowers in Riverisland stood where the distributor stands. They had fallen behind on their loan payments and signed a written agreement that extended the loan for three months in exchange for additional collateral, after the lender’s representative told them it extended the loan for two years. The court held evidence of the misrepresentation admissible under the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule, but pointed out that the borrowers would still have to establish fraud and might have trouble proving justifiable reliance, given their failure to read the written agreement.16 The Karteses stood differently, because the paper they signed carried a title that matched the lie. An exam answer that treats every lie about a writing’s contents as fraud in the factum skips the opportunity question and reaches the wrong consequence.
Void Versus Voidable
The distinction between void and voidable matters most when a third party arrives. A contract induced by fraud in the inducement stays valid until the victim avoids it, while fraud in the factum prevents any contract from forming. Elliott shows how the courts draw the line. Mary Elliott, an elderly woman who could neither read nor write, owned an undivided one-fifth interest in the minerals under a seventy-five acre tract. When B.G. Russell offered to buy her entire interest, she refused, and she agreed orally to sell him only two of her thirteen to fifteen mineral acres for $3,300. Russell prepared the deed and fraudulently substituted a clause conveying a one-fifth interest in all the oil, gas, and other minerals, with a legal description of the whole seventy-five acres. One-fifth of seventy-five acres is fifteen acres, a deal she had consistently refused to make.18
The court held the deed voidable, not void. The trial court’s findings that the grantee committed fraud and that the grantor was not negligent did not compel the conclusion that the alteration was the equivalent of a forgery. The grantor knew she was executing and delivering a deed of mineral rights, and the law charged her with informing herself of the legal effect of the document she signed. Where all the essential legal requisites of a deed are present, the deed conveys legal title, and fraud in the inducement renders it voidable in equity.19 Elliott and Park 100 mark the line from opposite sides. The Karteses believed they were signing a lease and signed a guaranty. Mrs. Elliott knew she was signing a mineral deed and was deceived about how much it conveyed, so even a grantor who could not read and was found free of negligence made a legally effective, though voidable, conveyance.
The classification decides what a later purchaser receives. A bona fide purchaser is one who paid value and had no notice of the fraud or forgery. If the deed is void, it conveys no title to the grantee, the grantee has no power to convey title to another, and the bona fide purchaser is not protected. If the deed is merely voidable by the true owner, a subsequent bona fide purchaser can obtain good title, and the victim’s sole remedy is a suit for damages for fraud or conversion against the wrongdoer.20 The void rule therefore protects the victim of a deception about what the paper was, and the voidable rule protects the purchaser who paid value without notice.
Commercial paper presents the same problem when a holder in due course sues. The holder’s status matters only if the person sued has some defense or other reason not to pay.21 Fraud in the execution, defined by the same neither-knowledge-nor-reasonable-opportunity test, is among the defenses that survive a holder in due course’s status, and fraud in the inducement is not.22