Concept
Remedies for Misrepresentation
Fraud, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure
Remedies for Misrepresentation
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164(1) states the consequence toward which every earlier section of this chapter has been building: when a fraudulent or material misrepresentation induces a party's assent and the recipient is justified in relying on it, the contract is voidable by the recipient.1 The operative word is voidable. The contract is not void; it stays in force until the recipient decides what to do about it, and the remedies for misrepresentation are best read as the forms that decision can take. The recipient may avoid the contract, may keep it and claim money for the harm the lie caused, or, when the lie concerned a signed writing, may ask a court to rewrite the paper to match the promised bargain. These remedies attach to any actionable misrepresentation, including the half truth and the silence in breach of a duty to speak that the earlier sections treated as assertions.2
Under modern law a victim of misrepresentation may choose between two significant avenues of redress: a tort action for damages, or avoidance of the contract by rescission.3 Rescission can be raised as a defense when the other side sues to enforce the contract, or pursued affirmatively in an action for restitution of benefits already conferred.4 The two routes do not demand the same proof. A party may rescind for a material misrepresentation even though it was not made with fraudulent intent, while the law may refuse a tort action, or narrow the remedy, when the misrepresentation lacked what the cases call scienter.5
The victim holds the choice because only the victim knows what the bargain is still worth. Take a buyer who receives a clean termite letter that the seller procured by bribing the termite company. If she wants to keep the house, rescission would make her give it up, so a tort action for money damages that compensates for the termite problem serves her better.6 A buyer who wants out has the opposite need. The lie is the same, and the remedy follows the victim's purpose.
Two limits recur throughout the subsections ahead. Avoidance returns the parties to their earlier positions, so the victim must give back what was received, and a victim who cannot return the property because it passed to a third person may be denied rescission.7 Tort damages leave the contract standing, but they ask more of the plaintiff, because a tort remedy may depend on a showing of scienter that avoidance does not require.8 The subsections below take up rescission and restitution, damages and tort claims, reformation of a writing that the lie distorted, and the effect of a misrepresentation made by someone outside the contract.
Rescission and Restitution
Rescission is the remedy that § 164(1) puts most directly in the recipient's hands.9 It undoes the contract, and the usual result is a mutual restoration of the benefits the parties had transferred.10 The recipient may invoke it as a defense when the other party sues to enforce the contract, or in an affirmative action seeking restitution of benefits conferred.11 Which vehicle fits depends on what has happened so far. A victim who has paid nothing needs only the defense, while a victim who has already paid must sue to recover, because a defense stops enforcement but returns no money.
Both uses appear in the decided cases. In Halpert v. Rosenthal, the court affirmed the denial of the seller's motion for a directed verdict on a buyer's claim for rescission after termite assurances proved false.12 In Weintraub, buyers who were sued for specific performance of a house sale answered with a rescission claim, and the court ordered rescission.13 Avoidance thus works as both shield and sword. The party who made the false statement cannot compel performance of the bargain the statement produced, and the deceived party can still recover what it has already paid.
Rescission does not require proof that the victim lost money. A party seeking rescission of a transfer induced by fraud need not show that the transferee profited or that the victim suffered economic loss.14 The remedy repairs a defect in consent, so the question is whether the false premise distorted the victim's choice, not whether the price was fair. Nor does rescission turn on the maker's state of mind. Halpert drew the line: deceit is a tort and requires some culpability, while an innocent misrepresentation of a material fact supports rescission, because it would be unjust to let a person who made false representations, even innocently, keep the fruits of a bargain they induced.15 Misrepresentation or nondisclosure can therefore make a transaction voidable even where no tort action for fraud would lie.16
The older equity label for this ground was constructive fraud. It covered any conduct that warranted rescission or reformation, including innocent misrepresentations, and it is best avoided because it invites confusion with the damages rules, which traditionally require a knowing falsehood.17 Two qualifiers survive the label. The innocent misrepresentation must be material, and relief remains subject to timeliness rules and other equities.18
Once the contract is undone, each side must account for what it received, and the cases charge each party for what it kept. In Holcomb, the court ordered rescission, charged the sellers for the buyers' expenses in curing defects, and charged the buyers with the reasonable rental value of the home. In Johnson, the sellers had to repay the amounts they had received from the buyers, with interest.19 Restitution can also supply a recovery that the contract itself would otherwise block. Ventura had waived royalties in express contracts, and the court held that he could avoid the fraudulently induced contracts and recover the reasonable value of the royalties in quantum meruit, a claim for the value of benefits conferred.20
At law, a party seeking rescission had to tender what it had received before suing, while equity required no tender. Since law and equity merged procedurally the difference has become relatively unimportant, though a court may still refuse equitable rescission if fairness does not warrant it.21 Rescission operates as a complete avoidance, and courts will not order partial rescission unless the contract is divisible and the parties can fairly be returned to their original positions.22
A victim who learns the truth and then treats the contract as binding loses the power to avoid it. A party induced by fraud may elect to rescind and recover what was paid, or to affirm the contract and sue for damages.23 A voidable contract stays in force until the victim elects to avoid it,24 and an election by conduct after discovery ends the choice, so a victim who keeps and uses the property and performs without protest has chosen to affirm. The reason lies in restoration. If the option stayed open indefinitely, the victim could enjoy the benefits of the deal while holding the power to escape its burdens, and the other party could not know which course the victim would take. Timeliness rules enforce the same discipline.25
The right also ends when the victim can no longer give back what it received. If the property has been transferred to a third person, rescission may not be allowed.26 Rescission exists to restore the status quo, and a court cannot restore it by ordering the other party to take back what the victim no longer holds. A victim who loses rescission this way is left to the damages remedies of the next subsection.
Damages and Tort Claims
A recipient who affirms the contract gives up release but keeps a claim for money. A party induced by fraud may elect to rescind and recover what was paid, or to affirm and sue for damages in deceit,28 and fraudulent inducement raises a choice among three routes: a contract-based claim for breach of warranty, the tort of deceit, and an equitable claim in restitution.29 The tort route carries the heaviest conditions, so most of this subsection concerns it.
The tort route asks more of the plaintiff than avoidance does. Deceit requires some culpability on the misrepresenter's part: the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew the statements were false and intended to deceive.30 Halpert shows where the burden falls. The buyer there conceded that nothing showed the seller or her agent knew the termite assurances were false, a concession that left rescission available but foreclosed a deceit claim.31 The Restatement (Second) of Torts reflects the same division, setting damages for fraudulent misrepresentation in § 549 apart from the remedy and damages for negligent and innocent misrepresentation in §§ 552, 552B, and 552C.32 The difference tracks what each remedy does. Rescission only undoes the exchange, so the maker loses nothing beyond the fruits of the bargain its falsehood produced, while deceit makes the maker pay for the harm, and the law looks for fault before it imposes that cost.
The tort rule reaches concealment as well as false statements. One who makes a fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment is liable for pecuniary loss to the persons or class of persons whom he intends or has reason to expect to act or refrain from acting in reliance on it.33 The plaintiff must also have been justified in relying. In one case, the court held as a matter of law that the respondent was not justified in relying on a salesman's oral representation, and it stressed that the action was brought in fraud and not for breach of warranty.34
The tort claim requires proof of actual damages, even when the misrepresentation was fraudulent, and causation limits the recovery. The plaintiff must show a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the harm, and the harm must be a foreseeable result of reliance on the false statement.35 A defendant who induces a stock purchase by false representations is not liable when the corporation fails because of unforeseeable later events unrelated to the falsity. The defendant is liable, however, if the corporation probably would have weathered the misfortune had its condition been as represented, or if the later events were foreseeable.36 Rescission avoids both proof burdens, because it asks about the victim's consent and not about loss.37
Fraud damages are measured two ways, and each compensates actual loss from a different starting point. The out-of-pocket approach awards the difference between the price paid and the value actually received. If a seller fraudulently represents that a leaky roof was recently repaired, the buyer recovers the difference between the contract price and the value of the defective house. The benefit-of-the-bargain method awards the difference between the value of the property as received and its value as represented.38 For fraud in a business transaction, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549(2) entitles the recipient to damages sufficient to give the benefit of the contract with the maker, if proved with reasonable certainty.39 In loan cases the two measures usually coincide, because the creditor wants repayment with interest either way. In sales they can diverge, because the profit from the deal can exceed the amount invested plus interest.40
Avoidance and tort damages therefore differ in more than amount, and four contrasts matter when an answer must choose between them.41
- Fault: a fraud claim in tort or contract requires wrongful intent, while a claim for restitution asks only whether benefits would be unjustly retained.
- Measure: fraud damages compensate the plaintiff's actual loss under the out-of-pocket or benefit-of-the-bargain approach, while restitution focuses on the defendant's gains, which may exceed the claimant's loss.
- Punitive damages: a court may award them on a tort claim for fraudulent inducement but generally cannot do so in equity through restitution.
- Limitations: a tort claim for fraud may be subject to a shorter statute of limitations than a quasi-contract claim in restitution.
Appellate courts review large fraud verdicts against the evidence. In one case the court called a $40,000 jury award large but sustained it, because the evidence of greed and avariciousness was shocking to its sense of justice. It also noted that the trial instruction on the measure of damages was closer to the out-of-pocket rule than to the benefit-of-the-bargain rule the state follows, but it found no prejudice because the defendants made no complaint.42 Money damages leave the contract standing. When the lie concerned what a writing says, the court has a further option, reformation of the writing, which the next subsection takes up.
Reformation for Fraud
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 166 supplies a remedy for a particular kind of lie, one about what a signed paper says. If a party's assent is induced by the other party's fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents or effect of a writing that evidences or embodies the agreement in whole or in part, the court may, at the recipient's request, reform the writing to express the terms of the agreement as asserted. Two conditions apply: the recipient must have been justified in relying on the misrepresentation, and the rights of third parties such as good faith purchasers for value must not be unfairly affected.44 Reformation rewrites the document so it matches the bargain the maker described. Unlike rescission, it leaves the contract in force, because its purpose is to correct an inaccuracy in the written terms so that the writing corresponds to the parties' original understanding.45
The remedy exists because the alternatives fit this victim poorly. Rescission would return the price and the property, but it would also give up the bargain the maker described and the recipient wanted. Damages would put a figure on the loss and leave the paper wrong. Reformation holds the maker to the words the maker spoke: the recipient asked what the paper said, was told one thing, assented on that footing, and receives it. Where mistake alone made a record inaccurate, reformation is usually the exclusive remedy, but where misrepresentation made it inaccurate, reformation and avoidance are available as alternatives.46
Section 166 speaks only of fraudulent misrepresentation. A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends the assertion to induce assent and either knows it is false, lacks the confidence it conveys, or lacks the basis it implies.47 The rules on silence and on signatures show where the remedy sits. As the earlier discussion of nondisclosure explained, silence is treated as an assertion where the silent party knows that disclosure would correct the other's mistake about the contents or effect of a writing.48 A drafter who quietly slips a changed term into a document the other side assumes matches the oral deal is therefore within § 166, and the same result follows where one party knows that the record does not express the other's intention and knows what that intention is.49 At the other edge, when a signer neither knows nor has a reasonable opportunity to know the character or essential terms of the proposed contract, the signature is not effective as assent at all.50 Reformation sits between the two rules. The recipient did assent, on the footing of the terms the maker asserted, and the paper records something else.
Justified reliance is the element most likely to be contested. Section 166(a) imposes the requirement that governs avoidance,51 and it weighs unusually here because the recipient holds the very document that contradicts the lie. The maker will say that a glance at the paper would have exposed the difference. A recipient with good reason to trust the maker's account of the writing, such as one who left the drafting to the maker, is likely to stand in the strongest position, and one who never looked at a paper he could easily have read in the weakest. The claim also needs proof of what was asserted, and the parol evidence rule does not bar extrinsic evidence offered solely to explain and correct the terms of the writing for reformation.52
Reformation reaches only a mismatch between the writing and the terms the maker asserted. The misrepresentation must relate to the content or legal effect of the record, and misstatements about the qualities of the subject matter, or about other factors that affect the desirability of the bargain or the economic equivalence of the exchange, are not grounds for reformation, because such relief would require the court to remake the agreement itself.53 The same line appears in terms of where the fraud occurred. Fraud in expressing the agreement warrants reformation, while fraud in inducing the agreement warrants rescission or damages, because reformation in the second situation could only impose a contract to which the parties did not agree.54 In one decided case, the plaintiff signed a written agreement on the fraudulent promise that additional promises omitted from the writing would be recorded in the corporate promisor's records, and the court upheld a complaint requesting reformation. The source treats the result as sound: although the case may involve fraud in the inducement rather than fraud as to the content of the record, the promise did not go to the desirability of the bargain but to its transcription.55
An exam stem that pairs a lie in negotiation with a signed paper invites the instinct to reach for reformation, and the instinct needs a check. A seller who calls the soil rich loam when it is rocky clay has misdescribed a quality of the land. The deed describes the land that was sold, so the writing records exactly the deal struck and gives the court nothing to correct, and the buyer's remedies are avoidance and damages. The line can blur because the word agreement does not always name a single fixed thing. Parties often agree on a general formula at one stage and on a precise term at a later stage, as when “all my land” becomes “lots 1 and 2.” Whether a court reforms the deed to match the formula depends on which stage it treats as the agreement.56
The last condition protects people outside the transaction. Reformation is unavailable to the extent that it would unfairly affect the rights of third parties such as good faith purchasers for value.57 The words to the extent make the protection measured, so the order can still run against the maker and anyone whose position it does not unfairly disturb. The reason is that reformation operates backward, declaring that the writing always said what the recipient was told. A purchaser who paid value in good faith dealt with the record as it stood and took no part in the lie, while the recipient chose to trust the maker.
Non-Party Misrepresentations
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164(2) extends avoidance to a case that § 164(1) does not reach, the one in which the false statement came from someone outside the deal. If a fraudulent or material misrepresentation by one who is not a party to the transaction induces a party's assent, and the recipient is justified in relying on it, the contract is voidable by the recipient, unless the other party to the transaction, in good faith and without reason to know of the misrepresentation, either gives value or relies materially on the transaction.59 Subsection (1) speaks of a misrepresentation by the other party,60 and every earlier section of this chapter assumed that the person who spoke was that party. The present rule asks what happens when the liar is a stranger, such as a friend of the seller who volunteers a remark to the buyer. Its shape is a general right with a limit. The right is the one § 164(1) grants, so the recipient must still show a fraudulent or material misrepresentation, inducement, and justified reliance, and the limit protects a counterparty who did nothing wrong.
Before subsection (2) can apply, the speaker must really be outside the transaction, and that class is narrower than it first sounds. An agent's statement is attributed to the principal. A bank was held liable on a theory of respondeat superior, the doctrine that an employer answers for an employee's wrongs committed within the job, when its commercial loan officer knowingly led a customer into a Ponzi scheme.61 A misstatement by the counterparty's own agent therefore falls under § 164(1), and the exception never comes into play. Subsection (2) is reserved for the genuine outsider, one who is neither the counterparty nor its spokesperson.
A stranger's lie is enough to support avoidance because avoidance repairs a defect in the recipient's consent, and the recipient's judgment is distorted to the same degree whether the false premise came from the seller or from the seller's friend. The counterparty's position depends instead on whether it did anything wrong. Avoidance is not always available where the other party has materially changed position, but that limit does not protect a wrongdoer, and fraud is a species of wrongdoing.62 A counterparty that never spoke and never knew of the stranger's remark has done no wrong, so the law must choose between two innocent people, and subsection (2) chooses by looking at what the counterparty has done with the deal.
The same lie would leave the buyer bound if the seller, still unaware of the friend's remark, had spent the weeks before closing moving its equipment out of the building and signing a lease on a replacement site. The seller would then have relied materially on the transaction in good faith and without reason to know of the misrepresentation, and the exception would remove the buyer's right to avoid. The buyer's position is identical in both versions, since in each the buyer was misled and the statement was material. The only fact that moves the answer is what the seller had done.
The exception has two parts, and each has its own logic. The first concerns the counterparty's state of mind. It must act in good faith and without reason to know of the misrepresentation, so actual knowledge is not the only disqualifier, and a counterparty cannot keep the protection by ignoring signs that the other side is acting on a lie. A counterparty that knows of the lie and stays silent may also have made a misrepresentation of its own, because silence is treated as an assertion where the silent party knows that disclosure would correct the other's mistake about a basic assumption and the nondisclosure fails the test of good faith and fair dealing.63 The case then returns to § 164(1), because the counterparty has become a maker.
The second part requires that the counterparty have given value or relied materially on the transaction, and innocence alone does not satisfy it. A counterparty that has done neither would lose only the chance of a profitable deal if the contract were avoided, and the recipient's interest in leaving a bargain built on a false premise outweighs that loss. A counterparty that has paid, performed, or reorganized its affairs on the strength of the contract would bear a real loss caused by a lie it did not tell and could not detect. The two alternatives register that difference. Giving value shows that something has already changed hands in the exchange, and material reliance shows that the counterparty has staked something significant on the deal before the exchange is complete.
When the exception applies, the contract stays in force against the recipient, but the speaker's own exposure is a separate matter. Tort liability for fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment runs to the persons or class of persons whom the maker intends or has reason to expect to act in reliance, and that test turns on who is expected to rely, not on who signed the contract.64 Griffith v. Byers Construction Co. of Kansas, Inc. illustrates the tort rule. A developer that placed residential lots on the market was assumed, at the summary judgment stage, to know the saline content of the soil, a defect the vendees could not discover by reasonable care once grading and development were finished. The court held that the developer's silence and failure to disclose could constitute actionable fraudulent concealment.65 That decision concerns tort liability. Whether a deceived buyer could also avoid his own contract under § 164(2) would still depend on what the other party to that contract knew and on what it had given or staked. A recipient deceived by an outsider may therefore hold two claims on different footing: avoidance against the counterparty, which the exception can defeat, and a claim against the speaker, which the exception leaves alone.