Concept
Public Welfare, Not Fairness
Illegality and public policy
Public Policy and Illegality
Public Welfare, Not Fairness
In 1725, one highway robber sued his fellow robber for failing to account for “partnership profits” after a successful season of robbing travelers. The court dismissed the action and fined the plaintiff's counsel for the scandalous impertinence of bringing it.1 That unreported English decision, Highwayman's Case, is where the illegality defense apparently traces its existence. Its lesson lies in what the court did not ask. The court never considered whether the defendant had cheated his partner, and its denial of recovery rested on no notion of fairness between the parties. It refused to let its process enforce an anti-social contract.2
That refusal separates this defense from the ones that precede it. Misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and unconscionability let a court go behind a party's apparent assent because the other party's improper bargaining conduct produced it, and each protects a party to the contract.3 Illegality and public policy protect something else: the public welfare, and the courts' reluctance to take part in enforcing certain transactions.4 The process of contract formation can be entirely clean and the contract can still fail, because the contract itself violates or runs directly contrary to public policy.5 A concurring opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion draws the same line: refusing to enforce a contract for public-policy reasons does not concern whether the contract was properly made.6
Section 178 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the defense in two alternatives. A promise or other term is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable, or if the interest in enforcing it is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against enforcing such terms.7 The text says nothing about deception, pressure, or unequal bargaining power.
Because the concern is the public, fairness to the parties is the wrong measure, and a student who asks which side was treated worse will be confused from the start.8 The doctrine can even carry a motive to punish a party for making an anti-social bargain, at the price of handing the other party a windfall: release from the contract and the benefits already received.9 Society is the principal victim of such a contract. Where the contract directly violates a rule of law, or its harm to society is serious enough, a court is most unlikely to enforce it under any circumstances, and it is better described as void than voidable.10 The public interest may also reinforce the equities in a particular case. One worked example argues that refusing enforcement serves the public because enforcement would condone, and give an incentive to, extortion.11
Suppose Ann agrees to buy an ancient figurine from Rob, knowing that Rob will take it from a protected tomb and smuggle it out of the country. Both parties understand exactly what they are doing, and both want the sale performed. Neither should expect help from a court, because the contract directly violates the law and enforcing it would make the court a participant in the wrong.12
Change the facts, and the analysis changes with them. Bea buys lawful jewelry on credit at a high price and a high interest rate, with no deception or pressure, and later protests that the terms were one-sided. Her protest concerns the fairness of an exchange between two private parties, so it belongs, if anywhere, to the doctrines that police bargaining conduct, such as unconscionability.13 Nothing in it alleges harm to the public or to the courts, so it gives the public-policy defense nothing to work with.14 On an exam, ask one question first: is the complaint that a party was treated badly, or that enforcing the contract would injure the public or the courts? The first sends you to the improper-bargaining doctrines, and the second sends you here.
The word “illegality” misleads, because the contract itself is often not, strictly speaking, illegal.15 The first Restatement defined an illegal bargain as one whose formation or performance is criminal, tortious, or otherwise opposed to public policy. The Restatement (Second) drops the term and subsumes every unenforceable bargain under the broader concept of public policy.16 The change matters in both directions. A contract can fail without breaking any law, and a contract that violates the criminal law is not necessarily against public policy.17 Not every violation of a statute, even a criminal one, creates a policy strong enough to deny enforcement of an otherwise valid contract.18 The Restatement (Second) instead lets courts weigh the strength of the recognized policy against the effect of declaring the bargain unenforceable.19
Courts apply the defense cautiously, because freedom of contract is itself a public value. Its ideological basis is reinforced by the pragmatic point that economic exchange is most efficient when participants are free to bargain toward terms they both want.20 In Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, Jessel, M.R., said that if public policy requires anything more than another, it requires that adults of full understanding have the utmost liberty of contracting and that their free and voluntary contracts be held sacred and enforced. The rules voiding contracts as contrary to public policy, he added, should not be extended arbitrarily.21 Burrough, J., put the warning more memorably in Richardson v. Mellish: public policy is “a very unruly horse,” and once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.22 Yet the doctrine still moves. Public policy is not static, and a contract valid in one era may violate the policy of another. Courts, the court in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. observed, “do not hesitate to declare void” provisions that clearly tend to injure the public.23
Two points therefore govern the rest of the chapter: the question is public welfare, not fairness between the parties, and the showing required is a strong one. The next section takes up the Restatement's two-part test, one alternative at a time.