Concept
The Section 178 Test
Illegality and public policy
The Section 178 Test
Section 178(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts offers two routes to the same result: a promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable, or if the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.1 A court needs only one route. Neither depends on bargaining misconduct, since a contract whose formation is untainted may still fail because the contract itself violates or runs directly contrary to public policy.2 The interest protected is that of the public at large, not of either party,3 and courts use the defense only in rare circumstances, because an overly expansive version would undermine the certainty of contractual deals.4 Because the rule speaks of a promise or other term, the objection may reach a single clause as readily as a whole contract, a point this chapter returns to under the consequences of unenforceability.
The two routes demand different work. The first is mostly reading: the court finds a statute, confirms that it covers the term in dispute, and applies it, because the legislature has already made the policy judgment. The second is weighing: with no legislation on point, the court sets the interest in enforcing the term against the public policy that cuts the other way, and it may refuse enforcement only when the enforcement interest is clearly outweighed. That one word carries the caution of the defense into the test itself, so that a close balance goes to the bargain and only a decisive imbalance defeats it. The division lets a court defer completely when the legislature has spoken and confine its own judgment to cases where the legislature has not.
On an exam, the order of analysis follows from that structure. Search first for legislation that makes the term unenforceable; if it exists, the inquiry ends there, and the weighing begins only when no statute settles the matter. The first subsection below takes up legislation declaring unenforceability, and the second takes up the clearly outweighed standard. The considerations that go on each side of the scale, found in § 178(2) and (3), and the sources from which a court may draw policy, found in § 179, are taught in later sections, so this unit concerns only the shape of the test.5
Legislation Declaring Unenforceability
The first clause of § 178(1) asks the least of a court, because the legislature has already made the policy judgment. When a statute declares that a contract or term is void or unenforceable, the court applies the declaration even if the equities and the balance of guilt would otherwise point the other way.6 Usury and gambling statutes are the traditional examples, since they characteristically state that contracts in violation of them are void.7 A lender who sues on a loan at a usurious rate therefore meets a statute that has already answered the question.8 Modern legislatures speak the same way. Michigan declares a surrogate parentage contract, an arrangement in which a woman agrees to conceive a child by insemination or to surrogate gestation and to relinquish her parental or custodial rights, “void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.”9 Connecticut provides that any language a seller or manufacturer of consumer goods uses to exclude or modify the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness, or the consumer’s remedies for breach of them, “shall be unenforceable.”10
Most statutes that bear on a contract never mention contracts at all. A criminal code is understood as a clear expression of policy even though statutes that proscribe conduct rarely say whether contracts involving that conduct can be enforced, so a court will not generally enforce a private agreement to do what the law explicitly prohibits.11 In effect, the court declines to lend its machinery to conduct the legislature has already forbidden. A contract under which one party pays the other to commit murder is the extreme case: it cannot be enforced, and making or performing it would lead to criminal prosecution.12 Once the law has settled that the performance is forbidden, the court’s remaining task is to decide how far the violation should cost the suing party a remedy. A statute may answer even that question, for example by declaring the contract unenforceable while allowing restitution of any benefit conferred, which tells the court that avoidance is required but restitution is available.13
Calling these contracts “illegal” misleads in two ways. Illegality is not criminality, because not every illegal contract is a crime, and contract law is not directly concerned with whether the transaction draws criminal penalties, which a separate prosecution handles; the seriousness of the illegality still bears on the remedy the court gives.14 And many contracts that fail on public-policy grounds are not, strictly speaking, illegal at all.15 Legislatures also attach consequences independently of one another. A statute may make a term unenforceable, impose a civil or criminal penalty on those who use it, or do both: the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act prohibits certain lease provisions and penalizes landlords who knowingly include them with three months’ rent, and wage-payment statutes frequently provide treble damages for violations.16 Unenforceability and added liability are therefore separate questions, and the first can be answered without asking whether anyone could be fined or jailed.
A statutory violation defeats a contract only when the statute is aimed at the contract at hand. The older rule was stricter: Lord Holt held in Bartlett v. Vinor in 1692 that every contract made for a matter a statute prohibits is void, even if the statute only inflicts a penalty, because a penalty implies a prohibition. Modern judges do not treat as void every contract that falls within the general aura of the criminal law. As Professor Gellhorn put it in 1936, they refuse enforcement only after respectfully studying the public policy involved and becoming persuaded that enforcement will disserve the general interest as the legislature has indicated it.17 Not every violation of a statute, even a criminal one, creates a policy strong enough to deny enforcement of an otherwise valid contract, and where the legislature’s intent about enforcement cannot be found, the court asks whether the statute establishes a fundamental policy that enforcement would violate.18 One court warned that commercial life is governed by so many regulations, easily broken without wicked intent, that businesspeople who unwittingly offend one have not thereby forfeited all right to justice. Yet a lease of commercial space for a bar or nightclub is void where its proximity to a school made the service of alcohol illegal, because the illegality attaches to the very use the lease contemplates.19
The two contracts answer different questions, and an essay must keep them apart. Whether crime appears somewhere in the facts is one question; whether a statute prohibits the performance the contract calls for, or declares such contracts void, is another. Only an affirmative answer to the second engages this route, and a violation on the margin of an otherwise lawful deal does not.20
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute shows that even when a statute condemns some contract terms, a question of coverage remains. The majority held that a forum-selection clause did not violate § 183c, because the clause “allows for judicial resolution of claims against petitioner and does not purport to limit petitioner’s liability for negligence.”21 The dissent would have read the statute liberally in light of its remedial purpose and the legislative history’s general condemnation of “all such practices,” and it reasoned that, although the statute never mentions forum-selection clauses, its language is broad enough to encompass them.22 Both opinions asked whether the clause fell within the statute, and they differed only on the answer, which is the question about the contract at hand that every statutory argument must face.
When legislation regulates a subject without saying whether contracts that violate it are enforceable, the analysis moves to the weighing route. The court may derive a policy against enforcement from the legislation, as § 179(a) describes,23 but only by asking whether the statute establishes a fundamental policy that enforcement would violate. Bidding statutes show the kind of legislation involved: some states protect subcontractors from bid shopping on government contracts by restricting a general contractor’s freedom to substitute subcontractors other than those listed in its bid without the approval of the granting authority.24 Those cases belong to the next subsection and to a later section on legislation as a source of policy, because the statute supplies evidence of policy for the court to weigh and does not itself decide the contract’s fate.
Clearly Outweighed Standard
When no legislation answers the question, the second clause of § 178(1) takes over: a promise or term is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against enforcing such terms.26 Three features of that clause shape every argument made under it. The clause asks the court to weigh two interests against each other, it puts a heavy burden on the party resisting enforcement, and it reaches beyond literal illegality. Two cases at the end of this subsection show the clause succeeding in one setting and failing in another.
The first route required a court to find a statute and read it; the second requires the court to compare. On one side sits the interest in enforcing the term, which includes freedom of contract itself, a public policy that calls for the enforcement of freely made contracts because private exchange benefits the parties and society. On the other side sits the policy the resisting party invokes, and that party must convince the court that the policy is more important than freedom of contract.27 The words in the circumstances tie the comparison to the facts, so a term that survives in one setting can fail in another. The Restatement (Second) leaves courts room for this judgment, allowing them to weigh the strength of legally recognized policies against the effect of declaring a particular bargain unenforceable.28
The word clearly makes the burden heavy. A court will refuse enforcement on this ground only in rare circumstances, because an overly expansive public-policy defense would undermine the certainty of contractual deals.29 Freedom of contract carries enough weight that the argument has succeeded only in limited circumstances,30 and a policy that merely sounds important, or a balance that comes out roughly even, leaves the contract standing. The record bears this out: Professor Friedman’s analysis found that public-policy defenses appealing to specific statutes or regulations were twice as successful as those appealing to a general notion of public policy.31
The third feature explains why the second route exists at all. The first Restatement defined an “illegal bargain” with analytic rigor as one whose formation or performance is criminal, tortious, or otherwise opposed to public policy. The Restatement (Second) abandons the label and folds every such bargain into the concept of public policy, the “unruly horse” of the law, and it recognizes that a contract that violates the criminal law is not necessarily against public policy.32 The objection that no statute forbids the contract therefore answers only the first route into § 178(1) and leaves the second untouched. Hanford v. Connecticut Fair Association shows a court working with policy in this open way. It affirmed the trial court and overruled a demurrer to a public-policy defense, and most of its opinion argued from public policy by analogy to cases in which performance would be immoral and to cases involving an overbroad covenant not to compete, before closing with a second, narrower argument from implied terms.33
The weighing succeeded in Shadis v. Beal, where the contracts barred a legal-services organization from seeking attorneys’ fees in suits against the state. The Commonwealth relied primarily on Westmoreland Hospital, in which certain cost-reimbursement contracts were held neither illegal nor contrary to public policy. That holding, the court observed, was predicated in part on the absence of a contrary public policy in the relevant legislation and administrative regulations. In Shadis there was such a policy, and the state had tried to avoid its impact, so the court held the no-fees provisions void as contrary to public policy and affirmed.34 The question the court asked was whether the legislation and regulations contained a contrary policy, not whether they expressly forbade the contracts.
The same clause failed in Black Industries v. Bush. Black Industries, a middleman, was to earn the difference between what the manufacturer charged it for parts and what its buyers paid it, and the buyers were building the parts into products for the government. The manufacturer, Bush, stopped short of completing the order and defended the middleman’s suit on the ground that the contract was void: the middleman’s profit was passed on to the government in higher prices, and Bush pointed to federal laws meant to prevent excessive profits on war contracts.35 The court refused to hold the contract void. It fit none of the recognized categories of invalid contract, which the court listed as paying someone to induce a public official to act, contracting to do an illegal act, and collusive bidding on a public contract, and neither party had dealt with the government at all.36 Voiding the contract would have meant either invalidating every contract that compensates a middleman in a chain of supply ending with the government, a result the precedents did not support, or deciding case by case whether the compensation was reasonable, which would have given the court price-regulating functions that bidding procedures and renegotiation already perform.37
What separates the two decisions is the relationship between the policy and the contract. In Shadis a contrary policy existed in the legislation, and the state was using the contracts to avoid its impact. In Black Industries the policy against excessive war profits was real, but the contract touched it only at a distance, other mechanisms already protected the government, and the interest in enforcing a negotiated business deal went undisturbed. An exam answer that stops at the observation that the contract is not illegal misses this route entirely, and an answer that stops at the observation that enforcement would hurt the public skips the burden. The analysis must name a specific policy, show where it comes from, and show that it clearly outweighs the interest in enforcement.
The comparison happens at the last step, but the earlier steps often decide the dispute, because a resisting party who cannot name a specific policy with an identifiable source has nothing to place on the scale. Section 178(2) assigns three matters to the enforcement side of the scale: the parties’ justified expectations, any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and any special public interest in enforcing the particular term. Section 178(3) lists the matters weighed on the policy side, and the next sections take up both lists in turn.39