Concept
Policy Against Enforcement
Illegality and public policy
Policy Against Enforcement
A term fails under § 178(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts if legislation makes it unenforceable or if the interest in enforcing it is clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcing such terms.1 Section 178(3) tells a court how to measure that policy: in weighing it, account is taken of four considerations.2 They are the strength of the policy, the likelihood that refusing enforcement will further it, the seriousness and deliberateness of any misconduct, and the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term. Professor Walter Gellhorn stated the caution behind the list in 1936. Judges, he wrote, “are not bound to regard as void every contract which seems in some way to fall within the general aura of the criminal law,” but only those whose enforcement, “after respectfully studying the ‘public policy’ involved,” will “disserve the general interest as it has been indicated by the legislature.”3 The four considerations are how a court does that studying.
The four fall into two pairs. The first two concern the policy: how much weight it deserves given what legislatures and courts have said, and whether refusal would advance it. The last two concern the wrong that put the contract in doubt: how grave and how knowing the wrong was, and how closely it is tied to the term the court is asked to enforce. The pairing follows from what refusal does. It costs the disappointed party its bargain and may leave the other side with a windfall it never paid for, because the defense serves the public welfare and does not aim at fairness between the parties.4 That cost is worth imposing only if it buys something for the public. A weakly grounded policy, a refusal that would change nothing, a trivial or accidental wrong, and a wrong only loosely tied to the term each mean the purchase is never made.
The considerations also keep the defense from becoming an escape hatch. The party invoking public policy usually agreed to the contract and now wants out, and a vague appeal to the public good is the cheapest argument available to a party stuck with a bad deal. Requiring the court to name a policy, ask whether refusal serves it, and measure the misconduct and its tie to the term turns that appeal into a showing that can be tested. Section 179 says where a court finds the policy: in legislation relevant to it, or in the need to protect some aspect of the public welfare.5 Later sections take up those sources. This section assumes a policy has been found and asks how much it weighs, beginning with its strength.
Strength of the Policy
Section 178(3)(a) puts first the strength of the policy against enforcement, “as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions.”6 The factor has two parts. The first is source: the policy must appear in legislation or in judicial decisions, which a court can point to, and a judge’s private view of what would benefit the public does not count. The second is force: a policy that a legislature states emphatically, or that precedent has applied repeatedly, outweighs one that a statute only touches in passing. A party resisting enforcement must therefore show both where the policy comes from and how loudly that source speaks.
Each part answers a different danger. Appeals to the public good cost nothing, so the source requirement forces the appeal to rest on something that can be checked. The force requirement keeps a court from filling a faint legislative signal with its own preferences. A public-policy argument therefore begins by stating the policy as a generalized principle, not as a bare conclusion that this case should come out differently; it then locates the policy in a legitimate source and shows that enforcement would undermine it.7
Courts disagree about how far a court may go in finding policy. In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., the New Jersey court said that public policy at a given time finds expression in the constitution, the statutory law, and judicial decisions, and it found the policy there in the implied warranty of merchantability that the legislature had imposed on the sale of automobiles.8 Mamlin v. Genoe states the strict view: a court may constitute itself the voice of the community only when a policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals, or welfare that there is virtual unanimity of opinion about it. Other courts take a more liberal view and draw policy from legislation, administrative rules and regulations, and judicial decisions, and in some circumstances from professional codes of ethics.9 The stricter the court, the heavier the burden on the party resisting enforcement.
Shadis v. Beal shows the factor at full strength. A legal-services organization had agreed in contracts with a state agency not to seek attorneys’ fees in civil rights suits against the state, and the Third Circuit weighed those clauses against the policy behind the fee provisions of Section 1988, which was to encourage compliance with the civil rights laws and their enforcement. The court described that policy as “a vital one”: Congress “could not have been clearer in its intent or in the seriousness it attached to the attorneys’ fees provisions,” and words such as “essential” and “integral” run through the legislative history and the cases construing the Act.10 The court did not require the Act to forbid fee waivers in so many words. Under § 179, the legislation need not expressly prohibit or require an act inconsistent with the contract; an adequate legislative declaration of policy that is inconsistent with the contract’s terms suffices. The court held the no-fees provisions void.11
The Commonwealth relied on Westmoreland Hospital, but the court distinguished it: in Shadis, it said, there was such a contrary public policy, “the impact of which the state has attempted to avoid.”12 The contrast teaches that the first question is always what the legislation and decisions actually say. A court’s distaste for a contract is not evidence of policy.
Strength can also accumulate across enactments. In Davidson Brothers, Inc. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., a supermarket operator that had left a New Brunswick site sought to enforce a covenant against the site’s later use as a supermarket. The court found the policy against enforcement in New Jersey’s legislation on urban rehabilitation: a rich variety of subsidies and incentives for businesses in designated enterprise zones, and other laws, “too numerous to describe in detail,” that show how rehabilitating cities is embedded in public policy and the public interest.13 Enforced by injunction or damages, the covenant would have been a formidable obstacle to remedying the harm from the supermarket’s withdrawal, both the hardship to residents and the damage to government and private efforts to revitalize the city, and the city received no equivalent benefit in return. The court held the covenant unreasonable and unenforceable.14
Experience supports this emphasis on specific sources. Professor Friedman’s analysis of public-policy defenses found that those appealing to specific statutes or regulations were twice as successful as those appealing to a general notion of public policy.15 A specific enactment gives a court words, a stated purpose, and a legislative history to evaluate. A general notion invites the judge to supply the content, which is what § 178(3)(a) discourages.
Courts also read strength from a legislature’s evident hostility to a practice, even when the statute says nothing about contracts. New York had made it a crime to bribe a purchasing agent without saying what a violation did to the contracts it produced. In Sirkin v. Fourteenth Street Store, a supplier that won an order by bribing the buyer’s purchasing agent was denied judgment for the price of the hosiery it delivered, and the court made clear the legislature’s hostility, and its own, to commercial bribery.16 A dissent accused the majority of judicial legislation and of permitting the defendant’s unjust enrichment, which shows how contested the inference can be. At the other end of the range, a party who has performed may recover where the offense is merely malum prohibitum, wrong only because a rule forbids it, and “the denial of relief is wholly out of proportion to the requirements of public policy or appropriate individual punishment.”17
The opposite failure occurs when the policy has no settled source because opinion in the community is divided. In Shaheen v. Knight, a physician defended a failed-vasectomy suit by arguing that a contract to sterilize a man whose wife could safely bear children was void as against public policy and public morals, and the Pennsylvania court rejected the argument. It reasoned that a court may act as the voice of the community only when opinion is virtually unanimous, and opinion about sterilization was divided. A divorce decision, Wilson v. Wilson, had recognized artificially created sterility without any exception, which suggested that no public policy against sterilization had been recognized.18 A policy that rests on the judge’s own moral view, with no statute or decision behind it, puts almost nothing on the scale.
Strength also depends on the setting in which a policy is invoked. In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Supreme Court declined to read an earlier policy against exculpatory towage clauses to reach an international towage contract and cautioned that “we should be careful not to over-emphasize the strength of the [Bisso] policy.” That policy rests on two concerns: that exculpatory agreements may be produced by overweening bargaining power, and that they do not sufficiently discourage negligence. The conduct there was that of a foreign party in international waters outside American jurisdiction, and the evidence disputed any overreaching.19 A policy that is strong at home may weigh little at its edge.
The first two steps matter most. A party that cannot state the policy or show where it appears has nothing to place on the scale. The later steps matter when a source exists but speaks quietly, as with a minor regulatory violation, or speaks about a different setting, as in the international towage dispute. The next consideration asks what refusing enforcement would accomplish.
Likelihood Refusal Furthers Policy
Section 178(3)(b) adds a second consideration to the policy side of the scale: “the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy.”21 The first factor asked how strongly legislation or decisions have spoken. This one asks what denial would accomplish, which is a separate matter, because a policy can be stated emphatically and still gain nothing from a refusal to enforce one contract. Refusal is a blunt tool: it costs the disappointed party its bargain and may leave the other side holding value it never paid for. A court therefore asks whether denial will change the conduct the policy targets or whether something else already does that work.
Courts have long justified refusing to enforce illegal bargains on modest grounds. One commentator calls the policy simple: it “accomplishes very little in discouraging the performance of illegal acts but it keeps the courts respectable.”22 Courts express it colorfully. “No polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice”; courts will not act as “paymasters of the wages of crime”; and, in one court’s words, “bad guys need not look to us for help.” Section 178(3)(b) asks for more than clean hands. It asks whether refusal helps the policy itself, and the cases that answer yes explain the gain in terms of incentives.
Shadis v. Beal supplies a refusal that plainly furthers its policy. The Commonwealth argued that the minimum funding it gave the legal-services organization to qualify for federal money helped the poor more than the prospect of fee awards. The court called that argument disingenuous. Advance funding gives a state no inducement to obey the civil rights laws, but the prospect of paying attorneys’ fees does, and it may also give the state a reason to settle early.23 Congress’s policy works through that incentive. A clause that bars fee requests removes it, and refusing to enforce the clause restores it, so refusal acts directly on the machinery the policy depends on. Davidson Brothers fits the same mold: enforced, the covenant would have been a formidable obstacle to remedying the harm from a supermarket’s withdrawal, and declining to enforce it cleared the obstacle.24
The factor cuts the other way when something else already guards the policy. In Black Industries v. Bush, a manufacturer resisted a middleman’s suit on the ground that the middleman’s profit was passed to the government in higher prices, contrary to the federal concern about excessive profits on war supplies. The court answered that other and more effective methods exist for making sure the government does not pay an unreasonable price: a manufacturer selling directly to the United States must follow procedures such as bidding, and its contract may be subject to renegotiation under federal statute. Voiding the contract would have required the court either to hold void every contract that pays a middleman in a chain of supply ending with the government or to decide case by case whether the middleman’s compensation was reasonable, which would have given the court price-regulating functions.25
The contrast with Shadis lies in what each contract did to the policy’s machinery. The no-fees clause disabled the incentive Congress had built, and nothing else could replace it, so refusal restored the policy’s working parts. The middleman’s contract left the bidding and renegotiation safeguards intact, so refusal would have added little to the protection they already supplied while imposing a large cost on an ordinary business arrangement. The policy was real in both cases; the difference is the marginal effect of denial. The same question arises whenever a legislature has regulated the practice directly. Some states, for example, have enacted statutes that protect subcontractors from bid shopping on government contracts by restricting a general contractor’s freedom to substitute subcontractors listed in its bid without the granting authority’s approval.26 Where a statute already polices the conduct, a court must ask what refusal to enforce a private contract adds.
Refusal works best when it lands on the party whose incentives drive the violation. In Sirkin, discussed above, it fell on the supplier who would otherwise have profited from the bribe, at the price of letting the buyer keep the goods unpaid.27 In Homani v. Iranzadi, a lender and a borrower agreed orally to interest on a loan but signed a note showing the loan as interest-free, to evade tax on the interest. The court refused to enforce the interest term and rejected the lender’s argument that the borrower would receive a windfall, because the public interest was best served by removing the lender’s incentive to enter such a transaction.28 The lender was the one who stood to gain from the evasion, so denial reached the person the policy targeted.
Reasonable minds can disagree about the direction of the effect. In Parente v. Pirozzoli, a convicted felon who wanted to buy a bar, and who would have had difficulty taking transfer of the liquor license, arranged for the plaintiff to apply for the license as a front man, and the two agreed to run the bar as equal partners. When the partnership dissolved, the felon refused to pay the plaintiff his share of the profits. The court refused to enforce the agreement because its purpose was to evade the liquor control laws. It recognized that the instigator would take a windfall but concluded that refusal would discourage people like the plaintiff from serving as front men. The opposite argument was just as available: letting the defendant keep the plaintiff’s share gives instigators an incentive to use a front man, since the instigator can count on the front man’s being unable to sue.29 The decision shows the difficulty of striking the right balance. When the deterrent argument runs in both directions, a court cannot treat refusal as clearly furthering the policy.
The second and third steps do the work in the hard cases, because they show whether denial lands on the party the policy targets. The last two considerations in § 178(3) turn from the effect of refusal to the wrong itself, asking how serious and how deliberate it was and how directly it is tied to the term.
Seriousness of Misconduct
Section 178(3)(c) directs a court to take account of “the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it was deliberate.”31 The two earlier factors examined the policy. This one examines the wrong that put the contract in doubt, and it measures that wrong along two lines. Seriousness is the gravity of the wrong in kind, ranging from an offense society treats as grave to a regulatory slip. Deliberateness is how knowingly the wrong was committed, ranging from a planned scheme to an honest mistake. The factor carries its full weight only when the wrong is both grave and knowing, and it shrinks as either line moves toward the minor or the innocent.
Grading the wrong matters because refusal operates as a sanction. Deterrence works on people who can choose: a party who broke a rule without knowing it could not have acted differently, so refusal teaches that party nothing and still takes the bargain, while a party who saw the problem, weighed the risk, and went ahead is the actor the policy wants to discourage. Seriousness adds proportionality, since losing a bargain is out of proportion to a trivial offense and easier to justify for a grave one. A court therefore weighs the seriousness of the violation together with the parties’ relative guilt, and minor violations, or violations that result from ignorance or other innocent conduct, ordinarily do not preclude enforcement.32
Regulatory offenses sit at the minor end of the range. In St. John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd., Devlin J. cautioned that so much of commercial life is governed by regulations that they may easily be broken without wicked intent, and that merchants who have unwittingly offended against one should not assume they have forfeited every claim to justice.33 At the other end sits Sirkin, where the supplier deliberately bribed the buyer’s purchasing agent to obtain the order, and the court denied the price even though the bribery statute said nothing about civil consequences.34 The bribe was knowing, it was a crime, and it corrupted the very contract the supplier wanted enforced, so both lines pointed the same way.
Blossom Farm Products Co. v. Kasson Cheese Co. shows the factor at work on a sale that was lawful on its face. Blossom sued for $138,306, the price of its last shipment of a product called Isokappacase, which could be used lawfully if the resulting cheese was labeled as imitation.35 The seriousness lay in what Kasson did with it: selling an end product as real cheese that purportedly met federal standards of identity. The deliberateness lay in what Blossom knew. Its salesman realized that Kasson was ordering about a hundred times more than a starter use could explain, and the manufacturer’s president even suggested a pump to feed the product directly into Kasson’s cheese milk, while Kasson’s president treated the practice as a gray area of the law. Blossom kept shipping large orders anyway, and both companies profited from the volume.36 The court refused to enforce Kasson’s promise to pay, so the seller lost the price of a product lawful in itself and the buyer escaped its promise. Blossom’s knowing, continuing involvement separates it from an innocent supplier.
Both disputes involve food labeling, so the labeling does not separate them. What does is how grave and how knowing the misconduct was. The wholesaler’s lapse was a missing metric figure that nobody intended and nobody could have been deterred from committing. Blossom’s was continued participation, shipment after shipment, in a scheme it understood to be passing imitation cheese off as the real thing. The factor aims at the second kind of conduct, and a clerical slip leaves the scale nearly empty on this point.
A contract with fair terms can still rest on a serious wrong, and the court then compares the wrongs on both sides.
On its face this is a sale of goods for a price, yet its underlying purpose is to conceal a crime in return for financial advantage. The seller’s extortion seems the weightier wrong, because it is directly related to procuring the contract, while the company’s earlier wrongs were committed by its agents and its innocent board and owners neither knew of them nor approved them. Enforcement would also condone extortion and give others an incentive to try it, which is the public harm the factor measures.37 The fairness of the prices does not change the analysis, because this defense concerns the public interest and the wrong behind the contract.
Promises of silence show how the same kind of bargain can sit at either end of the range. Agreements to conceal information relevant to the commission of a crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint of public policy, a disfavor reflected in the common-law duty to report felonies and the offense of misprision of felony.38 A promise of silence about a private matter is different. In Jordan v. Knafel, the plaintiff alleged that she agreed to forgo a paternity action and keep silent about an affair in exchange for $5 million on the defendant’s retirement from basketball, and the court held that the alleged exchange was not necessarily extortionate, because it was tied to a good-faith claim of right to file the paternity action.39
Directness of Connection
Section 178(3)(d) supplies the fourth and last consideration on the policy side of the scale: “the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term.”41 The previous factor graded the wrong itself, asking how grave and how knowing it was. This factor asks where the wrong sits in relation to the contract being enforced. A court needs both answers, because the weight of a violation depends on the closeness of its connection to the contract performances as well as on its gravity.42 A serious wrong far removed from the term sends little weight to the scale, while a lesser wrong bound up with the term can send a good deal.
The same wrong can attach to a contract in three ways, ranked here from closest to most remote. The contract performance itself may violate public policy, as when the contract calls for an illegal performance. The performance may be unobjectionable while the agreement was obtained by improper methods, such as bribing an agent. Or one party may commit an illegal act in the course of performing an otherwise legal contract.43 The first position is the plainest case. The other two need more care, since in each the contract may look lawful when read alone.
Two reasons support ranking the connections this way, and each answers a different question about what refusal accomplishes. The first concerns participation: when the wrong is the performance, or the means by which the contract was obtained, a judgment for the plaintiff would pay for the wrong or help carry it out, and refusal denies the wrongdoer the reward the wrong was meant to earn. The second concerns windfall. A refusal costs the disappointed party its bargain and may leave the other side holding value it never paid for, so the cost buys something for the public only when the wrong is tied to the term. When the link is remote, any penalty the legislature attached to the wrong still falls on the wrongdoer, and denial hands a free benefit to the party on the other side without advancing the policy.
Procurement by wrongdoing is the middle case, and its plainest form is Sirkin, where the supplier bribed the buyer’s purchasing agent and was denied the price of the hosiery it delivered, because the contract sued upon was itself the product of the bribe.44 McConnell v. Commonwealth Pictures Corp. loosened the tie and still reached the same result. A movie distributor had agreed to pay McConnell a fee and a percentage of gross receipts if he negotiated a contract between the distributor and a movie producer, and McConnell did so by bribing the producer’s agent. The distributor knew nothing of the bribe, and McConnell argued that his own contract with the distributor was lawful and, unlike the one in Sirkin, had not been obtained by bribery.45 The court refused enforcement. It held it beside the point that McConnell might make out a prima facie case, a claim that looks complete on its face, without the bribery ever coming to light.46 The reason lies in what the distributor’s promise bought. It was a promise to pay for the negotiated deal, and the bribe was the method by which McConnell produced that deal, so the obligation he asked the court to enforce was the price of the wrong’s fruit. Refusal removes the profit that makes bribery worth attempting, at the cost that the distributor kept the benefit of the deal without paying the percentage, the same retention of benefit the buyer enjoyed in Sirkin.47
The court drew a limit in the same opinion, and the limit keeps the factor from swallowing every contract near which some illegality occurs. It acknowledged the objection that denying enforcement would mean any small illegality in the performance of an otherwise lawful contract strips the wrongdoer of all rights and hands the other party a windfall, and it answered that its ruling went no further than the facts before it.48 In its words, it is “not every minor wrongdoing in the course of contract performance that will insulate the other party from liability,” and “[t]here must at least be a direct connection between the illegal transaction and the obligation sued upon.”49 That requirement directs attention to the link between the wrong and the particular obligation the plaintiff is suing on, and away from whether a wrong appears somewhere in the story.
Had the printer won that order by slipping the retailer’s purchasing manager a cash kickback, the same unpaid invoice would meet the Sirkin result, because the wrong would be the means by which the contract came into being. The difference between the two printers is not mainly how grave their wrongs are. It is how each wrong is tied to the obligation sued upon.
The same question arises when the wrong sits in a different transaction altogether. A decision on an antitrust defense, drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelly v. Kosuga, began from the premise that such defenses to contract actions are disfavored, because a successful one is too likely to enrich a party who has taken the benefits of a contract and then seeks to escape its burdens.50 The defense nonetheless succeeds when a judgment would enforce the precise conduct the antitrust laws make unlawful, and a contract that is legal on its face and calls for no unlawful conduct in its performance is not voidable simply because it resulted from an antitrust conspiracy.51 The critical question is whether the contract is so integrally related to the arrangement in restraint of competition that enforcing it would compel that precise conduct.52 The court could not answer on the record before it and left the matter for trial. There the inquiry would turn on whether the contract was an indivisible, effectuating component of the illegal arrangement, and on how far an unlawful use of market power had inflated the price, since a judgment on an inflated price would make the courts a party to carrying out the restraint.53
The antitrust decision and McConnell share a lawful-looking contract with wrongdoing nearby, and they separate on whether enforcement would complete the wrong. In McConnell, the percentage the distributor had promised was payment for the very deal the bribe produced, so the obligation was tied to the wrong by the way it was earned. In the antitrust case, the conspiracy stood behind the contract, and the tie would exist only if the contract itself, through its terms or its inflated price, was the vehicle by which the restraint would be carried out. A conspiracy among the seller’s competitors that merely lies in the background of a contract calling for nothing unlawful leaves the contract enforceable. The forfeiture questions travel with the inquiry, since the court also directed attention to the parties’ relative culpability, bargaining power, and knowledge, and to whether sustaining the defense would void the contract entirely or leave a recovery on a quantum meruit basis.54
The third step does the decisive work, because it turns closeness into a question about what the court’s judgment would do. Directness completes the policy side of the scale. A court combines the four considerations and sets their combined weight against the interest in enforcement, and the term fails only if that interest is clearly outweighed.55 A contract that is lawful in itself but used by one party for an improper end presents a different kind of connection, and a later section takes it up on its own.