Concept
Consequences of Unenforceability
Illegality and public policy
Consequences of Unenforceability
Section 178(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts ends in a conclusion: a promise or term is unenforceable when legislation says so, or when the interest in enforcing it is clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement.1 That conclusion leaves three questions open, and this section takes them in order. How much of the agreement falls with the offending term? Does the parties' relative fault change the answer? And can a party who has already delivered value get it back?
The answers vary from case to case because this defense serves the public and not the parties. The improper-bargaining defenses protect someone who was wronged, so letting that person walk away does the job. Here society is the principal victim, and the court shapes the remedy to what the public interest requires.2 Fairness between the parties is not the goal, and a party who escapes liability may collect a windfall that the defense tolerates.3
Whole Contract or Offending Term
A court that finds the interest in enforcement clearly outweighed must still decide how much to condemn. It can refuse to enforce the contract in its entirety, which resembles avoidance. It can keep the contract and refuse only the offending term, which resembles severance. Or it can enforce the contract with the term adjusted.4 Three considerations guide the choice: the nature and gravity of the violation, the goals of the law or policy, and the extent to which the impropriety permeates the contract.5 The third does most of the work in this subsection.
The broadest sorting question is whether the contract is void or voidable. A void contract has no legal force; a voidable one stays in effect unless the party the law protects chooses to avoid it. A contract that directly violates a rule of law, or whose harm to society is serious, is most unlikely to be enforced under any circumstances, and the same is often true when the parties are joint perpetrators and neither used the illegal contract to victimize the other.6 Where one party is more to blame, the other belongs to a group the law seeks to protect, and the illegality is not serious, the contract is more accurately voidable.7 The labels track who needs protecting. Voidability hands a choice to one party, which makes sense only when one party deserves protection; when the injured interest is the public's, no private choice should keep the contract alive. Even a contract that conflicts with a statute is not automatically unenforceable in every respect, since a court may enforce it or, more likely, grant restitution to a party who conferred a benefit, a point developed in the restitution subsection below.8 The labels settle less than the question of how far the offense reaches inside the contract.
When the offense is confined to one term, a court can often remove that term and enforce what remains. If the provisions are severable and severing one cures the offense against public policy, the rest of the contract may be enforced, and a court may rewrite a contract to remove the terms that violate public policy.9 The result is clearly desirable when the party seeking enforcement did not supply the offending terms.10 An employment contract with an excessively broad covenant not to compete shows why. The covenant is an unreasonable restraint of trade and unenforceable, but the employee, who has done nothing wrong, should be allowed to enforce the balance of the contract.11 Nothing but the covenant offends the policy against restraint of trade, so striking it gives the public everything the policy demands. Voiding the whole contract would demand more than the policy requires: it would excuse the employer, who wrote the offending clause, from paying for work already done, a windfall the policy never called for.
Enforcement on adjusted terms is the better solution when the equities favor the party seeking enforcement and the harm to the public can be averted or minimized by eliminating the offensive aspect of the contract.12
Severance has limits, and In re Baby M marks one. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a paid surrogacy contract conflicted with state statutes and public policy. The offending terms were the payment of money in connection with an adoption, the mother's irrevocable agreement, made even before conception, to surrender the child, and her agreement to cooperate in terminating her parental rights without contesting.13 Those terms were at the heart of the contract, so the court reasoned that, because they were invalid and unenforceable, the entire contract was unenforceable.14 Severance had nothing to work on. Strike the payment, the surrender, and the termination, and what survives is a promise to conceive and carry a child with no agreed purpose, an arrangement neither party bargained for. A court that enforced the remainder would be enforcing a contract the parties never made. The covenant in the employment contract sits at the edge of a bargain about work, and removing it leaves the bargain intact; the invalid terms in Baby M were the bargain itself.
A term that is overbroad but not forbidden outright, such as a covenant not to compete that reaches too far in time, territory, or activity, raises a third possibility. Courts formerly applied an all-or-nothing rule, enforcing the clause as written or rejecting it altogether, and partial enforcement was criticized for letting courts remake the parties' agreement.15 The trend has since moved toward judicial modification, by one of two routes.16 Under the blue pencil rule, a court strikes words only to the extent that a grammatically meaningful, reasonable restriction remains; in Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, a restriction on soliciting clients in 'Toledo, Ohio, and the United States' could be cut back to Toledo.17 Under the rule of reasonableness, the covenant is enforced to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the employer's interest. The Restatement follows that approach in § 184, and so did the court in Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, which held a one-year limit reasonable and remanded for modification of a three-year covenant to one year.18 Its defenders say the court does not make a new contract for the parties but chooses, among the possible effects of the contract they made, the one most desirable for the parties and the public.19 The balance still governs the choice. If the harm outweighs the promisee's interest, the court may refuse the clause altogether; if trimming the restraint, by shortening the time or narrowing the territory, would serve the policy, the court may enforce it as trimmed.20
Courts that prefer the narrower tool refuse to rewrite. In Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, the trial court found a physician's covenant unreasonable: its five-mile radius around three offices swept in 235 square miles, it made no exception for emergency medical aid, and it was not limited to pulmonology.21 The Arizona Supreme Court said that Arizona courts will blue pencil a covenant by eliminating grammatically severable, unreasonable provisions, but the court of appeals had gone further and in essence rewritten the agreement.22 The contract even contained a severance clause asking that any invalid provision be reformed so the covenant would be enforced to the fullest extent permissible, yet the court would not add terms or rewrite provisions.23 The court looked to the drafter's incentives. For every covenant that reaches a court, many more never do, so the words alone frighten departing employees, and employers who know a court will trim an excessive covenant to fit can write ominous ones at no risk.24 It accordingly disapproved an earlier decision that let courts rewrite a restrictive covenant into something significantly different from what the parties created.25
The hardest case reverses the roles. When the employer asks to enforce the part of an overbroad covenant that would be valid standing alone, the question is whether the drafter may collect whatever the law would have allowed. Some courts permit it, although the result seems to encourage people to draft illegal contracts, safe in the knowledge that a court will still give them all the law allows.26 That worry led Arizona to refuse to rewrite. The opposite rule has its own cost, since refusing every overbroad covenant would strip an employer of protection for an interest the law recognizes whenever the drafter erred on scope.
The driver's suit and the company's suit arise from one contract, and the difference between them lies in who asks for partial enforcement. An innocent party enforcing the remainder creates no incentive problem, since the driver gains nothing from the company's overreach. A drafter creates one, because a drafter assured of receiving whatever the law allows loses nothing by asking for more. That is why a single court can sever for one party and hesitate for the other.
Refusal can also be limited to a single remedy. In the Campbell Soup litigation, the only remedy withheld was the equitable one, and the legal remedy of damages remained at least theoretically available, just as with unclean hands generally.27 Because law and equity have merged, a plaintiff in that position had better claim damages in the same suit or risk being barred by res judicata.28
On an exam, a public-policy attack rarely ends in the flat answer that the entire contract is void. The doctrine reaches a promise or other term of an agreement, so a court may invalidate the offending term and leave the rest intact, and a good answer moves from the contract as a whole toward the single clause.29
The third step decides the cases above: the employment covenant is incidental to a lawful bargain and can be cut away, while the invalid terms in Baby M were the bargain itself.
Parties Not in Equal Fault
A court will not generally enforce a private agreement to do what the law explicitly prohibits.31 When both parties share the guilt of having entered such a contract, the in pari delicto rule tells the court to keep aloof, help neither side, and leave them where it found them.32 The name abbreviates the maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis: when the parties are in equal guilt, the defendant's position is stronger.33 The rule operates as an affirmative defense, so the party sued on the contract may raise it even though doing so points to that party's own wrongdoing.34
A court that lets a confessed wrongdoer win needs reasons, and the cases give two. The first is deterrence: if courts refuse to back bargains that offend public policy, the parties cannot count on each other to perform, and such bargains become less attractive to make. The second is the court's dignity. One frank statement says that refusal accomplishes very little in discouraging illegal acts but keeps the courts respectable.35 Neither reason depends on which party deserves to win, so the result can look arbitrary: the defendant keeps whatever it holds. The result is tolerated because fairness between the parties was never the aim of this defense.36
The name promises more precision than the rule delivers. Although it speaks of equal guilt, it really means that the guilt of the party seeking relief must be equal to or greater than the other party's, and assigning greater fault to one side is sometimes possible but seldom easy.37 The rule also looks beyond relative guilt to the seriousness of the illegality, the equities between the parties, and the effect on the public interest of giving or declining relief.38 It is therefore a starting premise, from which the court departs when the equities, the policy of the law, and the public interest demand it, and not an absolute bar to relief.39 A statute can also settle the balance in advance: by declaring the contract void, by declaring it unenforceable while allowing restitution, or by showing through its purpose that persons in one party's position are the ones it protects.40
The rule applies most readily to parties who willfully engage in wrongful conduct, and it bites hardest when the illegality is serious.41 In Al-Ibrahim v. Edde, an employee who had claimed the employer's gambling winnings as his own, as part of a plan to help the employer avoid federal income tax, could not enforce the employer's promise to reimburse the taxes he paid, because the judicial process cannot be used to further illegal acts.42 Maudlin v. Pacific Decision Sciences Corp. involved a similar tax scheme and came out the other way. The former employee who resold stock to the company knew that the employer had structured the deferred payments to evade taxes, yet he drew no benefit from the scheme, and leaving the parties where they stood would have cost him almost $1.7 million, so the court held him not in pari delicto.43 The first court stressed that its process could not serve illegal ends; the second weighed the absence of any benefit to the employee and the size of his loss.
Most exceptions to the rule rest on one idea: relief is allowed when the parties are not in pari delicto, because the claimant is less at fault. The claimant's inferior or vulnerable position and the defendant's dominant role in the illegality count in the claimant's favor. The point is that the claimant is more victim than wrongdoer, or that those in the defendant's position would ordinarily be better placed to avoid the wrongdoing.44
The clearest exception arises when the violated law was designed to protect a class to which the claimant belongs. Wage earners can enforce contracts made in violation of minimum wage laws, because those laws exist to protect workers and their purpose would be frustrated if the illegal character of the contract denied a remedy.45 The employer, being more at fault, could not enforce a below-minimum contract, while the employee can enforce it and also recover the additional wages the law requires.46 Without the exception the statute would work against the people it was written for, since the party it restrains could cite its own violation as a shield.
The same reasoning protects tenants and the clients of unlicensed professionals. If a housing or safety code that a lease violates was designed to protect the tenant, and refusing the tenant the benefit of the bargain would cause hardship, the Restatement (Second) of Property says the lease is enforced.47 Licenses issued under the police power exist to protect the public, so a bargain between an unlicensed professional and a member of the public is not between parties in pari delicto, and the professional may be liable to the client for malpractice.48 The unlicensed professional, meanwhile, may be precluded from recovering for the work.49
A claimant who did not know of the illegality has no guilt to share. Ignorance excuses a claimant who lacks the facts that make the transaction or its purpose illegal, or who is unaware of some relatively minor legal requirement.50 The rule aims at parties who chose to take part, and a party who could not have known could not have declined.
A third exception applies when both sides are guilty but one carries the weightier guilt. Sweaty Shoppe's purchasing agent once bought stolen goods, and its president covered it up. A seller learned of the crime and threatened to expose it unless Sweaty Shoppe signed a contract to buy the seller's goods at fair prices. The contract looks ordinary on its surface, yet Sweaty Shoppe can raise the in pari delicto defense to avoid it.51 The agents' acts are imputed to the company, but the seller's guilt in extorting the contract is the weightier, and the equities still favor the company, because its innocent board and owners neither knew of nor approved the wrongdoing.52 The public interest points the same way: enforcement would condone extortion and give others an incentive to attempt it.53 Relative guilt therefore decides who may use the defense as well as whether it applies.
When the equities are less lopsided, the balance is harder, and Parente v. Pirozzoli shows how. The defendant, a convicted felon, wanted to buy a bar but would have had difficulty taking transfer of the liquor license, so the plaintiff applied for the license as a front man and the two agreed to run the bar as equal partners.54 When the partnership dissolved, the defendant refused to pay the plaintiff's share of the profits, and the court refused to enforce the contract because it rested on the unlawful purpose of evading the liquor control laws.55 The plaintiff pointed out that the defendant, who had instigated the scheme, would be rewarded with a windfall. The court acknowledged the point but concluded that the public interest was best served by refusing enforcement, because refusal would discourage people like the plaintiff from acting as front men.56 The opposite argument was just as available: letting the defendant keep the plaintiff's share gives future instigators a reason to recruit front men who cannot sue.57
Homani v. Iranzadi shows the same windfall accepted with less hesitation. A lender and a borrower agreed orally to interest on a loan but signed a note showing the loan as interest-free, to evade tax on the interest. The court refused to enforce the interest term despite the borrower's windfall, because the public interest was best served by removing the lender's incentive to enter such a transaction.58 That result makes sense because the lender stood to benefit from the tax evasion and was the most guilty of breaking the law.59 In Homani the refusal fell on the party with the strongest incentive to offend, so the deterrence logic ran one way. In Parente it fell on the front man while the instigator kept the profit, so the same logic ran both ways, and that is why the court's choice there is open to dispute.
The defense reaches claims for money back as well as claims on the contract, a point the next subsection develops. Courts often treat an insurer and a policyholder under a policy that violates a statute or public policy as in pari delicto and decline relief in any respect, even a refund of premiums.60 A maxim of equity, that a party who comes into equity must come with clean hands, sometimes disposes of suits for specific performance or rescission on a similar ground.61 The two doctrines differ in reach. Unclean hands typically costs the plaintiff only the equitable remedy, with damages remaining at least theoretically available, while in pari delicto is an affirmative defense to the claim on the illegal contract itself.62
The second and third steps identify the exceptions that are easiest to prove, and the last two steps are where cases like Parente are decided. An answer that stops after finding that both parties broke the law has applied only the starting premise and has not yet asked whether the equities and the public interest call for a departure from it.
Restitution After Refusal
Refusing to enforce a contract does not settle what happens to value already handed over. A party who paid money, delivered goods, or did work may ask for it back, and that claim is for restitution: recovery measured by the benefit conferred on the other side, in contrast to damages measured by the bargain. It asks the court to reverse a transfer without carrying out any promise. Yet a court's reluctance to help with an illegal contract can reach even this claim.64 The general rule is that illegality bars restitution as well as enforcement, and the rule can produce what look like striking injustices.65 The exceptions below show how courts keep that rule from swallowing the forfeiture concern that the weighing of interests already recognizes.
Restitution is the harder claim to refuse. Enforcement asks the court to recognize the contract and help carry it out, so reluctance is understandable. Restitution rests on the opposite premise, that no contract exists, and the claimant's equities are usually stronger because the defendant has been unjustly enriched.66 Even so, the rule that leaves parties to an illegal contract where the court finds them is broad enough to reach restitutionary claims, and a court may conclude that recognizing even this claim is not in the public interest.67 Deterrence explains why. If a party to a shared illegal deal could always reclaim what it paid whenever the other side defaulted, the worst outcome would be a return to the starting point, and refusing enforcement would lose much of its power to discourage such bargains. The price is that whoever holds the transfer keeps a benefit it never paid for, a windfall the defense tolerates because fairness between the parties was never its aim.68 Because both consequences are real, courts do not necessarily treat a contract that conflicts with public policy as void and wholly unenforceable. They may enforce it or, more likely, grant restitutionary relief to a party who conferred a benefit.69
The starting rule applies with full force when the illegality is serious and both parties know of it. Suppose Ann agrees to buy a figurine that Rob will remove from a tomb and smuggle out of the country. Every step of the transaction is illegal and both understand that, so no court will abet it by ordering specific performance or awarding expectation damages.70 If Ann paid a deposit before Rob backed out, her claim to get it back would face the hurdle shown by a closely parallel illustration. A casino owner sells the casino to a gangster in violation of a statute forbidding mob ownership, both parties know of the ban, the buyer pays $100,000 down, and the seller repudiates. The contract is unenforceable, and whether the buyer may recover the down payment has no obvious answer: the buyer is arguably more to blame as the mobster seeking to acquire the casino, while the seller, by deliberately breaking the law, made possible the very harm the statute seeks to prevent.71 Unless judicial intervention is shown to be the more appropriate course, the thrust of the rule is to leave the parties as they are, so the down payment stays where it landed.72
A refund claim can look entirely different on facts that also involve a known violation. A liquor store sells a case of scotch to a 20-year-old, in violation of a statute that both sides know bars sales to anyone under 21, and the buyer pays cash before the seller refuses delivery.73 The buyer plainly cannot enforce the sale, yet it seems intolerable to let the seller keep payment for goods that were never delivered. The age limit exists because young people lack the maturity to use alcohol responsibly, and that same immaturity lessens the buyer's share of the blame, while a central purpose of the law is to protect minors, so returning the money serves the statute.74 Both the casino buyer and the scotch buyer knowingly took part in a violation, and what separates their claims is whom the statute targets and how heavily each claimant's blame weighs. A statute against mob ownership is aimed at buyers like the gangster, who on one view is the more culpable party, while a statute against sales to young people protects buyers like the scotch purchaser. The decision turns on relative fault, on the class the law protects, and on whether a refund advances the statute.
The exceptions begin with the party who changes course in time. A party who has not engaged in serious misconduct may withdraw from a transaction before the improper conduct has occurred and become entitled to restitution, so someone who advances money under an unenforceable contract that is not extremely shocking to the court's notions of policy and morality may rescind before the improper purpose has been accomplished and recover what was paid.75 The doctrine of locus poenitentiae, a Latin phrase for a place of repentance, rests on the same footing. When the illegal acts have not yet been performed, ending the deal with restitution is consistent with the deterrent goals, and the refund encourages and reinforces the claimant's change of heart; the court may award restitution for the legal part of the performance already rendered.76 The mechanism is easy to follow. A party who knows that a refund is available only until the illegality happens has a reason to stop, while a party who knows the money is lost either way has none.
Three further grounds apply where a court views the question of nonenforceability as borderline. Relief may be granted if the party seeking restitution was unaware of the law, if denial would produce a forfeiture disproportionate to the wrong, or if that party's misconduct is minor compared with the misconduct of the party against whom restitution is sought.77 Ignorance matters because deterrence works only on people who can choose. A party who did not know of the violation could not have declined to take part, so denying that party a refund teaches nothing and leaves the other side with a windfall. A related ground covers transactions that are unobjectionable on their face but fail a regulatory requirement, such as a contract that omits a term a statute requires or services rendered by someone who lacks a required license. Noncompliance of that kind will, with rare exceptions, not be evidence of the moral turpitude that forecloses a claim in restitution, and restitution is permitted unless it would interfere with the policy underlying the regulation.78 The qualifier carries the test, because the question is whether a refund would work against what the regulation is for. Town Planning & Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Amesbury Specialty Co. shows how courts ask it: the court considered whether the characteristics that gave the plaintiff's work its value to the defendant were the same as those that made it a violation of law.79 Where the value and the violation coincide, restoring the value subsidizes the violation, and where they are separate, the policy gives little reason to deny it.
The disproportionate-forfeiture ground has its own Restatement source. Comment b to § 197 allows restitution to a party 'who would otherwise suffer a forfeiture that is disproportionate in relation to the contravention of public policy involved,' a rule the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment has since somewhat reformulated.80 Proportionality is measured on whichever side the loss would fall. In Trees v. Kersey, contracts made in violation of a public works licensing act were void, but the court would not let a party who had committed fraud keep the benefit of performance without liability.81 In CitaraManis v. Hallowell, a lease of rental property made without the proper license was not necessarily unenforceable, and the court had to consider the strength of the policy, the degree of the violation, and whether a refund of rent would be a disproportionate penalty.82 A tenant who lived in a habitable apartment for months and demands every dollar of rent back may be asking for a windfall as large as the forfeiture the landlord would suffer, so a full refund can be as disproportionate as a full refusal.
Beneath these grounds lies the idea that drives the exceptions to the equal-fault rule. Restitution is permitted when the claimant is less at fault than the defendant, and courts use the exceptions either to protect the party in the inferior position or to withhold relief from the party most in need of deterrence.83 A tenant under an illegal lease shows the protective version. If the housing or safety code that a lease violates was designed to protect the tenant, and refusing the tenant the benefit of the bargain would cause hardship, the lease is enforced.84 When the lease was illegal when made because of substantial code violations that go to habitability, the illegal-lease doctrine gives strong grounds to recover rent already paid.85 The reach is limited, however, because the doctrine has only limited application outside the District of Columbia, where most jurisdictions instead follow the implied warranty of habitability, the majority rule for residential leases.86
Membership in the protected class does not guarantee a refund, as the unlicensed professional shows. A license meant to protect the public makes the parties to a bargain between an unlicensed professional and a client not in pari delicto, and the professional may be liable to the client for malpractice. Even so, although the unlicensed professional may be barred from suing for the fee, an unlicensed party who has already been paid can generally defeat the client's action for restitution, and courts are not unanimous on the point.87 The split reflects two competing pictures of the same payment. One sees a professional who did the work and would forfeit its value, and the other sees a member of the protected public asking for back a fee paid to someone the law forbade to sell the service. An exam answer should state both and say which exception the facts bring into play.
The last exception explains the others. Restitution may be granted or denied according to which result best serves the public policy, and the exceptions amount to a generalization that a court should choose whichever result deters most effectively.88 That is the question the weighing asked about whether refusal furthers the policy, now applied to the money instead of the promise. A refund to a party who withdrew in time or who belongs to the protected group advances the law, and a refund to the instigator of a serious scheme would soften the very deterrent that refusing enforcement was meant to create.
The second step decides most disputes, because it separates the scotch buyer from the casino buyer and the figurine buyer. The fifth step keeps the exceptions from becoming a list of excuses, since each one is a way of asking whether a refund helps the policy or hurts it.