Concept
The Governing Rule
Unconscionability
Unconscionability Doctrine
The Governing Rule
A party who has signed a contract sometimes asks a court to refuse enforcement of the whole agreement, or of a single clause, because of how the bargain was made or what it says. Unconscionability is the doctrine that answers that request, and for a sale of goods its text is UCC § 2-302(1). If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the statute lets the court do one of three things: refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder without the offending clause, or limit the clause's application so as to avoid an unconscionable result.1 The verb is “may,” so a finding opens a menu of responses and leaves the choice to the court. The remedies section below takes up each response in turn.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 states the same rule in nearly the same words. It says “term” where the sales statute says “clause” and omits the phrase “as a matter of law,” but it keeps the structure: a court may refuse to enforce the contract, enforce the remainder without the unconscionable term, or limit the term's application, and unconscionability is again judged when the contract is made.2 Section 208 parallels § 2-302,3 which governs sales of goods and, as the Restatement notes, states the rule without distinction between law and equity.4 The next section returns to the equitable background of that point.
States enact the rule in two forms. Georgia's OCGA § 11-2-302 reproduces both subsections of the uniform text.5 California took a broader route: in 1979 it enacted Civil Code § 1670.5, with identical language, applicable to all contracts.6 Because § 208 and general statutes like California's speak of any contract or term, the same standard reaches a remodeling agreement or a service contract, and a later section asks how far that reach extends in practice.
Both texts pose two questions in sequence. The first is whether the contract or term was unconscionable when it was made, a finding the sales statute assigns to the court and measures at the moment of formation rather than by how the deal has since worked out. The second, reached only after a yes, is which response fits the defect. The structure lets a court that finds a single overreaching clause strike it and enforce the rest, while leaving open refusal to enforce the entire contract.7
The finding is not made in the abstract. The Restatement says that a contract or term is judged unconscionable or not in light of its setting, purpose, and effect, and that the relevant factors include weaknesses in the contracting process like those behind the rules on contractual capacity and fraud.8 The sales statute builds the same instruction into procedure: when a contract or clause may be unconscionable, the parties must have a reasonable opportunity to present evidence of its commercial setting, purpose, and effect.9 The policy also overlaps with rules that make particular bargains or terms unenforceable on grounds of public policy.10
Neither provision defines “unconscionable.” Official Comment 1 to § 2-302 offers only a hint, calling unconscionable clauses “one-sided” and the statute's goal “the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise,” and courts have filled in the term across a wide variety of situations.11 The comment's basic test asks whether, in light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing when the contract was made.12 Official comments generally have not been enacted and lack the force of law, yet courts typically take guidance from them in interpreting UCC provisions.13
The two words in that formula point to the two places a bargain can go wrong. “Unfair surprise” suggests a defect in the bargaining process, one tied to the limited information available to a party. “Oppression” suggests terms that are unreasonable, one-sided, or otherwise unfair.14 Later sections develop these as procedural and substantive unconscionability.
The same comment fences the doctrine in: the principle is not one of disturbing the allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.15 The fence answers a standing worry about unconscionability, that it has no principled stopping place. If a wealthy company's advantage over a poor and uneducated consumer were enough to condemn a contract, it would be hard to explain why that consumer should be allowed to make contracts at all.16 Courts do not apply the comment's language literally, however. They generally ignore that part of Official Comment 1 and allow gross disparities in bargaining power to count when testing for procedural unconscionability.17
Unconscionability must also be kept apart from a merely bad bargain. The doctrine was intended to prevent oppression and unfair surprise, not to relieve a party from the effect of a bad bargain.18 A price that looks high only in hindsight marks the difference. Inadequacy of consideration does not of itself invalidate a bargain, although a gross disparity in the values exchanged may be an important factor, may corroborate defects in the bargaining process, and may suffice without more to deny specific performance.19
The elements that separate the two versions come from the formulation named for Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., which the sections that follow develop.