Concept
Timing and Procedure
Unconscionability
Timing and Procedure
UCC § 2-302(1) directs the court, “as a matter of law,” to decide whether a contract or clause was unconscionable “at the time it was made,” and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 asks whether a contract or term is unconscionable “at the time the contract is made.”1 Those phrases are easy to read past while hunting for a definition of unconscionable, yet they answer three procedural questions that students tend to run together: when a bargain is judged, who judges it, and what the judge hears before ruling.
The test itself, an absence of meaningful choice on one side together with terms unreasonably favorable to the other,2 is a judgment about one particular bargain, and the judgment is only as sound as the moment, the decision-maker, and the evidence behind it. A court that judged a term by how the deal turned out would let the market decide the claim. A court that heard nothing about the trade could not tell a harsh clause from a customary one. A court that sent the question to a jury would hand a discretionary judgment, equitable in origin, to a body that equity has never used. Each procedural rule guards the test against one of those errors, and the subsections below take them in order: measurement at formation, decision by the judge, and evidence of commercial setting.
Judged at Formation
Both texts fix the moment of examination in their own words, and the official comment’s basic test repeats it: the question is whether the clauses are “so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.”3 A court construing § 2-302 stated the consequence directly: the court determines the issue “as of the time of the making of the contract, not as of the time of suit.”4
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., the decision that anchors the modern doctrine, shows the kind of thing a court examines under that rule. Each appellant had bought household items on installments, and the terms of each purchase were contained in a printed form contract that purported to lease the item for a stipulated monthly rent, kept title in the store until total payments equaled the stated value, and allowed repossession on default.5 Those printed terms were fixed on the day of each purchase, and terms of that kind are what the formation-time rule puts under examination.
The rule protects the allocation of risk. Every executory contract hands some uncertainty to one side or the other, and when the uncertainty resolves, one party has usually fared better. If a loser could attack any term by pointing to how things turned out, nearly every bargain with a loser would be open to challenge, and the price each side accepted for carrying a risk would mean nothing. Measuring at formation keeps the doctrine aimed at the circumstances and terms that produced the agreement, and it leaves the sorting of winners and losers to the contract itself.
A later change in market price is the plainest event the doctrine disregards. Because unconscionability depends on the circumstances at the time the contract is formed, a later rise in market price is irrelevant,6 and subsequent changes in market conditions that make a bargain unfavorable to one party do not affect the issue.7 A buyer who agrees to a fixed price for components and then sees the market price fall has no claim for that reason; a seller who fixed a price and then watched the market climb is in the same position. The logic reaches other bad outcomes as well. A party who complains about what happened after signing must look to some other doctrine, because unconscionability looks only at formation.
Tuckwiller v. Morrison shows the formation view working on a bargain that looks uneven in hindsight. The plaintiff sought specific performance, and the defendants argued that, given the obviously brief duration of her services and their value in comparison with the value of the farm, she should have to accept the reasonable value of her services instead.8 That argument depends on how long the services happened to last, a fact that became visible only afterward. The court looked instead from the standpoint of the parties at the time of the agreement and found the contract fair, not unconscionable, and supported by an adequate consideration.9
Gladding v. Langrall, Muir & Noppinger applied the same view to a professional fee. An accounting firm’s fee was set as a percentage of the tax savings it obtained for clients, and the court rejected the claim that the fee was unconscionable, evaluating the bargain by the situation existing when it was struck.10 A fee that depends on a result the professional cannot guarantee may look lavish once the savings are in hand, but at signing it priced an uncertainty.
The formation-time rule protects the other side as well. In one decision, the party defending a unilateral reduction in the statute of limitations, Pinnacle, offered no reason why the reduction was required, and the court held the provision substantively unconscionable.11 A term of that kind is one-sided in the document on the day it is signed, and what the plaintiff later did under it, including whether the plaintiff happened to sue in time, does not change what the term was when made.
The rule therefore cuts both ways. Hindsight would condemn a bargain that was fair when made, which is what the Tuckwiller defendants asked a court to do by pointing to the brevity of the services, and hindsight would excuse a term that was one-sided when made, which is what the seller in the hypothetical asks. The usual exam error is to treat the plaintiff’s own later experience as the test, arguing that a term was harmless because it was never invoked or harsh because it eventually bit. The sound analysis asks what the term did to the parties’ positions at formation and sets aside what followed.
The Code makes one narrow exception, for a particular kind of clause. Section 2-719(3) lets the parties limit or exclude consequential damages unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable, and a limitation of consequential damages for personal injury in a contract for consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable.12 Unconscionability is typically determined at formation, but this provision is treated as a limited exception: a court testing an exclusion of consequential damages may consider how the exclusion operated after the breach.13 The exception follows from what such a clause does. It has no effect while performance goes well, and what it takes from the buyer depends on the breach that occurs and the loss that follows, so its real operation cannot be seen at signing. A price term, an arbitration clause, or any other provision remains subject to the formation-time rule.
A Question for the Judge
UCC § 2-302(1) makes each remedy depend on the court’s finding, as a matter of law, that the contract or clause was unconscionable when made.15 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 places the remedial power in the court in the same way, and its comment on law and fact explains that the determination is made by the court in light of all the material facts.16 Courts accordingly treat unconscionability as a question of law for the judge, one that either party may raise and that the court may raise on its own motion.17
History and function support the assignment. Unconscionability grew out of equity, where juries were never used, and the rule did not change when the doctrine became available in cases at law.18 The main reason for preserving it is that the determination has a strong discretionary content and is better left in the hands of the judge.19 The judge’s decision remains reviewable, because an appellate court will consider whether proper standards were applied.20 The equitable character of the issue also answers a constitutional objection: conscionability is an equitable issue for which no constitutional right to a jury trial exists.21
Barnes v. Helfenbein shows how firmly the line is drawn. An advisory jury found a 38.502 percent interest rate unconscionable, and the trial court then reduced the rate to ten percent on an equitable basis. The reviewing court held the reduction error.22 The case fits the allocation rule: the question belongs to the judge, and a jury’s finding on it is at most advisory. The usual exam error is to say that a jury decides whether a clause is unconscionable because the dispute turns on contested facts about the signing. The facts still matter, but the rule identifies who finds them: incidental findings of fact are made by the court rather than by a jury, and on appeal they receive the usual weight given such findings.23
A judge who must decide a fairness question without knowing how the form was presented, or what the trade expects, would be ruling blind. That need for facts is why § 2-302(2) gives the parties a right to present evidence, which the next subsection takes up.
Evidence of Commercial Setting
Section 2-302(2) attaches a procedural guarantee to the substantive test. When it is claimed or appears to the court that a contract or clause may be unconscionable, the parties “shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.”25 Georgia’s enactment, OCGA § 11-2-302, carries the same subsection.26 A party can trigger the guarantee by claiming unconscionability, and the court can trigger it by noticing that a clause may be unconscionable, so the opportunity arises whenever the question is live. One court called it a matter of right: the parties can introduce evidence relevant to any claim of unconscionability and so lay grounds for review.27
The reason lies in what the test measures. The official comment asks whether, in light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing when the contract was made.28 The words of a clause show what it says; they do not show how it compares with the practice of the trade or what business need it serves. A liability cap that looks harsh to an outsider may be customary in the field, and the same words in another trade may be an unexplained outlier. Each term in the statute calls for its own proof. Setting covers the trade, the parties, and how the form reached the signer; purpose asks what function the term serves for the party who wrote it; effect asks how the term allocates risk in operation. Evidence on how the form was presented goes to meaningful choice, and evidence on trade practice and purpose goes to whether the terms are unreasonably favorable.29 A ruling made on the face of the clause alone skips the step the statute requires.
Restatement § 208 has no evidence clause of its own, because its text states only the three responses and the moment of measurement.30 Its comment supplies the practice. The determination is made by the court in light of all the material facts, and the parties are to be afforded an opportunity to present evidence as to commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court.31 A court asked to decide in light of all the material facts cannot do so on an empty record, so a claim under § 208 is decided on the same footing as a claim under § 2-302.
Must a court always hold a hearing, then? Some decisions say so, reading § 2-302(2) to mandate an evidentiary hearing or a full trial on the merits.32 Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc. is of that kind: the court held that deciding unconscionability on summary judgment, without giving the parties an opportunity to present evidence, was error. The more reasonable reading requires a hearing only if the parties have raised real issues of fact in their motion papers.33 Vilella v. AT&T states the rule in both directions: where doubt exists about whether a contract is unconscionable, the parties must have an opportunity to present evidence at a hearing, but where the significant facts are essentially undisputed, the court may decide the issue without one. What separates the two decisions is the state of the record. Where evidence on setting, purpose, or effect is missing or the facts conflict, the court must first give the parties their chance to offer it, and where the significant facts are settled, a hearing would add nothing the court does not already have.
The narrower reading has a practical reason and a textual one. Without the limit, the unconscionability defense would become the primary dilatory defense in contract litigation.34 And the statute guarantees a “reasonable” opportunity, which can fall short of a trial when the facts are settled.35