Concept
Restraint Greater Than Needed
Ancillary restraint on competition
Restraint Greater Than Needed
An ancillary promise not to compete is unreasonably in restraint of trade under § 188(1)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts when the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interest.1 The rule's other ground, hardship to the promisor and likely injury to the public, is joined to this one by or, so a covenant can fail on this prong alone, whatever the balance of hardship and injury.2
The prong asks a question of fit. A covenant that clears the ancillary threshold has a legitimate transaction behind it, such as a sale, a job, or a partnership; what remains is whether the promise reaches only as far as that transaction justifies. Freedom of contract is itself a public policy, one that calls for enforcing freely made contracts, so a party who wants out of a covenant must persuade the court that a competing policy matters more.3 One way to make that case is to show that the promise reaches past anything the promisee needed.
The analysis runs in two steps, and the order matters. A court first identifies the promisee's legitimate interest, because the law protects only certain interests and the party defending the covenant must be able to name one. It then lays the restraint against that interest along three dimensions, time, territory, and activity, the factors on which most overbreadth cases turn.4 The interest is the yardstick for all three, since a court cannot say that a restraint runs too long or too wide until it knows what the promisee may protect. Excess on any one dimension triggers the prong, and whatever lies beyond the interest protects nothing the promisee holds and serves only to remove the promisor from the market. The next two subsections follow the same order: the interest first, then the measurement.
Legitimate Interest
The first question under § 188(1)(a) is whether the promisee has a legitimate interest at all, because a restraint cannot be sized to an interest that does not exist.5 A covenant with no real interest behind it fails however short or narrow it is. The initial burden rests on the employer, who must prove that the covenant is reasonable and bears a fair relation to, and is necessary for, the business interests it seeks to protect.6
The standard examples of protectable interests are business goodwill, trade secrets, and other confidential or proprietary information.7 The cases sort them under two headings: trade secrets and other confidential information, a heading that has covered customer and supplier lists, and goodwill.8
Trade secrets show the logic most clearly. An employee ordinarily may compete after the employment ends, but the competition must be fair, and it is unfair to use confidential information, trade secrets included, against the former employer. The employee obtained the customer list or other secret while in a position of trust, so later use without consent abuses that trust, and a trade secret is an asset of the employer.9 The law protects such information even without a covenant: a former employee may not disclose or use trade secrets, secret customer lists among them. A reasonable covenant enforced by injunction goes one step further, because it eliminates the potential for misuse or wrongful disclosure.10
Courts reject the argument that any commercial harm from a departure counts. An employer may seek protection from improper and unfair competition by a former employee, but it is not entitled to protection against ordinary competition.11 Employers may not use covenants simply because they think covenants are a good idea, to intimidate employees, or to discourage them from looking for work elsewhere, and a covenant meant to eliminate competition will not be enforced.12 Nearly every court likewise treats as illegitimate an employer's wish to keep a competitor from gaining an advantage from the employee in other ways; the prominent examples involve actors, comedians, and sportscasters.13 The radio-station covenant in Pathfinder Communications Corp. v. Macy belongs with these examples, because an employer that fears an audience will follow a performer to a rival is trying to keep a competitor from gaining an advantage from that performer.
An employment covenant therefore needs more than the employment itself. To uphold one, the employer must show special circumstances such as close customer contact or the learning of trade secrets or other confidential information.14
The strength of the interest varies with the relationship that produced the covenant. The seller of a business is in a strong position to poach customers, use trade secrets, and keep trading on the goodwill of the business sold, so a reasonable restraint is most justifiable there; covenants in partnership agreements are usually easier to justify than those in employment agreements because a departing partner resembles a seller.15 Facts matter within each relationship too. Emerick v. Cardiac Study Center held that the practice had business interests and goodwill to protect and that the noncompetition agreement was necessary to protect those interests.16
Even when goodwill is the claimed interest, the employer must prove it on the facts. The employer's interest in its clientele is a question of fact: is the relationship a longstanding one with a major client, or an insignificant one unworthy of protection? A long list of customers is more likely to be insignificant than a short one.17 The interest also has edges. An employer cannot stop a former employee from soliciting customers with whom the employee had no significant contact, or 'prospective' customers, and it cannot enforce a never-compete agreement.18 With the interest identified and bounded, the court has the yardstick it needs for time, territory, and activity.
Time, Place, and Activity
Once the promisee's legitimate interest is identified, § 188(1)(a) asks whether the restraint is greater than needed to protect it.20 Comment d to § 188 tells a court where to look: restrictions may be limited by type of activity, by geographical area, and by time.21 A covenant must be reasonable in duration, activity, and geographic limits to be enforceable.22 Each of these questions asks how far the restraint outruns the interest, and a covenant that fits on two can still fail on the third. An interest has a life span, a footprint, and a subject matter, and a covenant can match the first two while reaching into work where the promisee does no business.
No number of years or miles is reasonable in itself. One court applying Comment d held a two-year, five-mile restriction not facially invalid, and it observed that its own jurisdiction had struck a three-year restriction on the facts of one case while sustaining a five-year restriction within a thirty-mile radius on the facts of another.23 Emerick likewise refused to treat a four- or five-year term as unreasonable as a matter of law, because the temporal term must be considered in the context of the entire agreement.24 The assessment turns on the totality of the circumstances, so a court compares each limit with the interest and the facts in front of it.25
Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber shows all three dimensions in a single covenant. The trial court found that any covenant over six months would be unreasonable, that a five-mile radius around each of the group's three offices was unreasonable because the circles together covered 235 square miles, and that the restriction was unreasonable because it was not limited to pulmonology and made no exception for emergency medical aid.26 The supreme court affirmed the judgment because public policy concerns outweighed the group's protectable interests, a ground taken up in the next section.27
Duration is measured against how long the protected interest keeps its value. In Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, the clinics changed their pricing policies yearly, and practice-development information in a learned profession loses its value quickly as technology changes and new reference materials appear. The court held as a matter of law that a one-year limit sufficiently protected those interests, found the covenant's three-year term partially unreasonable, and remanded for a judgment enjoining the doctor for one year from termination.28 The same reasoning explains why most enforceable employee covenants last six months to a year. Courts reason that this period gives the employer ample protection, especially where technology advances rapidly, and that a longer one imposes an undue hardship on the employee.29 The trial court in Valley Medical sat at the short end of that range when it found that any covenant over six months would be unreasonable.30
The six-month-to-one-year pattern describes typical outcomes and sets no ceiling. Emerick enforced a four-year, two-mile restraint after the trial court trimmed the covenant to those limits, finding it necessary to protect the practice's business interests and client base and not overly burdensome, because the physician remained free to see patients immediately outside the restricted area and in hospitals.31 Hopper cut a three-year term to one, and Emerick upheld four. The two outcomes differ because the measuring stick differs: Hopper compared the term with information that goes stale within a year, while Emerick compared it with a practice's goodwill and the agreement as a whole.
Territory is measured against where the promisee's interest actually lies. The same five-mile figure can come out either way: one court held a two-year, five-mile restriction not facially invalid, while the trial court in Valley Medical found a five-mile radius around each of three offices unreasonable because the circles covered 235 square miles.32 A radius means little until a court lays it over the employer's actual market. A broad territory can fit a broad market: in Comprehensive Technologies International v. Software Artisans, Inc., the Fourth Circuit found a nationwide restriction reasonable because the employer enjoyed a national market and faced competitors across the country, so the restriction was no greater than necessary.33 A territory the employer can enlarge at will fails for the opposite reason. The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to enforce a covenant that defined its territory as ten miles from one specific location 'or such others as established' by the employer, because the employer could control the area of future restriction without the employee's consent.34
Activity is measured against the work the promisee actually does. The trial court in Valley Medical found the restriction unreasonable in part because it was not limited to pulmonology and made no exception for emergency medical aid.35 Karpinski v. Ingrasci reached a parallel result: because the employer practiced only oral surgery, a restriction on the employee's practicing dentistry was overbroad.36 A restraint cut to the work holds up. In Comprehensive Technologies the covenant was limited to specific software, and the former employee remained free to work on any other kind of software, and on the same type of software so long as it was not designed to run on personal computers.37
The measure applies outside employment too. If a promise in a lease restricts the covenantor from both an automobile repair business and a jewelry business, the promise is almost certain to be held overbroad, because a jewelry business does not compete with the covenantee's automobile repair business. A court might reform the promise by disregarding the overbroad portion and enforcing the remainder, perhaps only for three years and only within a five-mile radius of the premises.38
The fifth step explains why a covenant with a sensible territory and a sensible activity bar can still fail on a term that outlives the interest. A finding of excess does not always end the covenant. Whether a court will reform an unreasonable covenant to make it enforceable depends on the jurisdiction's rule on overbreadth.39 Hopper's one-year injunction and the trial court's trimming of the Emerick covenant to two miles and four years show courts cutting a restraint down to fit the interest.40 The closing section of this chapter takes up when courts may do that and when they must refuse enforcement outright.