Concept
How the Statute Operates
Whether the contract is within the Statute of Frauds
Contracts Within the Statute of Frauds
How the Statute Operates
Most oral promises bind. A spoken promise can be as effective in law as a written one, and most everyday transactions, such as small retail purchases and short-term employment arrangements, rest on binding promises that no document records.1 The Statute of Frauds is the exception, and a narrow one. It forbids enforcement of contracts in certain listed classes unless there is a written memorandum or an applicable exception.2 On any oral-contract problem, then, the first job is to decide whether the agreement falls within one of those classes.
The writing requirement began as a rule about proof. Its original purpose was evidentiary: to supply evidence of the existence and terms of a contract at a time when parties could not testify in support of their own claims, and the act that imposed it was adopted for the prevention of frauds and perjuries.3 A signed writing deters false claims because a prospective perjurer must then forge a document and risk criminal sanctions if the forgery is detected.4 The evidentiary purpose is no longer the whole story. Courts have allowed enforcement on oral testimony about the contents of a lost writing, which shows that the statute does not always serve an evidentiary purpose today.5
A writing requirement can serve three functions: evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling.6 The cautionary function works because a writing takes longer to prepare than an oral promise, and the extra time lets the parties reconsider or abandon the deal. A writing also avoids mistakes of faulty memory and sloppy phrasing, and a party's willingness to put terms on paper says something about that party's seriousness and reliability.7 The third function, channeling, lets the parties signal that they have made a contract.
Lawmakers did not demand a writing for every contract. Some contracts were too minor to justify the time and cost of preparing one, while others were especially prone to false claims that caused tremendous problems if upheld, among them contracts to wed and contracts to pay another's debt.8 That selectivity is why the statute lists classes instead of stating a general rule, and why the boundaries of each class matter.
The statute can also be turned against an honest claimant. A party who genuinely made an oral deal may find the other side using the missing writing to escape it, and courts, recognizing this, apply the statute with some flexibility to reduce the opportunities for abuse.9 Every writing requirement trades one error for another. Demanding a writing guards against enforcing promises never made but produces underenforcement of promises that were made, and the judicial exceptions that correct the underenforcement unavoidably permit some overenforcement.10
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 110(1) names five classes of contracts that fall within the statute:
- a contract of an executor or administrator to answer for a duty of the decedent;11
- a contract to answer for the duty of another, the suretyship provision;12
- a contract made upon consideration of marriage;13
- a contract for the sale of an interest in land;14 and
- a contract that is not to be performed within one year from its making.15
Sales of goods were part of the original English statute but are now governed by UCC § 2-201, which makes a contract for the sale of goods for a price of $500 or more unenforceable unless a sufficient record is signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought.16 Many states add further classes, which range from agreements to pay brokers for arranging real estate sales to agreements to guarantee a medical result.17 The sections that follow take each covered class in turn.
A contract within a covered class that lacks a sufficient memorandum, and to which no exception applies, is unenforceable, and unenforceable is not void. A void contract is no contract at all, but a contract unenforceable under the statute exists, and a court will simply not enforce it for want of a writing.18 Strictly speaking it is not a legal nullity. In most cases, though, the practical result is the same, because the party relying on the contract cannot obtain a remedy for its breach.19
Several consequences follow from that distinction. The oral agreement is not illegal, and the parties may make and perform it; enforcement becomes unavailable only if one side refuses to fulfil her obligations.20 Because the contract exists, the missing writing is a defense that the party sued must raise, and a defendant who does not raise it may be held to the contract.21 The memorandum also need be signed only by the party to be charged, the party against whom enforcement is sought, so a seller's signed memorandum can support a suit against the seller even though the buyer signed nothing.22
The statute removes only the claim on the contract, so other claims survive. A buyer who pays $50,000 down on an oral land contract cannot enforce the agreement if the seller refuses to convey, but the seller has no right to keep the money, and the buyer can recover it in restitution on an unjust-enrichment theory.23 In Hoag Living Trust Dated February 4 v. Hoag, a trust orally agreed to transfer property to Hoag if he maintained it and paid its taxes and insurance, and the trust later sold the property to someone else. The oral transfer agreement was unenforceable, but unjust enrichment is a separate cause of action that the statute did not bar, so Hoag could be reimbursed for the expenses that benefited the trust.24 A restitution claim rests on the other side's retention of a benefit, so it can succeed without anyone enforcing the promise.
This unit answers only the first question. What a memorandum must contain, what counts as a signature, and which exceptions apply are separate inquiries, and each of them removes only the statutory bar. Satisfying the statute does not by itself make a promise enforceable, so a promise that lacks consideration remains unenforceable, while noncompliance defeats even a promise that consideration supports.26