Concept
Suretyship Promises
Whether the contract is within the Statute of Frauds
Suretyship Promises
A contract to answer for the duty of another falls within the Statute of Frauds. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 110(1)(b) calls it the suretyship provision.1 Three people are involved. A principal debtor owes an obligation to a creditor (the obligee), and a surety promises the creditor to perform that obligation if the debtor does not.2 For deciding whether a writing is required, guarantor means the same thing as surety. A promisor who tells a seller, "Sell him the goods, and if he does not pay you, I will," is a surety or guarantor, and the promise is within the statute.3 The surety is a backup debtor who takes on a duty that would otherwise belong to someone else.4
The loan example contains two duties owed to the same creditor, the borrower's and the brother's, and only the brother's falls within the provision. A person who promises to pay a debt that is the person's own is not answering for anyone else.5
The writing requirement also serves a cautionary function. It is easy to make an offhand promise to guarantee a loan without appreciating how serious the consequences may be, and having to sign a writing gives the promisor a chance to reconsider. The risk is real because many sureties are not paid for their promises.6
Even so, many promises that mention someone else's debt need no writing. The three subsections below take up the limits on the provision: the test that separates collateral from original promises, the main purpose exception, and novation.
Collateral Versus Original Promises
Courts sort promises that touch another person's debt into two groups. A promise is called collateral when it contravenes the suretyship provision because no record evidences it, and original when it does not.7 Those words state a result. They do not tell a court which promises are enforceable, so the work lies in the facts that decide which label fits.8 The central fact is the promisor's place in the transaction. A collateral promise stands behind the principal debtor's primary liability, so the promisor's duty is secondary and arises only if the debtor fails to pay.9
Two sentences that differ by a single clause show the line. Suppose a promisor tells a shoe seller, "Sell the customer a pair of shoes, and if the customer does not pay you, I will." The customer is the buyer and the promisor is a backup. The promise is collateral to the customer's primary liability, it is within the statute, and it is unenforceable unless a writing signed by the promisor evidences it.10 Now delete the added clause, so that the promisor says only, "Sell the customer a pair of shoes, and I will pay you." The seller has extended credit to the promisor, not to the customer, and no debt of the customer's stands behind the promise. The promisor has become the buyer in everything but taking delivery, and the provision has nothing to catch.
That is why courts ask to whom the creditor extended credit. If credit goes only to the promisor, the promise is original.11 The question is another way of asking whether the creditor manifested an intent to contract with the principal debtor at all. Charging the customer as a debtor on the creditor's books is strong evidence that the creditor did, but it is not conclusive, and the question is ordinarily one of fact.12
The creditor's bookkeeping and the promisor's words can point in different directions, which is why the question is one of fact. A different pattern produces an original promise even without a ledger entry. Suppose a third person contracts directly with the creditor to pay for a benefit the creditor will give to someone else, such as a loan whose proceeds go to a friend. The third person is the only party who ever had an obligation, and she is guaranteeing no one's debt but her own.13
The promise must also run to the creditor. The provision is usually held inapplicable when the promise was made to the debtor or to someone other than the creditor to whom the debt is owed.14 A review problem shows the provision applying. A mother orally promised a contractor that she would pay her daughter's bill for construction services. She made the promise to the creditor for her daughter's benefit and gained nothing herself, so it fell within the suretyship category and required a writing she had signed.15 Had she voiced the same assurance only to her daughter, the usual rule would take the promise outside the provision.16
Only a promise that survives all four questions is a collateral promise within the provision. Even that promise may escape the writing requirement under the limits in the next two subsections.
The Main Purpose Exception
A guarantee falls outside the writing requirement when the promisor's main purpose is to obtain an immediate and direct economic benefit for the promisor.18 Restatement (Second) § 116 states this main purpose exception. It applies when the promisor guaranteed the debt mainly for his own economic advantage rather than out of solicitude for the debtor's well-being.19 When it applies, the absence of a signed writing does not bar enforcement.
The exception follows from what the provision is aimed at. The writing requirement targets the unpaid accommodation promise, the offhand favor made without appreciating its weight.20 A promisor who gives the promise to gain something personally is bargaining for an advantage and is not doing a favor for the debtor. Applying Ames v. Foster, a Massachusetts court asked whether the fair inference from the whole transaction was that the leading object was the promisor's acquisition from the creditor of some property, lien, or benefit not previously possessed. If so, the debt could fairly be deemed the promisor's own.21
A lumber-credit problem shows the exception at work. A contractor building a homeowner's house owes a lumber company for earlier purchases, and the company refuses him further credit. To hasten completion of the house, the homeowner phones the company, asks that the contractor be given more credit, and promises to guarantee the contractor's obligations. The promise is outside the statute because the homeowner's main purpose is a direct economic benefit for himself, a finished house.22 The company can enforce the oral guarantee even though the homeowner signed nothing.
Both promisors care how the debtor fares. What separates them is whose interest the promise mainly serves. The homeowner's promise buys him something, namely continued deliveries that finish his own house. The father's promise buys him only his daughter's success, which is the accommodating kind of promise the provision covers.23 Nearly every guarantor has some reason, such as affection or family loyalty, so a personal stake in the debtor's welfare cannot be enough. The benefit must be economic and direct, an advantage the promisor gains from the promise itself.24
A promisor can have more than one self-interested reason. In a review problem, two partners ran a shoe manufacturing business, and one learned that the other personally owed a large sum to a shoe distributor. The first partner feared that word of the other's finances would hurt their business, and he also wanted an order for their factories from the distributor. He phoned the distributor and orally guaranteed the debt. His main purpose was to secure benefits for himself, both forestalling the damaging rumors and obtaining the order, so the missing writing did not prevent the distributor from enforcing the promise.25
Results turn on the facts of each case. In Rosewood Care Center, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., an employer's oral promise to pay a nursing facility for an employee's care raised a question of fact about whether the main purpose exception applied. The court therefore could not decide the issue as a matter of law.26
The last limit does not ask what the promisor gains. It asks whether the creditor released the original debtor.
Novation and Substituted Debtors
A promise to pay another person's debt falls within the suretyship provision only if the promisor answers for someone else's duty.28 The creditor may instead agree to give up its claim against the original debtor in exchange for the promisor's promise, which leaves the promisor answering for the promisor's own duty. That arrangement is a novation: the parties remove one of the original participants and substitute a newcomer.29 Restatement (Second) § 115 reflects the result. A promise to pay a debt is probably outside the statute when the creditor, in return for the new promise, discharged the original debtor.30
The three-person structure shows how the substitution works. Paige owes Olivia a debt. Sarah tells Olivia, not that she will guarantee Paige's debt, but that she will take on Paige's obligations, and Olivia agrees. By accepting Sarah's offer, Olivia discharges Paige from any further liability, so Sarah is not a surety.31 She is answering for her own debt, and the suretyship provision, which reaches only the duty of another, has nothing to attach to. The release also removes what makes a surety a backup debtor. No one stands in front of Sarah, because Olivia has traded her claim against Paige for Sarah's promise.
The standard commercial illustration involves a lease. The new owner of a business promises the landlord to pay the rent, and in exchange the landlord agrees to release the former tenant from the remaining obligations. The landlord ends up with a contract with the new owner alone, and that contract discharges the former tenant. It is a novation and not a suretyship agreement, so no signed writing is required.32
The release is the only difference between the two lease promises. In the novation, the landlord surrendered the claim against the former tenant and took the newcomer's promise in its place, so the loss and the gain are two halves of one exchange. In the backup version, the landlord kept the first obligor and added a second, which is the situation the statute targets. The creditor must also have agreed to the release. A promisor who announces a plan to take over the debt has made a novation only if the creditor accepts the promise in satisfaction and discharge of the earlier obligation. A creditor who has not let the debtor go still holds the debtor to the debt, and the promisor remains a backup.33
Novation, the main purpose exception, and the collateral-versus-original test each answer one underlying question: is the promisor answering for another's duty or for the promisor's own? The credit inquiry asks to whom the creditor extended credit, the main purpose rule asks whom the promise mainly benefits, and novation asks whether the original debtor is still liable.