Concept
Promises Upon Consideration of Marriage
Whether the contract is within the Statute of Frauds
Promises Upon Consideration of Marriage
The Restatement (Second) lists the marriage provision among the contracts within the Statute of Frauds: a contract made upon consideration of marriage.1 Section 124 states the working rule. A promise for which all or part of the consideration is either marriage or a promise to marry is within the statute, unless the agreement consists only of mutual promises of two persons to marry each other.2 The test asks what the promisor is buying. If marriage is the whole price or only part of it, the promise is unenforceable unless it is in a writing signed by the party to be charged, and a bargain that rests on several things is within the statute whenever marriage is one of them.3
The writing requirement exists because of the setting in which these promises are made. Where marriage is part of the bargain, the parties seem likely to give the commitment less thought than an ordinary contract would receive, and a signed writing counters that risk.4 Because the worry is haste, the provision should reach any contract in which the proposed marriage is a substantial factor inducing its formation.5
The exception for mutual promises to marry shows how far the statute departs from a literal reading. In an engagement, each party's promise to marry is exchanged for the other's, and the language of the original statute seemed broad enough to cover it. Courts have consistently held that mutual promises to marry are not a contract made upon consideration of marriage.6 The result appears to be a policy decision and does not follow from the statutory language.7 The exception is narrow. It covers only an agreement consisting of the mutual promises themselves, so a promise to give money or property, or to support a prospective spouse's child, in exchange for marriage or a promise of marriage is within the provision, and so is a negative covenant given for that consideration.8 Whether a party may sue for breach of a promise to marry is a separate question. That claim was once valid in most jurisdictions, and statutes in many have restricted or abolished it.9
A second limit separates marriage as the price of a promise from marriage as the setting for it. The promise must itself be consideration for the promise to marry, and a promise made on the condition of marriage or in contemplation of it does not qualify.10 Courts apply the provision only when marriage is the end to be attained. It does not apply when marriage is merely the occasion for the promise, a condition of it, or an incident of the contract.11 Conditional phrasing alone therefore settles nothing: a promise that takes effect on marriage is made on a condition, while a promise that seeks marriage is made in consideration of it. Each of these constructions narrows the marriage category and widens the potential enforceability of oral agreements.12 The mistake to avoid is spotting a wedding in the facts and demanding a writing without asking whether the promisor sought the marriage as the price.
In the standard illustration, Lana promises to transfer land to Josiah in order to convince him to marry her. The promise is exchanged for the marriage, so it must be memorialized in a writing to be enforceable.13 Because the promise concerns land, it may also raise a question under the land provision, which is taken up below. That question is independent of the marriage provision, which applies because marriage is the consideration. Not every agreement about land falls within the land provision. In one case, a court rejected a land-contract defense because neither party owned the parcels when they agreed, so the contract was not one to transfer an interest in land.14
The father's status as a stranger to the marriage changes nothing, because the provision looks at what a promise is exchanged for and not at who makes it. A promise by a third party in consideration of the marriage of two other persons is within the statute.15 The friend's promise differs on the one fact that matters: she did not seek the marriage but responded to it, so marriage is the occasion for her promise and not its consideration.16
Antenuptial agreements are the other familiar setting. Because marriage is part of that bargain, the Statute of Frauds governs their enforcement, and an oral antenuptial agreement is unenforceable.17 The provision does not reach express contracts between unmarried cohabitants, which many courts now recognize. The treatise calls that exemption perhaps anomalous.18 Marvin v. Marvin shows how far courts have gone in enforcing such agreements. The plaintiff, a former entertainer and singer, alleged that she gave up her career to be the defendant's companion, homemaker, housekeeper, and cook, and that he agreed to support her for the rest of her life. The California Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of her complaint. It held that such an agreement is enforceable except to the extent that it explicitly makes meretricious sexual services the consideration, because many more couples now live together without marrying than once did and any other principle would be too uncertain to be workable.19
A party who marries in reliance on an oral promise might expect the wedding itself to cure the missing writing, but it does not. The consensus is that celebrating the marriage is not part performance sufficient to justify enforcing an oral antenuptial agreement, even when a party has changed position in some way other than marital status.20 The result makes sense because the wedding is the very consideration that brought the promise within the provision, so it cannot also be the performance that excuses the writing. Josiah, who marries Lana in reliance on her oral promise of land, therefore cannot enforce it on the strength of the wedding. If there has been additional part performance, the unperformed part of the contract may become enforceable, and if not, restitutionary remedies may be available.21 Once both sides have fully performed, the agreement cannot be rescinded merely because it was originally oral.22