Concept
Sales of Goods for $500 or More
Whether the contract is within the Statute of Frauds
Sales of Goods for $500 or More
UCC § 2-201(1) makes a contract for the sale of goods for a price of $500 or more unenforceable, by way of action or defense, unless a record sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made is signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by that party's authorized agent or broker.1 Because the bar reaches both action and defense, an oral contract can neither be sued on nor raised as a shield. The record may be imperfect, since omitting or misstating an agreed term does not make it insufficient, but the contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity of goods the record shows.2 This unit asks only the threshold question: does the contract fall within the rule at all? What makes a record sufficient, and which exceptions excuse a missing one, come later.3
The Restatement counts this class among those the Code now governs. Its list of contracts traditionally subject to the Statute of Frauds, but now governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, includes a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more (§ 2-201)4 and, under a separate provision, a contract for the sale of other personal property, enforced by action or defense beyond $5,000 in amount or value of remedy (§ 1-206).5 The $500 line therefore belongs to goods alone.
The Code kept a writing requirement for goods although the setting that produced it had changed. Section four of the Uniform Sales Act became law in most states in the twentieth century, yet the law also came to let parties testify on their own behalf and gave courts power to deal with unreasonable jury verdicts, and in 1954 Parliament repealed Britain's statute of frauds for the sale of goods. The law professors who evolved the Code in the 1940s and 1950s did not follow suit.6 Courts often regarded the statute as an obstacle to justice, and some commentators urged its abolition on the ground that changes in procedure and evidence had mooted its original purpose.7 Section 2-201 is therefore a contested choice, and a limited one: it demands a record only when the price reaches a dollar line.
Two questions decide whether § 2-201 governs a contract. The first is whether the contract is a sale of goods, because a contract for any other subject matter falls outside the section whatever it costs, though another provision of the statute may still reach it. The second is whether the price reaches $500, because a sale of goods below that figure needs no record under this section. The goods question comes first, since only a contract that passes it ever raises the price question.
Sale of Goods Versus Services
Section 2-201 reaches only a contract for the sale of goods, and the Code's definitions say what that means. A sale is the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price, and goods are all things that are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.8 The core transaction is therefore a seller transferring ownership of a movable object for a price, and a contract missing either element lies outside the section at any dollar figure.
Section 2-201 sits in Article 2, the Code's article on sales, and it does not apply to the sale of realty, to construction contracts, or to the rendering of services for a price. Nor does it apply to the sale of corporate stocks and bonds or choses in action generally, to investments or options, to contracts of employment, commission, or brokerage even when these look to a sale of goods, or to leases of personalty.9
Falling outside § 2-201 does not mean that no writing is needed. An oral sale of land is judged under the land contract provision, and a services contract is judged under the common-law classes, such as the one-year provision.10 Those classes have scope tests of their own, and they too look to what the contract does rather than what it mentions. In one dispute, Wheelock's bid on two parcels was successful, and he refused to let Thies take title to them. A court held that his oral agreement concerned land but was not a contract for the transfer of an interest in land, because neither party owned the property when they contracted and the transfer would occur later between the owner and the buyer. Thies could therefore enforce it.11
Many contracts do not sort so neatly. A painter supplies paint and applies it, and an installer supplies equipment and mounts it. Most courts apply a predominant purpose test: Article 2 applies if the sales component is dominant, but not if the central purpose of the contract is the supply of services, with goods furnished incidentally.12 Some courts instead look for the 'essence' of the transaction and classify it as essentially a sale or essentially a service.13 Either way, the question is what the buyer is bargaining for. A buyer who hires skill and effort and receives materials along the way has made a different bargain from one who purchases a product and pays for the work needed to deliver it, and Article 2, as the law of sales, governs only the second. A related rule holds that a contract to furnish labor and materials in erecting a structure or repairing a chattel is not within the statute unless title to goods passes before annexation.14
Two decisions show the test producing opposite results. In National Historic Shrines Foundation v. Dali, Salvador Dali orally agreed to paint a picture of the Statue of Liberty on a television show, and the court held that the contract was for his services as a performer, with the painting incidental, so the sales writing rule did not apply. In Power Restoration International, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., the parties orally agreed that Power Restoration would design and install energy-saving electrical equipment in PepsiCo facilities, and the court held that the predominant purpose of this hybrid was the sale of goods, so § 2-201 applied and the oral agreement was unenforceable. Services were present in both contracts, so their presence cannot be the dividing line. Dali's buyer was purchasing a performance, and the painting was a by-product of it. PepsiCo's design and installation work was done to deliver the equipment, which was what PepsiCo was acquiring.
The same line runs through the work of a single painter. An artist who orally agrees to paint a mural on a hotel lobby wall has made a hybrid contract, since paint is supplied and applied, but the hotel is paying for skill and labor and the paint is furnished incidentally, so Article 2 does not apply.15 The contract then stands or falls under the common-law classes, and the one-year provision is the likeliest candidate. In one problem a painter was given fifteen months to finish, and nothing barred earlier completion. Many courts read the one-year rule restrictively and apply it only when the terms clearly require performance to continue past a year, so the statute did not stop him from enforcing his contract.16 An artist who instead orally agrees to paint an oversized canvas for $100,000 and deliver it has made a different bargain. The buyer is acquiring a movable object, so the sales component dominates and the contract is within § 2-201, unenforceable without a record unless an exception applies. A contract for goods yet to be manufactured is within the section, and the exception for specially manufactured goods is a separate question from whether the section applies.17 The usual exam error is to treat any contract that involves paint, parts, or other materials as a sale of goods. The mural and the canvas use the same materials and the same painter, and the fact that moves the answer is whether the client receives a movable object or work performed on the client's own wall.
Things attached to land mark the border between goods and realty. A contract for the sale of growing crops or other things attached to realty that can be severed without material harm, or of timber to be cut, is a contract for the sale of goods whether the buyer or the seller severs the thing, even though it forms part of the realty when the parties contract.18 Minerals and structures to be removed from realty, which the Code's severance provision (§ 2-107) treats separately, are goods only if the seller is to sever them; if the buyer is to sever them, the contract is treated as one affecting land. A seller who separates the material delivers a movable thing, while a buyer who must do the separating is acquiring a right to enter the land and remove it.
The writing rule does not ask who the parties are. Its trigger is a sale of goods at a price of $500 or more, and its text sets no condition about merchants.19 A private seller of a used $900 riding mower is within the rule just as a dealer would be. Sales between merchants do carry special rules, and § 2-201(3) lists ways to avoid the writing requirement, but both topics come later.20
Only a contract that clears this screen reaches the price question taken up next, and a contract that fails it must be tested against the land provision, the one-year provision, or another writing requirement instead.
The $500 Price Threshold
UCC § 2-201(1) reaches a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more, and a contract priced below that figure falls outside it.22 Once a contract has passed the goods screen, the next question is arithmetic: what price did the buyer promise to pay? An oral agreement for 400 widgets at a total price of $400 is enforceable although nothing was written, and the party suing need only prove that the promise was made. At $500 or more, the section requires some writing that evidences a contract for the sale of goods, is signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought, and states a quantity.23 The floor leaves everyday purchases to proceed on a handshake and reserves the writing burden for larger sales.
The trigger is the price, meaning the amount the contract fixes as what the buyer will pay, and the value of the goods does not enter the count.24 The earlier Sales Act applied to goods of a stated value, and the Code substituted price. Whether the drafters intended a substantive change is unclear, but in ordinary speech price is far less vague than value. The change may have been meant to eliminate two problems: whether the statute applies when goods are sold for less than they are worth, and how to treat benefits other than money conferred on the seller.25
A buyer cannot escape the section by pricing goods item by item. The price that counts is the total price of the goods sold in a single contract. A buyer who orally orders 1,000 items at $5.10 each in one order has contracted at a price of $5,100, and the contract falls within § 2-201 even though each item costs about five dollars.26 The 400 widgets at a total of $400 sit on the other side of the line, because their combined price is under $500. Aggregation follows from what the section attaches to, a contract for the sale of goods. If each line item were tested alone, any large sale could be priced piece by piece and escape the requirement.
Not every price is paid in cash. The Code lets the price be payable in money or otherwise, so a swap of goods for services is not a zero-price deal.27 How to count benefits other than money that a seller receives is the part the Code leaves less settled. The practical step on an exam is to express what the buyer gives in dollars and test that figure against the line, leaving the market value of the goods the buyer receives out of the count.
A closer question arises when a buyer purchases several items, each priced under $500, whose total exceeds it. The Code does not say whether such a purchase is one sale to which the statute applies or several to which it does not.28 The test is whether the parties made one contract or several. It is often difficult to apply, and the Code favors a single contract.29
An exam answer that involves several sub-$500 items bought together should therefore argue that they form one contract and add them. Facts showing separately negotiated and separately priced deals point the other way and should be noted.
The $500 line is the figure in the Code's text. Proposed amendments would have raised the jurisdictional amount to $5,000 and replaced writing with record for this purpose.30 Because the text discussed here says $500, an exam answer should apply that figure unless the facts say otherwise.31 Do not confuse that figure with the $5,000 in former § 1-206, which governed contracts for the sale of personal property not covered by the Code's other record requirements and required a signed record for the sale of a chose in action when the amount sought exceeded $5,000. Revised Article 1 repeals that section without replacement, and many of the choses in action it governed are now subject to Article 9's writing requirements.32 It did not govern goods, which § 2-201 covers.
The threshold decides only whether the contract is within § 2-201. A sale under the figure still requires proof that the agreement was made, and a sale at or above it raises the separate questions of what record suffices and what excuses a missing one.