Concept
The Memorandum Standard
Whether a memorandum satisfies the Statute of Frauds
Satisfying the Writing Requirement
The Memorandum Standard
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 131 sets the general standard for satisfying the Statute of Frauds. Unless the particular statute adds requirements of its own, a contract within the Statute is enforceable if any writing, signed by or on behalf of the party to be charged, meets three content requirements.1 The party to be charged is the person against whom enforcement is sought, usually the defendant who wants out of the deal, so the signature that counts is the resisting party's. A later section takes up what qualifies as a signature.
The Statute governs enforcement, not existence. An oral contract within it is still a contract.2 The defendant's power to validate the contract merely by signing an appropriate writing confirms the point, because that power could not exist if the contract had never come into being.3 A memorandum therefore evidences a deal the parties already made, which is why § 131 asks only for “any writing” signed by the party to be charged. It requires no formal instrument and no signature from the other side.4
The standard also reflects what the Statute is for. Its original purpose was evidentiary: to supply proof of a contract's existence and terms when the parties could not testify in support of their own claims.5 That purpose no longer explains everything, since courts enforce contracts within the Statute on oral testimony about the contents of a lost writing, and a second concern now competes with it. The Statute aims to stop a person from enforcing a falsely alleged contract through perjured testimony, but a defendant can also abuse it to evade an oral contract that was genuinely made, so courts apply it with some flexibility.6 The competing errors are underenforcement, which fails to honor real assent, and overenforcement, which honors assent that never occurred. No rule avoids one without risking the other.7 Section 131 answers by demanding enough content to tie an oral claim to a real transaction, and no more.
The three content requirements are these. The writing must reasonably identify the subject matter of the contract, it must be sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made between the parties or offered by the signer to the other party, and it must state with reasonable certainty the essential terms of the unperformed promises.8 The sections below take them in that order. Two qualifications frame all three. Section 131 yields to any additional requirements a particular statute imposes. And for a sale of goods for $500 or more, UCC § 2-201(1) asks only for a signed record sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made, a lighter test that a later section sets beside § 131.9
Subject Matter
Paragraph (a) of § 131 requires that the memorandum reasonably identify the subject matter of the contract.10 Subject matter is the thing the bargain concerns: the house, the parcel, the job. The operative word is reasonably. A note recording the “sale of house at 313 Windsor Drive” identifies its subject well enough.11 Price and the other terms of the bargain are tested separately under paragraph (c), so this element asks only what the contract is about.
Reasonable identification is the standard because a writing corroborates a claimed bargain only if it ties the claim to one identifiable thing. A memorandum that fits any of several parcels gives a court no assurance that this particular promise was ever made, and the claimant is left with the oral testimony the Statute discounts. The same logic explains why the description need not be perfect. Once the writing points to the right thing, outside evidence can fill in details, and that evidence still screens out an invented claim.
For most contracts, identification is rarely contested. Land is the exception.12 Courts normally require a land contract to describe the property clearly enough that the seller knows what she is conveying and the buyer knows what he is buying, though what that demands varies from state to state.13 In some jurisdictions a street address will not do and only the full legal description suffices. At the other extreme, many courts hold that the writing need not itself identify the property so long as it furnishes the key to identifying the land.14
Under the key approach, the writing does enough of the work to point a court toward the right land, and outside evidence supplies the rest. A writing that points to no particular land supplies no key, so the claimant's testimony would have to identify the parcel, and that is the oral proof the Statute exists to discount.
The cases sort along that line. An owner of twenty acres who signs a memo agreeing to sell “10 acres of my land” has identified nothing, because the words fit any ten of the twenty. A street address or a community nickname for a well-known tract works the other way, since in each instance the land can be readily identified.15 Postal descriptions also sort. “1234 Country Lane” may suffice because the property can later be located, while “P.O. Box 294” may not.16
The harder cases fall between those poles. In a classroom problem, a memorandum identifies the land by street number at the intersection of two streets but names no city, state, or county. If the city were sufficiently identified, the street-number description would probably be adequate, because outside evidence can then supply the exact dimensions or boundaries. The description might also pass if there were an averment that the seller owned only one parcel matching the street description in a particular city and state.17 In each variation, the writing has to point to the land before outside evidence can complete the description.
Indicating a Contract
Paragraph (b) of § 131 asks a second question: does the writing indicate that a contract about the subject matter has been made between the parties or offered by the signer to the other party?19 Paragraph (a) asked what the bargain concerns. Paragraph (b) asks whether the signer's own words show that someone struck or proposed a bargain about it. A page that merely mentions the subject ties the oral claim to no transaction, while a page that treats the deal as made, or as put forward by the signer, supplies the link the Statute requires.
Courts state the test as acknowledgment. The writing must amount to an acknowledgment by the party to be charged that he or she has assented to the contract the other party asserts.20
What the signer meant the writing to do does not matter. The writing need not have been made to memorialize the contract, and it need never have been delivered to the party seeking enforcement.21 Even a deed or will prepared under the oral contract has been held sufficient, and the writing need not have been intended to satisfy the Statute if it does so in fact.22 It may be a signed statement addressed to a stranger to the contract.23 A signed intra-company memorandum advising a production department of a contract with X for 100 widgets could serve.24
In a standard illustration, A and B orally contract for the sale of Blackacre, and A writes and signs a letter to a friend, C, accurately stating the contract. The letter is a sufficient memorandum to charge A even though it was never mailed.25 The corroboration lies in the signer's own words recording the agreement, so it makes no difference that no one on the other side ever saw them.
A signed offer that the other side accepts orally is the harder case, because the writing evidences an offer, and an offer is not yet a contract. In a standard illustration, A writes B: “I will employ you as superintendent of my mill for a term of three years from date, at a salary of $28,000 a year. Let me know if you wish to accept this offer.” B accepts orally, and the letter is a sufficient memorandum to charge A.26 The better view is that the offeror's signature on the offer satisfies the purpose and function of the Statute, and paragraph (b)'s coverage of a contract “offered by the signer” supports that result.27 The offeror's own signed statement of the terms is not the claimant's say-so. Acceptance is the only element left to prove, and the writing already states what was accepted.
A writing that admits the deal while refusing to honor it still indicates a contract. In a further illustration, A and B orally agree on a $5,000 sale of Blackacre, and A then writes and signs a letter to B accurately stating the terms but adding that the agreement was oral, does not bind A, and will not be carried out. The letter is a sufficient memorandum to charge A.28 The letter takes a legal position, but it also gives the signer's own account of the bargain, and that account is what corroborates. Letting the denial cancel the memorandum would hand the defendant the evasion that the Statute's flexibility is meant to prevent.29
The contrasting case comes from a textbook hiring problem. Viva's signed letter of May 23 mentioned no contract terms and was phrased like the revocation of an unaccepted offer, so it implicitly denied that any contract existed. It gave the claimant nothing, though two other documents in the problem might help him in combination.30 Both that letter and the seller's letter above are signed, and both refuse to perform. The seller's letter treats the deal as made and Viva's treats it as never made, so only the seller's letter points toward the contract the claimant asserts.
In practice, the question is what the signed writing says about the deal. A letter that describes the bargain, even to refuse it, indicates a contract. A letter that describes only an undecided or unaccepted proposal does not.
Essential Terms
Paragraph (c) of § 131 supplies the third content requirement: the memorandum must state with reasonable certainty the essential terms of the unperformed promises.32 Paragraph (a) asked what the bargain concerns, and paragraph (b) asked whether the signer's words show a bargain was struck. Paragraph (c) asks what each side promised to do. The word unperformed aims the requirement at obligations still waiting to be carried out. Whether a consideration already delivered, such as a price already paid, must also be stated remains in dispute.33
The requirement has two halves, each answering a different risk. The essential terms must appear because a writing is meant to evidence the rights and duties a contract creates, not merely that some contract exists. A writing without the main terms leaves every question about what either side owes to oral testimony.34 Only the essential terms must appear, and only with reasonable certainty, because demanding every term the parties discussed would defeat the notes and letters real parties write, and a genuine bargain would fail over detail the evidentiary purpose never required. The first half screens out invented claims; the second keeps the screen from catching real ones.35
No fixed list says which terms are essential. At common law, the writing must at least identify the parties and the nature of the exchange and set out the material terms. Materiality is a matter of interpretation, and a term is material if it is an essential part of the exchange and goes to the very basis of the bargain.36 Missing nonmaterial terms can be proved by oral evidence, and a lack of clarity in the writing is resolved by interpretation and construction.37 In a land sale, minor terms such as the time for closing, the type of deed, or the identity of the escrow holder are nonessential, and a court fills such gaps with reasonable terms customarily used in similar transactions.38
Price is the term most often fought over. Most courts insist that the purchase price be specified if the parties have agreed on an amount. Even without agreement on an amount, the contract is enforceable if the writing establishes a procedure for fixing the price later, such as appraisal, and some courts will still require the buyer to pay a reasonable price.39 The authorities are not uniform. Many courts hold that a promise to buy at the property's “appraised value” is not enough, because the price must be stated with some specificity.40
Identifying the parties is equally basic, and a classroom problem shows how a gap there is fatal. Ozzie signs a memorandum identifying his land by street number and promising to convey it, but nowhere names a buyer. The buyer sues and tenders cash. The memorandum is deficient because it does not identify the parties: Ozzie promised to convey his land, but not to any particular party. Because the buyer is the one bringing the action, the buyer need not have signed. Ozzie is the party to be charged, and Ozzie did sign.41 Without a named buyer, the writing gives the claimant nothing in the seller's own words to attach the claim to, and the buyer's identity would rest on testimony alone.
Identifying a party does not require a name, but the writing must supply a key. In Stanley D. Bujnoch, Life Estate v. Copano Energy, LLC, the terms of an easement purchase lay in a series of emails between the buyer and the landowners' attorney, and none mentioned the landowners by name. The court conceded that the identity of the parties is a material term and that a writing failing to identify a party does not satisfy the statute. It held that the references to the attorney's “clients” were enough, and extrinsic evidence was admissible to establish who the clients were.42 A seller who writes “assignee” where the buyer's name belongs has done less. The word describes a role and points to no one, so the designation is insufficient.43
The same classroom memorandum's other gaps do no harm. With nothing said about the manner of payment, an all-cash transaction may be inferred, especially where the buyer tenders cash, and with no date for closing a reasonable time can be inferred.44 A writing that says nothing about financing leaves the buyer obligated to pay the price in cash.45 Apart from the missing locality discussed under subject matter, the omitted buyer is the one gap that reaches an essential term.
Employment deals shift attention from price to duration and pay. The negotiations in Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. show what a hiring bargain is made of: Arden offered a two-year contract at a salary that rose over the term, plus an annual expense allowance, and Crabtree called the offer “interesting.”46 Duration, pay, and expenses are the terms around which that deal turned, so they are natural candidates for essential terms. A later section takes up how separate papers can be combined to supply them. A signed memorandum in Marks v. Cowdin never stated the nature of the employment, yet the court held it sufficient to permit the plaintiff to show he had been employed as “sales manager” and that the employment had continued, because the statute “must not be pressed to the extreme of a literal and rigid logic.” A notice sent during the first period of employment had described the plaintiff as sales manager.47 In that case the writing pointed to the missing term. The next illustration has no such pointer.
The consequence follows from the reason for the rule. Oral evidence can prove missing nonmaterial terms, but the writing itself must carry the material ones, or the plaintiff would be proving the heart of the deal by testimony alone.48 Jurisdictions differ on how much the writing must contain. One statutory formulation for real-estate transactions rejects any requirement that the memorandum contain all the material terms. It treats only the description of the real estate and the price or a method of fixing it as essential, so that the writing shows the parties considered price and reached some agreement on it or on how to fix it later. If those two terms appear, every other term may be established by parol evidence.49 A stricter state or a different formulation changes the list of essential terms but not the question: which terms define this bargain, and does the writing state them with reasonable certainty?