Concept
Why Exceptions Exist
Whether an exception permits enforcement without a complying memorandum
Exceptions to the Writing Requirement
Why Exceptions Exist
Any test for deciding whether parties really made a contract can fail in two opposite directions. It can refuse to enforce a genuine agreement (underenforcement), or it can enforce an alleged agreement that never existed (overenforcement), and almost any effort to avoid one error invites the other.1 A writing requirement aims at the second error, and it pays the usual price. In its familiar formulation, the statute of frauds forbids enforcement of certain classes of contracts unless there is a written memorandum or an applicable exception, and the words “or an applicable exception” belong to that standard statement.2 Exceptions are therefore the statute’s own check on the first error, not a revolt against it.
The statute works on enforcement, not on formation, and every exception inherits that feature. A promise supported by offer, acceptance, and consideration forms a contract even when it is spoken, and the statute may then make that contract unenforceable if no signed writing evidences it.3 The statute is an affirmative defense: the party sued must raise it affirmatively and on time, and a party who does not may be deemed to have lost or waived it.4 Courts read statutory wording the same way. The majority treat the oral contract as unenforceable rather than void, even when the statute uses the word “void,” and they hold that the oral contract remains operative for a wide variety of purposes.5
Two lawsuits on the same oral deal can therefore come out differently for that reason alone.
Because the statute bars enforcement and nothing more, an exception removes only the missing-writing bar. Finding a signed writing, or an exception, does not dispense with the plaintiff’s need to prove offer, acceptance, and consideration.6 Even a signed writing may only help the plaintiff show that the contract was made as alleged, and it is not necessarily conclusive on that point.7
Exceptions enter the analysis at a particular moment. A court first asks whether the contract sued on is within the statute, and then whether a writing sufficient to satisfy it exists. If the answers are yes and no, the case does not necessarily end, because a third question remains: whether other factors, such as the plaintiff’s performance or reliance, invoke an exception to the statutory bar.8
Courts often answer that third question yes, for a reason that is easy to feel. Where there has been partial performance or reliance on an oral contract, many argue that justice requires a better answer than “Case dismissed.”9 A significant body of case law accordingly avoids the writing requirement by giving a remedy where the equities seem to require one.10 That impulse fits the general tendency of the decisions to avoid a literal construction of the statute.11 More than in most statutory areas, the case law has produced not only interpretations but also requirements and exceptions that the statute itself does not contain.12 Statutes of frauds normally say something about scope, very little about content, and even less about exceptions.13 Even scope is a question of policy, since one can ask what a given provision furthers and whether it is important or broad enough to belong in a state’s general statute.14
The exceptions courts and legislatures accept are narrow and specific, and each applies only if the party seeking enforcement establishes its elements. Each is justified on one or both of two grounds. One is evidentiary: the circumstances the exception recognizes tend to prove that a contract was made despite the lack of a writing. The other is the protection of a party who incurred a detriment in justifiable reliance on the contract.15
The first family of exceptions rests on reliance. Under Section 139 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, a promise that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance by the promisee or a third person, and that does induce it, is enforceable notwithstanding the statute of frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise, and the remedy for breach is limited as justice requires.16 Because courts built this rule from the equities of cases rather than from legislative text, its acceptance is uneven. Several jurisdictions refuse to erode the statute, reasoning that the legislature created the writing requirement and should create any exceptions, and some add that experienced parties know the writing rule, so reliance on an oral contract cannot be reasonable.17
The second family needs no reliance at all. Under UCC § 2-201(2), between merchants, a record in confirmation of the contract that is sufficient against its sender and is received within a reasonable time by a party who has reason to know its contents satisfies the writing requirement against that party, unless the recipient gives notice of objection in a record within 10 days after receiving it.18 The idea is that those who deal with merchants may expect them to read their mail.19 The recipient is in the equivalent position of having signed the record, but the party alleging the contract must still prove the oral agreement the record purports to confirm.20 The statutory text asks about the parties’ merchant status, the content and timing of the record, and the recipient’s response, and it never asks whether injustice would result. A companion rule, UCC § 2-201(3)(b), rests on the equally plain idea that anyone who admits entering into a contract should be bound by it.21
The two families therefore differ in kind: one is equitable, judge-made, and contested in some states, and the other is a mechanical statutory substitute for a signature.