Concept
The Reliance Exception
Whether an exception permits enforcement without a complying memorandum
The Reliance Exception
The statute of frauds forbids enforcing certain classes of contracts unless there is a written memorandum or an applicable exception.1 A bar of that kind invites the two errors that trouble every rule about assent: refusing to enforce a real agreement and enforcing one that was never made. Almost any effort to avoid one error produces the other, and the reliance exception is one place where the law pushes back toward enforcement.2
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) states the general reliance exception. A promise that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance by the promisee or a third person, and that does induce it, is enforceable notwithstanding the statute of frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing the promise, and the remedy for breach is limited as justice requires.3 The rule has four conditions (a promise, the promisor's reasonable expectation of reliance, actual reliance, and injustice that only enforcement can avoid) and one limit on the remedy.4 Opinions written while the rule was still in draft cite it as § 217A, so a student who meets that number in a case is reading the predecessor of § 139.5
The rule grows out of an older and narrower doctrine, part performance of a land contract. A buyer who invokes that doctrine must show definite acts in reliance on the oral contract, usually possession plus valuable, permanent, and substantial improvements. Most courts add that the buyer must seek a formal transfer of the land (specific performance) rather than money damages, which spares the court messy valuation issues.6 Those acts also prove the contract. The more evidence piles up that a contract existed and what it said, the better the parties' performance serves the evidentiary function at the core of the writing requirement,7 because a party who acts as the buyer did would not have done so without a contract in place.8 In one case, buyers who erected valuable temporary and permanent improvements with the sellers' consent, and who spent about $85,000 buying the home and improving it, had made sufficient part performance to take the oral agreement outside the statute.9
Section 139 takes that idea and extends it to every contract within the statute of frauds, not only land contracts.10 The result is another version of promissory estoppel, and the argument that is estopped is the claim that a contract cannot be enforced for want of a writing.11 Fairness supplies the justification: promissory estoppel may permit enforcement of an informal promise when the promisor should not be allowed to escape liability.12 Courts describe the section as the route by which detrimental reliance takes a case out of the statute.13
The subsections below follow the order in which a court applies the section. The first takes the promise and the two reliance conditions. The second separates § 139 from classic estoppel. The third and fourth take up the injustice standard and the limit on the remedy, and the fifth shows that courts have not adopted the section uniformly.
Promise and Induced Reliance
The first three conditions of § 139 will look familiar from promissory estoppel: a promise, the promisor's reasonable expectation that it would induce reliance, and reliance that it actually induced.14 What changes is the obstacle. Section 90 displaces the requirement of consideration, while § 139 displaces a statutory requirement of a writing. The Restatement's comment observes that the requirement of consideration is more easily displaced than the requirement of the writing, and § 139(2) expands the plaintiff's burden of proof beyond anything § 90 requires.15
The first condition is a promise that would bind the promisor but for the missing writing, and the plaintiff must still prove it. Section 139 serves bargained-for and gratuitous promises alike. It complements § 90, which dispenses with consideration under the same conditions, and it also applies to promises supported by consideration, so it makes no difference whether the promise is unilateral or bilateral.16 To stem the flow of promissory estoppel claims, some courts have raised the standard for a valid promise. Some now require an express promise, one made in words, or even an explicit promise, one that leaves little room for doubt about the intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way. Other courts impose no such requirement.17 In a jurisdiction of the first kind, a plaintiff who relies on a vague assurance loses at the first step.
The second condition looks at the promisor. The question is what the promisor should reasonably have expected, and between sophisticated parties the answer can defeat the claim.18
The rule also reaches action or forbearance by someone other than the promisee, so the person who relies need not be the person who was promised.20
The third condition asks whether the promise in fact induced the action or forbearance, and the usual way to fail it is to offer the breach itself as the reliance. In Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, the court held that a promisee who invokes promissory estoppel against a statute of frauds defense must show more than the nonperformance of an oral contract. It required proof that the promisor should reasonably have expected the agreement to induce action or forbearance, that such action or forbearance was induced, and that enforcement is necessary to prevent injustice.21 The refusal to perform is the wrong sued upon, and it comes after the promise, so it cannot be what the promise induced. Other courts put the same demand in their own words; Brown v. Branch is one example.
A promisee can also fail the third condition because the claimed forbearance cost nothing. In Tucker v. Roman Catholic Diocese, the statute of limitations had already run on the plaintiff's claim when the diocese made its promise. She could not have sued anyway, so she suffered no detriment in forbearing from suit, and nothing required enforcement to prevent injustice.22 More generally, § 139 does not advocate routine use of promissory estoppel to get around the statute, because in most cases a party is not justified in relying on an oral contract that it should reasonably have known must be in writing.23 Reliance that satisfies the condition is concrete and substantial. The buyers in the part-performance case above spent approximately $85,000 buying the home and making improvements in reliance on the agreement.24
The demand for reliance beyond the breach follows from how the exception works. Every plaintiff who sues on a broken oral contract has lost the promised performance. If that loss counted as reliance, every such plaintiff would qualify, and the statute of frauds defense would almost never succeed. Section 139 does give courts authority to treat reliance on the oral contract itself as sufficient, and a substantial body of case law takes that position, but most successful estoppel cases still rest on some additional statement or promise.25
Estoppel Versus Section 139
Two doctrines let a party who changed position on an unwritten deal defeat a statute of frauds defense, and they ask the plaintiff to prove different things. Section 139(1) asks about the promise: whether the promisor should have expected reliance, whether reliance occurred, and whether only enforcement can avoid injustice.27 Classic equitable estoppel asks about something the defendant said or did.
Equitable estoppel requires justifiable, injurious reliance on a factual representation or conduct of the other party, and when those elements are present most jurisdictions will not let the party to be charged raise the statute.28 In the statute-of-frauds setting the representation usually concerns the writing: that a writing would be created and signed, that a signed writing already exists, that the statute would not be asserted, or that it does not apply.29 A seller who says the signed contract is in the mail is a familiar example, and the rationale is that the promisee's change of position estops the promisor from invoking the statute.30 The doctrine rests on the defendant's own conduct. The statute was enacted to prevent fraud and injustice, so courts refuse to let it shield a party who would use it to take advantage of that party's own wrong.31 The same logic confines the doctrine, because a plaintiff who cannot point to a statement about the writing has nothing to hold against the defendant.
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson shows the doctrine at work. A pilot with Western Airlines, a job with considerable security, agreed orally to take a six-month leave and work as general manager of the defendant airline. If the defendant obtained a franchise to fly from Seattle to Alaska, he was to receive a written contract for two years of employment. He moved his family from California to Alaska and gave up his tenure rights with Western. When the franchise came, no written contract did.32 The court reasoned that the doctrine of estoppel, promissory or otherwise, is as much a part of the law as the statute of frauds, and that it falls to the courts to harmonize the two.33 Its prediction that other courts would follow has largely proved correct, although a few courts have rejected promissory estoppel as a way around the statute.34
Courts did not stop at representations about the writing. Some used the label of equitable estoppel whenever a claimant suffered an unconscionable injury by relying on an oral or insufficiently memorialized contract, and those decisions led to the widespread adoption of promissory estoppel against the statute.35 The Kansas Supreme Court described the shifting theories, from part performance to fraud to estoppel, and treated that confusion as the reason the American Law Institute issued a clarifying tentative draft in 1973.36 The Restatement (Second) now gives courts authority to treat reliance on the oral contract itself as sufficient to preclude a statute of frauds defense, and a substantial body of case law takes that position. The modern trend may be to find an estoppel whenever the other party simply relied on the making of the oral contract.37 That reliance still serves the statute's evidentiary function, because the party seeking enforcement would not have acted as it did without a contract in place.38
Hickey v. Green shows the broader reasoning on land. Relying on their arrangements with Mrs. Green, the Hickeys advertised their house in newspapers on three days in July 1980, agreed with a purchaser for its sale, and took a $500 deposit check from him. On July 24, Green told Hickey that she no longer intended to sell her property to him and had decided to sell to another for $16,000. Hickey told her he had already sold his house and offered her $16,000 for Lot S.39 Green did not deny the oral contract; she asserted the statute of frauds. Citing Restatement § 129, the court held that the Hickeys had reasonably relied on the contract by agreeing to sell their own home, so principles of equitable estoppel required enforcement.40 The reasoning rests on the Hickeys' sale of their own home, not on any promise of a writing. The result was not inevitable, for some courts likely would not have departed from the statute of frauds in this way.41
Courts that accept some estoppel still hesitate over the broader version, for two reasons. The first is practical. Most successful estoppel cases rest on reliance on some additional statement or promise,42 and that requirement works as a filter: if reliance on the oral contract itself always sufficed, nearly every plaintiff on a broken oral contract could claim the exception. The second is institutional. Court-created exceptions such as estoppel are fact-sensitive, and some courts resist them because they derogate from the apparently clear intent of the legislature.43 Courts on the other side answer that harmonizing the statute with common-law doctrine is the judges' task.44 The last subsection sorts out the resulting split.
The Injustice Standard
The fourth condition sorts plaintiffs who deserve relief from plaintiffs who merely lost an oral bargain. An oral promise within the statute is enforceable only “if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”46 The first three conditions describe how the promisee came to act. This one asks what the court must do about it, and the answer turns on the word only. Enforcement is the last response in a sequence of possible responses, so the promisee must show that nothing less, such as giving back what the promisee handed over, leaves matters just.
Courts treat this as a separate burden. In Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, the court held that a statute of frauds defense, where otherwise applicable, cannot be overcome unless the promisee proves three things: the promisor should reasonably have expected the agreement to induce action or forbearance, such action or forbearance was induced, and enforcement is necessary to prevent injustice. The court added that the circumstances listed in the rule's second subsection must be considered in deciding whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement, which gives a means of deciding whether the equities support enforcement.47 A promisee can prove the first two items and still lose on the third, because harm that can be repaired without enforcing the oral contract does not call for enforcement.
The condition reads like § 90, yet it operates with more resistance, and the reason lies in what each section displaces. The comment to § 139 observes that the requirement of consideration is more easily displaced than the requirement of the writing.48 The writing requirement comes from the legislature, and courts that resist reliance exceptions do so because court-created exceptions derogate from the apparently clear intent of the legislature.49 A court following § 139 therefore overrides the statute only as far as it must, and the word only measures that distance.
Money paid is the clearest harm that a lesser remedy can repair. The Kansas Supreme Court held that payment of the purchase price alone is not sufficient part performance, because the money can be recovered by an action and no fraud is accomplished if the oral contract goes unenforced.50 A promisee who has performed under an unenforceable contract may seek restitution so long as the promisee is not in default, which means the defendant must have refused to sign a sufficient memorandum, repudiated, or materially breached.51 Where that route repairs the loss, enforcement is not the only way to avoid injustice.
The decided cases mark the poles. At one pole stands the pilot in Alaska Airlines, who gave up his tenure rights with another airline and moved his family to Alaska, losses a refund cannot repair.52 At the other stands the buyer whose only act was to pay money, who can recover it by an action.53 Buyers who spent about $85,000 on a home and its improvements stand nearer the pilot, since their changed position was enough for part performance.54
An essay stem that says the plaintiff relied has supplied only the start of the analysis. Ask what the plaintiff would be left with if the court refused enforcement and the defendant returned everything it received. If the answer is nothing of consequence, the injustice condition fails. If the plaintiff changed position in a way no refund can reverse, the condition is likely met, subject to the circumstances that guide the judgment. Section 139(2) lists those circumstances, and the next section takes them in turn.55
Limits on the Remedy
The last sentence of § 139(1) provides that the remedy for breach is limited as justice requires.57 The four conditions decide whether an oral promise escapes the statute, and this sentence decides what the plaintiff receives once it does. The text fixes no measure of relief, so the choice among a refund, compensation for reliance losses, and performance of the promise belongs to the court. An answer that announces expectation damages because the promise was held enforceable, or one that announces reliance damages as a fixed rule, supplies a measure the text does not contain.
Promissory estoppel generally explains the discretion. It does not rest on a bargain, so neither an agreement nor consideration is necessary. The promisor's obligation arises from a foreseeable change of position by the promisee, and the remedy may be limited to the extent of the promisee's reliance rather than the promisee's expectation.58 Courts may likewise limit the remedies available under promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment. An employee whose oral employment contract was breached would ordinarily recover the expected salary minus what the employee could reasonably earn in a substitute job, while under promissory estoppel the same employee might recover only the costs of traveling to take the job and the wages lost at the old one.59
The traditional rule shows why the limit matters. Restitution was the baseline, and a plaintiff entitled to it for performance under an unenforceable contract must not be in default, which means the defendant must have refused to sign a sufficient memorandum, repudiated, or materially breached.60 Restitution typically ignores both the gains the plaintiff would have made by performing and the out-of-pocket costs that did not enrich the defendant.61 A plaintiff who suffered only a loss and conferred no benefit therefore recovered nothing; Boone v. Coe is the classic illustration, and it overruled McDaniel v. Hutcherson, which had allowed such a recovery. The statute itself forbids enforcement of the contract unless a memorandum or an exception is present,62 so the traditional rule treated a reliance award as enforcement by another route.
Restitution does not disappear under § 139. In Munoz v. Kaiser Steel Corp., an employee who relocated on a promise of a three-year position got no relief beyond the pay he had earned, because he had been adequately compensated for his services and had suffered no unconscionable injury. Where restitution has already reached everything the plaintiff lost, no further remedy is called for. A § 139 plaintiff whose loss consists of out-of-pocket costs that enriched no one, such as the cost of a move, has nothing for restitution to restore.
The limit follows from what § 139 cures. The section addresses the promisee's change of position in reliance on the promise, so relief that undoes that change fits the wrong, and the obligation arises from the reliance rather than from a bargain.63 Reliance losses on land are often concrete. Buyers who spent approximately $85,000 buying a home and making improvements in reliance on an oral agreement had a loss that could be counted in dollars.64 Whether justice also requires the profit the promisee expected is the question the remedy sentence leaves to the court.
Where Courts Disagree
A Restatement section carries weight only to the extent that courts follow it, so a reliance argument begins with a question about the jurisdiction. State courts are all over the map on the general reliance exception of § 139.66 Three positions account for most of the decisions:
- Some courts adopt the exception for all contracts within the statute of frauds.
- Some courts reject it for particular categories, such as employment contracts.
- Other courts reject it for all contracts, reasoning that courts should not create an exception that would trump a statute passed by the legislature.67
Courts also differ on how much the plaintiff must show once the exception is available. Some require an express or explicit promise and others do not,68 and some look for an additional statement or promise beyond reliance on the oral contract itself while others treat the oral contract as enough.69
A court that adopts the rule can tie it to its earlier cases. The court in Warder & Lee called the § 217A standard consistent with its holdings that allow promissory estoppel to defeat the general statute of frauds and with decisions allowing it to defeat the Uniform Commercial Code's statute of frauds, citing decisions from Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota. It also observed that the standard provides a basis for distinguishing contrary holdings.70 Reliance Under the UCC returns to those decisions.
The two ends of the range rest on different views of what a judge may do to a statute. Courts that adopt the rule reason that estoppel, promissory or otherwise, is as much a part of the law as the statute of frauds and that harmonizing the two is the judges' task. Use of the doctrine against the statute has been largely accepted, although a few courts reject it, and the resulting body of case law has been labeled remarkably incoherent.71 Courts that refuse reason that the legislature created the requirement of a signed writing and should be the one to create exceptions. Some add that experienced parties know the writing requirement, so reliance on an oral contract simply cannot be reasonable.72 The divide tracks a distinction between statutory rules that permit enforcement of oral contracts, which are recognized everywhere, and court-created exceptions such as estoppel, which turn on the facts and meet resistance.73
The practical effect appears when one set of facts meets each approach.
The facts are identical in each state, so the research question comes before the elements of § 139.
When an essay stem names no jurisdiction, say that jurisdictions divide, analyze the facts under § 139 as the Restatement states it, and note briefly what the narrower and refusing jurisdictions would do with the same facts. That answer earns credit under every approach, while an analysis that assumes § 139 applies everywhere commits to a position the facts have not supported.