Concept
Injustice Factors
Whether an exception permits enforcement without a complying memorandum
Injustice Factors
Section 139(1) makes a promise enforceable despite the statute of frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcing it, and it limits the remedy as justice requires.1 Section 139(2) tells a court how to decide the injustice question: it lists five circumstances and calls them “significant.”2 In Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Britten, the court required the promisee to prove that the promisor should reasonably have expected the agreement to induce action or forbearance, that the action or forbearance was induced, and that enforcement is necessary to prevent injustice. It then directed courts to answer the third question by considering the listed circumstances, which it described as a means of deciding whether the equities support enforcement.3 The inquiry is one overall judgment, and each circumstance feeds it with whatever weight the facts give.
Every state has a statute of frauds,4 and even wording changes that look significant have had little or no effect on the courts’ opinions.5 A court applying § 139 therefore sets aside a legislative choice and needs a reason for doing so. The recognized exceptions offer two. Some circumstances tend to prove that a contract was made despite the missing writing, and others protect a party who incurred a detriment in justifiable reliance on the contract.6 The five circumstances sort along those lines. Adequacy of other remedies and the substance of the reliance measure the detriment. Corroboration measures the proof. Reasonableness and foreseeability ask whether the detriment was justifiably incurred and fairly charged to the promisor.
The list also answers a problem contract law meets whenever it asks whether assent occurred. A rule that guards against enforcing promises never made will fail to enforce some that were, and a rule that avoids that failure will enforce some that were never made; almost any effort to avoid one error produces the other.7 Weighing several circumstances, in place of demanding one fixed proof such as a signature, is one way to steer between the two.
On its face § 139 is stricter than § 90, because it stresses reliance of a substantial character, reasonableness, and foreseeability by the promisor. The difference is smaller than it looks, since § 90 implies the same requirements.8 None of the five circumstances is a condition. They can point in different directions in a single case, and a plaintiff does not have to win all five.
The subsections below take the circumstances in the Restatement’s order.
Adequacy of Other Remedies
The first circumstance directs a court to weigh “the availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation and restitution.”9 It comes first because it bears most directly on the word only in § 139(1): if a lesser remedy can repair the harm, enforcement is not the only way to avoid injustice.10
Restitution takes several forms. Quasi-contractual relief yields a sum of money. Equitable restitution returns specific property, as by cancellation of a conveyance, a constructive trust, or an equitable lien, and the legal remedy of replevin also recovers property.11 Restitution is often measured by the money value of the plaintiff’s performance, but it may be made in specie, by constructive trust or the like, when appropriate.12 It can restore any benefit of performance rendered under the unenforceable contract.13
The circumstance works as a subtraction. The court totals what the promisee lost in reliance, removes what restitution or cancellation would return, and examines what is left. When the loss is money paid or a benefit conferred on the promisor, restitution restores it, and full enforcement then exceeds what is needed to avert injustice.14 The two kinds of loss that restitution leaves behind are the gains the promisee would have made from performance and out-of-pocket costs that did not enrich the promisor, because restitution usually takes account of neither.15 The first remainder is the profit of the bargain, which a court has little reason to supply. The second is a real loss that no lesser remedy repairs, and the circumstance favors the promisee as to that loss.
A prepaid contract shows the first result. If A pays B in advance under an oral contract that the statute makes unenforceable, and B repudiates, A is entitled to recover the money in restitution. A court should therefore find that no injustice follows from refusing to enforce B’s promise, and the estoppel theory fails.16 The land cases reason the same way. Payment of the purchase money without more was once thought enough to justify specific enforcement, but the contrary view now prevails because restitution is an adequate remedy in those cases.17
The opposite result appears when the promisor received nothing. A tenant who spent money and time preparing to occupy premises that the owner never delivered has conferred no benefit, so restitution has nothing to return and no conveyance exists to cancel. That is the kind of loss restitution ordinarily does not reach.18
The words availability and adequacy ask separate questions. A remedy is unavailable when something closes it to the particular promisee. The great weight of authority denies restitution to a plaintiff who is in default, so the plaintiff must show that the defendant refused to sign a sufficient memorandum, repudiated, or materially breached.19 A court cannot use a closed remedy to conclude that enforcement is unnecessary. A remedy is inadequate when it exists but leaves the promisee short. Specific performance is a drastic remedy available only when there are no reasonable alternatives. If the contract itself is unenforceable, the main alternative is restitution, which is usually considered adequate even though it may not be entirely compensatory.20 A promisee whom restitution makes whole has no remaining injustice for the other circumstances to measure, and the writing requirement controls.
Definite and Substantial Action
The second circumstance directs a court to weigh “the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in relation to the remedy sought.”22 Like the other four, it feeds the single judgment that § 139(1) requires and does not answer that question alone.23 The phrase makes two demands: the reliance must be definite and weighty, and its weight must be measured against what the promisee asks the court to award.
The first demand comes from promissory estoppel itself. The first Restatement bound a promisor who should reasonably expect “action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character.”24 The Second Restatement’s § 90 dropped those words, and the Maryland court that adopted the revised wording called the old language redundant: if the reliance is not substantial and definite, justice will not compel enforcement.25 Section 139(2)(b) puts the idea back as a weighed circumstance.
Two reasons support the requirement, one about harm and one about proof. The exceptions to the writing requirement rest on evidence that a contract was made and on protection of a party who incurred a detriment in justifiable reliance,26 and slight reliance supplies little of either. It leaves a loss that a refund or the promisee’s own shrug can absorb. It also proves little, because a party who sues on an oral promise ordinarily would not have acted as it did without a contract in place,27 and the more the promisee committed, the harder that inference is to explain away.
The words in relation to the remedy sought turn the circumstance into a comparison. Relief under § 139 comes in sizes, and § 139(1) leaves the court free to limit the remedy as justice requires.28 Restitution can restore benefits conferred under the oral contract, so full enforcement usually exceeds what is needed to avert the injustice.29 The more of the bargain the plaintiff asks the court to deliver, the more the reliance must justify. Modest reliance can support modest relief without supporting more.
Beaver v. Brumlow shows reliance at the heavy end. The Buyers skirted the mobile home, poured concrete footers and a foundation, built a deck and two sets of stairs, ran electricity and water to the property, and installed septic and propane systems, brought in a storage shed, and landscaped, spending about $85,000 in reliance on the agreement.30 They also erected valuable temporary and permanent improvements and landscaped with the Sellers’ consent,31 and the court held that these actions were sufficient part performance to take the oral agreement outside the statute of frauds.32 The Buyers sought enforcement of a sale of land, and a refusal would have left them with a house, a foundation, and utility connections on land that belonged to someone else, a loss no return of money would repair.33
At the light end sits the buyer whose only reliance is payment. Payment of the purchase price alone is not sufficient part performance, because the money can be recovered by an action and no fraud is accomplished if the oral contract goes unenforced.34 Older land cases measured reliance by the acts they would accept. English decisions treated a transfer of possession of the land as sufficient if it was unequivocally referable to the oral agreement.35 The modern theory of part performance explains the exception as necessary to avoid serious or irreparable injury to a party who has substantially changed position in reasonable reliance on the oral contract, which overlaps substantially with the separate estoppel exception.36 That overlap is why § 139(2)(b) speaks of the character of the action and lists no approved acts. Land cases make reliance easy to see, because foundations and utility lines are visible, but § 139(1) is not limited to land.37
On an exam, ask three questions of a plaintiff who relied: how much, in what definite acts, and for what relief. The same acts can be ample to support reimbursement and too slight to support enforcement of the whole bargain, so the answer should name the remedy the plaintiff seeks and compare the reliance against it. Heavy reliance also tends to show that the promise was made, but that is the work of the next circumstance, and the two arguments should be kept apart.
Corroboration of the Promise
The third circumstance directs a court to weigh the extent to which the promisee’s action or forbearance corroborates evidence of the making and terms of the promise, or whether the making and terms are otherwise established by clear and convincing evidence.39 The wording offers two routes to the same result. On the first, the promisee’s own conduct supplies the confirmation, because it is conduct that would occur only if the alleged promise had been made. On the second, the conduct may prove little, but other evidence establishes both that the promise was made and what it said. The previous circumstance asked how much the promisee gave up in relation to the remedy sought; this one asks what the conduct, or anything else in the record, proves about the promise.
The statute of frauds screens out claims on agreements that were never made, so a court that sets it aside needs a substitute for the assurance of a signed writing. Some exceptions rest on the evidentiary ground that the circumstances they recognize tend to prove a contract was made despite the missing writing.40 Reliance can serve that function because a party seeking to enforce a contract would not have acted as it did had there not been a contract in place.41 The text names both the making and the terms because a writing would have shown both, and conduct may confirm that some arrangement existed without confirming what it required.
The test courts developed asks whether the conduct points to the alleged contract and away from the competing explanations. Cardozo put the requirement for land in a famous phrase: the buyer’s acts must be “unequivocally referable to a contract for the sale of land.”42 Conduct that fits several explanations makes each of them about equally likely, so it cannot raise the probability of the plaintiff’s account above the probability of the defendant’s.
A claimant who occupies property and pays on it every month shows how corroboration fails. Cardozo’s opinion in Burns v. McCormick treated monthly payments on property the claimant occupied as consistent with both a purchase and a lease, so the payments were not unequivocally referable to the oral purchase contract.43 Knorr v. Norberg reached the same result on fuller facts. The lessees who claimed an oral option to buy had paid rent, real estate taxes, and utilities, insured the property, and kept it up, yet the court found this performance just as consistent with a lease without an option.44 Everything the lessees did is what a tenant does under a lease, so their conduct fit the owner’s account as well as their own. They had shown effort and expense, and that showed nothing about the option.
Conduct succeeds when the competing explanation weakens. The Guldens lived rent free in the Sloans’ mobile home, and the Sloans’ only competing explanation was friendship. The court noted that the two men had known each other for thirty years but found it doubtful that their friendship was so strong and long lasting that it explained the rent-free arrangement. It held that part performance exempted the oral contract from the statute.45 The court asked only that the competing explanation not be so likely that it precluded that holding, which means the Guldens did not have to make every alternative impossible. A forgone opportunity can corroborate in the same way. In Thies v. Wheelock, a man who agreed orally to bid jointly with another on five parcels withdrew his own bids, and the court observed that this change of position was consistent only with the existence of the agreement, so the part performance exception would have applied had the contract been a sale of land.46
Beaver supplies a contrast with Burns. The Buyers there spent about $85,000 buying the home and improving the land in reliance on the agreement, and the court held the performance sufficient to take the agreement outside the statute.47 Foundations, septic systems, and utility connections are not the expenses of a tenant who expects to give the land back.
The hypothetical shows why this circumstance must be kept apart from the one on definite and substantial action. A large outlay of a generic kind, such as equipment usable in any business, weighs heavily when the court measures the loss against the remedy sought, yet it corroborates little, because it would have been made under almost any arrangement. A small act tied unmistakably to the alleged deal may do the reverse. Corroboration also shows only that the promise was made. Many courts separately require that the party seeking enforcement suffered some prejudice in performing in reliance on the agreement.48
Section 139 raises the value of equivocal conduct. Part performance that does not create an exception on its own can still count as a factor, because a court deciding whether to grant relief should consider whether the promisee’s conduct in reliance, or other available evidence, corroborates the existence of a contract.49
The second route matters most when the conduct is ambiguous. The text states the alternative in disjunctive form, so a plaintiff whose acts fit several explanations can still satisfy the circumstance by establishing the making and terms through independent evidence.50 Examples include an unsigned message that restates the price, a recording of the promisor, and the account of a disinterested person who heard the bargain struck. Performance and paper often work together in these cases. Some sort of writing frequently exists, and the plaintiff’s conduct then serves mainly to verify that the writing is genuine, so it need not carry the whole burden of proof.51
The standard of proof on this route is clear and convincing evidence.52 The reason follows from what is missing. Without a signature, the plaintiff’s own testimony about oral terms is the kind of evidence the statute distrusts, and an ordinary preponderance standard would let a plaintiff win a contest of credibility. A heavier burden gives the defendant some of the protection the writing would have given.
Reasonableness of Reliance
The fourth circumstance directs a court to weigh “the reasonableness of the action or forbearance.”54 The earlier circumstances asked what other remedies could restore, how much the promisee gave up, and what the promisee’s conduct proves about the promise. This one asks whether a sensible person in the promisee’s position would have acted on an unwritten promise at all. The question matters because the case for setting aside a legislative writing requirement rests on a loss that can fairly be charged to the promisor. A promisee who commits money or leaves a job on a word that no sensible person would have trusted has taken a gamble, and a court has little reason to move the cost of a gamble onto the other side.
The circumstance overlaps with the reasonable-expectation requirement of § 139(1), but the two examine the same reliance from opposite sides. Section 139(1) asks what the promisor should reasonably have expected the promise to induce.55 Section 139(2)(d) asks whether the promisee’s response was reasonable. The answers usually travel together, because conduct a sensible person would take on the strength of a promise is conduct the promisor should have anticipated. They differ in status: the first is a condition every plaintiff must meet, and the second is one consideration weighed among five. Reasonableness is not new to promissory estoppel, since § 90 implies it as well.56
Courts measure reasonableness against the setting in which the promise was made, and the most useful evidence of that setting is the parties’ history and the customs of their field. A course of dealing is the pattern of earlier transactions between these same parties, and a usage of trade is a regular practice in the field that those engaged in it expect to be observed. In adopting the Second Restatement’s wording of promissory estoppel, the Maryland court in Pavel Enterprises, Inc. v. A.S. Johnson & Co. expected evidence of both to give strong indications of the reasonableness of a subcontractor’s expectations.57 A promisee who acts as everyone in the trade acts, on the word of someone who has always kept such promises, is doing what the surrounding practice has shown to be safe. Some relationships carry reasonableness with them. A promise from a grandfather or a fellow church member is one a promisee can trust without asking for paper, and the relationship alone makes it reasonable for the promisee to change position.58
Reasonableness is judged objectively, so a promisee’s own confidence in the promise does not settle it. Nieto v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP shows the objective cast of the inquiry: a federal court applying Nevada’s strict statute of frauds required objectively reasonable reliance and found none where the promise was unspecific. A vague assurance leaves open what was promised, which makes a large commitment on it hard to defend as sensible.
Reasonableness cuts the other way when the promisee should have known that the contract had to be in writing. In most cases, a party is not justified in relying on an oral contract that it should reasonably have known must be in writing, and some courts hold that reliance on such an oral contract simply cannot be reasonable.59 The mechanism is practical. A commercial party that regularly deals in contracts of a given kind knows that signatures are customary, and asking for one costs little compared with the sums at risk, so a promisee who skips that step has chosen the risk of the oral promise.
The hauler and the developer each committed heavily on a handshake, and what separates them is what each one’s own experience said about the promise. The hauler’s trade and history said that oral commitments were kept, so the reliance had a basis. The developer’s practice said that deals of this size were signed, so the reliance rested on a risk the developer could have removed by asking for a signature. Where a court follows § 139 as written, that difference moves the weighing of this circumstance. Where a court takes the stricter view, the same difference can end the claim at this step, which is one more place where the split described in Where Courts Disagree shows up in outcomes.
Foreseeability to the Promisor
The fifth circumstance directs a court to weigh “the extent to which the action or forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor.”61 The word that does the work is extent. A promisee who acts on an oral promise has usually done something the promisor could picture, but the money and commitment may far exceed what the promisor had in mind, and this circumstance measures the gap. Its weight rises and falls with how closely the promisee’s actual response matched what the promisor had reason to expect. Like the other four circumstances, it feeds the single judgment that § 139(1) requires.62
The circumstance overlaps a requirement already in § 139(1) but does a different job. The promisee must prove that the promisor should reasonably have expected the agreement to induce action or forbearance, and that expectation is a gate every plaintiff must pass. The court then considers the listed circumstances in deciding whether enforcement is necessary to prevent injustice.63 Foreseeability sits inside that second inquiry and measures a matter of degree. A plaintiff can clear the gate and still find this circumstance weighing against full enforcement, which happens when the promisor should have expected some reliance and the reliance that occurred went far past it. Foreseeability to the promisor is implicit in § 90 as well, so § 139 states expressly what promissory estoppel assumes.64
A promisor’s foresight matters because of what a promise costs. A person deciding whether to make an oral promise weighs what breaking it might later cost, and that calculation works only if the exposure has a boundary the promisor can see. If a promisee could take unannounced and unlimited steps and then charge the promisor with every one, a casual oral promise would carry unbounded liability. The promisee stands in the opposite position, because only the promisee knows what is being committed, can tell the promisor, and can ask for a signature that would fix the terms. A promisee who stays silent about extraordinary steps has chosen to carry the risk of those steps. Because § 139(1) also limits the remedy as justice requires, a court need not choose between enforcing the whole promise and enforcing nothing, and it can match relief to the reliance the promisor foresaw.65
Grain-elevator disputes show how the question is litigated. The elevators argued that they had relied on farmers’ oral promises. Some courts held to the traditional position that such reliance did not make the promises enforceable, while others accepted the elevators’ argument and enforced the promises.66 In Warder & Lee, the promisor, Britten, resisted on the ground that the elevator did not prove he knew it would rely on the oral agreement.67 That objection goes to foreseeability, and the promisee answers it with evidence of what the promisor knew or should have known about how the elevator would act on the promise. The wider split over whether reliance can overcome the statute for goods at all is taken up in Reliance Under the UCC.
Relationship and consent also make reliance foreseeable. Where the parties stand in a relationship such as grandfather and grandchild or church and member, the promisor is particularly likely to foresee that the promisee will change position in reliance.68 In Beaver, the Buyers built improvements and landscaped the property with the Sellers’ consent,69 so the Sellers could hardly claim surprise at the reliance.
The failing side of the circumstance appears when the promisee’s response outruns the promise itself.
This circumstance views the promise from the promisor’s side, which separates it from the reasonableness of the reliance. Reasonableness asks whether a sensible promisee would have acted as this one did, and foreseeability asks whether the promisor could have seen the action coming. The two can diverge: an elaborate build-out may be a sound business judgment and still far beyond what the promisor knew, and a promisor may fully foresee a step that a careful promisee would have avoided. Because the circumstance is weighed and not required, heavy unforeseen reliance leaves the claim alive and lowers the weight of the surplus when the court sets the remedy. An essay should ask what the promisor knew or had reason to know when the promise was made, whether from trade practice, the promisee’s own statements, or the setting of the deal, and compare that with what the promisee actually did. Outlays within that knowledge support relief, and outlays beyond it count against.