Concept
Other UCC Exceptions
Whether an exception permits enforcement without a complying memorandum
Other UCC Exceptions
The statute of frauds forbids enforcement of the contracts it covers unless there is a written memorandum or an applicable exception,1 and UCC § 2-201(3) supplies three exceptions of its own for sales of goods. Its opening words govern all three: a contract that does not satisfy subsection (1) but is valid in other respects is enforceable in the situations the subsection lists.2 The phrase “valid in other respects” keeps the exceptions narrow. The party seeking enforcement must still prove that offer, acceptance, and consideration produced a contract, and the exception removes only the defense that nothing was signed.
Each exception also demands something more than proof of an oral deal. Either the seller has begun making goods fitted to this buyer, or the party resisting enforcement has admitted in court that a contract was made, or goods have been paid for and accepted or received and accepted. That something more is a special indicator that a contract, albeit oral, was in fact made.3 Sellers do not produce custom-made goods just to pass the time of day, parties do not admit contracts lightly in open court, and people do not ordinarily confer gratuitous benefits on others.4
| Exception | What corroborates the contract | How much is enforceable |
|---|---|---|
| § 2-201(3)(a), specially manufactured goods | The seller’s substantial beginning of manufacture or commitments, made before notice of repudiation | Contested: some courts limit enforcement to the units begun or committed |
| § 2-201(3)(b), admission in court | The resisting party’s admission in a pleading, in testimony, or otherwise in court | The quantity admitted |
| § 2-201(3)(c), payment or acceptance | Payment made and accepted, or goods received and accepted | The apportionable goods paid for or accepted |
These three exceptions differ in kind from the reliance exception of § 139. Statutory exceptions will be universally recognized, while court-created exceptions such as estoppel call for a fact-sensitive inquiry, and some courts resist them because they derogate from the apparent intent of the legislature.5 A court applying § 2-201(3) asks a defined set of factual questions and does not weigh whether injustice would result. By the time the Code was drafted, courts often regarded the statute of frauds as an obstacle to doing justice,6 and these exceptions let a court enforce an oral sale when the record itself shows that a bargain was struck. The group matters for a second reason. Section 2-201(1) opens with the words “Except as otherwise provided in this section,”7 and the list that follows does not mention reliance. Courts divide on whether that silence leaves room for a § 139-style argument against a sale of goods, the question the next section takes up.
Specially Manufactured Goods
A seller who starts building goods that no one else would buy has taken a step that makes sense only if a deal stands behind it, and UCC § 2-201(3)(a) treats that step as a substitute for the buyer’s signature. The subsection lifts the writing requirement when the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller’s business, and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances that reasonably indicate the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement.8 The seller must still prove the oral contract. The exception belongs to sellers, because its conditions describe what a seller did, although buyers have tried to use it.9
The seller’s preparation corroborates the claim because sellers do not produce custom-made goods just to pass the time of day.10 Reliance is not an express element of this defense, but it might as well be: the seller would not have started making otherwise unsalable goods without a contract. The exception also goes beyond partial performance, because the substantial beginning of manufacture need not benefit the buyer at all.11 It therefore serves two purposes at once. It gives the fact-finder reason to believe that a real transaction exists with this buyer, and it protects a seller who changed position by starting work.12
The paradigm case is a made-to-order purchase that the buyer abandons after the seller has finished. In Goddard v. Binney a contract to build a carriage to the buyer’s specifications was held outside the statute of frauds, because the carriage had been specially manufactured and the buyer then breached. The finished carriage was the seller’s loss, built for one buyer and built only because of the agreement. Riley v. Capital Airlines shows the other side. The plaintiff had mixed water methanol for the airline’s use alone, yet the district court declined to apply the special-manufacture exception in Alabama’s sale-of-goods statute. Each mixed delivery had been paid for separately on the plaintiff’s invoice, and the court saw no case of goods specially manufactured and then refused by the buyer, as in Goddard. Together the cases locate the protection: it covers a seller left holding made-to-order goods, not a seller whose batches were delivered and paid for as they were made.
The second condition causes the most litigation, because it asks about the goods’ market and not about what the buyer wanted. A key issue is whether the goods are unfit for sale to other potential buyers without significant alteration.13 A seller that can pass the goods to someone else unchanged has lost, at most, a sale, and its preparation says little about whether this buyer ever ordered anything, because sellers build salable goods for many reasons. In Packgen v. BP Exploration, Inc., a containment boom allegedly made for BP after a major oil spill fell outside the exception because the seller sold it to another buyer without alteration. Preparation proves a deal only when no one else would want the product. Where the market is unclear, the dispute becomes one of proof. A painting commissioned for the buyer and reflecting a theme of particular interest to the buyer strongly indicates that it is for the buyer, but whether the artist could sell it to someone else in the ordinary course of business depends on whether there is much demand for an oversized painting of the buyer’s smelter.14
The timing condition keeps the exception tied to corroboration. Work done before notice was done while the seller believed the deal was on, so it points toward a contract; work done after notice is the seller’s reaction to a dispute that already exists. A seller who could build goods after a cancellation and then rely on them would be manufacturing its own corroboration. The statute reaches commitments for procurement as well as manufacture, so a seller that bound itself to buy materials for the buyer’s goods before notice also qualifies, even if no one has begun building.15
Proof of the oral contract and the scope of enforcement are separate questions, and the twelve plaques in the first fabricator’s case raise the second. Some courts enforce the contract only as to the units on which the seller made a substantial beginning of manufacture or for which it made commitments for procurement. The authors of one leading treatment call that view contrary to comparable pre-Code statutes and a step backward. If the seller must still prove its oral contract, and the fact-finder is trusted to find the contract itself, the fact-finder can be trusted to determine the quantity too. Section 2-201(1) limits enforcement to the quantity shown in a writing because the theory of the statute is that a writing is sacrosanct, but paragraph (3)(a) dispenses with a writing and does not expressly limit recovery to the units begun or committed.16 An answer on an exam should state the produced-quantity limit as the position some courts take and note that the text of paragraph (a) imposes none.
Admission in Court
Section 2-201(3)(b) takes the writing defense away from a party who concedes the deal in court. It makes an oral contract for the sale of goods enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought “admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made,” but the contract “is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted.”18 The special-manufacture exception corroborates the claimed contract through the seller’s preparation; this one corroborates it through the words of the party resisting enforcement.
The rationale is the equally unremarkable idea that anyone who admits entering into a contract should be bound by it.19 A statute of frauds guards against claims on agreements that were never made, claims that are easy to assert and hard to disprove when nothing is written. A defendant who admits the agreement has answered that worry, and letting the statute shield that defendant would turn a formality against a claim the defendant itself confirms is true. Some would regard it as a mockery of the statute to let a defendant use it as a defense while admitting a contract in pleadings or in open court. Comment 7 to § 2-201 states the result: it is “no longer possible to admit the contract in court and still treat the statute as a defense.”20 A defendant who wants the statute must therefore avoid conceding the agreement in any pleading or testimony.
The subsection names three occasions for the concession: a pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court. A pleading that references the oral contract is a sufficient admission.21 Admissions in pleadings are necessarily voluntary, but involuntary admissions count too, whether they occur in pretrial discovery or are drawn out on cross-examination at trial.22 In Nebraska Builders Products Co. v. Industrial Erectors, Inc., a party’s reference to “the contract” on cross-examination was an admission where the evidence indicated the party had not misspoken.23 The speaker must be the party to be charged, or an agent who still has authority to bind that party at the time of testifying.24
Courts read an admission for its substance and require no magic words. It is enough if the party admits facts sufficient to show that the parties made a contract, as in “I said I’d deliver the piano because she said she would pay me $2000.”25 In Wehry v. Daniels, a dealer in Formula One memorabilia sued a customer over an oral agreement to buy a racing helmet. Asked on cross-examination whether he had told the dealer to order it, the customer answered yes, at a price he put at $1,700 or $1,800 while the dealer claimed $2,750, and the court treated the answer as an admission despite the price dispute. In Jones v. Baran Co. the dealer’s answer admitted that it made a contract with the customer, and its representative testified at a deposition that the parties entered into one, which sufficed despite a dispute over terms. In St. Francis Mercantile Equity Exchange v. Newton a farmer who had orally agreed to sell corn and did not deliver, believing he was not bound without a writing, admitted in a deposition that he had agreed to sell 40,000 bushels at a specified price. The Kansas Court of Appeals held that the deposition showed a meeting of the minds, even though he testified at trial that he was not obligated until he signed. The exception answers whether a deal was struck and leaves disputed terms to the fact-finder, and a party’s mistaken view of the legal effect of the facts does not undo an admission of them.
The opposite pole is a denial that merely borrows the vocabulary of contract. Mere mention of the word “contract” or “agreement” will not necessarily suffice, because courts look to overall substance and not to labels, and purely procedural admissions do not qualify.26 In Rinderknecht v. Luck the defendant’s answer conceded the surrounding negotiation facts but denied that a contract existed, and the Utah Court of Appeals read the defense as a whole and found no admission. A defendant who denies a contract and then pleads in the alternative as a strategic matter likewise concedes nothing, and decisions such as Anthony v. Tidwell decline to find an admission in that situation.27 Any other reading would force a careful defendant to choose between defending on the merits and keeping the statute.
The second half of the subsection fixes how far an admission reaches. A contract proved by admission is enforceable only as to the quantity of goods admitted.28 If you orally agreed to sell Alice two pianos for $800 each, and she admits that she agreed to buy one, you can enforce a contract for one piano.29 The limit matches the ceiling that a signed writing imposes. Where the only signed record states 200 sprockets of an alleged 2,000-sprocket deal, the contract is enforceable no further than 200, and the claimant has no claim on the rest.30 For the same reason, when a confirming memorandum satisfies § 2-201, neither party may introduce evidence that the parties agreed to a different quantity.31 In the peaches hypothetical, the packer may enforce 400 cases and must look elsewhere, perhaps to a merchant’s confirmation, for the other 600.
Because an admission can come late, even on cross-examination at trial, the exception shapes when a defendant can win on the statute. It has been held that a complaint alleging an oral contract within the statute need not be dismissed merely because the defendant may admit the contract at trial or in pretrial discovery, and such holdings appear consistent with the legislative intention behind the provision.32 Some courts likewise refuse to dismiss or grant summary judgment on statute of frauds grounds before the promisee has had the opportunity to examine the promisor under oath.33 Other courts worry that sending every such case to a jury leaves the statute without independent significance, because a jury may decide the whole case on whether it thinks the parties really made a deal. At least one court has refused to let cases go to trial for that reason, and Packgen affirmed summary judgment where the defendant denied making an agreement in sworn statements.34
Subsection (3)(b) governs sales of goods, and the rule for other contracts within the statute of frauds is less settled. At common law the older view was that an admission of the contract did not defeat the statute. The Code rests on the common-sense argument that a party should not admit the making of a contract in legal proceedings and still escape liability for want of a writing, and some courts have extended that argument beyond Article 2. In Gibson v. Arnold the Tenth Circuit surveyed the decisions and observed that the growing weight of authority recognizes an admissions exception outside the UCC. An essay on a contract outside Article 2 should say that the statutory exception reaches only goods, note that courts divide on extending it, and identify the controlling jurisdiction’s position.
The exception also puts a lawyer in a delicate position. A lawyer whose client admits that she concluded an oral contract may not make contrary factual claims in court, but the statute of frauds is a separate legal defense that the lawyer may properly seek to preserve.35
Payment or Acceptance
UCC § 2-201(3)(c) makes an oral contract for the sale of goods enforceable “with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted.”37 The first branch runs in the buyer’s favor: the buyer pays and the seller accepts the payment. The second runs in the seller’s favor: the seller delivers and the buyer receives and accepts the goods.38 Receipt means taking physical possession of the goods. Acceptance, which the subsection defines by cross-reference to § 2-606, asks not whether the buyer accepted title but whether the buyer has indicated an intention to keep the goods.39 As with the other exceptions in subsection (3), the claimant who clears the writing requirement this way must still prove agreement and consideration.40
Performance can stand in for a signed record because both sides have acted as though a contract exists. The Fifth Circuit said so in Bagby Land and Cattle Co. v. California Livestock Commission Co.: “receipt and acceptance either of goods or of the price constitutes an unambiguous overt admission by both parties that a contract actually exists.”41 Because both parties must act, neither can manufacture the admission alone. A fraudster who ships goods to an unsuspecting recipient, hoping the recipient will accept them expressly or by the passage of time, has produced nothing until the recipient acts too.42 The mutual conduct also explains why goods differ from land. For goods there is no requirement that the part performance be “unequivocally referable” to the alleged contract, the standard associated with part performance of land contracts.43
What both sides’ conduct corroborates is a contract for the goods that moved, so the Code enforces the contract only to that extent. The subsection expressly limits enforcement to the apportionable part of the goods that the buyer received and accepted, or for which the seller received and accepted payment, and so changes prior law.44 Take an oral order for 100 gross of pencils at ten cents each, $1,440 in all. If the seller delivers one gross and the buyer accepts it, the contract is enforceable as to that gross and the seller can collect $14.40, while the other 99 gross remain unenforceable unless another exception applies. The delivered gross shows that a real transaction occurred, but it says nothing reliable about how many pencils the parties agreed on. The payment branch scales the same way: a buyer who orally orders 150 widgets at $10 each and hands over a $70 check that the seller accepts can enforce the contract for seven widgets. In the goods branch, acceptance does the sorting, because receipt alone is only physical possession.
A timber sale separates what moved from what was merely marked. A landowner and a buyer orally agree that the buyer will take all the trees standing on a staked-off part of the timberland for $300,000, with cutting and removal to be finished within two months at the buyer’s expense, and the buyer cuts and removes ten trees the next day. Timber that the buyer is to cut and remove counts as goods under UCC § 2-107, so the sale falls within § 2-201 because the price exceeds $500. The contract is enforceable for the ten trees received and accepted, and that partial performance does not make the entire contract enforceable. The stakes that mark off the plot are not receipt and acceptance, because nothing had passed into the buyer’s possession when the boundary was drawn. Only a different exception could carry the rest: if the landowner admitted the deal in court, § 2-201(3)(b) would permit enforcement to the extent of the quantity admitted.45
Whether the rest of a contract survives depends on whether the goods can be divided. When the whole shipment is apportionable and the whole is paid for, the oral contract is enforceable as to the whole contract.46 Courts so held when a buyer accepted an entire shipment of steel screws in Alarm Device Manufacturing Co. v. Arnold Industries, Inc. In Haken v. Scheffler the buyer had not accepted every item of brick, stone, and mill irons that the seller delivered, yet the buyer’s acceptance and use of part of them plainly indicated a real transaction, and the court held § 2-201(3)(c) satisfied.47 A dispute over basil shipments divided the same way: an oral modification of price terms came within the statute for the 24,430 pounds of basil already shipped, received, and accepted, including 3,041 pounds not yet paid for, but not for future shipments.48
A single indivisible item cannot be apportioned, and the result reverses. Suppose you orally agreed to sell one piano to Alice for $2,000, and she paid you $500. Most courts let her enforce the entire contract, free from a statute of frauds defense.49 Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co. reports that the majority of courts let a buyer who made part payment for a non-divisible unit prove and recover in full on the oral contract, and a Missouri court applied the same rule to a $500 payment toward a Corvette in Sedmak v. Charlie’s Chevrolet, Inc. The general approach is to apportion where a just apportionment can be made and, where it cannot, to let part payment bring the entire contract within the exception.50 In each case the buyer has shown only that the statute is no obstacle, and must still prove agreement and consideration.51
Both halves of the phrase “made and accepted” must be satisfied. Payment may be made in money, by check, or in goods or services, so long as the other side accepts it.52 A check the seller never cashes has not been accepted, and an invoice sent in advance of payment is not payment at all. In each case one side acted and the other did not, so the mutual admission that justifies the exception is missing.
The two-sided requirement separates this exception from the specially manufactured goods exception. There the seller’s own substantial beginning of manufacture or commitments for procurement suffices, even though the buyer has received nothing and the seller’s preparation does not benefit the buyer.53 Here the corroboration comes from the exchange itself, so enforcement reaches only the portion of the exchange that took place. An exam stem that reports a deposit, a partial delivery, or a staked plot therefore asks two questions in order: did each side act, and what part of the goods did that action cover?