Concept
Choosing the Right Exception
Whether an exception permits enforcement without a complying memorandum
Choosing the Right Exception
An exception enters the analysis only after two earlier answers have gone against enforcement: the contract falls within the statute of frauds, and no sufficient signed writing exists. A contract outside the statute needs no rescue, and a contract with a sufficient writing meets no bar, although even then the plaintiff must still persuade the trier of fact that the agreement was made as she alleges.1 Only when the answers are yes and no does the third question arise: whether performance, reliance, or some other factor invokes an exception.2 Laid out as a sequence, the questions run from sufficient writing, to exception (part performance is the example), to estoppel, which comes last.3
The exceptions are narrow and specific, and the party seeking enforcement must establish the elements of the one it invokes.4 Each rests on one or both of two grounds. Some are evidentiary: the circumstances they recognize tend to prove that a contract was made despite the missing writing. Others protect a party who incurred a detriment in justifiable reliance on the contract.5 Naming the ground tells you which facts to look for, and the facts then tell you which exception fits.
Two of the Code's exceptions need no showing of reliance at all. Both appear in UCC § 2-201 and reflect an emphasis on sound commercial practice. Section 2-201(2) rests on the idea that those who deal with merchants may expect them to read their mail, and § 2-201(3)(b) on the idea that anyone who admits entering into a contract should be bound by it.6 They sit among four statutory exceptions. The other two, specially manufactured goods and part performance, turn on the claimant's own conduct, and some courts add an estoppel exception that the statute does not provide.7
The merchants' exception turns on facts that a court can check one at a time. Between merchants, a record in confirmation of the contract that is sufficient against its sender must be received within a reasonable time by a party who has reason to know its contents. The record then satisfies the writing requirement against that party unless notice in a record of objection to its contents is given within 10 days after receipt.8 Nothing in that text asks whether the sender changed position.
Merchant status, the first element, is not confined to those who sell the goods in question. In the firm-offer rule of § 2-205, which makes a merchant's offer irrevocable without consideration, a “business practice” merchant qualifies even though not in the business of selling goods of that kind.9 A claimant who meets a merchant-status argument under § 2-201(2) should therefore ask how broadly the Code treats the term before conceding the point.
Defeating the statute of frauds defense does not prove the contract. A recipient who stays silent after a qualifying confirmation loses the defense, but the burden of persuading the trier of fact that a contract was in fact made orally before the confirmation is unaffected.10
Trade practice explains why silence carries weight. In the Brooks Peanut litigation, the broker M & H had routinely brokered thousands of peanut sales using the same form of trade confirmation at issue. The seller, GSP, had agreed to sell peanuts to Brooks Peanut in June 2009 and April 2010, and each of those agreements was memorialized solely by M & H sending a substantially similar confirmation.11 In a trade that treats confirmations as the ordinary record of a deal, a merchant who receives one and says nothing is doing just what the rule assumes merchants will do.
Reliance works on a different premise. Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1), a promise that the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance, and that does induce it, is enforceable notwithstanding the statute of frauds if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement. The remedy is limited as justice requires.12 Courts do not agree on whether to apply the section. Some state courts adopt it for all contracts within the statute, some reject it for certain categories such as employment contracts, and others reject it for all contracts on the reasoning that courts should not create an exception that trumps a statute the legislature passed.13 Rice's employment dispute shows the section at work where it is accepted. ADP refused to pay her for the remaining time on her two-year oral contract, and the court applied § 139 and enforced the promise notwithstanding the statute after finding that she otherwise “would be a victim of injustice.”14
The dispute over reliance reaches sales of goods as well. In Rockland Industries v. Frank Kasmir Associates, the court read the Code provision before it as apparently defeating both Kasmir's full-execution contention and its argument that the statute is inapplicable where promissory estoppel is shown. It nonetheless acknowledged authority that promissory estoppel can defeat the statute of frauds under the Code.15 That uncertainty fixes the order of attack. The statutory exceptions apply wherever the Code applies and ask defined questions, while reliance is available only where the jurisdiction accepts it and the court finds that only enforcement avoids injustice. A claimant should therefore test the statutory routes first and reach reliance last.16
The hypothetical shows how one fact can close a route and send the analysis to the next one. A stem that instead reports a resignation, a relocation, and a withdrawn job promise points to the last step. It describes no merchants' confirmation, and the question becomes whether the promise induced the move and whether the jurisdiction accepts § 139.
The three kinds of route differ in what each demands of the claimant and what each delivers:
- The merchants' confirmation route demands a confirming record that binds its sender, timely receipt by a merchant with reason to know its contents, and ten days without objection in a record. It asks nothing about changed position, and it removes only the writing defense.17
- The other statutory routes each turn on a distinct event. An admission requires no changed position, while specially manufactured goods and part performance turn on what the claimant did.18
- The reliance route demands a promise the promisor should have expected to induce action, actual inducement, and a judgment that only enforcement avoids injustice, in a jurisdiction that accepts the rule. It delivers whatever remedy justice requires, which may fall short of the full bargain.19
Every route removes only the missing-writing defense. A claimant who gets past the statute by any of them must still prove that the agreement was made.20 A strong answer therefore names the route that fits the facts, states what that route requires, and says what it leaves the claimant to prove.