Concept
Purpose and Operation
Parol evidence
The Parol Evidence Rule
Purpose and Operation
Alice buys a piano under a written contract that covers every term, including a price of $500. When payment falls due she offers $300, claiming that the seller orally agreed to that figure before they signed and that the two of them simply forgot to change a price typed earlier. The traditional parol evidence rule bars her evidence: it proves a prior oral agreement that contradicts the writing, and the writing is complete on its face as to price.1
That result rests on what the Restatement calls an integrated agreement, a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement.2 A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them.3 A standard formulation of the rule adds that a writing intended by the parties as a final embodiment of their agreement cannot be modified by evidence of earlier or contemporaneous agreements that might add to, vary, or contradict it.4 The two statements differ in how much they bar, and later sections show that the difference turns on whether the writing is a complete or only a partial integration.
Two ideas explain why the law protects a final writing this way. The first is that a formal writing reflects the parties' minds at a point of maximum resolution, so duties that do not appear in it, even ones apparently accepted at an earlier stage, were not intended to survive. Quite apart from discarded terms, there is the obvious danger of outright fraud.5 The second looks forward. If the parties have gone to the trouble of putting some or all of their agreement into a final writing, the law ought to protect that writing against attacks based on prior evidence from outside. Doing so advances the certainty and predictability of contracts by letting the parties rely on the terms they reduce to writing, and the law achieves this by having the judge decide in advance whether a party may even present evidence that would contradict, or in some cases add to, those terms.6 A related aim is to train contracting parties to memorialize their agreements, which minimizes disputes between them and in the courts.7
The protection has a price. If the seller really did tell Alice that $300 was enough and both forgot to retype the figure, the rule still shuts her out. Courts created the exceptions taught later in this chapter for just such cases, where they strongly suspected that the parties did agree to terms that contradict the writing, and judges who believe the story are understandably reluctant to enforce the contract as written.8
The rule's name misleads in two ways. Parol means oral, yet the rule usually applies to prior written drafts as well as to oral agreements.9 And although the topic concerns the admission and exclusion of written as well as oral evidence, the rule is a substantive rule of contract law and not a rule of evidence.10 Atiyah makes the same point: the question is not really whether evidence can be admitted that might vary the document, but whether, once admitted, it will have the legal effect of varying it.11 The label has a procedural consequence. Under ordinary rules of evidence, the right to object to inadmissible evidence is lost if not asserted when the evidence is offered. In Estate of Parker v. Dorchak, a Mississippi court reasoned that because the parol evidence rule is substantive law, evidence admitted in violation of it, even without objection, should be disregarded if objection comes before the case goes to the trier of fact.12
A dispute under the rule runs in two stages with two different decision-makers. Suppose Alice's case is tried to a jury. The writing goes into evidence first, because a judge cannot invoke the rule at all until the writing is before the jury.13 The seller then objects to Alice's testimony, and the judge holds an in camera hearing out of the jury's presence. Alice's lawyer outlines what the evidence would show, both sides argue how the rule applies, and the judge decides whether the evidence is admissible under it.14 The judge thus acts as gatekeeper, screening evidence before the jury can hear it. If the judge excludes the testimony, the judge gives preference to the writing already in evidence by prohibiting the jury from considering the oral evidence.15 If the judge admits it, the second stage begins, and the jury decides whether the alleged oral agreement was in fact made. Admission only gives Alice the chance to convince the jury; it does not find that the conversation happened.16
Some disputes never reach the second stage. A lessee leased a freezing unit for his store under a written contract that listed the conditions on which the lease would end, none of which was an option to terminate if frozen foods did not sell. When he tried to terminate for lack of sales, he admitted the contract in response to a motion for summary judgment but filed an affidavit claiming that the lessor's salesman had orally assured him of such an option. The trial court entered judgment for the lessor, and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, citing the contract's statement that there were no conditions other than those expressly carried out.17
The rule is not a blanket ban on testimony about oral promises, and the weight of the suspicion depends on how the offered term relates to the writing. Suppose a recording group claims that, when signing, its label orally promised to arrange a ten-city concert tour. The written agreement says nothing about tours, and the label denies the promise. A rule that simply barred all testimony of oral agreement would be too blunt an instrument. Because this testimony does not directly contradict the writing, it is less presumptively suspect, and there is greater justification for admitting it.18 Whether a court actually lets the tour promise in turns on integration, which the next sections develop.
A court first has to be dealing with the right kind of writing. To invoke the parol evidence rule, a writing must have qualities beyond those needed to satisfy the statute of frauds. The statute asks for the minimum writing needed to establish that a contract exists, while the parol evidence rule asks how far the writing should be used to exclude extrinsic evidence of what was agreed.19 The extra quality is that the parties intended the writing as the final embodiment of their agreement.20 A seller who types a memorandum of the sale and files it away without ever showing it to the buyer has produced no writing the two of them jointly intended as final, and the memorandum gives the seller no ground for invoking the rule.
If either answer is no, there is no parol evidence problem. An entirely oral piano sale leaves the rule nothing to protect, so the jury hears both accounts of the price. An agreement reached after the writing falls outside the formulations above, which speak of prior and contemporaneous agreements, and a later section takes up subsequent agreements.21 When both answers are yes, the inquiry turns to what the parties intended the final writing to do about earlier understandings, and in particular whether they meant it to represent their agreement in its entirety or only in part.22 For sales of goods, UCC § 2-202 has the same structure. Terms set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement, but may be explained or supplemented.23