Concept
Scope of the Rule
Parol evidence
Scope of the Rule
The parol evidence rule is a rule about timing. Section 215 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts bars evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or negotiations when a party offers it to contradict a term of a binding integrated writing, whether the writing is completely or partially integrated.1 Section 213 states the companion principle: an integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that they are inconsistent with it.2 Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code draws the line at the same places for sales of goods, providing that a final writing may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement.3 Each formulation reaches back to the period before the writing and to the moment the parties adopted it. None reaches forward.
That limit follows from what the rule does. When the parties adopt a single and final memorial of their understanding, the writing supersedes the negotiations that came before it.4 Only an understanding that existed when the parties made that choice can be superseded. A statement made as they sign is still a statement about what the document will contain, so the rule treats it like everything said earlier. An agreement made later is a new act by parties who already hold the writing, and the writing cannot have replaced something that did not yet exist.
Two questions follow from the timing line. The first is what falls on the covered side: which earlier materials count as prior or contemporaneous evidence, and how the rule treats each. The second is what falls on the far side, an agreement reached after the writing, which modification law governs and which carries a timing trap that is easy to miss on an exam.
Prior and Contemporaneous Terms
Section 215 screens evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or negotiations offered to contradict a term of an integrated writing, and it asks when the material arose, not whether it was spoken or written.5 The Uniform Commercial Code draws its line at the same two moments but words it differently: it names any prior agreement but only a contemporaneous oral agreement.6 That difference matters once a second writing signed at the closing comes up for sorting. For now, the working definition is this: parol evidence is extrinsic evidence, meaning evidence found outside the writing, of what the parties agreed or communicated before the writing or as they adopted it.7
A single sale of an office building shows all three forms. The written contract says nothing about warranties, and after closing the buyer finds a structural defect and sues for breach of warranty. If the buyer testifies that the seller promised, in a conversation before signing, that the building was structurally sound, the evidence is a prior oral agreement. If the buyer places the assurance at the meeting where the parties signed, it is a contemporaneous oral agreement. If the buyer offers emails exchanged a week before signing in which the seller promised that the building was free of structural defects, the evidence is a prior written agreement.8
Every version invites the same two suspicions. The final writing is where a warranty would be expected to appear, so its absence suggests either that the buyer invented the promise or that the parties discussed it and chose to leave it out of the contract. Either inference justifies having the judge examine the evidence with special care before a factfinder hears it.9 The two spoken versions rest only on the buyer's account, so both suspicions arise in full.
The emails change the first suspicion and leave the second untouched. A dated message in the seller's own words is objectively verifiable, so the worry that the buyer made up the promise recedes. Its absence from the final contract still suggests that the parties did not intend to include it, which is why the emails are parol evidence even though they are written.10 A standard statement of the rule treats written and spoken negotiations alike. Extrinsic evidence is excluded because it cannot prove what the agreement was, that question being answered as a matter of law by the writing itself. Once a single and final memorial of the understanding exists, prior and contemporaneous negotiations, oral or written, are excluded, and the writing supersedes them.11 A contractor who offers either testimony or correspondence showing that the owner agreed, at or before contracting, that the bid excluded common areas therefore meets the same objection whichever form the proof takes.12
The sorting works the same way for goods. A buyer who says a salesperson promised, before signing, a free inspection and oil change is offering extrinsic evidence, and the rule then decides whether the court excludes it.13
A second writing signed together with the final one is the case students most often miss. The rule screens a prior writing, but a contract need not live in a single document, and parties may express their agreement in several writings.14 Under section 2-202, a prior writing may not be admitted if it contradicts a later writing that is a final expression of some terms, and it may not be admitted at all, contradictory or not, if the later writing is a complete and exclusive statement of all terms. Contemporaneous writings are treated differently: if two of them contradict each other, the judge may admit both and leave the jury to decide which embodies the actual agreement.15 Neither writing is earlier than the other, so nothing supports the assumption that one was meant to supersede the other.
Business closings produce such documents routinely. A purchaser of a business may sign a principal agreement and, at the same closing, a separate document in which the purchaser assumes the seller's lease, kept separate so that a copy can go to the landlord without the confidential terms of the sale. Between buyer and seller, the assumption agreement is part of the integration.16
Set the two poles side by side. The seller's email of a week earlier in the office-building sale is a prior writing that the final contract did not carry forward, so it is parol evidence.17 The lease assumption signed at the same closing is a companion to the principal agreement, so it is not.18 Article 2 fits that treatment: it bars contradiction by a prior agreement or a contemporaneous oral agreement and says nothing of a contemporaneous writing.19
Step three is where candidates most often go wrong, because the word writing feels like a safe harbor. A dated email that predates the signed contract is parol evidence. Its reliability answers the fabrication worry but not the inference that the parties chose to omit the term.20 Classification is only the first move. Whether the evidence is actually excluded depends on integration and on the exceptions later in this chapter, and an agreement made after the writing falls on the far side of the timing line, which is the next subsection's subject.
Subsequent Agreements
Section 215 screens prior or contemporaneous agreements and negotiations, and that wording marks the far edge of the rule: an agreement reached after the writing was adopted lies outside it.22 Section 2-202 draws the same boundary for sales of goods and mentions nothing later.23 A later agreement is still extrinsic evidence, but it poses a modification issue rather than a parol evidence issue.24 The rule sometimes excludes what came before the writing; it does not exclude what comes after, a point that a few lawyers and judges continue to forget.25
The reason lies in what the rule assumes. A final writing displaces earlier understandings because the parties are taken to have folded them into the document when they adopted it.26 That assumption has no application to an agreement made afterward, which the document could not have absorbed. The parol evidence rule does not apply to agreements, whether oral or written, made after the writing was executed.27
Vary the facts of Thompson v. Libby, a sale of logs under a written contract. Suppose that some weeks after signing, the parties orally agree that the price will be paid partly in cash and partly in promissory notes. The rule does not bar testimony about that later agreement. Courts apply the same reasoning to other written contracts: in Litman v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., the Eleventh Circuit held that evidence of a later oral modification of a written employment contract was not barred.28
Once a later agreement is classed as a modification, different questions govern it. A court asks, among other things, whether the parties assented to the change, whether consideration was required and present, and whether a statute or the original contract requires the modification to be evidenced by a signed writing.29 Those questions belong to the law of modification. Here the task is only to place a later agreement on the correct side of the timing line.
The line is hard to see when the later promise follows the signature by minutes. In Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, a bank agreed to finance the purchase of shares in a corporation, and the closing took all day. The parties signed a written loan agreement during the day, and before the closing ended the borrowers asked the bank to increase the loan. They claimed the bank agreed orally, but the writing was never changed.30 The trial court admitted the evidence on the ground that the oral agreement came after the signing, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. The closing was a single, continuous transaction, and it was artificial to fix on the sequence of the signature and the alleged promise. The question was whether both belonged to the same process of formation, and because they did, the oral agreement was contemporaneous, irreconcilable with the writing, and excluded.31
The holding makes practical sense. If the order of the conversation decided the question, a promise spoken a minute after the signature would escape the rule while the identical promise spoken a minute before it would not.
Exam stems exploit this boundary. A fact pattern that says a promise came after the contract was signed tempts the reader to stop there. The better question is how far after, and in what setting.
The clock matters less than the occasion. Minutes separating a signature from a promise do not take the promise out of the closing. Weeks separating them, with a new interaction in between, put it beyond the writing's reach.
A later written agreement presents the same sorting problem in another form. In Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v. American Business Center, Inc., a Chinese seller and a Texas buyer disputed payment for weight-lifting equipment, and they signed a written agreement acknowledging the buyer's debt and setting installment payments. The buyer later asserted that the seller had orally agreed to ship replacement goods and to accept a ninety-day payment term. The district court and the Fifth Circuit applied the parol evidence rule, found the written agreement completely integrated, and barred the oral terms. That treatment is open to criticism. The installment agreement was itself a modification of the parties' earlier arrangement, so the first question was what the modification included. The governing convention allows modification by mere agreement, which can be oral as well as written, so whether the modification included the alleged oral terms was a question of fact that summary judgment could not properly decide.32