Concept
UCC Section 2-202
Parol evidence
UCC Section 2-202
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code carries the parol evidence rule into sales of goods, and section 2-202 states it. Terms in a writing that the parties intended as a final expression of their agreement on those terms may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement, but they may be explained or supplemented.1 Article 2 reaches only goods, which section 2-105(1) defines as all things movable at the time of identification to the contract, apart from the money in which the price is paid, investment securities, and things in action; unborn young of animals, growing crops, and other identified things attached to realty count as goods.2 As at common law, the section does its work only after you have concluded that the parties made an enforceable written contract, and it then applies to a writing intended as either the final or the complete and exclusive statement of their terms.3
Three features separate the Code's rule from the common law version taught in the sections above. The first is vocabulary. The common law asks whether a writing is integrated and, if so, whether completely or partially; the Code asks whether the writing is a final expression and whether it is also complete and exclusive, and the two pairs correspond, with 'final' matching partial integration and 'complete and exclusive' matching full integration.4 The second is the default. A final writing is presumed to be only a partial integration, so consistent additional terms may supplement it unless the court finds that it was also intended as complete and exclusive.5 The third is a source of evidence: section 1-303 defines course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, and section 2-202 lets each explain or supplement a writing.6
Behind all three features lies a broader view of what a sales agreement contains. The Code adds to sales agreements much that the parties never made express: section 1-303 supplies course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade; section 1-103 feeds general contract law into Article 2; and sections 1-302(b) and 1-304 impose obligations of good faith that may be thought of as part of any Article 2 contract.7 Section 2-202 then broadens the notion of contract further by permitting parties to prove 'extrinsic' terms that various pre-Code versions of the parol evidence rule would have kept out.8 Article 2A applies the same analysis to leases, because section 2A-202 is virtually identical to section 2-202 and the Article 2 case law bears on it.9
Three questions organize the rest of this section. How does a writing's status as final, or as complete and exclusive, determine what a party may add to it? Which evidence supplements even a complete writing? And how does the rule treat a seller's oral promises about the goods?
Final Versus Complete and Exclusive
Section 2-202 builds the rule in two layers. The first layer protects the writing against contradiction: terms in a writing intended as a final expression may not be contradicted by any prior agreement or any contemporaneous oral agreement.10 The second layer protects the writing against addition, and it applies only if the court finds that the writing was intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms; without that finding, evidence of consistent additional terms may supplement the writing.11 The word 'also' marks the relationship. Finality is the first finding, and completeness and exclusivity is a second finding resting on top of it. In common law terms, a final writing is a partial integration and a complete and exclusive writing is a full integration.12 The current text speaks of a 'record' where the older text speaks of a 'writing,' and it keeps both findings.13
Two layers exist because a writing can be the last word on some terms without being the last word on all of them. Comment 1 therefore rejects any assumption that a writing which is final on some matters includes all the matters agreed upon.14 Article 2 accordingly presumes nothing about completeness: a writing that is final as to some material terms is not presumed to be the parties' complete and exclusive agreement.15 Stated from the other direction, the writing is presumed to be only partially integrated, and the presumption yields if the parties actually intended a total integration or if, as Comment 3 puts it, parties similarly situated would certainly have included the offered term.16
That default separates Article 2 from the four corners test, under which the trial judge looks only at the writing and, if it appears complete on its face, treats it as conclusively a total integration.17 The test is in decline but retains vitality. Section 2-202 is less congenial to it than earlier versions of the rule were, because a four corners test thrives under a rule that presumes full embodiment in the writing unless only partial embodiment is proved.18
Courts assign both findings to the judge, although the Code does not say so, because a judge who decides completeness and exclusivity would decide the lesser question of finality as well.19 Some courts call the question one of fact, but they still have the judge decide it outside the jury's presence.20 The judge looks to the parties' intent. A court applying the Illinois version listed the relevant factors as merger or integration clauses, disclaimer clauses, prior negotiations, the extrinsic terms alleged, and the sophistication of the parties.21 On Corbin's account, the very evidence whose admissibility is challenged, including evidence of prior negotiations, is admissible on the question of integration.22 The authors of the leading treatise disagree about how readily to infer completeness: one finds it quickly in an elaborate writing, and the other trusts the jury more and distrusts the drafter.23
The Illinois decision shows how those factors cut toward completeness. It refused to treat a preprinted integration clause as inoperative merely because the clause was not specifically negotiated. It also counted as a factor favoring complete integration that both parties were very knowledgeable about promotional vehicles, were aware of the vehicle's limited production, and were willing to contract before production and pricing were confirmed.24
A gap on the face of the writing cuts the other way. When parties provide for a discount but fail to state its amount, the writing cannot be a complete and final expression of their agreement on that term, so evidence of what they agreed orally is admissible to supplement it.25 If both sides admit an oral agreement and dispute only its content, and neither version contradicts the writing, the court admits all of the evidence and the jury decides whose version is correct.26
Facial completeness remains evidence even though it is not conclusive. Under New York law, the court begins by examining the writing's facial completeness, on the reasoning that the more complete a writing appears, the less likely it is that extrinsic terms were agreed upon.27 Another court, finding that key terms were missing from a writing, took the omission as a reason to admit extrinsic evidence of agreement on those terms.28 Both courts treat facial completeness as one consideration for the judge to weigh, whereas the four corners test treats it as the whole answer.
Even when the writing is not complete and exclusive, Comment 3 adds a second screen. If the additional terms are such that, if agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the document in the view of the court, 'then evidence of their alleged making must be kept from the trier of fact.'29 The judge applies the screen while assuming that the prior agreement was made. The question is whether leaving the term out of the writing shows that the parties meant it not to be part of their final agreement; whether the term was in fact agreed remains for the jury.30 A judge who finds the writing not complete and exclusive may therefore still exclude a particular term, though the word 'certainly' defines itself poorly and judges apply it with little guidance.31
The comment endorses an approach similar to the Restatement's, with 'certainly have been included' substituted for 'naturally be omitted from the writing.'32 The substitution favors admission. The Code's draftsmen would exclude the evidence in still fewer instances than the earlier tests, so a term that probably, though not certainly, would have been written down still reaches the jury.33
Contradiction is a separate hurdle, and a term that contradicts the writing fails whatever the writing's completeness. Courts have found contradiction in an oral agreement to renegotiate a note against a six-month due date, in an oral warranty against an 'as is' clause, and in oral evidence of a much lower quantity against a written quantity term.34 An oral damages limitation, by contrast, does not contradict a written delivery date on which damages would ordinarily be calculated.35 The statute's opening words also protect terms on which the parties' confirmatory memoranda agree, in addition to terms in a writing intended as a final expression.36
The fourth step is where the Code departs from the common law. A detailed, signed writing earns no automatic classification as complete, and the judge weighs facial completeness together with the other evidence of intent. The fifth step is the one most easily forgotten, because a finding that the writing is not complete and exclusive does not by itself admit every consistent term.
Dealing, Performance, and Usage
Clause (a) of section 2-202 names three kinds of evidence that explain or supplement a final writing: course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, as section 1-303 defines them.39 The statute attaches its 'unless the court finds' qualifier only to clause (b), the clause on consistent additional terms, so a finding that the writing is complete and exclusive does not close clause (a).40 A problem that stops once the writing is found complete and exclusive has therefore answered only half of the Article 2 question.
Section 1-303 distinguishes the three sources by whose conduct counts and when it occurred.
- Course of performance is a sequence of conduct under the current contract, which must involve repeated occasions for performance by a party.41
- Course of dealing is a sequence of conduct concerning previous transactions between the parties.42
- Usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.43
A usage may be limited to a particular area, to a particular activity, or to both.44 The parties themselves can establish a course of performance or a course of dealing by testimony, while a trade usage is usually established by expert testimony.45
The three sources count as part of the agreement because of how the Code defines that word. 'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade, and 'contract' means the total legal obligation that results from the agreement.46 The agreement is therefore a broader thing than the signed paper; it takes in the three sources alongside the written contract.47 That definition suits contract law's primary concern, which is to protect the reasonable expectations of the persons who become parties.48
Because the three sources belong to the agreement, section 2-202(a) makes trade usage and course of dealing always admissible.49 Some common law cases still exclude evidence of usage, dealing, and performance unless the written contract is ambiguous or contains a gap, and the commentary calls those cases unwise.50 The common law in many jurisdictions allows a usage or course of dealing to be added to a writing if the term is not inconsistent with it, and the Code adopts a similar rule.51
In Grace Label, Inc. v. Kliff, the seller offered evidence of its prior transactions with the buyer to show that the parties expected it to use in printing the cards the same materials it had used before. The buyer objected, and the court overruled the objection because the evidence merely explained and supplemented the written contract and did not contradict any of its terms.52
Course of performance differs from the other two sources in timing. It consists of conduct after the writing was made, so the part of the parol evidence rule that governs additional terms does not apply to it, and using a course of performance to add a term raises a question of modification or waiver.53 Agreements made after the writing are extrinsic, but they never raise a parol evidence issue.54 For the same reason, section 2-202(a)'s express mention of course of performance is unnecessary in most cases, because course of performance typically does not even qualify as parol evidence.55 A course of performance also bears on meaning; at common law it is usually called practical construction, and it is often the best evidence of the parties' intentions.56 Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distributing Co. illustrates that use of the parties' own performance as evidence of what they meant.
Admission starts the analysis and does not end it. Former section 1-205(4) directed that the express terms and any applicable course of dealing or usage of trade be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other, and that when such a construction is unreasonable, express terms control both course of dealing and usage, and course of dealing controls usage.57 That rule does not bar evidence; it supplies criteria for evaluating it.58 Once course of performance joins the list, the ranking runs as follows:
- Express terms prevail over the other three sources.
- Course of performance prevails over course of dealing and usage of trade.
- Course of dealing prevails over usage of trade.
The order follows closeness to the transaction at hand, since what lies nearest to the parties' own bargain best describes their intent.59
The hard question is how far a usage may modify a written term, and Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co. states the generous view. Performance, usages, and prior dealings are important enough to be admitted always, even against a final and complete agreement, and they lose only if they cannot reasonably be reconciled with the express terms.60 The limit is real, because evidence that contradicts or negates the terms of a written agreement is inadmissible.61
Southern Concrete Services, Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc. shows where that limit can fall. A quantity of 12,000 cubic yards is more than a mere variation on the 70,000 cubic yards stated in the writing.62 The court regarded an attempt to cancel more than 80 percent of the agreed quantity as a major departure, well beyond the minor quantity variations that trade usage contemplates.63 The line between a usage that reasonably qualifies a term and one that negates it is not sharp. Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co. is the usual point of comparison on the liberal side, and because courts differ in how generously they find consistency, an answer should argue the point and not assume an outcome.
Parties may exclude the three sources, but only by saying so carefully: unless carefully negated, they become an element of the meaning of the words the parties used.64 The Code's strong recognition of course of dealing and trade usage compels parties to use very clear and specific language in the writing if they truly intend to exclude either one.65
The cartons contract names the sources, and for that reason alone the supplier's evidence fails. The same three-day practice, offered under a writing silent on the subject, would come in if the short tolerance can reasonably be read together with the stated date.
Step four does the contested work. The same facts can come out differently before a court that admits usage liberally and one that guards the written term closely, so an answer should say which reading the facts support and why, in place of announcing a single outcome.
Express Warranties and Merger
A seller's oral promise about the goods, made while the parties negotiate, is where section 2-202 does its most visible work. Express warranties may be created orally or by one of several writings, so whether one exists may turn on the parol evidence rule.68 Formal words such as 'warrant' or 'guarantee' are not necessary; the sole question is whether the language is fairly to be regarded as part of the contract, and statements of opinion, of value, or of mere commendation (puffing) create no warranty.69 This subsection applies the final-versus-complete analysis of the first subsection to that recurring problem.
The warranty rules contain their own cross-reference. Section 2-316(1) directs that language negating an express warranty be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with the language creating it, and it makes a disclaimer inoperative to the extent that construction is unreasonable.70 Language creating an express warranty therefore prevails over inconsistent language negating or limiting it, unless the parol evidence rule requires a contrary conclusion.71 The same subsection is 'subject to' section 2-202, and that qualification governs a different situation.72 A buyer alleges that the seller orally promised that the car would get 36 miles per gallon on the open road, but the written contract either disclaims all warranties or specifically warrants lower mileage. No two clauses of the contract compete there. The question is whether the oral statement became part of the contract at all, and if section 2-202 bars it, the buyer cannot even prove that the seller made it.73
Two interests collide in that situation. The rule exists to protect parties who rely on their written contracts from false allegations of prior promises or agreements that contradict the writing.74 Sellers have a second reason to value it, which is the cost of agency. A seller whose representatives get credit for sales runs the risk that a representative will make unauthorized statements to induce them, and a disclaimer helps the seller control that risk.75 The rule excludes a contradictory oral statement only if the writing was intended as the final expression of the parties' agreement; otherwise evidence of the warranty comes in only if it does not contradict the writing and explains or supplements it.76
The timing step separates two statements that sound alike. A statement made after the deal closes can still become part of the contract, but it does so as a modification. When a sales clerk hands over just-purchased eye-shadow and says it is absolutely harmless to the eyes, the assurance needs no consideration to bind, because an agreement modifying a sales contract is binding without it under section 2-209(1).77 The parol evidence rule has nothing to exclude in that setting, since a later agreement raises a modification issue and never a parol evidence issue.78
The same kind of oral assurance can survive for one buyer and fail for another, and the writing decides which.
Tomas's case rests on the Code's default. A writing intended as a final expression is treated like a partial integration, so a consistent additional term comes in unless the court finds that the writing was intended also as complete and exclusive.79 Whenever the judge finds that the extrinsic term does not contradict a term in the writing, the term may supplement the writing, provided the judge does not find that it would certainly have been included had it been agreed.80 Ingrid's case turns on the opposite facts, because an oral warranty contradicts an 'as is' clause and an exclusive writing bars even consistent terms.81 Whether a disclaimer is effective is a question for the law of warranties, and section 2-316 imposes requirements such as conspicuousness; the parol evidence analysis assumes that the writing contains a disclaimer that works.82
A buyer facing a disclaimer has two principal arguments. The first is that the writing was final but not complete and exclusive, so the warranty is a consistent additional term that merely supplements it. A complete and exclusive writing defeats that argument, and a merger or integration clause is the usual device drafters use to trigger the rule against statements made during negotiations or earlier rounds of documentation.83 The second argument is fraud. If the contract is complete and exclusive, the buyer may argue that the seller's statement, about gas mileage for instance, fraudulently induced the signing.84 Fraud demands more than warranty does, because it requires a material misrepresentation made with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, and without that knowledge, fraud closely resembles breach of an express warranty.85 The case law as a whole conflicts on whether merger clauses preclude such evidence, and some courts hold that they do not, on the theory that fraud vitiates all.86
Courts that disfavor disclaimers have found several routes around them, and these are judicial tendencies, not settled rules. Some courts have said outright that the parol evidence rule has no effect where a prior oral express warranty is contradicted by a written disclaimer. Others admit the oral warranty while deciding whether the writing was intended as the parties' final expression, sometimes noting the absence of a merger clause or finding post-contract statements.87 Their skepticism has a rationale: the problem typically arises when the seller added language to control its agents, and the seller is better placed than the buyer to control what those agents say, so efforts to shift the risk of agent representations to buyers should perhaps be construed narrowly.88 A 2008 decision shows the flavor: a statement at an auction that items were Tiffany lamps went to the core description and could not be disclaimed despite multiple 'as is' disclaimers, and the statement was moreover made after the buyer had received the terms and conditions.89
A seller who wants protection must draft for it. The task requires carefully worded contractual language, possibly including a merger clause that makes clear the disclaimer is part of the parties' final expression, and even the most careful drafter is vulnerable to the imagination of courts.90 A Texas lease dispute shows the clause doing its job. The lessee leased a freezing unit, and the written contract listed the conditions on which the lease would terminate, none of which gave the lessee an option to terminate whenever he decided that frozen foods would not sell. When the lessee claimed that the lessor's salesman had orally promised such an option, the court affirmed judgment for the lessor, citing the contract's language that no conditions other than those expressly stated bound the parties; the contract also expressly disclaimed warranties of fitness for any particular purpose.91