Concept
Applying the Rule Step by Step
Parol evidence
Applying the Rule Step by Step
The provisions in this chapter fit together as one sequence of questions, and a problem is worked by asking them in order. The Restatement supplies the pieces. An integrated agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or more terms of an agreement.1 A binding integrated agreement discharges prior agreements to the extent that it is inconsistent with them.2 Section 215 turns that discharge into an evidentiary bar: where there is a binding agreement, completely or partially integrated, evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or negotiations may not contradict a term of the writing.3 Section 216(1) admits a consistent additional term to supplement the writing unless the court finds the agreement completely integrated.4 Section 214 lists the purposes for which earlier agreements and negotiations remain admissible, and section 215 yields to that list.5
The order of the steps follows from how those provisions depend on one another. A problem must first establish what triggers the rule: a writing the parties adopted, and evidence of an earlier agreement offered to add to or explain it. If either is missing, no parol evidence question exists.6 Contradiction comes next, ahead of completeness, because a contradictory prior term fails against a partial integration and a complete one alike, so a court that finds a contradiction never has to classify the writing. Completeness matters only to a term that contradicts nothing, because the difference between the two kinds of integration is whether a consistent additional term may supplement the writing. The section 214 purposes come last because they work as exceptions to the bar. They turn on what the evidence is offered to show, so they can admit evidence that the earlier steps would exclude.
The judge answers these questions before the evidence reaches the jury, and passing them settles only that the jury may hear it. If the judge admits a term, the proponent must still persuade the jury that the parties in fact agreed to it.14 The rule is a threshold question about whether a party may try to prove an agreement that the writing does not set out.15 The list also gives a logical order, not always the order courts follow. Unless the intent to integrate is clear, how well the alleged term fits the writing can color the court's view of whether the parties meant the writing to be complete, so steps three through five often blur into one another.16
The rabbit-sale problem runs the sequence on several items from one contract and shows how far each travels before the analysis ends. S and B execute a written contract under which S will sell B 10,000 rabbits for $15,000, with delivery at S's ranch on April 1. A dispute arises, the contract is never performed, and B sues. B offers to prove three things: that during negotiations S promised to deliver the rabbits to B's ranch; that at the signing S agreed to take $5,000 down and $10,000 by April 15; and that during negotiations S promised to include surplus vaccine.17
The first three steps come out the same way for every item. The writing is signed and states the goods, the quantity, the price, and the place and date of delivery, so step one is met. Each statement B offers was made during negotiations or at the signing, so each is prior or contemporaneous. A writing this specific reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, and the Restatement takes it to be an integrated agreement unless other evidence shows it was not a final expression.18 Given the terms it contains, there is no logical reason to doubt that it is a final expression. Nothing in the facts marks it as the exclusive statement of the whole deal, so the safe starting point is a partial integration, and whether it is more than that matters only to items that survive step four.19
The delivery statement ends at step four. The writing fixes delivery at S's ranch and the oral promise places it at B's ranch, so the rabbits cannot be delivered at both, and the offered term contradicts an express term of the writing.20 A contradictory prior term is barred against a partial integration and a complete one alike, and the integrated agreement discharges the inconsistent understanding.21 No finding on completeness is needed. Only step six could rescue the statement, and it would require B to offer the promise for some purpose other than proving a different delivery term, such as mistake or another defense.22
The credit term is harder, because step four is itself contestable. The writing states a price and says nothing about when it is paid. A bare price implies a cash sale, so installment payment arguably contradicts what the writing implies.23 Courts read inconsistency more or less broadly. On a narrow reading the term is not a contradiction and the analysis moves on to completeness; on a wider reading the court can dispose of the claim summarily.24 A complete answer therefore follows both branches. If the court finds a contradiction, the credit term is excluded at step four, as the delivery term was. If it finds none, the question moves to step five, where B may prove the term if the writing is only partially integrated and may not if it is completely integrated.25 Because rabbits are goods, the UCC also asks whether the parties would certainly have put the term in the writing had they agreed to it. Parties who intended anything other than a cash sale would probably have written the payment terms down, which points toward exclusion, but the point is debatable and the answer should say so.26
The vaccine promise clears step four easily. The writing says nothing about vaccine, and a promise to include surplus vaccine negates no term, express or implied, so it is a consistent additional term and the outcome turns on step five. The court excludes it if it finds the writing completely integrated or, for goods, finds that the parties would certainly have included the term; otherwise it comes in.27 A writing is completely integrated when the parties adopted it as a complete and exclusive statement of their agreement, as though it said, 'Our entire deal is in this writing—and there are no other agreements between us.'28 The earlier sections of this chapter describe the tests courts use to decide that question. Here, the intent to include surplus vaccine in a deal of this kind without writing it down is plausible conduct, so B has a good case for admission.29 The delivery promise answers a question the writing already answers, while the vaccine promise addresses a subject the writing never touches, and that difference accounts for the different outcomes. Admission would then send the vaccine question to the jury, which must decide whether S made the promise at all.30
Because the sale is of goods, step seven remains available. The problem also offers an industry usage under which '1,000 rabbits' means 100 dozen, so that B's order of 10,000 rabbits would mean 1,000 dozen, or 12,000 animals.31 That evidence supplies a meaning for the written quantity and adds no new term. Evidence of course of performance, course of dealing, and trade usage is admissible to supplement any integration, whether total or partial, and where it conflicts with an express term the express term prevails.32 The contested question at this step is whether the usage explains the written number or cannot be reconciled with it.
A strong answer ties each conclusion to a fact with the word because: the delivery promise is excluded because the rabbits cannot be delivered at both ranches, and the vaccine promise survives step four because the writing says nothing about vaccine. Where a step is contestable, as the credit term is, the answer works out both branches and says which one the court's approach selects. An answer that follows only the contradiction branch leaves the step undone.33