Concept
When Meanings Differ
Whose Meaning Prevails
When Meanings Differ
When the parties attached different meanings to a promise, an agreement, or one of its terms, Restatement (Second) § 201(2) interprets it according to one party's meaning, provided that party meets a condition about knowledge at the time the agreement was made.1 Under clause (a), a party's meaning controls if that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other and the other knew the meaning attached by the first.2 Under clause (b), it controls if that party had no reason to know of any different meaning and the other had reason to know the first party's.3 Section 201(1) settles the cases in which the meanings match; § 201(2) governs the rest.
The two clauses state one rule at two levels of awareness. In each, the more innocent party's meaning prevails: that party was unaware of any difference, and the other party was aware of it, either in fact or because the circumstances gave reason to be. Many interpretation disputes therefore reduce to a single question: did one party know or have reason to know of the meaning the other attached? A party who did is bound by the other's meaning.4
Fault explains the rule. A party who makes a contract knowing of a misunderstanding is sufficiently at fault to justify binding that party to the other's understanding.5 That party could have asked a question, clarified the term, or declined to deal, while a party with no inkling of a difference had no occasion to do any of these things. The rule puts the cost of the mismatch on the one who could have prevented it.
The time for measuring knowledge is the time the agreement was made.6 Whatever a party later learns, or later claims to have understood, cannot supply what the rule requires, because formation is the moment when either side could still have cleared up the difference.
The rule assumes a choice between two meanings, and simple disputes fit that assumption. Complex agreements do not. Each party may arrive in court with a self-serving, detailed account of what it intended on a whole range of issues, and the court is not limited to selecting “whose meaning prevails.” It may find that the manifested intention each party should reasonably have understood differs somewhat from the detailed subjective intent of either.7 A court may even find that it must enforce terms that neither party intended, because the alternative, a finding that no contract was formed, comes much too late.8
The two clauses call for separate treatment: clause (a) turns on what a party actually knew, clause (b) on what the circumstances should have told it. When neither clause favors either party, the usual consequence is that no contract exists, a result developed below in the discussion of when neither meaning controls.
Actual Knowledge
Clause (a) of § 201(2) supplies the first of two routes by which one party's meaning can prevail. The meaning of the party asserting it (call that party the claimant) controls if the claimant did not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other party knew the meaning the claimant attached.9 The word and makes the claimant satisfy both conditions. One concerns the claimant's innocence: did the claimant know that the other side read the term differently? The other concerns the other party's awareness: did that party actually know what the claimant meant? Section 201(2) measures both when the agreement was made.10
Consider a piano sale in which Alice, the buyer, reads the contract price of $500 to mean $300, while the seller reads it to mean $500. Alice's meaning prevails if the seller knew she understood the price to be $300 and she had no idea the seller read it as $500.11 Alice satisfies the first condition because nothing she knew suggested a competing reading. The seller satisfies the second because he knows what she meant and, knowing it, lets the agreement go forward. Alice wins even though $500 ordinarily means $500, because this prong asks what each party knew, not which reading is more natural.
Each condition answers a different unfairness. A party who makes a contract knowing of a misunderstanding is sufficiently at fault to justify being bound by the other party's understanding.12 That reasoning supports the second condition, since one sentence from the knowing party would have corrected the mistake. The first condition does separate work. A claimant who also knew the other side meant something different had the same chance to clarify, and fault shared between the parties cannot be assigned to one of them alone. Requiring innocence on one side and knowledge on the other confines the rule to the case in which one party is blameless and the other is not.
Remove either condition and the prong fails. Had Alice heard the seller insist that $500 means $500 and signed anyway, she would fail the first condition, and the seller's knowledge of her reading could not rescue her under clause (a). If each party knew or had reason to know of the other's different meaning, the usual result is that no contract is found,13 a situation taken up under Equal Fault below. The second condition can fail even when the claimant is wholly innocent. If the seller never actually learned what Alice meant, clause (a) is unsatisfied despite her innocence, and her claim depends on clause (b), which asks whether the seller had reason to know her meaning.14 A seller who overlooked a signal that a careful seller would have caught lacks actual knowledge; the oversight goes to reason to know.
Centron DPL Co. v. Tilden Fin. Corp. applied the same two-sided inquiry to a payoff figure rather than a price. Centron sent Tilden $2,937,825.25 on August 26, 1988, and the parties attached different meanings to that amount: Centron believed the figure rested on the assumption that an August payment from Home Life had not yet been received.15 The court noted that differing meanings technically mean no meeting of the minds and no contract, and then turned to the exception: where only one party knows or has reason to know of the different meaning the other attached, the knowing party is bound by the other's meaning.16
The district court had found that Centron did not overpay and that Tilden supplied an accurate payoff figure. The court of appeals held that those findings missed the point. What mattered was not whether Tilden received what it believed it was owed but what Tilden knew about Centron's assumption. Among the facts likely to matter was whether Tilden's officials either affirmatively confirmed, or failed to refute, the assumption that the August payment had not been received.17 An official who heard that assumption and confirmed it, or let it pass, is the kind of party the fault rationale targets, because a word from that official could have corrected the misunderstanding. If Centron had no inkling that Tilden meant anything different, Centron would be the innocent party whose meaning controls. The court did not decide who prevailed. Because the district court had made no findings on Tilden's knowledge, the court of appeals vacated the judgment and remanded for more complete factual findings.18
Reason to Know
Clause (b) of § 201(2) supplies the second route. The claimant's meaning controls if that party “had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.”20 The clause keeps the two-sided structure of clause (a) and the same moment of measurement, the time the agreement was made.21 What changes is the measure of awareness: clause (a) asks what each party actually knew, and clause (b) asks what the circumstances should have told each party.
The change cuts differently on the two sides. For the other party, clause (b) is easier to satisfy, because reason to know suffices and actual knowledge is unnecessary. For the claimant, it is harder: a claimant who never noticed the difference but should have cannot rely on the prong. Do not read clause (b) as asking which meaning was more reasonable. It asks what each party had reason to know about the other's meaning, and a party's meaning can prevail without being the most natural reading of the words if the other side had reason to know of it.
Extending the rule from knowing to having reason to know closes a gap. If only actual awareness counted, a party could avoid being bound by the other's meaning simply by claiming never to have realized any difference existed, however plainly the circumstances pointed to one. Awareness lives in a single mind, and the only witness is the party who gains by denying it, so a court would have little to test the denial against. Reason to know gives the factfinder something to check against the record: what the communications, the price, and the earlier dealings should have signaled. The fault rationale carries over. A party with reason to know of the difference could have prevented the mismatch with a question before signing, and a party who knows or has reason to know is bound by the other's meaning.22
Course of dealing can supply that reason. In Ragen v. Hancor, Inc., a sales representative had worked under multiple contracts with a manufacturer for some twenty years and had received detailed information with each regular commission payment. That information gave the representative reason to know that the manufacturer did not view the contracts as granting exclusive territorial rights, so the representative was bound by the manufacturer's meaning. The representative need not have actually concluded that the manufacturer disagreed. Two decades of payments accompanied by explanatory detail were enough to put a reasonable representative on notice.
Price can carry the same kind of signal. In an illustration involving Lucy and Grant, the oil paintings and sketches at issue together were worth at least $800,000, so a sale of all of them for $280,000 would have been a plainly irrational bargain for the seller. The answer concludes that Grant should have been aware of Lucy's meaning and is therefore bound by it under § 201(2).23 No testimony about Grant's state of mind is needed. A buyer offered a deal that lopsided has reason to suspect that the seller means to sell less than the buyer assumes, and a buyer with that suspicion can resolve it by asking before signing.
Centron frames the same inquiry for the factfinder in words that span both prongs: did Tilden know or have reason to know of Centron's assumption about the August payment? The answer depended on what Tilden's officials said or left unsaid, the kind of communications evidence that proves reason to know as well as actual knowledge.24 Communications, price terms, and course of dealing are all ways of proving what the circumstances should have signaled. How a factfinder weighs that proof is the subject of the next section.
Clause (b) also has an outer limit. If the court concludes that the parties attached different meanings to a material term but neither knew or had reason to know the meaning of the other, neither party's meaning gains priority, and no contract exists because mutual assent is absent.25 That result follows from § 201(3), and the equal-innocence discussion below develops it.