Concept
Proving What a Party Knew
Whose Meaning Prevails
Proving What a Party Knew
Section 201(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts asks what each party knew, or had reason to know, when the agreement was made. Where the parties attached different meanings to a term, the agreement is interpreted according to one party's meaning if, at that time, either of two conditions holds:1
- that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party;2 or
- that party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party.3
Each condition turns on awareness, so a dispute under it is a contest over proof. The inquiry is one of interpretation: the process of determining the meaning the parties attributed to contractual language. Some courts and writers separate interpretation from construction, the judicial role in determining the legal effect of that language, but modern contract theorists use interpretation to include construction because the distinction is cumbersome and usually unnecessary, and this chapter does the same.4 The words of the contract cannot settle the contest, because they do not say who knew what.
The district court in Centron's dispute with Tilden over a payment found that Tilden had received what was actually owed and that Tilden had made no misrepresentation to Centron. The appellate court deemed the no-misrepresentation finding, although conclusory, amply supported by the evidence. It held, however, that the finding about what Tilden was owed did not relate to the critical issue the parties had presented. Lacking the critical factual determinations, the court vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to make more complete findings. One finding it singled out as important was whether Tilden's officials either affirmatively confirmed or did not refute Rigelman's assumption that the August payment had not been received.5
The finding that Tilden received what was owed describes the transaction; it says nothing about what Tilden's officials knew of Rigelman's assumption. The finding of no misrepresentation did not close the gap either, since the court accepted it and still demanded findings on confirmation or failure to refute. An official who heard an assumption and let it stand has made no false statement, yet may have known exactly what the other side believed. Findings on what was owed and on misrepresentation therefore cannot stand in for findings on awareness.
Joyner v. Adams shows who weighs such evidence once it is in the record. The dispute there concerned a rent escalation provision. Much of the evidence the plaintiff relied on, like other evidence in the record, could support more than one inference, and deciding which inference was credible and worthy of belief was a decision for the trial court. The evidence did not show, as a matter of law, what effect the parties intended the language to have.6 Both opinions place the finding of these facts with the trial court.
Suppose a lease raises the rent when the building reaches “completion.” Before signing, the tenant's lawyer emails the landlord's agent: “We read ‘completion’ to mean issuance of the certificate of occupancy. Please confirm.” The agent replies, “Understood,” and the clause is signed unchanged. The landlord later insists that completion means finished work on the last unit. At formation the landlord knew the tenant's meaning, because the tenant had stated it and the agent had acknowledged it. Nothing in the exchange hinted that the landlord read the clause differently, so the tenant had no reason to know of the landlord's meaning. Section 201(2) selects the tenant's meaning. The agent's reply plays the part that confirmation of Rigelman's assumption would have played in Centron. Delete the email and the reply, and the tenant must prove the landlord's awareness some other way.
If a court concludes instead that the parties attached different meanings to a material term but that neither knew or had reason to know the other's meaning, neither party's meaning prevails. Even under the modern approach of the Restatement (Second), the result in Raffles follows: no contract exists because of the absence of mutual assent. Restatement (Second) § 201(3) and Comment d.7 The next section takes up that result.