Concept
Knowingly Accepting Ambiguity
Whose Meaning Prevails
Knowingly Accepting Ambiguity
Colfax Envelope Corp. v. Local No. 458-3M marks the point where the no-contract result of the preceding sections stops. Colfax signed a summary of its 1991 agreement with a union, and the summary used the expression "4C 60 Press," which on its face says nothing about the minimum manning requirement for a 4C 78 Press.1 The summary muddied the agreement's actual terms, so the parties may well have understood it differently.2 Colfax tried to treat that possible difference as a reason to walk away from the contract, and the court refused.
The court's reason is what Colfax should have realized. The clearest cases for rescission on the ground of "no meeting of the minds" involve a latent ambiguity, one that neither party knew existed, usually because an offer was garbled in transmission.3 Colfax was not in that position. Unlike the promisors in the cases the court cited, it should have realized that the contract was unclear.4 This fits the Restatement's framework, which resolves conflicting meanings by asking what each party knew or had reason to know when the agreement was made.5
The summary's language gave Colfax that warning. A reasonable Colfax could not have doubted, after reading the summary, that the interpretations the union and later the district judge placed on it were entirely plausible.6 The union's reading was that the phrase merely extended the old upper bound for three-man four-color presses from 50 to 60 inches, and it may or may not have been correct. Plausibility was enough to put Colfax on notice. Colfax had a right to hope that its own interpretation would prevail. It had no right to accept the summary on the premise that either its interpretation was correct or it could walk away. The court called that stance "Heads I win, tails you lose" and said that spirit does not animate the principle that latent ambiguity is a ground for rescission.7
A practical concern supports the limit. If rescission were permitted in that kind of case, the enforcement of every contract would be at the mercy of a jury, which might be persuaded that one party had genuinely held an idiosyncratic idea of the term's meaning. In the court's words, "Intersubjectivity is not the test of an enforceable contract."8
The garbled-offer cases show where rescission remains available. The buyer in Konic thought, really thought, that he was being quoted a price of $56.20, and he no doubt fell off his stool when he learned the price was a hundred times greater.9 Konic, Vickery, and the other cases the court cited are all of the transmission type.10 In each, the party who misunderstood had no reason to suspect the term was unclear. The line therefore falls at what the party should have realized when it signed, and the size of the surprise afterward does not move it.
Step two does the real work, and it asks what a reasonable party would have seen, not how confident the claimant felt. The Konic buyer was sincerely sure of $56.20, and Colfax may well have been confident of its own reading. Only the buyer lacked reason to doubt. Sincerity cannot carry a claim of latent ambiguity when the language itself signaled the risk.