Concept
Rules in Aid of Interpretation
Rules in Aid of Interpretation and Standards of Preference
Rules in Aid of Interpretation
Section 202 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts collects the working rules a court uses to find what the parties meant, and each rule points to a different place where reliable evidence of a shared understanding is likely to sit.1 One rule looks to the setting and purpose of the deal. Another looks to the rest of the document. A third asks how ordinary speakers, or specialists, use the words. A fourth looks at how the parties have behaved under the agreement, and a fifth tells the court to reconcile whatever the first four produce.
No single rule decides a case by itself. Each yields evidence, and evidence can point in more than one direction. A bare word such as “chicken” carries a range of meanings until context narrows it, so a court that consulted only a dictionary would be choosing from that range at random. The § 202 rules narrow the range by adding what the parties knew, wrote, and did. A court therefore applies them together to the whole record and asks which reading the combined evidence best supports. When the purpose of the deal, the writing read as a unit, the usual sense of the words, and the parties' own conduct all point the same way, the reading is secure. When they diverge, the divergence tells the court to look harder. The standards for choosing among readings that survive that scrutiny come later in the chapter.
The rules are taught one at a time below, beginning with the setting that frames the rest. Each feeds a single overall judgment about meaning, and each is easier to apply once you remember that the others are working on the same record.
Circumstances and Principal Purpose
Section 202(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts directs a court to interpret words and other conduct in the light of all the circumstances and, if the parties' principal purpose is ascertainable, to give that purpose great weight.2 The first half opens the record to the setting of the deal: the recitals, the price, the market, and what the parties said to each other. The second half says where to lean hardest within that setting, which is on what the parties were trying to accomplish. A clause is easiest to read once you know the job it was written to do.
The rule makes sense once you see why a court cannot decide meaning from the words alone. Meaning varies with the “verbal context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in view of the linguistic education and experience of their users and their hearers or readers (not excluding judges),” and so it cannot be ascertained simply by reading the document.3 A judge who pronounces a clause perfectly clear reports how it strikes a reader with that judge's own vocabulary and background, and the parties may have used the words differently. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co. drew the practical conclusion. The sense in which a writer used words can be found only by interpreting them in light of all the circumstances that reveal it, and excluding evidence of those circumstances merely because the words do not appear ambiguous to the reader can easily lead to attributing to a written instrument a meaning that was never intended.4
Purpose receives great weight because it is the best clue to what a particular clause was meant to accomplish, and a reading that defeats the evident point of the deal is unlikely to be the one the parties wanted. Purpose often appears in the recitals, the background statements that open a contract, while the operative part states what the parties promised. When both are clear but inconsistent, the operative part is preferred.5 Labels rank lower still. A descriptive caption is no part of the contract and may be disregarded if it is inconsistent with the terms, and a contract that is a lease in every respect is treated as a lease even though it calls itself a “residence agreement.” Put a Cadillac insignia on a Chevrolet, and the car is still a Chevrolet.6
The recital did real work in the first lease only because the operative clause left room for it. Purpose helps resolve an open question, and it cannot rewrite text that answers the question plainly.
Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp. shows the circumstances at work, and it shows their limit. A buyer protested that the stewing chickens delivered to it were not the “chicken” the contract called for, and the seller answered that the contract contemplated two different kinds of chicken. The court worked through the circumstances in this order:7
- Dictionary and U.S.D.A. regulatory definitions of “chicken,” which excluded neither party's meaning.
- The contract document as a whole, where the price term supported the seller because the larger birds were priced below the market price for fryers.
- The wider context of the transaction, including expert testimony on the meaning of “chicken” in the trade, which conflicted and did not clearly support either side.
- The parties' course of performance, which showed no common intention because the buyer protested about the stewing chickens immediately on delivery.
Even after all of that, the court could not establish what the parties meant by “chicken,” and it decided the case on the burden of proof. The buyer lost because it failed to prove that the word was used in the narrow sense it alleged.8 Section 202(1) lets the court consider context, and it does not promise that context will supply an answer. When the evidence leaves meaning unresolved, the party who needed the narrower meaning to win carries the loss. The contract's own price term proved somewhat more helpful than the witnesses, whose accounts conflicted.
Many courts approach the same problem through the plain meaning rule. Under it, if a writing or a term is plain and unambiguous on its face, its meaning is determined from the four corners of the instrument without resort to extrinsic evidence of any kind, meaning evidence from outside the writing itself.9 As one court put the consequence, when the language is clear the court presumes the parties intended what they expressed, even if the expression differs from their intentions when they made the contract.10 Commentators, the UCC, the Restatement (Second), and a number of courts have condemned the rule, yet the great majority of jurisdictions employ it, often using the dictionary as a corroborating source.11 The rule comes in variations, and some jurisdictions seem to have returned to it after adopting or flirting with more liberal approaches.12
Plain meaning courts still have to decide whether a term has a plain meaning. If it does not, the term is ambiguous, meaning it is susceptible to more than one meaning, even in a plain meaning jurisdiction.13 The question is for the court. The parties' disagreement when the dispute arises does not establish ambiguity, and judges in a plain meaning jurisdiction can dissent as to what is plain. Once ambiguity is found and conflicting extrinsic evidence is admitted, the jury determines the meaning.14
The Restatement rejects that gatekeeping approach and follows Corbin. Under the view of Corbin and the Second Restatement, the judge needs no preliminary finding of ambiguity before considering extrinsic evidence.15 The court considers all of the proffered evidence for its relevance to the parties' intent and then applies the parol evidence rule to exclude only evidence that contradicts or varies the meaning of the agreement. Corbin's reason is that the court cannot apply that rule without first understanding the meaning the parties intended, and for that understanding the judge cannot be confined to the four corners of the document.16 The reasoning has been faulted as circular, because the content of the writing to be interpreted cannot be known until the parol evidence rule has been consulted.17 A court describing the approach warned of the danger on the other side: what appears plain and clear to one judge may not be plain to another, and a decision uninformed by context may not reflect the parties' intent.18
Even Corbin's liberal approach has a gatekeeper. Even where there is an unambiguous integration, all relevant extrinsic evidence is admissible on the issue of meaning, including what the parties said to each other about it.19 But the trial judge must first decide whether the asserted meaning is one to which the language, taken in context, is reasonably susceptible in light of all the evidence. If it is not, that meaning may not be attached to the language, and the jury does not hear the proffered evidence.20 Without this limit, a party could use evidence of the setting to invent a meaning the words cannot carry.
Reading the Writing as a Whole
Section 202(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts gives two instructions: a writing is interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of the same transaction are interpreted together.23 The first governs a single document, and the second governs a deal the parties papered in several. Both follow from how contracts are drafted. A document is composed to work as a unit, so each clause is written with the others in view and draws part of its sense from them. A court that lifts one word out of its sentence and consults a dictionary is reading a text nobody wrote.
Isolation also invites strategy. A word such as “upon” or “chicken” has a range of dictionary senses, and a litigant free to choose among them will choose the sense that pays. The rest of the writing limits that choice. A disputed word is read against the document around it, no part of the document is ignored, and the writings of one transaction are harmonized if possible.24 A reading under which a clause does no work invites the question why the parties wrote it, and it is harder to defend than a reading that gives every provision a job.
Hahn v. GEICO Choice Insurance Company shows neighboring language fixing a single word. The court refused to look at the word “upon” in isolation. Read with the other language in the policy, it meant someone who was in some way associated with the vehicle before the collision, such as a passenger.25
One provision can also shed light on another without defining any word in it. In Frigaliment, the price term did this work. The lower price for the larger birds pointed toward a contract that contemplated more than one kind of chicken, so a clause about money informed the reading of a clause about the product.26 The clue helped without proving the point, since the buyer lost on the burden of proof.27 Courts have also formulated many “canons of construction” to aid this work. Some conflict with each other, and some seem devoid of grounding in policy or common sense, so they inform the reading and do not dictate it.28
Reading the whole is a method, and it carries no guarantee of agreement. In Breeding v. Kye's, Inc., the majority of the court of appeals found that the contract's disc jockey provisions clearly and unambiguously committed Kye to provide the services of Sounds Unlimited. The dissent read the same terms differently, as a limit on the client's choice of disc jockey and not as a promise to Breeding that Sounds Unlimited would provide the services.29 Both judges had the whole agreement in front of them, and they still reached opposite conclusions. That is why the chapter continues with further tools after the writing itself has been consulted.
The second sentence of § 202(2) carries the same logic across document boundaries. Parties often divide one transaction among several papers for convenience. A buyer of a business, for example, may sign a principal agreement covering price, inventory control, and claims arising from the seller's past dealings, and a separate document in which the buyer assumes the seller's lease. The separate document lets a copy go to the landlord, who need not see the confidential terms of the sale.30 That reason explains why the papers are split, and it gives no sign that the parties meant the documents to be strangers to each other. Between buyer and seller, the assumption document is part of the deal, so a dispute over what the buyer took on under the lease is read together with the purchase agreement, and the writings are harmonized where possible.31
The limit lies in the words same transaction. A second writing joins the reading when it is part of the bargain being interpreted, and the fact that the same two parties signed it does not make it so. Treating the sentence that contains the disputed word as though it were the whole contract is one error, and importing every document the parties ever signed is the opposite one. The rule supports neither move. It points to the paper the parties made together, in all its parts.
Generally Prevailing Meaning
Section 202(3)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts sets the starting point for reading any word: where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.33 A generally prevailing meaning is the sense a word carries among ordinary speakers of the language, the one a neutral listener would assume. The ordinary meaning of the words the parties used is always the primary indicator of what they intended.34 Parties who say nothing special about a word are presumed to use it as their community does. A shared default also gives a court a place to begin that does not depend on either litigant's later account of what was meant.
The duck is barred in the first building because nothing displaces the default. The second building shows the qualifier that gives the rule its shape. The lead-in to § 202(3) reads “Unless a different intention is manifested,” which makes ordinary meaning a presumption that yields once the parties' own meaning appears.35 The same lead-in governs clause (b), taken up in the next section. The word manifested matters, because the different intention has to be shown and cannot merely be held.
Why does the default give way? Interpretation exists to find the parties' meaning, and ordinary usage is only the best available guess about it. Under § 201(1), if both parties in fact attach the same meaning to a provision, that meaning governs, even if a reasonable person would have read the provision differently.36 TKO Equipment Co. v. C & G Coal Co. put the point vividly: parties, like Humpty Dumpty, may use words as they please, so that “one Caterpillar D9G tractor” could mean “500 railroad cars full of watermelons,” provided the parties share that weird meaning.37 Courts rarely see such cases, because in the usual litigated case each party is trying to prove that her own reading is the reasonable one. The shared-meaning rule is best thought of as an exception to the objective interpretation of language.38 The displacing intention has to be shared. A meaning held by one party alone and never revealed leaves ordinary meaning untouched.
The Restatement's default resembles the plain meaning rule and treats outside evidence differently. Under the plain meaning rule, a writing that appears plain and unambiguous on its face is read within its four corners, without resort to extrinsic evidence of any kind.39 The generally prevailing meaning rule is a watered-down version of that approach. It sends the court to ordinary usage first and conforms to what is reasonable and logical, yet it leaves room for proof that the parties meant something else.40 A plain meaning court asks at the outset whether the words look clear and, if they do, closes the record. A court applying § 202(3)(a) can hear the circumstances, as § 202(1) allows, and treats ordinary meaning as a baseline that the party urging a different meaning must support with evidence.
Ordinary meaning is easy to name, and it is sometimes too broad to decide anything. In Frigaliment, the dictionary and U.S.D.A. regulatory definitions of “chicken” excluded neither the buyer's narrow reading nor the seller's broader one, so the common sense of the word chose no winner. The court went on to the price term, the conflicting expert testimony, and the course of performance, and none of them resolved the question, so the buyer lost for failing to prove the narrow sense it alleged.41 The default worked as a starting presumption, and the party who needed the narrower sense carried the burden of proving it.
The qualifier has a boundary as well. A motive that never became part of the agreement is not a manifested different intention, so it leaves the ordinary reading in place. In Breeding, the dissent noted that under the objective test, the express terms of the contract were not affected by Breeding's subjective motivation in selecting the hall because of the disc jockey.42
Technical Terms and Words of Art
Section 202(3)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts sets a second default for reading words: technical terms and words of art are given their technical meaning when used in a transaction within their technical field.44 A technical term is a word or phrase that a specialized trade, profession, or area of law has tied to an exact sense. Like the ordinary-meaning default, the rule is a presumption: terms used in a technical context are understood in accordance with their technical meanings unless another intention is established.45
The reason follows from why specialized vocabularies exist. Specialists adopt exact terms so that they can communicate without ambiguity, and a participant who uses such a term in a deal inside the field probably chose it for the sense the field gives it. A court that applied the everyday sense would reach a reading neither party held. The inference is weaker outside the field, because a person who does not work there has no specialized vocabulary to choose from. That is why the rule is tied to the transaction. The technical sense applies when the deal falls within the field, while the generally prevailing meaning default governs language wherever it appears.
The presumption also marks a place where even a plain meaning jurisdiction relaxes its bar on outside evidence. Such a court will admit parol evidence to define terms of art that, even if unambiguous, are not generally understood. Evidence may be taken, for example, of the meaning of “Amacid Blue Black KN.”46 A judge reading the page cannot tell what a designation like that names, while those who work in the trade know exactly. Testimony from the trade supplies the sense, and it explains the contract without adding to it.
Lease law supplies a setting where such vocabulary matters. Ernst v. Conditt, a Tennessee Court of Appeals decision from 1964, begins with Rogers, who leased land from the Ernsts for a term of one year and seven days and built a go-cart track on it.47 When Rogers negotiated the sale of the business to Conditt, who wanted a two-year lease, the two went to the landlords' home and negotiated an extension. It resulted in an amendment to the lease and in what the opinion calls “the sublease or assignment of the lease as amended” to Conditt.48 Words like “sublease” and “assignment” are lease-law vocabulary, so a dispute over which one describes the transfer brings the technical-terms rule into play, along with the parties' intention in light of the surrounding circumstances.
Does a word's technical sense control whenever the word appears in a contract? It does not, and the presumption can fail in two ways. The transaction may lie outside the technical field, so the technical sense has no special claim and the ordinary-meaning default applies. Or the parties' own manifested intention may displace the technical sense even inside the field, as where the word also has a non-technical meaning and one party is a layperson, who is likely to have used it in its everyday sense.49
The word is the same in both scenes. What moved the answer was whether the deal lay inside the field where the word has its exact sense, and whether the parties' evident usage matched it. A court therefore asks two questions in order: does the transaction belong to a specialized trade, profession, or body of law, and does anything in the words or conduct show that the parties meant something else? An essay that stops at the observation that a word has a technical meaning has skipped both questions.
Course of Performance
Section 202(4) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts gives special weight to the way the parties actually carry out their agreement. Where the agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by either party, with knowledge of the nature of the performance and an opportunity for the other to object, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in interpreting the agreement.51 A course of performance is the parties' post-contractual conduct, as each does what the agreement calls for.52 The rules covered so far draw on evidence that existed when the deal was formed, such as the circumstances, the writing, and the ordinary or technical sense of the words. This rule draws on evidence that comes into being afterward, and that timing is the source of its force.
Conduct under the agreement is persuasive because the parties produce it while nothing is yet in dispute. When a seller ships goods the same way month after month and the buyer takes them and pays, each side is applying the agreement's words to real facts, with no lawsuit in view and no incentive to shade the account. Testimony offered after a dispute arises lacks that quality, because each witness already knows which reading helps. Silence proves something only in the right setting, however, and each condition in § 202(4) screens out one way the inference could go wrong. The rule covers performance by either party, so the seller's shipments and the buyer's payments can each form a course of performance, and in either case the reaction that matters is the other side's.
The first three conditions are usually easy to establish from the history of the deal, so the fourth is where disputes concentrate. The number of repetitions also counts by degree, since repetition strengthens the inference of a shared understanding.53 A prompt objection cuts the inference off at its root. It tells the performing party that the other side does not share its reading, so the performer can no longer claim to have been reassured by silence.
Frigaliment shows the objection doing that work. When the larger birds arrived, the buyer protested immediately about the stewing chickens. The seller therefore had no silence to point to, and the court found that the course of performance showed no common intention. After the other interpretive tools also failed to settle the meaning, the case was decided on the burden of proof, and the buyer lost.54
The buyer's reaction separates the two scenes. The buyer in Frigaliment spoke at once and left the seller nothing to treat as acquiescence. The buyer in the supply contract watched twenty identical deliveries and said nothing, which makes its later reading of “prompt” hard to defend.
Three related sources of meaning are easy to confuse, because each draws on conduct or practice. The difference lies in when and where the conduct occurred. While course of performance means the parties' post-contractual relationship, course of dealing refers to any relationship they had before the transaction in question, so the current deal may be the latest in a series of similar ones.55 Usage of trade is a practice having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed in the transaction at hand, so it comes from the wider market and not from these parties alone.56
The earlier-lease facts give the cleanest picture of course of dealing. Suppose a tenant rented from the same landlord under a lease with an identical clause banning animals and was told during that term to get rid of a duck or face eviction. That tenant cannot argue that “animals” in a new lease with the same clause excludes ducks. It is reasonable to infer that the parties meant the wording to carry the meaning established under their earlier relationship, unless the new lease says otherwise.57 That conduct predates the agreement being interpreted, so it is dealing and not performance, and it counts only where the earlier transactions were comparable and the disputed term appeared in them.58 A landlord who watches the duck on the balcony month after month under the current lease, by contrast, has generated a course of performance, and that conduct is tested against the four conditions above.
The three also differ in how they are proved. The parties' own testimony can establish a course of performance or a course of dealing, while a trade usage is usually established by expert testimony. A party engaged in a trade is bound by its usages even if ignorant of them, and the parties may negate a usage by agreement.59 When all three bear on the same term, they carry great weight in the order course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, and express terms outrank all three, a ranking taken up later in this chapter under the standards of preference.60 The order tracks closeness. Conduct under this very agreement is nearer to what these parties meant than their earlier dealings, and those are nearer than a market practice they may never have considered.
The importance the law gives this group of sources has drawn a caution. An empirical study points out that customs are not uniform in many lines of business, that merchants often grant concessions to keep a relationship together and do not expect those concessions to bind once the relationship ruptures, and that standardized written contracts already incorporate trade customs.61 The caution leaves § 202(4) in place. It explains why a court looks closely at whether silence under a repeated performance reflected acceptance or only tolerance, which is the work the fourth condition performs.
Reading Terms as Consistent
Section 202(5) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts tells a court that, wherever reasonable, the parties' manifestations of intention are interpreted as consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.63 The manifestations of intention are the words and conduct through which the parties expressed what they meant: the clauses of a writing, the messages they exchanged, and the things each side did. The rule is an instruction about method. The earlier rules each told the court where to look for evidence of meaning, and this one tells the court what to do after looking in several places at once, which is to search first for a reading that lets all of the evidence stand.
The rule has two halves, and each rests on its own reason. Consistency among the parties' own manifestations rests on a presumption about how people write deals. Parties who sign an agreement do not usually intend to contradict themselves, so when two clauses seem to pull apart, the likelier explanation is that one of them has a reading the court has not yet found. A reading that gives every term a job also honors every piece of evidence, whereas a reading that sets a term aside discards something the parties chose to put there. Consistency with course of performance, course of dealing, and usage rests on shared background. Parties choose words against a setting made of how they have acted under the deal, how they dealt before, and how their trade talks, so a reading that fits that setting is more likely to be the one they meant. That second reason explains why material outside the writing belongs in the analysis at all.
The three background sources differ in whose conduct they describe. Course of performance is conduct after this agreement was made, course of dealing is earlier conduct between the same parties, and usage of trade is a practice with enough regularity in a place, vocation, or trade to justify an expectation that it will be observed in the transaction at hand.64 A party engaged in a trade is bound by its usages even if ignorant of them, and the parties may negate a usage by agreement.65 That last point matters for the limit discussed below, because it makes a usage a default background that a clear agreement can displace.
The usage in the nursery scene overrides nothing. It fills in what a word means, and the other clauses confirm that the fit is right, which is why harmony is the first move: it costs the parties nothing they wrote. The same logic runs to earlier dealings. A tenant who was told under a prior lease to remove a duck or face eviction, and who then signs a new lease with the identical clause forbidding animals, cannot read “animals” to exclude ducks. It is reasonable to infer that the parties meant the wording to carry the sense it had under their earlier relationship.66 The inference holds only unless the new lease says otherwise, and that qualification leads to the rule's own limit.
How far must a court go to force the pieces together? The phrase “wherever reasonable” answers that, and it means a court may not stretch language until it fits. A reading that no reasonable person could give the words would rewrite the agreement, and it would replace the parties' choice with the court's preference for tidiness.
Once harmony fails, the question changes from which reading fits everything to which source outweighs the other. Section 203(b) answers that question: express terms are given greater weight than course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade, course of performance outweighs course of dealing and usage, and course of dealing outweighs usage.67 The UCC reaches the same place for sales of goods. Course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance may supply a consistent additional term even in a writing meant as the final statement of the deal, but a true contradiction between the express terms and any of the three is resolved in favor of the express terms.68 The merchants' thirty-day term shows why this ranking is sensible. The parties wrote that deadline for this transaction, and because they may negate a usage by agreement, the clear written deadline outweighs the usage. Two errors are tempting here. One is to rank the sources at once in the nursery scene, which would pit the usage against a writing where no conflict exists. The other is to let the usage override the thirty-day term, which would ignore the conflict that actually exists.
The sequence explains why this rule stands between the interpretive aids and the standards of preference. The aids supply evidence, this rule tries to reconcile all of it, and the preferences take over only for the conflict that remains.