Concept
Usage of Trade
Usage, Course of Dealing, and Course of Performance
Usage of Trade
A contract term can mean one thing in a dictionary and another in the market where the parties do business. Usage of trade is the contextual source that lets the market's meaning in. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts starts from the broad concept, that usage is habitual or customary practice,1 and narrows it to the category that matters in commercial disputes: a usage of trade is a usage with such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed in a particular agreement.2 The word expectation carries the weight. A practice becomes a usage of trade when people dealing in that market can count on it, so that a contract made there is naturally read with the practice in mind.
Usage differs from the other contextual sources because it exists before the parties meet. A course of dealing, by contrast, is the parties' own private usage, developed in their earlier dealings with each other, and it prevails over a general usage when the two conflict.3 If the sources conflict, the general rule gives greatest weight to the express terms, then to course of performance, then to course of dealing, and least to usage.4 A seller who has never met a buyer still brings the trade's habits to their first deal, which is why usage can give a term its meaning when no earlier deals exist.
That outside origin creates the central difficulty. A practice followed by most people in an industry may be unknown to one of the two people in a given contract, and a rule that bound every party to every habit of the trade would impose terms that party never had a chance to learn. The subsections below take the difficulty in three steps: what counts as a usage, when a particular party is bound by one, and how a usage reaches the factfinder.
Defining Usage of Trade
Usage, in the Restatement's general account, is a fact about how people behave and not a rule of law. A practice may prevail across a city, a state, or a larger region; it may prevail among everyone in the area or only within one trade; it changes over time; and people in close association may develop temporary usages peculiar to themselves.5 That breadth is descriptive. It leaves open the question that matters, which is when a court may let a practice shape the meaning of a contract.
The definition of a usage of trade answers that question with three working parts. “Place, vocation, or trade” names the group whose habits count. “Regularity of observance” sets how consistent the practice must be. The clause on justified expectation says what regularity is for: a practice qualifies when a participant can reasonably count on it.6 The Code states the same test, asking for any practice or method of dealing with such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed in the transaction in question,7 and under the Code's definition a usage may be limited to a particular area, a particular activity, or both.8 The regularity requirement also blocks a tempting litigation move. Without it, a party who lost an argument over meaning could announce after the fact that some habit of its own is how things are done, and the other side could not answer that the habit was unknowable when the deal was made.
A usage may also take the form of a system of rules regularly observed even though particular rules change from time to time.9 Trades are never frozen, and if every amendment to one rule destroyed the usage, no body of trade practice could qualify. Treating the system as the usage lets a court look to the body of practice as it stood when the parties contracted.
Usages that depart from dictionary meaning show the definition at work. If trade custom treats two bundles of shingles of a certain size as “1,000 shingles,” a contract for 4,000 shingles is fulfilled by delivering eight bundles of that size, even if a count of the shingles in the eight bundles yields some other number, such as 2,500.10 The usage looks strange to an outsider and obvious to anyone in the trade, and the definition measures the insider's expectation.
The definition looks simple partly because the Code stripped away tests that older law imposed. At early common law a trade usage had to be legal, notorious, ancient or immemorial and continuous, reasonable, certain, universal, and obligatory.11 Under the Code a usage need not be ancient or universal, certainty is no longer required, and reasonableness need not be proved, although an unconscionable or dishonest practice may be disallowed.12 The official comment says the ancient English tests are abandoned, and it gives full recognition to new usages and to usages observed by “the great majority of decent dealers, even though dissidents ready to cut corners do not agree.”13 The reasons follow from how commerce works. A rule that recognized only ancient customs could never recognize a practice that arose with a new product or technology, so courts would read modern deals in a vocabulary the market had dropped. A rule that demanded universal observance would let one dissenter veto a practice nearly everyone else relies on. The Code lists, among its purposes, permitting the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties.14
Regularity is what remains, and it excludes practices that are merely familiar.
The same claim succeeds where nearly every seller in the market quotes delivery-inclusive prices and only a few discounters add a fee. The discounters are dissenters, and the Code comment requires regularity of observance, not universality.15
Nanakuli Paving & Rock Sales, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co. applies the definition on a larger scale. Nanakuli, a paving contractor on Oahu, bid government work at fixed prices because government agencies refused to accept escalation clauses, and pavers in that position expected price protection from their materials suppliers.16 Shell, the asphalt supplier, refused Nanakuli that protection in 1974.17 The court held that a regularly observed practice of protection, of which Shell should have been aware, was enough to constitute a usage that Nanakuli had reason to believe was incorporated into the agreement, because the Code comment demands “not universality but only the described ‘regularity of observance.’”18
The court also upheld the trial judge's definition of the relevant trade as the asphaltic paving trade in Hawaii rather than the purchase and sale of asphalt alone. Shell sold asphalt, but the Oahu market was small, only two suppliers served it, Shell's asphalt sales had grown up alongside Nanakuli's own expansion, and Shell's Hawaiian representative understood the economics of Nanakuli's bids and the refusal of government agencies to include escalation clauses.19 The court also read the word “or” in the definition to mean that parties can be bound by a usage common to the place where they do business, even if it is not the usage of their particular vocation or trade.20 Whether a particular party must also have known or had reason to know of the usage is the separate question taken up in the next subsection. The point here is that the definition does not confine the relevant group to a party's own line of work.
The usage did its work on contract language. A commentator reads the price-protection usage as a common basis of understanding for the contract phrase “Shell's Posted Price”: changes in the posted price would not be retroactive. On that reading the usage interprets the express term and does not conflict with it.21
Step three does the real work, and step two sets its scale: a practice measured against a small locality or a narrow specialty is easier to show as regular than one measured against a whole country or industry.
When a Usage Binds
Proof that a usage exists settles only half the question, because a regularly followed practice must still be tied to the two people who made this contract. The Restatement ties it through knowledge: an agreement is interpreted in accordance with a relevant usage if each party knew or had reason to know of the usage, and neither party knew or had reason to know that the meaning the other attached was inconsistent with it.23 The first half asks whether each side was on notice of the usage. The second asks whether either side was on notice that the other meant something different. A party is on notice of what it actually knew and of what it should have been aware of, since a party is held to general business practices to the extent of its actual knowledge or to the degree its ignorance is inexcusable because the practices were so generally followed.24
Membership in the trade supplies the easiest case. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, a usage of the vocation or trade in which they are engaged, or a usage of which they know or have reason to know, gives meaning to, supplements, or qualifies their agreement.25 The first route needs no proof of what the particular party actually knew: a party engaged in a trade is bound by its usages even when ignorant of them, on the theory that everyone in the trade should know how it works, and the parties remain free to negate the usage by agreement.26 The reason is reliance. A person who enters a trade takes on its vocabulary, and the other party is justified in assuming that the member speaks it unless the member indicates otherwise.27 A professional chef who buys poultry from wholesale suppliers belongs to the wholesale poultry trade, so where that trade widely recognizes that a “regular” pheasant can be used only to make soup, the chef is bound by that meaning. Even a chef who never knew the usage had reason to know it.28
The analysis changes for a party outside the trade. In Frantz v. Cantrell, a roofer who installed asphalt shingles on a homeowner's house argued that roofing-trade usage excluded the implied warranty of merchantability. The roofer's expert testified that roofers do not warrant the shingles they use, but the homeowner was not a member of the roofing trade and was unaware of the practice. The court concluded that, to exclude the implied warranty by usage, both parties had to be engaged in the relevant trade, or the usage had to be one of which both were aware or should have been aware.29 A person who buys one roof has no way of learning the conventions roofers share among themselves, and holding that homeowner to them would attach a meaning the homeowner had no reason to expect. Other decisions put the same question to parties outside a trade, asking whether the outsider knew or should have known of the usage on the facts at hand; see Martin Rispens & Son v. Hall Farms, Inc., Foxco Industries, Ltd. v. Fabric World, Inc., and Flower City Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Construction Co. Nanakulii shows an outsider held to a usage because reason to know was present. Shell sold asphalt, while the practice at issue ran from suppliers to pavers, yet the court held that “[a]n asphalt seller should be held to the usages of trade in general as well as those of asphalt sellers and common usages of those to whom they sell.”30 The facts made Shell's ignorance inexcusable. The Oahu market was small. Shell had invested half a million dollars there because of Nanakuli's long-term commitment, had promoted Nanakuli's expansion, and sold almost exclusively to Nanakuli for use in asphaltic paving, and its agent in Hawaii stayed in close contact with Nanakuli and understood both the paving market and Nanakuli's bidding economics. It was not unreasonable to expect Shell to know so small a market.31 The court also found that the 1974 decision to deny price protection was made by new management who did not understand the 1969 agreement or Shell's past pricing practices and made no effort to find out.32 The usage question, though, asked what Shell should have been aware of when it dealt with Nanakuli.33
What separates the two outsiders in Frantz and Nanakuli is contact. Shell dealt continuously and closely with the paving trade in a small market where its practices were hard to miss. The homeowner made one purchase from a roofer and had no connection to the roofing trade.
The Restatement states the consequence for the party who should have known. When the meaning one party attached accorded with a relevant usage and the other knew or had reason to know of the usage, the other is treated as having known or had reason to know the first party's meaning.34 This completes the second half of the knowledge test. A party who should have known of the usage should also have understood that a counterparty speaking in the trade's terms meant what the trade means, and so cannot fall back on a private meaning the counterparty had no reason to suspect.
Nanakuli's breadth rested on unusual facts. The court stressed the smallness of the market, the presence of only two suppliers, and the long, intimate connection between the two companies.35 A supplier in a large market with many buyers has far less reason to know what suppliers do for any one of them, so the reasoning does not extend automatically beyond facts like these. Judge Kennedy's concurrence drew the same limit. The evidence of custom and usage on price protection was not contradicted in major respects, and the jury could find that the parties knew or should have known of the practice; he treated those findings as necessary predicates to the result, and he cautioned that the opinion should not let juries import a specific term such as price protection from a concept of good faith unsupported by well-established custom and usage or other objective standards of which the parties had clear notice.36
Step three is where outsider disputes are decided, and it turns on what a reasonable person in the party's position would have learned.
Proving a Usage
The Restatement treats the existence and scope of a usage of trade as questions of fact, and it assigns the interpretation of a written trade code or similar writing that embodies a usage to the court as a question of law.39 The Code takes the same two-part position: existence and scope must be proved as facts, and once a usage is shown to be embodied in a trade code or similar record, interpreting the record is a question of law.40 The division tracks the character of each question. Whether a practice is regularly observed in a market is empirical, so it is tried like any disputed fact, with witnesses and a factfinder. What the sentences of a published code mean is a question about text, which judges answer every day, and the industry origin of the text is no reason to give the reading task to a jury.
Three questions blur together in usage disputes. Admissibility asks whether the evidence may be heard at all, and the judge answers it by screening for regularity and relevance.41 Proof asks what the proponent must show. Weight asks how persuasive the admitted evidence is, and the factfinder decides it: the court's decision to admit is only the first step, and the proponent must still convince the jury that the usage existed and supports its position.42
A course of performance or a course of dealing can be established by the testimony of the parties, but a trade usage is usually established by expert testimony.43 In Nanakuli, the contractor offered documents showing routine price protection by aggregate suppliers and two witnesses from the trade, a vice president of Ameron H.C. & D. and a division manager of Lone Star Industries for Pacific Cement and Aggregate. Both testified that, to their knowledge, price protection had always been practiced at their companies, and that it consisted of advance notice of increases coupled with charging the old price for work committed at that price or for long enough to order the committed tonnage.44 Each witness spoke from inside the market and could be contradicted by other members of the same trade, which is what makes usage evidence checkable: the existence and scope of a usage can be determined from other members of the trade.45 The standard is the preponderance of the evidence, and unanimity is not required. In the dispute over the trade meaning of “regular” pheasant, the court found widespread trade recognition enough although the experts did not all agree, while noting that a severe clash of experts could defeat the burden.46
A fifth question, how the usage fits with the written terms, belongs to a later section of this chapter.
Defining the market decides more than it appears to. A practice that is regular among regional distributors may be absent from the industry at large, so the proponent should name the market in which the practice lives. Nanakuli tied the prevalence of price protection to one reality of the Oahu paving market: the largest paving contracts were let by government agencies, none of the three levels of government allowed escalation clauses for paving materials, and a paver who bid at one price and faced a higher price before the award would lose a great deal of money because it could not pass on the increase to a government agency or to most general contractors.47
The Code adds a procedural condition. Evidence of a relevant usage of trade offered by one party is not admissible unless that party has given the other party notice that the court finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise.48 The rule matters because usage proof rests on witnesses from the trade, and the opposing party can answer it only with witnesses of its own. A party who first hears of the claimed practice in the middle of trial has no time to find them, and the court, not the proponent, decides whether the notice given was enough.
Before the evidence reaches a jury, the judge acts as gatekeeper. If the evidence fails to show that a practice is regularly observed, the judge can exclude it because it does not describe a usage of trade as the Code defines one, and if members of the trade confirm a usage but do not support the claim that it applies to the facts in litigation, the judge will exclude it as irrelevant.49 The gatekeeping serves a purpose. The court must demand that usage evidence be sufficiently definite and widespread to prevent one party from unilaterally revising contract terms after the fact, because the Code's intent is to put usage evidence on an objective basis.50 An accepted usage adds to or reshapes the written deal, and without a screen a party could rewrite the contract by describing a habit of its own once a dispute had arisen.
One court's illustration shows how the relevance screen works. A contract was negotiated at length for the sale of part of the output of a major new facility over three years. If contracts of similar detail, duration, and care were regarded as estimates by others in the trade, the asserted usage should be admitted; if the contracts treated as estimates were always form contracts, short-term contracts, or otherwise substantially different, the evidence should be excluded as irrelevant.51 Admission is also not the end. In one dispute, a party offered evidence that in the oil and gas industry an “operator” of a drilling well is not ultimately liable for debts to the contractor who drills the well. The court held evidence of course of performance and usage of trade admissible as a matter of law and then turned to whether the party had offered enough to withstand a motion for partial summary judgment.52
Caution about usage is itself empirical. An empirical study has questioned the weight these contextual sources receive, pointing to the lack of uniform customs in many lines of business and to merchants' belief that concessions granted to keep a relationship together should not be imposed on them once the relationship breaks down.53 The criticism helps explain why courts insist that the proponent prove regularity and not assume it.
Usage evidence may also meet a threshold objection. Contract theorists have been practically unanimous in rejecting the plain meaning rule, yet many, perhaps most, courts still rely on it and refuse extrinsic evidence of meaning unless they first conclude that the agreement is ambiguous.54 A later section of this chapter takes up that objection directly. For now, note that even a writing a judge finds complete and exclusive may be explained or supplemented by course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance.55
A usage can fail on the evidence even after the gate opens. In Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., the plaintiff buyer said “chicken” meant a young chicken suitable for broiling and frying,56 while the seller said it meant any bird of that genus meeting the contract's weight and quality specifications, including stewing chicken, and the dictionaries gave both meanings.57 The court could not establish what the parties meant by the word, so it decided the case on the burden of proof, and the buyer lost because it failed to prove that “chicken” was used in the narrow sense it alleged.58 When dictionaries give both meanings, the dictionary cannot decide the case, and the burden falls on the party who needs the narrower one. For further applications of these principles, see Williams v. Curtin, and for an admission ruling on industry-usage testimony and what followed at trial, see Wolf v. Superior Court of Los Angeles.
Unrebutted proof, by contrast, can carry the day. In Figgie International, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., the seller supported summary judgment with affidavits from people of extensive experience in the bottle-labeling and packaging industry, attesting that sellers in the industry always limit the remedy for breach to repair, replacement, or return and specifically exclude consequential damages. The buyer asserted that it had not acquiesced in the practice but offered no evidence to contradict the affidavits, so usage of trade limited it to the exclusive remedy of repair, replacement, or return.59 Nanakuli ended the same way for the proponent. Shell pointed in rebuttal to no instance, before its own 1974 refusal, of any supplier to an asphalt paver in Hawaii declining to price protect, which left enough proof for a jury to find a practice regular enough in its observance to be a usage binding Nanakuli and Shell.60 In Frigaliment the court had competing accounts to weigh. In Figgie nothing was left for a factfinder to resolve.
Proof also has a time dimension, because a usage matters through the expectation it justified when the parties contracted. In Nanakuli, Shell objected to evidence of usage after the 1969 agreement. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether usage evidence from after a contract was signed is admissible to show that reliance on a usage was justified, because part of that evidence was admissible to show the reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing prevalent in the trade in 1974, and the part showing continued price protection by aggregate suppliers after 1969 was not extensive enough to prejudice Shell.61
Usage may also be offered to fill a gap and not to define a word. In the setting of Drennan, could a general contractor use usage of trade to show that a subcontractor's bid, silent as to revocability, was irrevocable? What facts would be sufficient to establish such a usage?62 Answering requires the showing this subsection describes: a practice regularly observed in the relevant market, tied to the parties, and bearing on the omitted term.