Concept
Course of Performance
Usage, Course of Dealing, and Course of Performance
Course of Performance
What the parties do under a contract can show what the contract means. Section 2-208(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code says so: where a contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by either party, with knowledge of the nature of the performance and an opportunity for the other party to object, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is relevant to determining the meaning of the agreement.1 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts applies the same idea to agreements generally and gives it more force: a course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in interpretation.2
Course of performance differs from the other two contextual sources in whose conduct it records and when. Usage records what a trade does. Course of dealing records what these two parties did in earlier transactions. Course of performance records what they are doing under the contract in dispute, as the deal unfolds.
The official comment explains why this evidence carries weight: the parties know best what they meant by their words of agreement, and their action under the agreement is the best indication of that meaning.3 The conditions in § 2-208(1) protect that inference. Silence signals agreement only when the silent party saw what it was silent about and had a chance to speak.
Two questions follow. The first subsection asks what conduct qualifies and takes the conditions of § 2-208(1) one at a time. The second takes up a risk the same facts create: a party who tolerates a deviation may be showing what the contract means, or may be giving up a right the contract conferred, and the two readings fall under different rules. The full ranking of course of performance against express terms and the other sources comes in a later section.
Elements of Course of Performance
Section 2-208(1) makes a course of performance relevant to meaning only when four conditions are met: the contract involves repeated occasions for performance by either party, the other party knows the nature of the performance, that party has an opportunity to object, and it accepts or acquiesces in the performance without objection.4 Revised Article 1 defines course of performance by the same sequence.5 Each condition screens out a different kind of conduct that may look like interpretation and is not. All four serve a single inference: when a party watches the other side perform in a certain way again and again and says nothing, the likeliest explanation is that both read the contract to allow it. Anything that weakens the inference, whether thin repetition, missing knowledge, no chance to speak, or an actual protest, takes the conduct outside the rule.
The Restatement states the same conditions and attaches a stronger consequence: where the Code calls the conduct relevant, the Restatement gives it great weight.6 The four conditions are the same in both. The verbs describe only what a court does once the conditions are met, so the analysis below applies whether the agreement is a sale of goods or something else.
The first condition looks to the structure of the contract and then to the amount of conduct. The section applies only when the contract calls for repeated occasions for performance, and a single instance does not qualify.7 A lone tolerated act is ambiguous, because it could simply be a disinclination to enforce a right on that occasion; the more extensive and repetitious the conduct, the stronger the inference that it reflects what the parties intended.8 Take an anvil contract under which Road Runner, Inc. is to receive ten anvils a month, delivered to its place of business by the first of each month. For March through June the shipments arrive between the third and the fifth, and RRI accepts each one without complaint. That sequence is a course of performance: the late deliveries are repeated occasions for performance that RRI accepted without objection.9 The statute speaks of performance by either party, so a buyer's repeated manner of paying can form the sequence just as a seller's repeated manner of delivering can.
The second condition, knowledge of the nature of the performance, ties the conduct to what the other side actually saw. Take a lease that bars dogs, cats, and other animals, where the dictionary leaves open whether a pet duck is an animal. If the lessee keeps the duck on the premises for months, the lessor sees it repeatedly, and the lessor never complains, the shared conduct supports the inference that the parties meant animals not to include ducks.10 If the lessee instead kept the duck indoors, where the lessor never saw it, the same months of keeping would show what the lessee understood the lease to allow, but not that the lessor shared that understanding.11 A party who is mistaken about what it is receiving stands in the same position, because the section does not apply when the other party is mistaken.12
A protest defeats the inference, and the clearest illustration is a sale in which the buyer objected the day the goods arrived. In Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp. the buyer received stewing chickens and protested immediately on delivery, so its taking delivery did not show that it understood "chicken" to include them.13 The performance carried its own protest, and the court found no common intention in it. With the rest of the evidence also inconclusive, the case was decided on the burden of proof, and the buyer lost for failing to prove the narrower meaning it asserted.14 The lease works the same way. A lessor who protests the duck each time it appears has not acquiesced, and his failure to take stronger action does not support the conclusion that the parties meant ducks to fall outside the ban.15 An objection, if made, must also be timely.16
Conduct that satisfies every condition helps only on the term it bears upon. The lessor's tolerance of the duck does nothing to clarify the date on which rent is due.17 Payment history, by contrast, speaks directly to payment. After four deliveries, each paid for one week after arrival without objection from the seller, the parties are taken to have intended payment after one week as part of their agreement, and it becomes an implied term; a consistent 2% deduction for payment within ten days, left unchallenged, becomes a term in the same way.18 The same history says nothing about what quality the goods must have. The point has practical bite. In Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distributing Co. the court treated a buyer's payment of invoices at the seller's catalogue price less 11 percent as acquiescence in the seller's pricing, although the buyer claimed the agreed price was cost plus 10 percent on warehouse shipments and cost plus 5 percent on factory shipments.19 Paying an invoice may show how a party paid without showing what price the parties agreed to, and the relevance requirement exists to make a court ask which.
One more point concerns the source of the conduct. A course of performance comes from carrying out the contract in dispute, after it was formed. The Code treats actual performance as the most relevant evidence of how the parties interpreted their contract.20 In Nanakuli Paving & Rock Sales, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co. the Ninth Circuit called that performance the most important evidence of the parties' agreement.21 The performance was Shell's handling of the only price increases it announced between 1969 and 1974, in 1970 and 1971, when it held its old price for Nanakuli for four months and three months.22 Conduct under an earlier contract between the parties would belong to course of dealing instead, so the first question about any sequence of conduct is which contract it was performing.
Steps two and three usually carry the dispute, since parties contest what the other side saw and whether it spoke. When all five steps favor the party offering the conduct, the Code treats the course of performance as relevant to the meaning of the agreement and the Restatement gives it great weight. Whether the same conduct instead shows that a party gave up a right, or that the contract was modified, is a separate question under different rules, taken up next.
Performance Versus Waiver
Section 2-208(3) gives course of performance a second job beyond fixing what a term means: subject to the next section on modification and waiver, a course of performance is relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with it.25 Revised Article 1 states the same rule in § 1-303(f).26 The provision matters because the repeated, unprotested performance described above is ambiguous evidence. It may show that both parties always read the term to allow what happened, or it may show that one party, holding a term that meant what it said, later chose to give up a right the term conferred. One pattern of conduct supports two conclusions, and the conclusion a court draws decides what the conduct accomplishes.
The two uses look in opposite directions in time. Interpretation looks back to formation and treats the conduct as evidence of what the parties meant when they signed, so the term never required anything different. Waiver and modification look forward from formation: the term meant what it said when the contract was made, and later conduct relieved a party of it or changed it. Because performance follows the writing, the parol evidence rule's bar on additional terms does not apply to it. A course of performance that adds a term to the agreement, or subtracts one, raises modification or waiver instead.27 The label also matters because conduct characterized as waiver or modification is subject to different rules from conduct that merely reveals meaning, and a court can draw the wrong inference from behavior that is ambiguous or does not really bear on the term at issue.28 The Code collects those rules in § 2-209, which is taught elsewhere.
The pet-duck lease shows how one pattern of conduct supports more than one reading. A lessor who sees the duck on the premises and never complains may be showing that both sides took animals to exclude ducks. The silence might as easily show that the lessor decided not to enforce a ban that does cover ducks, and only the first reading is interpretation.29 A single sighting deepens the ambiguity, because isolated conduct is more likely a disinclination to enforce a right on one occasion than evidence of a shared meaning.30 Repetition, shared knowledge, and the absence of protest push the reading toward interpretation, and their absence leaves the waiver reading open.
The ranking of sources makes the choice consequential. The express terms and any course of performance must be construed, whenever reasonable, as consistent with each other.31 When no such construction is reasonable, the express terms prevail over course of performance, a ranking that revised § 1-303(e)(1) and the Restatement both repeat.32 Read alone, that ranking would mean a course of performance could never defeat a written term, and § 2-208(3) supplies the exception: where the conduct shows a waiver or modification, it can reach an inconsistent term. Apply that to the anvil contract. If "by the first of each month" cannot reasonably be read together with deliveries on the third through the fifth, the express term controls the question of meaning, and the deliveries matter only as evidence that the date was waived or modified. When the conduct is instead read as showing what the term meant, no conflict with the writing arises.
The characterization decided Nanakuli. Shell had held its old price for Nanakuli for four months in 1970 and three months in 1971, the only times it raised prices between 1969 and 1974.33 Shell later argued that two instances could not make a course of performance, because the official comment says a single occasion of conduct does not fall within the section. The Ninth Circuit answered that the comment excludes one instance without saying how many are needed, and that these were the only occasions before the dispute on which such conduct was called for.34 The jury also had evidence that Blee, the Shell asphalt official who had negotiated the contract and knew what terms bound Shell, wrote of the need to "bargain" with Nanakuli over the extent of price protection, which suggested that some protection was a legal right under the 1969 agreement.35 Conduct that Shell's own official treated as owed pointed toward what the price term meant. Had the accommodations been waivers, the question would have been whether Shell gave up its right to the full price, and that question follows the rules of § 2-209, not the rules of interpretation.
Shell's second defense invoked the commentary's preference for waiver when it is hard to tell whether an act sheds light on meaning or relinquishes a term. The concern behind the preference is easy to see: a seller who accommodates a buyer once should not be taken to have rewritten the deal. The Ninth Circuit held, however, that the preference applies only where the acts are ambiguous, and that whether they were ambiguous, and if not whether they were waivers or a course of performance, was for the jury. The jury's reading of the conduct as a course of performance drew support from Shell's own evidence that it price protected Nanakuli again on the only two occasions of price increases after 1974, in 1977 and 1978.36 The preference is therefore a tie-breaker for conduct that could go either way, and it does not make tolerance waiver as a rule. Where the conduct shows how both parties understood the term from the start, calling it waiver would let one party retract a shared meaning.
The second step carries the argument in most disputes. It separates a party that treated the accommodation as owed from one that treated it as a favor, and that difference is what the Nanakuli jury could see in the Blee memo and the repeated price protection.