Concept
Applying the Framework
Usage, Course of Dealing, and Course of Performance
Applying the Framework
Courts read a disputed term in a fixed order: the written words first, the contextual sources nearest the parties second, and a ranking of those sources last, used only when the sources cannot be read together. The Code sets the order. It directs that the express terms, course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade be construed “whenever reasonable as consistent with each other,” and it lets express terms control over course of dealing and usage of trade only when such a construction is unreasonable.1 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts gives the same instruction for contracts generally: wherever reasonable, the parties’ manifestations of intention are read as consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.2 When harmony fails, the Restatement supplies the ladder. Express terms weigh most, then course of performance, then course of dealing, and usage of trade weighs least.3
Every source is also a fact, and a party must prove a fact before it can move the meaning of anything. The steps therefore run from the express words outward and end with the ranking.
Steps five and six explain why the ladder comes last. Ranking declares one source the loser on the point in conflict, while a consistent reading lets every source operate. The five decisions below show the range: a hypothetical where the evidence converges, a case where an apparent conflict dissolves, a case where nothing resolves the meaning, and two that test how far admissible evidence carries a party.
A hypothetical about pheasants shows the sequence working smoothly. Gordon, a professional chef who buys poultry from suppliers, and Fairest Fowls dispute what “regular” means in a contract for pheasants, and Fairest Fowls contends that the word denotes birds good only for soup. If trade usage gives “regular” that esoteric meaning, the word is ambiguous, and its trade meaning can be reconciled with the word on the page, so the expert testimony should not be excluded as parol evidence.10 The experts in the hypothetical did not speak with one voice, yet there is widespread recognition in the wholesale poultry market that “regular” refers to pheasants usable only for soup. A party needs to prove a usage only by a preponderance of the evidence. A severe clash among experts could defeat that showing, but unanimity is not required.11 Gordon surely belongs to this trade, and even if he did not know what “regular” meant, he had reason to know the usage and is bound by it.12 The court’s ruling to admit the evidence is only the first step, however. Fairest Fowls must still convince the jury that the usage existed and supports its reading.13
An apparent conflict between a written term and a usage does not end the inquiry, and Nanakuli Paving & Rock Sales, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co. shows why. The paver claimed that price protection, a usage of the asphaltic paving trade in Hawaii, became part of its 1969 contract with Shell. It pointed to suppliers’ routine use of price protection and to the way Shell actually performed the contract until 1974. Shell raised the price of asphalt from $44 to $76 in January 1974 without price-protecting 7,200 tons, and the jury awarded Nanakuli $220,800 for that breach.14 The express price term, Shell’s posted price at delivery, seems at first glance inconsistent with price protection. On a closer reading, the court held, the jury could reasonably have construed price protection as consistent with that term.15 Because a consistent construction was available, the ladder never came into play, and an answer that ranks express terms first at the first hint of tension skips the step that decided this case.
The sequence yields its least satisfying result when the sources settle nothing. In Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. International Sales Group, Inc., the buyer protested about the stewing chickens immediately on delivery and claimed that “chicken” carried a narrow sense. The court tried each source. The course of performance showed no common intention, because the buyer had protested on delivery. In the end, despite these efforts, the court could not establish what the parties meant by “chicken,” and it resolved the case on the burden of proof. The buyer lost because it failed to prove that the word was used in the narrow sense it alleged.16 The framework gives a party a way to prove a meaning and promises no result, so a party that asserts an unusual meaning bears the loss when the sources leave the question open.
Agreement among the sources separates the chicken from the pheasant. A conclusion about meaning is most strongly supported when the evidence from every part of the context points to the same meaning. If the sources conflict, the general rule, reflected in UCC §§ 1.303(e) and 2.208(2) and in Restatement (Second) § 203(b), gives greatest weight to the express terms, followed in order by course of performance, course of dealing, and usage.17
Parties often assume that winning the admissibility ruling wins the case, and the dispute between Carter Baron Drilling and Badger Oil shows otherwise. Colorado courts once refused to admit custom and usage to vary the terms of an unambiguous contract, but since the state adopted the Code, parol evidence of usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance can be introduced to explain or supplement a contract.18 Badger offered evidence that in the oil and gas industry the operator of a drilling well is not ultimately liable for debts to the contractor who drills it. The court first held that evidence of course of performance and usage of trade is admissible as a matter of law. It then asked whether Badger had offered enough to withstand Carter Baron’s motion for partial summary judgment, applying the settled rule that summary judgment is unavailable when a genuine issue of material fact exists.19 Contrary evidence from the contractor about the industry practice would leave exactly that kind of issue, and a court cannot resolve it on motion. The proponent who wins the admissibility ruling has earned a hearing, and the weight of the evidence then belongs to the factfinder.20
Figgie International, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc. shows the other side of the summary-judgment coin. Figgie supported its motion with affidavits from people of extensive experience in the bottle-labeling and packaging industry, who attested that sellers in the industry always limit the remedies for breach to repair, replacement, or return and exclude consequential damages. Serralles asserted that it had not acquiesced in the practice, but it offered no evidence to contradict the affidavits. The district court therefore correctly concluded that the usage limited Serralles to the exclusive remedy of repair, replacement, or return.21 Usage evidence that no one contradicts can carry a motion, and usage evidence that the other side contradicts goes to the factfinder. In these decisions, harmony and proof did the deciding, and the ladder stayed in reserve.