Concept
Construing Against the Drafter
Interpretation Against the Drafter and Favoring the Public
Construing Against the Drafter
Doubt that survives every aid to meaning is a flaw in the writing, and the party who wrote the writing pays for it. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 states the rule in one sentence: in choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise, an agreement, or one of its terms, the meaning generally preferred is the one that operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.1 Lawyers call the preference contra proferentem, “against the offeror,” or the ambiguity doctrine.2
Courts reach the rule last. It applies “only as a last resort,” after the ordinary methods of interpretation have left a provision ambiguous, and it then resolves the ambiguity against the drafter on public-policy grounds, chiefly the parties’ relative bargaining strength.3 The justification is the author’s responsibility. When the effort to find the parties’ true intention has been exhausted without success, it may be appropriate to construe the language against the drafter, “who, after all, is responsible for the lack of clarity.”4
The rule’s force varies with the setting, and the four subsections below follow that variation. Standard forms and insurance policies, which the other side could only accept or reject, draw the rule most often and apply it most firmly. Negotiated deals between sophisticated parties drain it of most of its force. And in every setting the court must first decide who, if anyone, chose the disputed words.
Rule and Rationale
The rule’s wording sets three conditions. “Reasonable meanings” confines it to genuine contests, in which a sensible person could hold at least two readings. “Generally” makes the preference a default that a stronger consideration can displace. And “from whom a writing otherwise proceeds” reaches a party that adopts or issues a text someone else composed, because the text still comes from that party.5 The canon also works provision by provision: when one party was entirely responsible for drafting a contract or a particular provision, a court will interpret any ambiguity against that party.6
The first step screens out the most claims. A party cannot create a tie by proposing a strained meaning. If a proposal were enough, every term in every form would become a contest, and the rule would stop being a tiebreaker and become a tool for rewriting the drafter’s words. When the court rejects the proposed reading as unreasonable, one meaning remains, and the court enforces it without asking who wrote the language.
A real tie looks different. A shopping-mall lease provided that “the fixed minimum rental [for the renewal period] shall be renegotiated to the then prevailing rate within the mall.”7 The clause pulls two ways. “Renegotiated” suggests a figure still to be agreed, while “the then prevailing rate within the mall” names an outside measure that could fix the figure without further agreement. If both readings survive the earlier steps, the second and third steps decide the matter, and the doubt falls on whichever party supplied the clause.
Because the rule operates only after the search for the parties’ meaning has failed, no guess about that meaning can justify it. Its footing is public policy. The party who chose the words is more likely to have provided carefully for its own protection, more likely to have had reason to know of uncertainties, and may even have left the meaning deliberately obscure.8
Each reason shows a different way in which the writer is the better party to bear the cost of doubt. A party that selects the words writes with its own interests in view, so a doubt that survives the drafting is more likely to lean toward the writer’s side, whether by design or by inattention. A party that works with the text before signing can see an uncertainty and remove it, while the other party often meets the language only when asked to agree and has no practical power to choose it. The third reason, deliberate obscurity, explains the incentive. If doubt were resolved in the drafter’s favor, a drafter could leave a term vague, collect the benefit of whichever reading later proved convenient, and pay nothing for the vagueness. Assigning the doubt to the author removes that payoff.
The same policy account explains why the rule’s force varies. Courts usually apply it in cases involving an adhesion contract, or where one party holds the stronger bargaining position, although the rule is not limited to those settings.9 A rule built on those considerations strengthens where they are strongest, as the next subsection shows for standard forms, and weakens where they are missing, as the one after it shows for negotiated deals between peers.
Standard Forms and Insurance
Contracts that the other side could only accept or reject draw the drafter rule most often, because the earlier steps of interpretation have nothing to work on. A court looking for shared meaning needs evidence of how the parties formed the agreement, such as drafts and negotiations. A form issued without bargaining generates almost none.11
Insurance leaves a court emptier-handed than most forms do. Insurers draft standard policies, typically with no input from the policyholder, and many terms were written long ago and are reused each time a new edition issues, so no one now using the words formed any intent behind them. The drafters are often dead or unknown, and documents showing what they meant rarely exist. The policyholder never signs the policy, and by the time a coverage dispute arises the policyholder has already performed in full by paying the premium. Talk of the parties’ intent is therefore a legal fiction, and courts offset the policyholder’s disadvantage with interpretive rules that favor the policyholder. The first is that every jurisdiction follows some form of construction against the insurer as drafter.12
The missing evidence changes the order of analysis. In an ordinary contract a court weighs extrinsic evidence before it turns to the tiebreaker. In Sun Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission the court noted that insurance and surety contracts are “arguable exceptions” to that order. They are ordinarily not preceded by discussion or negotiation of specific terms, so absent meaningful extrinsic evidence of intent, recourse must be had directly to the maxim that ambiguities should be construed against the drafter.13 The shortcut skips the evidence stage and leaves the ambiguity requirement in place, because the maxim resolves an ambiguity and the court must first find one. Construction against the insurer is especially appropriate when the ambiguous term sits in an exclusion, which is strictly construed against the insurer.14
A California court stated the point sharply in Neal v. State Farm Insurance Cos.: the rule that ambiguities caused by the draftsman must be resolved against that party “applies with peculiar force in the case of the contract of adhesion,” a contract that one side prepares and the other takes or leaves.15
Courts define ambiguity as language that can be construed in more than one reasonable way. If the policyholder offers a reasonable reading, it prevails even though the insurer’s competing reading is also reasonable, and the insurer wins only when its reading is the only reasonable one.16 The rule thus rewards a reasonable reading and gives no advantage to a strained one, which matches the requirement of § 206 that the choice be among reasonable meanings.
Exclusions receive special attention. Courts read the insuring agreement broadly in favor of coverage and construe exclusions strictly against the insurer. The insurer bears the burden of proving that an exclusion applies, and an exclusion may not be read so broadly that it swallows the coverage the policy grants.17
Construction is not the only place where insurance law has moved toward the policyholder. Under the common-law warranty rule, an insurer had a complete defense to any claim if an applicant gave incorrect information that the policy incorporated as a warranty, and a warranty had to be literally true. Statutes in every state now modify that rule to some extent, and the literal-truth requirement has been substantially relaxed in many, though not all, contexts.18
Uninsured-motorist stacking cases show the rule stopping where the clauses leave no second reasonable reading. The question is whether coverage limits for several vehicles under one policy add together. In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co. the court held that a single policy carried a single coverage limit even though the insured paid a separate premium for each vehicle. Woods v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. distinguished that decision, holding that the applicable clauses, read together, made the contract ambiguous, so it was construed against the insurer that drafted it. Sanders v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. concluded that the policy unambiguously precluded stacking. The deciding question in each is whether the clauses together admit a second reasonable reading. A conflict between a limits-of-liability clause and a clause such as a separability provision, which applies the policy’s terms separately to each vehicle, can supply that second reading and resolve the dispute for the insured.
Surety and fidelity bonds follow the same pattern. Courts begin with the plain language of a bond and give its terms their fair meaning. But the obligor, the party whose promise the bond expresses, generally drafts a commercial bond and issues it without negotiating most terms, so an ambiguous term is construed against the drafter and the meaning favoring the obligee, the party the bond protects, is adopted.19 A fidelity bond, which covers an employer against an employee’s dishonesty, is construed under general principles of insurance law, so its ambiguities run against the surety.20
The preference reaches beyond policies and bonds. In a dispute over checks, a court found that the advice forms attached to the checks contained ambiguous language which, construed against the drafter, allowed the items to be treated as collection items.21 The rule weakens when the take-it-or-leave-it premise is missing, as the next subsection explains.
Negotiated Deals Between Peers
The drafter rule loses most of its force when sophisticated parties with counsel bargained over the disputed language. Courts do not hold that sophistication ends the rule. They ask whether the reasons for it fit the facts, and between peers those reasons largely do not.
Each reason depends on how the parties stand toward the text. The first two assume that one party controlled the wording while the other met it only when asked to agree. The third assumes that a drafter can profit from vagueness because the other side has no way to make the drafter clarify. When both sides have lawyers, exchange drafts, and hold the power to change the clause, none of those premises holds.
In Joyner v. Adams the trial court construed an ambiguous provision against the defendant as its drafter and awarded judgment to the plaintiff. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the rule had been improvidently invoked. The parties dealt at arm’s length and were equally sophisticated, both experienced in the real estate business, and the record showed a fairly protracted negotiation in which the provision in question underwent particular scrutiny. Both parties had the knowledge to understand its import and the bargaining power to alter it, so the policy behind the rule was not served.23
Withholding the rule did not leave the dispute without an answer. The court sent it back to the earlier steps of interpretation. If the defendant knew or had reason to know the meaning the plaintiff attached to the disputed terminology, and the plaintiff did not know or have reason to know the defendant’s meaning, the contract was to be taken in the plaintiff’s sense, and otherwise the plaintiff’s claim failed.24 A later appeal approved a finding that a reasonable lessee in the defendant’s position would not have been led to the plaintiff’s reading, so the plaintiff did not prevail.25
Aluminum Company of America v. Essex Group, Inc. presents the same limit between two commercial enterprises. The court found it untenable to argue that ALCOA had implicitly or expressly assumed a limitless, if highly improbable, risk, and it read the absence of an express floor limitation as a sign that the parties deemed the risk too remote and their meaning too clear to trifle with additional negotiation and drafting.26 The court then described what the drafter rule is for. In cases involving conscience or strong policy, such as forfeiture, it complements strict construction to favor lenient results, and in other cases it helps resolve otherwise intractable ambiguities. The dispute before the court was neither, because defining the risks ALCOA assumed was a question of interpretation that implicated no strong public policy and raised no intractable ambiguity.27 The decision does not say that large companies can never invoke § 206. It rests on how that contract was formed and on the nature of the dispute, and a different record could produce a different result.
The law of excuse shows a similar preference for self-protection among commercial parties, who tend to be significant enterprises rather than consumers or “Mom and Pop” stores. Some courts hold that a party who can foresee an adverse event has the burden of contracting for protection against it.28 A party that can negotiate the text has the means to protect itself, which is why a rule that comes to the aid of the party who could not has less work to do here.
Courts differ on how much sophistication alone accomplishes. One decision, Hamilton v. Hamilton, saw “no reason to automatically construe ambiguities in the contract against the drafter.” Another, Speedway Motorsports International Ltd. v. Bronwen Energy Trading, Ltd., applied the maxim between sophisticated parties because one of them had chosen the language, citing Joyner.29 Speedway shows that sophistication does not end the rule when one party alone chose the wording. Whatever weight a court gives sophistication and counsel, the question stays the same: does the policy behind the rule fit these facts? Sophistication is evidence on that question and does not answer it.
The two settings differ in one fact: whether both sides shaped the disputed language or one side chose it. In Joyner the provision was bargained over, and the rule was withheld. The carrier’s paragraph passed through the negotiation untouched, so the rule’s reasons were fully present despite the parties’ size. A fact pattern may announce early that both parties are sophisticated and mention only later who supplied a particular clause. The first fact does not answer the question the second raises.
Identifying the Drafter
The rule charges the doubt to the party who “supplies the words” or from whom “a writing otherwise proceeds,” and that wording reaches past the person who typed the text.31 A related preference rule shows the same attention to the source of an instrument: a deed is construed against the grantor even though the grantor is not necessarily responsible for drafting it.32 In either setting authorship drives the inquiry, so the record must supply two things before the rule can operate. It must show a term that still has two reasonable meanings, and it must show that the language in dispute is one party’s choice. Without the first, nothing remains to resolve. Without the second, no one can fairly be charged with the doubt.
The second requirement follows from the reasons for the rule. Each describes the person who selected the language, a person more likely to have provided for its own protection, to have known of uncertainties, or to have left the meaning obscure.33 None can be attributed to a party that took no part in choosing the words. Charging that party with the doubt would allocate the cost by guesswork and let the real author escape the consequences of unclear drafting.
Joyner v. Adams shows the requirement at work. The defendant had been treated as the drafter, but nothing in the record showed that he, rather than the plaintiff, drafted the provision. The only evidence was the plaintiff’s own testimony that no one in his law firm had anything to do with it. Even assuming that testimony supported an inference that the defendant or his agent wrote the provision, the court held that it did not establish that the defendant could be charged with having chosen its language.34 The proof fell short on two levels. A statement that one side kept out of the drafting says nothing about whether the clause came from the other side, from a shared draft, or from a third person. And even proof that the other side’s agent wrote the words leaves open whether that side chose them, the fact on which the rule’s reasons depend.
Authorship matters only when the ambiguity is real. A court that mistakes who wrote a clause commits a harmless error if the clause has only one reasonable meaning, because that meaning is enforced whoever wrote it and the rule operates only on a choice among reasonable meanings.35
The drafter canon also ranks below the search for intent. In an Arizona dispute State Farm argued that any uncertainty in the language should be construed against the drafter, and the court answered that the rule “is subordinate to the rule that the intent of the parties should govern.”36 That answer fits the canon’s character generally. Canons of construction are rules of thumb, and some conflict with others.37
The buyer’s clause passes both requirements: the record shows who chose the words, and the clause is truly ambiguous. In Joyner the proof of authorship was a denial offered by the side that wanted the rule applied. A fact pattern that says which party is larger, or which party loses under one reading, has not yet told you who chose the language. Authorship has to come from the facts, whether drafts, testimony, or the form itself.