Concept
Acceptance or Confirmation
Additional terms in an acceptance
Acceptance or Confirmation
Section 2-207(2) screens additional terms the same way whether they arrive in an acceptance or in a written confirmation: they are proposals for addition to the contract, and between merchants they become part of it unless an exclusion applies.1 The section's own title, "Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation," names both vehicles.2 Official Comment 1 explains why. In one situation the parties have already reached agreement, orally or by informal correspondence, and one or both then send formal memoranda that embody the agreed terms and add terms nobody discussed. In the other, a letter or wire meant as an acceptance adds further proposals, and the familiar example is the exchange of printed purchase order and acknowledgment forms, whose terms often fail to correspond because each form reflects the thinking of its drafter.3
The merchant requirement is the gate to both situations. Where the parties acknowledge that each is a merchant within the Code, § 2-207(2) is in play,4 and a merchant is a person with specialized knowledge of the goods, of business practices, or of both.5
A confirmation presupposes a deal already made, and that fact controls the rest of the analysis. Article 2 lets parties form a contract in any manner sufficient to show agreement and does not require anyone to pinpoint the moment of formation,6 so a telephone call can create a binding contract. Once that contract exists, the formation question that subsection (1) answers for an acceptance has already been answered. The language in subsection (1) that preserves an offeree's right to respond with an express counteroffer therefore does nothing for the party who sends a confirmation: it is too late for a counteroffer, and subsection (2) governs what becomes of the terms that do not match.7 The confirmation can propose; it cannot rewrite.
Conduct after the deal does not change that result. In Rogers, as a later court quoted it, buyers accepted computers and did not return them. That conduct was consistent with contracts formed when the orders were placed, and it could not be read as acquiescence in a "Terms and Conditions of Sale" document that arrived with the invoice, the acknowledgment, or the packaging. If the contracts were formed at the time of the orders, the document was an additional term under § 2-207, and its arbitration provision was a proposal to add a term, not part of the contracts.8 Courts confronting a seller's acknowledgment form after an order was placed, as in St. Charles Cable TV, Inc. v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc. and Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., ask which of the form's terms joined the deal.
The same logic fixes what counts as "additional." When the later document answers a written offer, the comparison is with that offer. When it confirms an oral or informal deal, the comparison is with the deal, and the other side's paper, if any, drops out. A confirmation term that merely states what the contract already provides asks nothing new of the other party. If nothing in the contract, whether express or implied through clearly established marketplace usage, gives the buyer a right to cancel and return the goods, a confirmation saying there is no such right seeks no change in the contract's terms.9 The agreement being confirmed also carries terms the Code supplies on its own. White argues that gap fillers on price, warranty, or delivery enter an adequately formed contract directly, without any help from § 2-207, so what the contract "says" includes more than the parties spoke aloud.10
That screen is the same in either vehicle. A proposed term stays out if the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer,11 if the term materially alters the contract, or if objection is made within a reasonable time.12 Later units develop each exclusion. Two points matter here. First, failing the screen costs the sender only the offending term. In Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford the confirmation was not made conditional on assent to the added terms, yet its option provisions were a material addition. The addition did not void the contract; it simply did not bind the other party.13 Second, materiality can turn on hardship even where the other side is not surprised. One court held an indemnity clause that shifted liability from a negligent party to an innocent one to be a material alteration as a matter of law, because such a clause by its nature imposes hardship if it is incorporated without the other party's express awareness.14
Subsection (3) has no work to do when the confirmed deal already exists. It operates only when the writings fail to establish a contract. Conduct by both parties that recognizes a contract then suffices to create one, even though the writings alone would not have done so.15 By its terms it applies only where "the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract."16 The deal being confirmed is already a contract, so there is no formation gap for conduct to fill.
Statute of Frauds Is Separate
Section 2-201(2) and § 2-207(2) share vocabulary and little else. Section 2-201 asks whether a contract for $500 or more is enforceable at all: it is not, by action or defense, without a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. Between merchants, a written confirmation that is sufficient against its sender, and that the recipient receives within a reasonable time with reason to know its contents, satisfies the statute against the recipient unless the recipient gives written notice of objection within ten days after receiving it.18
That rule is about proof, and silence has a narrow effect. The only consequence of failing to object to a written confirmation under § 2-201 is that the receiving merchant loses the statute-of-frauds defense. It does not relieve the party seeking enforcement of the burden of proving the oral agreement. The court in C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v. Jordan Int'l Co. reasoned that a section that does not even establish the existence of an agreement cannot make a particular term of it, such as an arbitration provision, binding.19 The New York Court of Appeals drew the same line in Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc.: § 2-201 settles only whether a contract can be enforced in the face of a statute-of-frauds defense, so it cannot decide which terms a confirmation adds.
Once the existence and terms of the oral agreement are established, § 2-207 decides whether a term in the confirmation that was not in that agreement binds the recipient. The Official Comments show the division of labor. Under § 2-201, failing to object removes the statute of frauds as a bar. Under § 2-207, failing to object to a term may, in the circumstances the section specifies, make that term part of whatever agreement is proved.20