Concept
Different Terms and Knockout
Additional terms in an acceptance
Different Terms and Knockout
At common law, a reply that varied the offer’s terms rejected the offer and operated as a counteroffer.1 Section 2-207(1) abandons that rule for a reply that states different terms: unless the offeree expressly conditions its acceptance on the offeror’s assent to them, the reply is an acceptance and a contract forms.2 An offeree who insists on its own terms must therefore demand the offeror’s assent, which keeps the reply from operating as an acceptance and turns it into a counteroffer.3 Once a contract exists, the live question is what it says where the two forms disagree.
The statute answers only part of that question. Subsection (2) treats additional terms as proposals for addition to the contract, and between merchants they become part of it unless an exclusion applies.4 It never mentions different terms, although subsection (1) does.5 Read literally, subsection (2) therefore cannot admit a term that is different rather than additional, and subsection (3) applies only when the writings do not otherwise establish a contract.6 In Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Industries, Judge Posner observed that the Code does not explain what happens when the offeree’s response contains different terms and that there is no consensus on the answer.7 The problem is ordinary. A buyer’s purchase order requires arbitration, the seller’s acknowledgment calls for adjudication in court, and a dispute follows.8
Whether a term counts as different or additional depends on how the reply relates to the offer, read for what it implies as well as what it says.9 As a rough guide, a term is different if it varies or contradicts something the offer provides, and additional if it adds new matter the offer does not cover.10 The guide works when the offer speaks to the subject: an order that requires arbitration, answered by a form that sends disputes to court, produces a different term. It strains when the offer is silent. A seller’s clause selecting Pennsylvania courts looks additional when the buyer’s order never mentions disputes, but the order’s silence would usually be read to allow suit in the courts of an appropriate state other than Pennsylvania, so the clause contradicts an implied term and is different after all.11 Judge Posner called the whole exercise hair-splitting, because “all different terms are additional and all additional terms are different.”12
Courts have resolved the gap in three ways.13 The first treats a different term like an additional one and sends it through subsection (2). The second ignores the offeree’s different term, so that the offeror’s term governs. The third cancels the conflicting terms on both sides and lets the Code’s default rules fill the space they leave. The first two usually leave the offeror’s term in place; only the third gives neither party its term.14
Different Terms as Additional
The first approach reads subsection (2) to reach different terms as well as additional ones. Official Comment 3 supplies the text: “[w]hether or not additional or different terms will become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection (2).”15 The drafting history adds support, because it shows that the omission of “or different” from subsection (2) was a drafting error.16 The approach also spares a court the label hunt. Treating the two kinds of term alike “substitutes a manageable inquiry into materiality” for the effort to tell them apart.17
Under this approach, a term in the acceptance that is materially different from the offer operates only as a proposal, so the offeror’s term prevails unless the offeror agrees to the variance; a term that is not materially different becomes part of the contract.18 The tests are the three exclusions of subsection (2). The term stays out if the offer expressly limits acceptance to its terms,19 if the term materially alters the offer,20 or if notification of objection has been given or is given within a reasonable time.21 Any one exclusion is enough, because subsection (2) is phrased in the disjunctive; one court therefore skipped the parties’ arguments about advance objection once both admitted that the seller’s invoice terms materially altered the buyer’s purchase order.22 A term that materially alters the offer cannot become part of the contract unless the offeror expressly agrees to it, and whether a term has that effect can be a question for findings of fact.23
A different term usually fails that test. Some courts hold that different terms, by their very nature, materially alter the contract, so that only the acceptance’s term is excluded and the offeror’s term prevails.24 The offeror’s agreement to a variant term must be actual. In one dispute over a product sold with a box-top license, the seller twice asked the buyer to sign agreements containing warranty-disclaimer and limited-remedy terms like those in the license, the buyer refused both times, and the seller kept shipping anyway.25 A buyer who refuses to sign has not agreed to the seller’s variant terms.
Critics respond that subsection (2) says only “additional” and that official comments, though very influential, are not part of the statute.26 The approach has also won few converts. Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Industries preferred it, under which the offer’s terms prevail over different terms in the acceptance only if the latter are materially different, yet counted California as the only state to have adopted it.27 California’s decision in Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp. holds that, where the Code keeps a term in the acceptance out of the contract, the conflicting term in the offer becomes part of it.28
Two decisions show the approach at work. One court rejected the argument that subsection (2) reaches only additional terms and that a seller’s limitation-of-liability provisions were different from the offer’s terms, finding that argument contrary to Comment 3.29 In Gardner Zemke Co. v. Dunham Bush, Inc., a warranty dispute, the court concluded that Dunham Bush’s warranty terms did not become part of the contract and that Gardner Zemke’s warranty provision and the Article 2 warranties controlled.30
Offeror's Terms Prevail
The second approach takes subsection (2) at its word. The subsection refers to additional terms only, so a different term in the acceptance has no route into the contract.32 The court ignores the acceptance’s discrepant terms and the offeror’s terms control, a position the Northrop court called “the leading minority view.”33 Its proponents press the objection exclusion. In Summers’s view, Comment 3 goes beyond the text, because paragraph (c) would automatically eject the different term: the offeror gave notification of objection when it included the contrary term in its offer.34
The first two approaches part company only when a different term is not materially different. The first admits such a term; the second ignores every discrepant term in the acceptance.35 On the arbitration exchange above, both leave the buyer’s arbitration clause in place, but the second does so without any inquiry into materiality or objection. In Northrop, the minority view “would give the palm to Litronic,” the offeror, whose warranty ran 90 days; the court nonetheless presumed that Illinois would follow the majority view.36
The difficulty is the advantage the approach gives the sender of the first form. The offeror goes first and has more time to specify its terms, while acceptances are often given by phone by relatively junior employees, so it is unrealistic to expect every offeree to protect itself with an expressly conditional acceptance.37 A rule that lets the offeror’s terms win every conflict may tempt the offeror to spring a surprise and hope the offeree never reads the fine print.38 It replaces the common law’s last-shot rule with a first-shot rule.39 The premise that the offeror’s term reflects a considered choice is also doubtful, since an offeror’s boilerplate can be as thoughtless as an offeree’s, and an offeror who wants its terms or no deal can say so by requiring the offeree to accept all of them.40
On an exam, classify the variance first. This approach removes a term only when it contradicts the offer; a term on a subject the offer never addressed is additional and must still clear the exclusions of subsection (2).41
The Knockout Rule
The knockout rule is the majority approach. When the offer and the acceptance contain conflicting terms, both terms fall out and a suitable Code gap-filler replaces them.43 The contract then consists of the terms on which both parties expressly agreed, together with terms supplied by the Code.44 If a buyer’s offer makes the seller responsible for all consequential damages and the seller’s acceptance contains a contrary clause, both damages clauses drop out and the dozens of default rules in Article 2 fill the gap.45 Many courts now apply the rule to different terms in cases where subsection (1) formed the contract.46
Two statutory observations explain the result. The acceptance’s term is different, not additional, so subsection (2) does not admit it, and subsection (3) does not apply because the writings already establish a contract.47 On White’s account, neither conflicting term enters the contract, yet a gap-filler dealing with price, warranty, or delivery enters directly, without any reference to § 2-207.48 Comment 6 supplies the textual hook. Where clauses on confirming forms conflict, it reasons, each party must be assumed to object to the other’s conflicting clause, which satisfies paragraph (c) and keeps both terms out of the contract. The court in St. Paul, applying Minnesota’s version of the Code, relied on that comment.49
St. Paul Structural Steel Co. v. ABI Contracting, Inc. shows the rule at work on a payment term. ABI’s offer called for 10 percent retainage and St. Paul’s acceptance proposed a different retainage term. ABI argued that St. Paul’s term was material and never accepted, so that ABI’s own retainage term became part of the agreement; the court disagreed and held that the different retainage terms cancelled each other out.50 The court then turned to the Code. Minnesota’s version of § 2-310 makes payment due when the buyer receives the goods unless the parties agree otherwise and provides nothing for retainage, so ABI owed the full price at the time the parties had expressly agreed on, within 30 days after receipt of each invoice.51 The cancellation reached only the conflicting term, and the agreed payment date survived. The result, the court said, “favors neither party,” because a Code term at least has the merit of being one the draftsmen considered fair.52
Northrop counted Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., St. Paul, and Challenge Machinery Co. v. Mattison Machine Works among the authorities for the majority view that discrepant terms fall out and are replaced by a suitable Code gap-filler.53 Northrop applied the rule itself, though it preferred another reading. Litronic’s offer carried a 90-day warranty and Northrop’s purchase order called for one unlimited in duration. Because Northrop accepted Litronic’s offer without expressly conditioning its acceptance on Litronic’s acceding to Northrop’s terms, Northrop got neither: the court supplied a warranty of “reasonable” duration, and Litronic remained free to argue that special circumstances made 90 days reasonable.54 The court presumed that Illinois would follow the majority, because Illinois tends to adopt majority rules in other Code cases and because uniform national application of the Code argues for nudging majority views toward unanimity.55
Cancelling the conflicting terms rests on the idea that a different term in the acceptance suggests the offeree never really acceded to the offeror’s version, yet both parties wanted a contract, so a neutral term should govern the dispute between them.56 Neither side’s term has the better claim: the offeree may have mailed a boilerplate form without a thought for its contents, but the offeror’s term may be just as thoughtless.57 The rule also avoids replacing the last-shot rule with a first-shot rule that rewards whoever sent the first form.58 Under it, an offeree who tries to spring a surprise only moves the parties to neutral ground, and the offeror, who can more easily protect itself against surprise, does not win through its own boilerplate. An offeror that wants its terms or no deal can specify that the offeree must accept all of them for any contract to exist.59
Critics doubt that the text supports the rule. Some justify the result by Comment 6, but a careful reading shows that the comment applies to confirmations of existing contracts, the subject of subsection (3).60 Critics also note that a neutral gap-filler does not guarantee a neutral result. In one illustration, the seller’s response is assumed to be an expression of acceptance, and the buyer has no practical way to avoid the result: rejecting the goods on tender would be a breach because there are no grounds for rejection, and keeping them leaves the buyer without an implied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose it described.61 If the disagreement instead involves dickered terms, the seller’s response may not be an acceptance at all, but a buyer who keeps the goods then has a contract under subsection (3) and, again, no implied warranty of fitness.62
Cancellation reaches only the subjects on which the forms collide. A term both forms share stays in the contract, as the 30-day payment term did in St. Paul, and a term in one form on a subject the other never addresses contradicts nothing. It is additional, and subsection (2) governs it.63