Concept
When Subsection (3) Applies
Additional terms in an acceptance
When Subsection (3) Applies
Section 2-207(3) is the section's last route to a contract, and it opens only after the other two have closed. It provides that conduct by both parties that recognizes the existence of a contract is enough to establish a contract for sale although the writings do not otherwise establish one, and that the contract's terms are those on which the writings agree, together with any supplementary terms the Act supplies.1 Which route governs depends on what the reply to the offer is. A reply that operates as an acceptance forms a contract on the writings even if it carries different or additional terms, and subsection (2) then decides which of those terms join the contract.2 A reply that does not so operate leaves the transaction without a contract, and only performance by both sides can supply one, with subsection (3) fixing its terms.3
One hypothetical will carry the doctrine through all four parts below.
The group is not bound. The writings form no contract, the shipment and payment do, the contract consists of the terms the two forms share plus the Act's supplementary terms, and the disclaimer lies outside that overlap.
Writings That Form No Contract
Subsection (3) speaks only to a transaction in which the writings do not establish a contract, so the first question is how an exchange of forms can fail to do so. It fails in two ways: the reply is not a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance, or the reply contains an expressly made conditional clause. The second way is substantially more common.4
The first way requires a reply that departs from the offer so far that it is no acceptance at all. An expression of acceptance must respond to the offer closely enough to show an intent to contract, and a response that differs radically from the offer, particularly on dickered terms (those the parties actually bargained over) such as price, is not one.5
The second way turns on the offeree's own drafting. At common law, a reply that purports to accept but is conditional on the offeror's assent to additional or different terms is a counteroffer, not an acceptance.6 Section 2-207(1) keeps that result for the expressly conditional reply and for no other. When the proviso applies, the writings form no contract, and the transaction aborts at that point unless later conduct recognizes one.7
Courts read the proviso narrowly, and the statute's wording explains why. It does not stop at "expressly conditional"; it requires an acceptance expressly conditional on the offeror's assent to the added terms. In Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., the Sixth Circuit read that language to reach only an acceptance that clearly reveals the offeree's unwillingness to proceed unless assured of the offeror's assent.8 Two reasons support the narrow reading. Subsection (1) was designed to recognize contracts despite variances that would have defeated them at common law, and a loose reading of the proviso would revive the old result.9 Judges also doubt that even businesspeople read boilerplate, so they hesitate to let a printed condition defeat a contract.10
Two decisions show where the line falls. In Dorton, the acknowledgments listed ways the buyer could assent, from signing and returning the form to keeping it ten days without objection. The court held them not expressly conditional, since retention without objection could never be assent where acceptance is expressly conditional on that assent.11 In Step-Saver, a dispute over a box-top license, an integration clause and language deeming the buyer to consent by opening the package gave no real indication that the offeree would forgo the transaction if its terms were left out.12 Both courts asked whether the offeree said it would not proceed without the offeror's assent. The importance of the added terms does not answer that question.
The broadest reading appears in Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., where the court held that a response stating a condition that materially alters the obligation solely to the offeror's disadvantage is an acceptance expressly conditional on assent. It thought it unrealistic to suppose that an offeree who sets burdens only on the offeror meant an unconditional acceptance, leaving the offeror to take on those burdens out of good nature.13 The narrow test leaves no room for that rule. The rule lets the materiality of a term decide whether a contract exists, which confuses formation with terms, and it solves a problem the Act already solves, because between merchants a proposed term that materially alters the contract stays out under subsection (2)(b).14
Conduct Recognizing a Contract
When the writings fail, performance can succeed where they did not. Conduct by both parties that recognizes the existence of a contract establishes one, and the usual conduct is the seller shipping the goods and the buyer paying for them.16 In Step-Saver, the parties' shipping, receiving, and paying demonstrated the existence of a contract, while the box-top license was only a proposal for additional terms that required the purchaser's express agreement.17
Courts do not read that performance as assent to the offeree's conditional terms. If shipping and paying meant acceptance of a conditional acknowledgment, the party that sent the last form would win all its terms by performing. That is the last-shot rule of the common law, and the Code pointedly rejects it.18 Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp. reflects the point: the court did not treat the buyer's continued receipt of and payment for the goods as assent to the seller's conditional terms, and it left the contract to subsection (3).19
Express assent still changes the result, because the offeror may agree to the offeree's terms in so many words.20 In Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, the seller answered the buyer's purchase order with a counteroffer. The buyer replied by asking for a change only in the payment terms and raised no objection to the seller's other modifications. The seller granted the change in a letter that referred to the counteroffer's terms, and the buyer did not object to that reference. The Seventh Circuit held the buyer to the counteroffer, finding no occasion to create a contract by operation of law.21 Had the buyer done nothing but perform, subsection (3) would have supplied the contract, and the Act's implied warranties would have filled the gap left by the parties' disagreement on warranty terms.22 The difference lies in what the offeror said and did. The Construction Aggregates buyer engaged the counteroffer's terms and changed one, while a party that merely performs leaves everything to subsection (3).
Subsection (3) also requires conduct by both parties. A shipment the buyer refuses recognizes no contract, and neither does a payment for goods never sent.23 Nor can an offeror use a mirror-image demand to escape the subsection. In Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Industries, the Seventh Circuit observed that subsection (3) may seem to make it impossible for the offeror to protect itself by insisting that the acceptance mirror the offer. But the subsection applies only when the parties' conduct manifests a contract, as when an offeror that demanded a mirror-image acceptance and received a deviating one goes ahead and performs as if a contract existed.24 An offeror that does not perform has not recognized a contract by its conduct.
Terms of the Conduct Contract
The statute fixes the terms of a conduct contract by formula: the terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with the supplementary terms the Act incorporates.26 A contract formed solely through conduct therefore contains only the narrow set of terms on which the forms overlap, and the Act's default rules fill the gaps.27
A term that appears in only one party's form stays out. In McCarty v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., the seller defended an indemnity clause with testimony from its marketing vice-president that it would never have sold the press without the clause. The court rejected the argument. Nothing showed that the seller communicated that intent to the buyer, and under subsection (3) terms contained only in one party's form are not part of the contract.28
The Act's own rules fill what the overlap leaves open. Where the parties never agreed on warranty terms, the implied warranties of §§ 2-314 and 2-315 ordinarily apply.29 Course of dealing and usage of trade give meaning to and supplement or qualify the terms of an agreement, and a course of performance accepted without objection bears on what the agreement means.30 Terms missing from the forms, such as release dates and typeface in one dispute, may thus come from prior dealing confirmed by performance to which the other party did not object.31
Where the forms state the same subject differently, the discrepancy vanishes and the Act's gap-fillers replace both versions.32 On the facts of Northrop, this route led to the same result as subsection (2) read as most states read it.33 Both halves of the formula follow from the Code's rejection of the last-shot rule: if either side's boilerplate controlled, one side would win outright.34 The party that wrote the conditional clause could have refused to proceed, and by performing anyway it accepted a contract on neutral terms in place of its own.
In the mixer example, the forms agree on the goods, the price, and the delivery date. The disclaimer appears only in the maker's form, so it is not part of the contract, and the implied warranties the Act supplies govern the failed mixer.
Boundaries of Subsection (3)
Subsection (3) fills a gap that exists only when the writings fail to establish a contract, so it has nothing to establish when the parties already have one. A form that confirms a closed deal belongs to subsection (2) instead: its additional terms are proposals for addition to the contract, and between merchants they join it unless an exclusion applies.36 A merchant is a person with specialized knowledge of the goods, of business practices, or of both.37
The subsection is equally unavailable when subsection (1) has already formed a contract. A definite expression of acceptance that is not expressly conditional forms the contract on the writings whatever its boilerplate says, and its additional terms go to subsection (2).38 The route changes outcomes. Suppose the maker in the mixer example had merely listed its terms without conditioning its acceptance on the group's assent. The writings would form a contract, and the warranty disclaimer would face subsection (2), where it materially alters a contract silent on warranties and stays out.39 A non-material term in the same form would enter between merchants unless another exclusion applied, while under subsection (3) it would stay out because the forms do not agree on it.40 That difference explains why courts police the boundary of the expressly conditional acceptance so carefully.
The two subsections also treat conflicting terms differently. Subsection (3) removes them by its own text. Under subsection (2), courts divide. One view drops the discrepant terms of both offer and acceptance and fills the gap from the Code. Another keeps the offeror's terms. A third treats different terms as additional, so that materially different ones operate as proposals and the offeror's terms prevail unless it agrees, while the others become part of the contract.41 The first view finds support in a retainage dispute, where the trial court held that the different retainage terms in the offer and the acceptance cancelled out, and the appellate court rejected the offeror's argument that its own term governed because the acceptance's term was material.42