Concept
What Course of Dealing Does
Course of dealing
What Course of Dealing Does
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 223(2) gives a course of dealing three jobs: unless the parties agreed otherwise, it gives meaning to their agreement, supplements it, or qualifies it.1 For sales of goods, the Code assigns the same jobs to course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade. Each is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the agreement, each may give particular meaning to specific terms, and each may supplement or qualify the terms.2
The three verbs describe three relationships between the history and the writing. Giving meaning works on a word already in the text: the earlier dealings show what it covers. Supplementing adds a term the writing never states. Qualifying cuts back a term the writing does state, or carves an exception out of it. The same evidence can serve any of the three, and the job a party asks of it fixes the question the court must answer. A court reading a disputed word asks what the word meant to these parties. A court filling a gap asks whether the history justifies a term the writing lacks. A court asked to cut back an express term asks whether the history can be reconciled with the words the parties chose.
Two limits govern all three jobs. The opening words of § 223(2), “unless otherwise agreed,” let the parties exclude their history, and the history cannot be read to contradict an express term. Later sections develop both. The jobs come first, in order of how far each departs from the text, beginning with the one closest to ordinary interpretation.
Giving Meaning to Terms
In its first job, a course of dealing explains a word already in the writing.3 The writing is not silent here, so a court could stop at the dictionary and announce an answer, but the dictionary answer is only where interpretation begins. Words and other conduct are interpreted in light of all the circumstances, and language with a generally prevailing meaning carries that meaning unless a different intention is manifested.4 Words are never spoken in a vacuum, and to the extent their context shows what they might mean, interpretation goes beyond the language to take that context into account.5 The parties’ earlier transactions belong to that context, and they often reveal the different intention that displaces the ordinary sense. A student who answers an interpretation question from ordinary usage alone has stopped one step early.
The history carries this weight because of what interpretation seeks. Contract law protects the parties’ reasonable expectations, so the court asks what these two parties should reasonably have understood each other to mean, judging reasonableness within the framework of what each knew or should have known about the other.6 A message is construed as a whole in light of all the surrounding facts, including prior communications and transactions between the parties, and language is read in light of any prior course of dealing.7 A seller who has watched a buyer accept a product under a given label expects the label to carry the same sense in the next contract, and the buyer expects the same in return. A dictionary reading could hand one side a meaning the other had no reason to anticipate. The Code reaches the same place by defining “agreement” as the bargain the parties made in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of dealing.8 The Ninth Circuit made the point in Nanakuli: express terms do not constitute the entire agreement, which must be sought also in evidence of usages, dealings, and performance, and the purpose of that evidence is to help understand the entire agreement.9
A lease shows the same function with a different kind of word. A tenant signs a new lease that repeats a clause from the earlier lease barring “animals.” Under the earlier lease, the landlord made the tenant remove a pet duck. Both sides know how the clause worked last time, so the earlier episode is evidence that the repeated clause covers ducks, and a tenant who wanted a narrower reading this time had reason to say so.
In Grace Label, Inc. v. Kliff, the seller supplied cards that smelled, and it answered the buyer’s breach claim by offering evidence of its earlier similar transactions. That evidence showed the parties’ expectation that the seller would print the cards with the same materials it had used before, and it had.10 The court overruled the buyer’s objection, holding that the evidence explained and supplemented the written term without contradicting it.11 The earlier transactions bore directly on what materials the seller would use. The court’s own description of the evidence, explaining and supplementing, shows how the jobs in § 223(2) shade into one another, and the next subsection takes up terms the writing never states.
The Code goes further than merely allowing such evidence when the agreement is not integrated. Section 2-202 makes clear that contextual evidence of course of dealing, trade usage, or course of performance should be admitted even where the writing is intended as a final expression of agreement, because it presumes very strongly that the parties contract in light of their own and the market’s customary practices.12
Because the tractor is a good, § 2-202 lets that history in even though the writing is meant as final.13 A later section takes up how the parol evidence rule treats such evidence.
Earlier dealings do not help every time, and the reason lies in what they must show. Evidence outside the writing faces two hurdles: the judge must admit it, and then the factfinder must be persuaded that it shows what the parties agreed.14 History that clears the first hurdle can still fail the second if it tells the factfinder nothing about the term in dispute. It helps only to the extent that it shows what these words meant to these parties.15 Earlier transactions do that when they involved the same kind of term in a comparable setting.
The lumberyard history succeeds where the poultry history fails. The same label recurred in comparable orders, and the builder’s own conduct under the label answers the question now in dispute. Borrowing the poultry deals for a different bird and a different contrast would credit the parties with an understanding they never reached.
Supplementing a Silent Writing
When a writing says nothing on a point, a course of dealing may supply the missing term. Unless otherwise agreed, a course of dealing supplements the parties’ agreement,17 and the Code gives it the same power to supplement or qualify the terms.18 The question changes from what a word means to whether the agreement contains a term at all.
A writing can be silent where the bargain is not, because parties who deal repeatedly leave unwritten what they have always done between themselves. The Code accommodates this by defining an agreement as the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.19 The history belongs to the agreement, so a term it supplies is one the parties made themselves, and the court is applying their bargain. Outside the Code, many jurisdictions reach a similar place by allowing a course of dealing to be added to a writing as an additional term “if the term is not inconsistent” with the agreement. Some common-law cases still exclude such evidence unless the written contract is ambiguous or contains a gap, and the commentary calls those cases unwise.20 The consistency condition is the main limit on supplementing, and a later section takes it up.
The order puts the parties’ own conduct ahead of trade practice and trade practice ahead of a generic default. The Code builds that priority into its structure. It incorporates its gap-filling provisions into the contract absent an agreement otherwise, and its “agreement” already includes course of dealing, so a gap-filler yields whenever the history supplies the term.22 The boundary with the defaults is porous. A usage so well established that it is recognized as a gap-filler becomes part of the contract as a matter of law, not of fact, and needs no proof, while a usage short of that remains a fact for the party who invokes it to establish.23 However the term arrives, the contract must remain definite enough to enforce. The degree of certainty required varies with the subject matter and complexity of the transaction, and land contracts, which parties typically set out in specific detail, generally demand more than service contracts such as employment or construction.24
A delivery problem shows why the history comes before the default. A seller, S, agrees to sell six computers to a buyer, B, and the writing states no place of delivery. The instinct is to open the Code to its default rule on place of delivery, and that instinct skips the steps that come first. Assume one further fact: in three prior transactions involving other types of electronic equipment, S always delivered the goods to B’s place of business, and S’s employees handled installation.25 If S refuses to deliver the computers to B’s place of business, B will argue that the prior course of dealing establishes the parties’ implied intention that delivery and installation are part of the contract terms.26 The Code’s structure supports B. The defaults operate absent an agreement otherwise, and the agreement includes the course of dealing, so delivery at B’s site is an agreed term and the default never comes into play.27 The earlier deals involved different equipment, but the points now in controversy, where the goods arrive and who sets them up, recurred in each, and that recurrence makes the history relevant.
The doctrine also allocates the drafting burden. A party that wants silence to mean nothing can write a clause negating or excluding such a term. Without such a clause, courts will likely permit the parties to use course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance to establish additional terms.28
Price is the other familiar gap that history fills. Parties who intend a sale can conclude a contract even though the price is not settled, and in the cases the Code describes the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery.29 When evidence of price from course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade is sufficient, it determines the reasonable price, and it may even be said that the agreement had no gap at all. Without such evidence, which describes many and perhaps most cases, the court’s duty is to find and choose the fair market price at the time and place of delivery.30 The checklist order shows here as well: the parties’ history comes first and the default second.
Qualifying Express Terms
Qualifying is the third job: unless the parties agreed otherwise, a course of dealing may qualify their agreement.32 The writing already speaks to the point, and the history trims the term’s reach by showing that, across earlier transactions, the parties treated a stated figure or condition as something that bends. A court listens because parties write express terms against a background they share. A buyer and seller who have repeatedly adjusted stated amounts when markets moved will write the next number with that practice in mind. The same fact creates the danger. A qualifier that grows large enough swallows the term it modifies, so the law needs a line between history that trims a term and history that destroys it.
The line falls at consistency. The Code restates the well-established rule that evidence of usage of trade and course of dealing should be excluded whenever it cannot reasonably be construed as consistent with the terms of the contract.33 Nanakuli put the test as a choice: if the evidence negates the written contract, it is inadmissible, and if it merely qualifies the contract, it is admissible.34 A later case applied that test to course of performance in a contract between a well operator and a contractor, whose express term said the operator would pay the contractor. A complete negation of that term would be “operator shall not pay contractor.” A mere qualification would be “operator shall pay contractor unless operator is not himself paid by the working interest owners.”35
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co. tests the line against a stated price and quantity. When phosphate prices plunged, Columbia, the buyer, was unable to resell competitively and ordered less than one tenth of the scheduled tonnage during the first contract year. Royster sold the unaccepted phosphate below the contract price and sued for damages. Columbia offered evidence of course of dealing and trade usage, including witnesses with long experience in the trade. They would testify that, because of uncertain crop and weather conditions, farming practices, and government agricultural programs, express price and quantity terms in the mixed fertilizer industry are mere projections to be adjusted according to market forces.36
Royster answered that the evidence was inconsistent with the contract, which contains detailed provisions on base price, escalation, minimum tonnage, and delivery schedules.37 The court rejected the premise. Read together with the Virginia statute on course of dealing, the Code makes the test of admissibility not whether the contract appears on its face to be complete in every detail, but whether the proffered evidence reasonably can be construed as consistent with the express terms.38 The court found the evidence reasonably consistent with this contract for three reasons drawn from its text:
- The contract does not expressly state that course of dealing and usage of trade cannot be used to explain or supplement it.39
- The contract is silent about adjusting price and quantity in a declining market. It neither permits nor prohibits adjustment, and that neutrality is a fitting occasion for recourse to usage of trade and prior dealing.40
- The minimum tonnages are expressed in terms of “Products Supplied Under Contract,” not “Products” or “Products Purchased Under Contract,” a description consistent with the proffered testimony.41
The court spoke of supplementing and explaining the agreement, but if a factfinder credited the evidence, its work would be to cut back. The stated price and quantity would bind Columbia less rigidly than their face suggests, because the parties and their trade treated such figures as yielding to a collapse in prices. That is qualification. The result also fits the interpretive preference that, wherever reasonable, the parties’ manifestations of intention are read as consistent with each other and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.42
Other courts police the limit. A court deciding a dispute over a sale of construction materials held for the seller. It agreed that trade usage should be considered in determining what variations in specifications are acceptable, but it did not believe that § 2-202 was meant to invite a frontal assault on the essential terms of a clear and explicit contract.43 Minor disagreements about quantity and the like in such sales are often worked out through compromise and settlement, presumably the practice in the trade.44 Usage that adjusts minor variations sits comfortably beside the writing. Usage that treats a stated term as binding no one does not. Columbia’s description of stated terms as “mere projections” runs close to that second kind, and the difference between qualifying and negating is the subject of the next section.
A falling market alone does not excuse a buyer who cuts back. In requirements contracts, a court may find breach when a buyer drastically reduces requirements solely to cut losses on the very contract in question, and the Code comments call a reduction “merely to curtail loss” a failure of good faith. The same rule applies to output contracts, and the cases on buyers who switch to cheaper substitutes point in different directions depending on whether the court finds the substitute was bought in good faith.45 Columbia’s contract stated minimum tonnages, so these rules reach it only by analogy. The analogy still shows that a drop in price cannot carry the argument by itself. The history must show that stated amounts, between these parties and in this trade, were treated as adjustable.