Concept
Usage Within the Agreement
Usage of trade
Usage of Trade
Usage Within the Agreement
Section 221 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts supplies the rule that organizes this chapter: “An agreement is supplemented or qualified by a reasonable usage with respect to agreements of the same type if each party knows or has reason to know of the usage and neither party knows or has reason to know that the other party has an intention inconsistent with the usage.”1 The sentence sets three conditions:
- The usage is reasonable and belongs to agreements of the same type as the one in dispute.
- Each party knows or has reason to know of the usage, so actual knowledge is not required when the party has reason to know.
- Neither party knows or has reason to know that the other intends something inconsistent with the usage.
When all three are met, the usage does one of two jobs. It supplements the agreement by adding a term the writing never states, which the Restatement comments describe as “a term that is consistent with the agreement,”2 or it qualifies a term the writing does state. The UCC treats usage of trade the same way: a usage in the vocation or trade in which the parties are engaged, or of which they are or should be aware, may supplement or qualify the terms of the agreement.3 Restatement § 222 adds that, unless the parties agree otherwise, such a usage gives meaning to, supplements, or qualifies their agreement, and that the existence and scope of a usage are questions of fact.4
A usage reaches the agreement because the agreement is larger than the writing. The UCC defines “agreement” as the parties’ actual bargain, found in their language or implied from the circumstances, including course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance.5 The word is broader than “written contract” and takes in trade usage in the parties’ industry.6 Nanakuli Paving & Rock Sales, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co. states the consequence directly. A commercial agreement is broader than the written paper, and its meaning is determined not only by the contract’s language but “by their action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances.” The commercial context, the court said, “may explain and supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.”7
Nanakuli applies the rule to a term that looks airtight. The express term was the seller’s posted price at delivery, which on its face leaves no room for protection against a price rise. The court held that a trade usage of price-protecting pavers on work already committed at non-escalating prices could reasonably be construed as consistent with that term. Its reasoning began with the premise that the agreement is broader than the express terms and includes usages, which may even add terms, and that the commercial background they supply is vital to understanding the agreement. A court therefore proceeds on the assumption that the parties included the usages unless they cannot reasonably be construed as consistent with the express terms.8 The posted-price term and the protection practice could sit side by side, so the usage became part of the deal.
A party who had no way of knowing about a practice presents the opposite case. Walls v. Bailey reasoned that a usage is engrafted on a contract on the assumption that the parties contracted in reference to it, and that intention cannot run toward a practice unless knowledge of it guides the parties. A party sought to be bound by a local or trade usage must therefore be shown to have had knowledge or notice of it, and the usage must be so well settled, so uniformly acted upon, and so long continued that it raises a fair presumption that both parties knew of it.9 Without that showing, the assumption that justifies adding the usage has no footing. The two decisions guard different conditions. Nanakuli asks whether a usage can coexist with an express term, and Walls asks whether the party can fairly be bound by the usage at all.
Usage has two close neighbors, and the way to keep them apart is to ask whose practice is in play. The UCC speaks of a course of performance or course of dealing “between the parties,” while a usage of trade belongs to the “vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware.”10 It defines a usage of trade as any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.11 The evidence for a usage therefore comes from the community around the parties, not from their own history together.
Usage is also a practice in fact. A standard legal dictionary quotes the point this way: “usage is not in itself a legal rule but merely habit or practice in fact.” Its existence and scope are questions of fact, except that when the usage is embodied in a written trade code, the court interprets the writing as a question of law.12 One exception follows from the fact-law line. A usage so well established that it has reached the point of being recognized as a gap filler becomes part of the contract as a matter of law, not of fact, and no evidence is needed to establish it.13 The comments to § 221 draw a related line on reasonableness: it is treated as part of the meaning of the agreement, not as a factor in enforcement under § 204.14
The rest of the chapter takes § 221 apart in the order the rule states it. The next section separates the two effects, supplementing and qualifying, and asks how far a usage may add to or cut back a written term. The sections after that ask what counts as a usage (regular observance, reasonableness, the trade whose practice matters) and how a usage is proved. They then turn to the knowledge condition, which applies differently to members of a trade and to outsiders, and to the limit that a known contrary intention or a clear exclusion places on an otherwise valid usage. The last section explains how usage evidence reaches a court when the contract is in writing.